Iraq is the Key to Resolving Unrests in Syria

When we talk of widespread unrest in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, we must not dismiss Iraq after US troop withdrawal in December 2011. The Obama administration failed to found a sound partnership with Iraq, which led to resurgence of Al Qaeda and growing sectarian violence there. Furthermore, worsening security in Iraq inflicts tremendous negative impacts on Syria. Sunni extremists from Iraq join the civil war, and Iran uses Iraqi air space to support the Assad administration. Moreover, Iraq experiences pose psychological constraints to R2P intervention in Syria. Therefore, it is necessary to assess security in Iraq after US withdrawal and its spill over effect in the neighborhood, including Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

To begin with, we must understand the overview of security in current Iraq. The public in the United States and the most of the world regards that the war in Iraq is over, but Senator John McCain endorses deep engagement with Iraq after December 2011. Retired General Jack Keane of the US Army and Director of the Critical Threat Project Frederick Kagan at the American Enterprise Institute, both of who are the architects of successful surge to defeat insurgents in Iraq, explored strategic implications of the unrest in Iraq along with Senator McCain. Let me mention their panel discussion at the AEI on March 19. See the video below.




 In this panel, Senator John McCain, Retired General Jack Keane, and Director of the Critical Threat Project at AEI Frederick Kagan, assessed security in Iraq. The three panelists are top architects of the Iraq War and the surge to defeat insurgents, and they stress that Iraq policy must be beyond the partisan storm in a tea cup. While the public regards the war in Iraq is over after the withdrawal in December 2011, sectarian conflicts still continue there. In view of this, the three panelists argue that policymakers must learn lessons from Iraq and define the role of the united States.

For the lesson, we must understand that current turmoil in Iraq is a consequence of poor security coordination under the Obama administration. When the Bush administration signed the security pact with Iraq in 2008, the Maliki administration was ready to accommodate US 20,000 troops. However, quoting a comment by General Martin Dempsey, McCain said that the Obama administration “cascaded down” the troop level to 3,000, and such tiny scale was no worth for Iraq to maintain security. The problem is not just total pullout of US forces. The Los Angels Times reports poor contacts between Iraqi tribal leaders and US troops in the Gulf area allows the rise of sectarian violence and penetration of Iranian influence (“Ten years after Iraq war began, Iran reaps the gains”; Los Angels Times; March 28, 2013). The United States failed to show enduring will to defeat insurgents, and that has invigorated the enemy. Successful intelligence against the enemy is another lesson to be learnt from Iraq. Misinformation about Saddam’s nuclear weapons gives rise to psychological hesitation for active intervention, and helps widespread annoyance of war grow among the public.

As to the role of the United States, Keane pointed out that the Obama administration failed to respond to the Arab Spring, unlike in past historical cases like the collapse of the Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein’s invasion to Kuwait, undermines American leadership in the Middle East. Quite devastatingly, Iraq has become Al Qaeda’s new safe haven and Iran’s pathway to provide chemical weapons for Syria. Those weapons can be handed to extremists like Hezbollah from Assad. The spillover effect of Iraq so great that it is necessary to assess how much reliable Baghdad is as an ally of the United States.

The most critical issue to Iraq’s neighborhood is Iranian military aid to Syria through Iraqi air space. When Secretary of State John Kerry met Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to stop arms supply from Iran on March 24, he was simply frustrated because the Iraqi side was not so cooperative (“10 years after Saddam, is Iraq a U.S. ally?”; Foreign Policy—Passport; April 9, 2013). This is primarily due to insufficient armament and training of the Iraqi security forces. Former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker comments that the Obama administration’s precipitous pullout has ruined achievements made by the surge from 2007 to 2008, and Al Qaeda has come back to refound their bases in Iraq. Crocker says the clash in Hawija near Kirkuk on April 23 this year very illustrative, because Sunni protesters harbored insurgents against the security forces. Some Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq like Jabhat al-Nusra, send combatants to Syria to prevail extremist influence among the rebel (“Iraq on the brink, again”; Washington Post; May 1, 2013).

The number of casualties rose dramatically since then. Emma Sky, Political Advisor to General Ray Odierno of the US Army, says similarly “Driven by an imperative to end the war, the U.S. strategy for Iraq became lost in the transition as America disengaged rather than changing the basis of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship to a nonmilitary one,” in a commentary piece for the Center for a New American Security (“Iraq’s Sectarian Violence: Bombings Plunge Country Into Deadly Spiral”; Time; May 21, 2013). In July, the death toll number exceeded 1,000, which I the highest record since 2008 (“Over 1,000 Iraqis killed in July, highest monthly toll since 2008: U.N.”; Reuters; August 1, 2013). See the table below.

As Hezbollah does in Lebanon, a Shiite power broker Abu Mehdi Mohandis acts to help Iranian influence grow in Iraq. A proxy like him raises critical concerns among Iraqi politicians and Western diplomats (“Ten years after Iraq war began, Iran reaps the gains; Los Angels Times; March 28, 2013). For Iran, Syria has been the only consistent ally since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Most of the Iran’s Arab neighbors supported Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the Iran Iraq War, for fear of Shiite revolution expansionism. Iran gives military and financial aid to Syria, including chemical weapons program, because Iran needs an ally along with Hezbollah to resist the United States and Israel, according to Karim Sadjapour, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (“Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria”; Combatting Terrorism Center; august 27, 2013). Considering such indispensable strategic interest, there is every reason for Iran to conspire unrest in Iraq to maintain the passage for Syria.

A destabilized Iraq poses spillover effect to another big neighbor Saudi Arabia. Domestic sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites are brought to Saudi Arabia. Economic inequalities intensify Sunni-Shiite clashes in Saudi Arabia. Shiites reside in oil rich Gulf areas, rather than in urban areas like Riyadh and Jeddah. However, they are marginalized to live in mud brick houses, while oil companies earn petro-dollars. Quite alarmingly, Shiites are more loyal to their religious leaders than to the state of their citizenship (“Iraq conflict reignites sectarian rivalry in Saudi Arabia”; Baltimore Sun; April 27, 2013). This implies that insecurity in Iraq can prevail throughout the region, and the rise of extremist populism as seen in Egypt can augment the crisis furthermore. The Geostrategic importance of Iraq must be understood from historical perspectives. Abbasid caliph al Mansur moved the capital to Bagdad in 762 to expand the sphere to Iran and the Mediterranean area, while maintaining contacts with the Arabian Peninsula.

In order to improve security in Iraq, Former Ambassador Crocker suggests that the United States strengthen the leverage on Iraq through providing training and armaments to the Iraqi security forces, and facilitate secretarial level communications based on the Strategic Framework Agreement between both countries. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari visited Washington mid August in view of the worst death toll record since 2008 in July, and said “There is greater realization in the Iraq government that we should not shy away from coming and asking for some help and assistance”. He is critically concerned that Sunni terrorists from Iraq join the rebel to fight against Allawite Assad regime (“Iraq seeks help from U.S. amid growing violence”; Military Times; August 16, 2013).

The experience in Iraq has made the global public reluctant to intervene Syria. In an interview with BBC, Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair comments that the Commons vote against the attack to Syria gave a blow to the alliance with the United States and R2P mission in the face of mass murder with chemical weapons by the Assad regime. Unlike Iraq, the use of chemical weapon is apparent in the case of Syria. Therefore, Blair focuses on the problem of extremist participation as he talks about psychological hurdles for intervention (“Tony Blair: Iraq War made UK 'hesitant' over Syria intervention”; BBC News; 6 September 2013). Actually, war opponents in the US Republican Party are extremely concerned that Obama’s attack against Assad will help extremists rather than pro-Western freedom fighters. The rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt startled conservative citizens in the West as Morsi enacted the Sharia law.


 


Regarding the Iraq effect on Syria, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfovitz also says the use of chemical weapons is apparent in Anderson Cooper 360 of CNN on September 4. He advocated that America act in accordance with the Reagan Doctrine to assist those who are fighting for the American side, and help their endeavor by arming them. Wolfovitz says that “boots on the ground” is not necessary in Syria, in reply to war annoying public opinion. Quite importantly, he said that the United States should have responded to Saddam’s repression against the Kurds shortly after his loss in the Gulf War. This is a critical point to think of the moral case for American interventionism. See the above video.

When we talk of the risk of intervention in global crises, we must also consider the risk of non -intervention. Obama’s disengagement policy in Iraq worsens the civil war in Syria and political transition in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. Considering the geostrategic position, stability in Iraq is the key to the war in Syria, democracy promotion after the Arab Spring, and American preeminence in the Middle East. Furthermore, comprehensive Middle East strategy is necessary, rather than acting on stopgap and country specific basis.

Britain’s Major Power Suicide on Syria in the House

In face of chemical attack to noncombatant citizens in Syria, British Prime Minister David Cameron proposed a resolution to protect them to the UN Security Council (“Syria crisis: UK puts forward UN proposal”; BBC News; 28 August, 2013). However, as a result of the revolt by Tory rivals and backbenchers (“Dozens of Conservative MPs defied David Cameron over Syria”; daily Telegraph; 30 August 2013), the Cameron administration lost the vote on military intervention in Syria at the House of Commons by 285 to 272 (“UK's Cameron loses parliamentary vote on Syria action; Reuters; August 29, 2013).

As widely argued, Iraq experience casted a shadow on Syria. Also, I have to mention psychological gaps between cabinet and party executives who believe in Britain’s burden as a major power, and non executive MPs who regard domestic accountability and much more important than national power and prestige on the global stage. Let me talk about it briefly. In an interview with the Daily Telegraph, Prime Minister Cameron and Lord Paddy Ashdown who chairs Liberal Democrats General Election Team worry that the House vote precluded Britain from harnessing the world’s 4th largest military power in such an international crisis, which will diminish its global influence. On the other hand, Labour leader Ed Miliband said that Britain adopt nonmilitary measures to pressure the Assad administration to abide by international norms. See the videos below.


Prime Minister Cameron


Lord Ashdown


Labour Leader Ed Miliband


Cameron blamed Miliband for siding with Russia and ruining the alliance with the United States. Though Cameron stressed that Britain explore to bring maximum pressure on Syria through international organizations (“David Cameron accused Ed Miliband of 'siding with Russia' over Syria”; Guardian; 30 August, 2013), the rise of isolationism within the Conservative Party makes Britain reluctant to overseas engagement, which pleases authoritarian opponents like Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin (“Britain and Syria”; Economist; August 30, 2013). Lord Paddy Ashdown laments that their defiance to Tory leadership has isolated Britain from both the United States and Europe.

Prior to the vote in the Commons, the British government issued a report on chemical weapons use in Syria, in order to assume the burden to stop proliferation of such destructive arsenals from Syria. Isolationist Tories rejected Cameron’ moral case for military intervention (“The heir to Blair: PM makes 'moral case' for attack on Syria”; Independent; 28 August 2013). By refusing to assume a special role as a major Western democracy and simply shaming the incumbent administration, what sort of Britain do they want?

How Can Japan Make Its Voice Heard More in American Foreign Policy?

Japan is a country prospering in a world of Pax Americana, because Japan itself was remade into a liberal democracy by America. Nationalists should bear it in mind, in recent debates for constitutional reform, before complaining US made postwar constitution. Blaming America will dismantle the safety net for Japan’s security and global standing. Therefore, it is Japan’s foremost priority to make its voice heard among foreign policymakers in the United States, whether in a unipolar or a multipolar world.

Since foreign policy is primarily arranging state to state relations, the Abe administration is right to improve relations with the Obama administration, which was shattered by the Hatoyama administration. Some people mention philosophical gaps between supposedly nationalist Abe and liberal or even “post-American” Obama. However, enduring alliances in history have overcome such differences. This is typically seen in Britain’s special relationship with the United States. It has been a foreign policy priority for Britain to keep a staunch alliance with America to boost its global standing, regardless of ideology of the incumbent administration, as in the case of Democrat Kennedy and Conservative MacMillan, Republican Bush and Labour Blair. But that is not enough to maximize Japan’s influence on US policymaking.

For fear of Chinese and Korean lobbies, with the background of the rise of Asian American population, Japanese people insist on strengthening counter lobbying against their aggressive penetration to the American political corridor. Congressman Mike Honda’s “notorious” resolution to blame Japan for Korean wartime sex slaves inflicted deep psychological scars among the Japanese public. Therefore, such sentiments are understandable, but lobbying to serve specific country’s interests will make Americans increasingly suspicious and vigilant. Remember vehement hostility to the Japanese lobby among the American grassroots in the 1980s when a Japanese company bought the Rockefeller Center. Excessive dependence on the “Japan lobby” or the “Japan handlers” does not necessarily advance Japan’s national interest.

Rather, I would argue that Japan appeal common interests with US global strategy. Despite post-American thinking of the Obama administration and isolationist mindset among small government Republicans, we have to notice backlashes of internationalists among American foreign policymakers. They are much better partners for Japan than dubious “Japan Lobby”. In order to explore close relations with internationalists in Washington, the Japanese side must be more broad-sighted and globally-oriented. Let me mention a typical case. The Japanese public welcomed naïvely when the Obama announced the pivot to Asia. In reality, it was just a scale down of US military presence in the Middle East, as seen in the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, as MackenzieEaglen, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, frequently points out that American military presence has not strengthened sufficiently tocounter China, North Korea and so forth.

When Secretary of State John Kerry visitedEast Asia this April, it was global interventionists who demanded him not toappease China with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict over the East China Sea. Eight Republican senators, including John McCain, Lindsey Graham, Marco Rubio, and so forth sent an open letter to Secretary Kerry to remind the amendment of the National Defense Authorization Act by Democrat Senator Jim Webb and Independent Senator Joseph Lieberman (Senate Approves Webb Amendment to Reaffirm US Commitment to Japan on the Senkaku Islands; Pacific News Center; 30 November 2012) to articulate US obligation to defend Japan, in case of the Chinese invasion to the Senkaku Islands. Therefore, the reminder to Secretary Kerry is beyond partisan politics. Also, most of them are critical to Obama’s Middle East policy as a superpower suicide. It is neither regional balance of American strategy nor America’s attention to Japan that matters. It is the will of assuming the burden of Pax Americana that really serves the interests of Japan and the rest of the world. Most importantly, 9-11 terrorist attacks have made it clear that commitment to Pax Americana is the vital interest for the United States itself. True partnership is mutually beneficial. This shall never be achieved through the channel of dubious “Japan Lobby”.

Fortunately, there are some initiatives by globalists in the United States. A joint project called “Defending Defense” was found by the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Foreign Policy Initiative. This project explores how to maintain American defense capability both in terms of quality and quantity in an era of fiscal austerity as typically seen in sequestration. More importantly, political heavyweights are launching initiatives to overturn the post-Americanism and isolationism. Former Democrat Senator Joseph Lieberman andformer Republican Senator Jon Kyl founded the American Internationalism Project in the AEI. The objective of this project is not to act receptively to multiplied threats, including terrorism, Chinese expansionism, nuclear proliferation, and so forth. More affirmatively, the Internationalism Project advocates US commitment to build a world based on American ideal of liberal values. Whether liberal or conservative, there are numerous American think tanks and civic organizations that advocate US commitment to world peace and prosperity. The focal point is that venerable and influential politicians take leadership to override fiscal constraints, psychological fatigue with overseas intervention, and isolationism. Japan’s national interests must be closely assosiated with those of such far-sighted people.

Of course, it is also important to promote Japan’s interests through specific lobbying channels. In this case, Japan must find allies for specific objectives, among ethnic, religious, industrial, or any other kind of groups in the United States. Successful alliance with those groups will help Japanese influence advance, and make it taken positively among the American public. For example, pro-Israel lobby is an alliance of Jewish and evangelists. Fear of Arab terrorists is widespread among the American public, and particularly in both groups. Sharing common awareness, Jewish and evangelists are strongly united to make their voices heard in American public opinion. Similarly, Koreans and Armenians formed a solid alliance to build a comfort woman statue in Glendale, California. Koreans and Armenians have common historical perception that they were repressed by Japan and Turkey respectively (“Glendale approves Korean 'comfort woman' statue despite protest”; Los AngelsTimes; July 10, 2013). For Japan, Indian Americans may be a potential ally against Chinese influence, because Indians and Chinese compete high skill brain jobs. Also, their home countries are geopolitical rivals each other.

What I mentioned here are not the only way to maximize Japan’s voice in the American political corridors. In any case, whether to take a broadly based globalist approach or narrowly focused specific alliance approach, excessive dependence on the Japanese connection shall not expand Japanese influence. America’s primary allies such as Britain and Israel use various channels, and they combine those methods. As other state and non-state actors upgrade their approaches to the United States, Japan needs to do so accordingly.

The Threat of Islam Extremists is beyond the Occident

Remember the Algerian hostage crisis in InAmenas early this year. An Al Qaeda affiliate led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar killed more Japanese and Asians than Americans and Europeans working at the natural gas joint venture site. This incident is symbolic to show that Islamic extremists are enemy to anyone beyond Christians and Jews. The threat of radical Islamists is universal. In high school and college world history textbooks, the authors focus primarily on the Islam-West clash as typically seen in the Crusade. Throughout the history, Islam and the West frequently antagonized each other in the Battle of Tours, the Reconquista of Iberia, the Fall of Constantinople, and the Siege of Vienna. Furthermore, 19th century colonialism has led to the spread of anti-Western sentiments in the Islamic world.

In view of long and bitter Islam-West conflicts, it is widely believed that Middle East Muslims hate Americans and Europeans, but not Japanese and Asians. This is a sheer myth as shown in the In Amenas massacre. In the eyes of radicals like Belmokhtar, any non-Muslim outsiders are kaffir aliens. Moreover, from a literal understanding of the Koran, most of the Japanese and Asians are more pagan to Musulims than Judeo-Christian Americans and Europeans, as both are not people of the Book. For example, many Japanese were brutally killed by Islamic extremists, even though they were not acting with Americans or Europeans, nor were they associated with Christianity, when they were attacked. The most noticeable case is the shooting of Japanese diplomats, in which Counselor to Britain Katsuhiko Oku and Third Secretary to Iraq Masamori Inouewere shot dead near Tiktit, shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

For further understanding of the threat of Islamic extremism, let me review Oriental history. Islam fought against kaffir civilizations other than the West. The most noticeable one is the destruction of Buddhist holy land in India. It is commonly understood that resurgence of Vedism as Hinduism among Indian rulers and grassroots drove Buddhism to fall. When Chinese (Tang) Buddhist monk Xuanzang stayed in India to study Buddhism philosophy under the reign of Emperor Harsha Vardana in the 7th century, Buddhism was already in decline. However, it isIslamic radicals who vandalized and delivered the final blow to IndianBuddhism.

Islamic invasion to India was intensified by the Ghaznavid Empire in the 11th century, which led to Islamification of the subcontinent and iconoclastic assault to Buddhist civilization. The most fatal raids were the destruction of venerable institutions of Buddhist intellect, including Nalanda University (where Xuanzang studied Buddhism philosophy andSanskrit) in 1193 and Vikramasila University in 1203 by Muhammad BakhtiyarKhilji during the Ghorid rule. Coincidentally, it was after 1,500 years since Gautama Siddhartha expired when the Latter Day of the Law begins, according to Buddhist theory in the early Middle Age. In this concept, the Latter Day, people respect Buddha’s teachings, but no longer follow them, which leads to the end of Buddhism and social disorder. It is the iron fist of Islam that devastated Buddhism and brought the Latter Day to the real world in India.

Strangely, unlike European knights, Buddhist kings and lords in Asia hardly thought of recapturing Siddhartha’s birthplace and other holy lands in India from Muslim seizure. This is partly because there were neither the pope of the Roman Catholic nor the Byzantine emperor of the Eastern Orthodox to urge kings and lords to organize a multinational coalition for religious cause in the Buddhist sphere. However the notion of theLatter Day of the Law spread among Buddhist nations across East Asia. The Latter Day theory had significant effects on the Buddhist thoughts in those nations.

In Japan, the impact was not just religious but political. It was widespread of anxiety to social disorder that led to the rise of samurais. War lords like Taira no Kiyomori and Minamoto no Yoritomo took over power from the emperor and aristocrats when Islamic warriors were expanding their dominions in India. Therefore, I would like to stress the point of my argument again that it is too dangerous to trivialize the threat of Islamic extremists only for Americans and Europeans, considering the above mentioned history. European launched the Crusade but Asians didn’t. That does not belittle the danger of radical Muslims.

Now, I would like to discuss the peril of Islamic radicalism in presentday context. Taliban is notorious for iconoclastic ravage to bomb the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001. Having been detained for several years in Guantánamo, Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef published a memoir “My Life with Taliban” in the United States in 2010. According to his book, Japan sent an official delegation that accompanied a Sri Lankan Buddhist group to stop Taliban from devastating the Buddhas. The Japanese delegation even said that they respect Afghans as forefathers of Buddhist civilization, and requested them to preserve these venerable cultural heritages.

In reply, Zaeef told the Japanese delegation bluntly to convert to Islam if they respect Afghans as their forefathers (“Japan offered to hide Bamiyan statues, butTaliban asked Japan to convert to Islam instead”; Japan Today/AFP; February 27,2010). The Japanese are too naïve, and liable to believe that Islam fanatics do not hate us while they do Americans and Europeans. But for extremists like Taliban and Al Qaeda, kaffirs are kaffirs.

In view of such intolerance to other religion and civilization, American conservatives and Indian policymakers are extremely skeptic to the Good Taliban Theory. Indians are highly alert to Pakistan’s ties with Taliban and still resented with the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008. In addition, it is quite likely that their historical experience of Islamic invasion to the subcontinent has inflicted psychological impacts on their attitude to extremists. In 2010, MP (Lower House) Manish Tewari, then-Spokesman of the Indian National Congress (INC), stated clearly that he did not believe in good Taliban as two Sikhs were beheaded by them (“There is no good Taliban: Congress”; Economic Times; February 23, 2010).

Despite the request from the Obama administration, India is still concerned with giving legitimacy to Taliban if they are included in Afghan peace talks. After the meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry in Delhi this June (“India's concerns over talks with Talibanwon't be overlooked”; New Indian Express; 24 June, 2013), Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said that the Singh administration would accept Taliban’s participation in Afghan peace talks as long as India’s red line is respected at he ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei early July ("In change ofstance, India supports talks with Taliban"; Times of India; July 3, 2013). The red line is that the only legitimate government to represent Afghan sovereignty is democratically elected Karzai administration, not Taliban ("India's redline for Afghanistan Taliban"; Frontliner India; June 23, 2013).

However, oppositions like BJP criticize the idea of talking with terrorists (“BJP cautions US against peace talks withTaliban.”; Indian Express; July 24, 2013). Apparently, Indians are more sensitive to the danger posed by Islamic terrorists than Americans and Europeans. In his recent visit to Mumbai, Vice President Joseph Biden articulated that Taliban must cut ties with Al Qaeda, in order to ease anxieties of India. However, Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, comments that Biden must assure that the United States will not make a secret deal with Taliban after 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan (“Biden seeks to assure India onAfghanistan, presses on trade” Reuters; July 24, 2013).

In view of history and present day international politics, we must change commonly believed perception that the threat of Islamic extremism is for Americans and Europeans only.  Once I heard a Japanese TV anchorman suggested that Japanese people stay away from Americans to travel safely when they go to the Middle East. I have no doubt that Indians will laugh scornfully at such a poorly aware remark. They have historical experience in the horror of Islamic extremists, which is deeply embedded in their minds, and no less catastrophic than 911 terrorist attacks. Those religious fanatics are utterly merciless to kaffirs regardless of race and nationality. Remember In Amenas!

The Failure of Morsi and Its Impact on Turkey

The fall of President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt inflicts serious damages to those who advocate democratic Islamism. The Arab Spring gave rise to them. Democratic Islamism is nothing new as AKP (Justice and Development Party) took office in Turkey long before the Spring. However, the coup d'état in Egypt has curbed the momentum for Islamic populism. Particularly, Turkish AKP’s vision of Islamist democracy was severely hit. Trends in both countries lead to the decline of Islamic populism in the Middle East. That is the vital reason why I am exploring the implications of anti-Morsi coup in Egypt to Turkey. Therefore, I would like to argue two points. First, why did the Morsi administration fail to govern Egypt? Second, what are the implications for Turkey and others who aspire Islamist democracy?

Morsi succeeded in toppling the long rule of police state under the Nasser, the Sadat, and the Mubarak administrations, since the 1952 revolution. However, Michael Hirsh, Chief Correspondent for National Journal, comments "Once again, an Islamist political party in charge has failed the simple test of finding its way into the modern world. Ideology trumped reality in an era when the reality of the global economy demands fast integration, openness, and adherence to basic economic principles." Islamists seize the power through the vote, but failed to govern the state. Iranians selected the most moderate Hassan Rowhani in the last presidential election because the Shiite theocracy has worsened Iran's economy and international position since 1979 . Other extremists like Hamas also have difficulties to govern the Gaza Strip. In Turkey, the Erdoğan administration faces civic protests, though the economy goes well (“AfterA Rapid Rise, A Challenge To Political Islam”; NPR News; July 6, 2013).

The Muslim Brotherhood may have won the election, but they are political amateurs. Kori Schake, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, comments that in a society after the collapse of an authoritarian regime, incapable groups often take power, and they have little experience of building a national consensus (“American Freedom and Egypt's Coup”;Foreign Policy – Shadow Government; July 3, 2013). Nathan Brown, Nonresident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues furthermore that the Morsi administration failed to make coalition with other political parties. They clung to their own ideology rather than managing realities, and ruined opportunities for partnership with potential allies. The Muslim Brotherhood made bad decisions to become a dominant political party rather than a leading political organization. As a result, Morsi was distrusted, or even hated among the Egyptian public. The Muslim Brotherhood was overconfident to govern the state despite their lack of experience, simply because they won the election (“Where Does the Muslim Brotherhood Go From Here?”; New Republic; July3, 2013). This lesson for Islamists, mentioned by Brown, sounds somewhat identical to the Seiken Koutai (power rotation) of 2009 by the Democratic Party of Japan, which resulted in miserable failure to govern the state.

Regretfully, Morsi became an elected dictator as he despised consultation and public consensus, both of which are important aspects of democracy. Democracy is composed of human rights, the rule of law, and public participation; and election is just one of those components (“Whencoups advance democracy”; New York Daily News; July 7, 2013). Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, comments that the Muslim Brotherhood was measles for Egypt. Morsi imposed religion, and did not improve the economy, though that was the vital issue for the Egyptian people. But the Brotherhood’s secret cell structure is still formidable enough to plot possible terrorism. See the video below.

Then, let me discuss the second question, which is the implication for Turkey. Since the inauguration of Mohamed Morse in 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan founded a strong tie with Egypt to prevail the vision of a "more democratic and more Islamist-leaning Middle East". As a consequence of the coup d'état, Turkey has become isolated in this region. The war in Syria intensifies tensions with the Assad administration. Also, relations with pro-Assad Iran are aggravated. The Kurdish problem worsens the relationship with Iraq. Moreover, Turkey itself has repeated coup d'état in the postwar era when civilian rule does not work (“Egypt’scoup is a serious blow to Turkey’s vision of a more democratic Middle East”;Financial Times; July 4, 2013).

The military backlash against Morsi poses critical impacts on Turkey’s domestic politics as well. The Turkish government toughens law enforcement against street protesters in the wake of Egyptian coup. The Turkish judiciary also calls for universal jurisdiction against the Egyptian army’s human rights abuse, associated with the coup. However, the West was concerned with Morsi’s poor governance capacity, and takes equivocal attitude to the coup d'état. In the eyes of Turkey, that appears a double standard, and Turkish people even talk about a Western conspiracy to oust Morsi. As a result, Turkey’s relations with the West are cooling down (“Egypt coup rattles Turkey’s Erdogan”;Financial Times; July 11, 2013). Currently, AKP’s Turkey is isolated from both the West and Middle East neighbors. Things are developing opposite to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s blueprint of a Turkey at the heart of the Afro-Eurasian sphere.

Whether in Egypt, Turkey, or any other countries in the Middle East, the Islamist paradoxes are witnessed, that is, they took power by popular vote but betrayed democracy. It is poor governance capabilities of non-the military government that allowed repeated coup d'états both in Egypt and Turkey. Even though the coup saved Egypt from falling into a failed state, such dependence on military coup d'état stalls the progress toward real democracy and good governance.

How should the global community respond to such vicious cycles of failed civilian rule and military dictatorship?Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, mentions that the fact that the military can dispose an elected government so easily implies that the real and long lasting power lies in the armed forces. If the military depose a democratically elected government, it can depose another. In order to stop such a cycle, Kagan insists that the United States send a message to the interim government to urge early transition to democracy, including aid suspension (“Time to break out of a rut in Egypt”; WashingtonPost; July 6, 2013). Once Kagan’s prescription works to end military rule, the United States and the global community can use soft power, primarily by empowering the grassroots to promote well-aware policy debates.

Like Egypt, Turkey has also had coup d'états in its postwar history. However, Turkey’s AKP is more experienced and competent to govern the state than the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In addition, thanks to a good economy, the wealthy establishment give some support, though they detest Islamic populism. Despite Islamist backgrounds, Erdoğan’s AKP tries to associate itself with European conservatives like Christian Democrats. Though the Erdoğan cabinet takes strong stances against civic unrest, the EU's Copenhagen Criteria on humanrights and the rule of law will deter radicalization of AKP and human rights abuse. When those built-in-stabilizers do not work, and the military do not tolerate instability, Turkey may fall into another Egypt. If that happens, every effort for Middle East democracy up to the present will fall back. This is a tremendous disadvantage in the War on Terror. Therefore, the United States and the global community must endorse smooth and quick transition to democracy in Cairo.