Geopolitics and values behind King Charles III`s state visit to Trump’s America for the 250th anniversary

I have been watching Britain’s tightrope diplomacy between Trump’s America and Europe since last May. UK-US relations in Trump 2.0 started relatively friendly, but as the trans-Atlantic chasm grows due to the Donroe doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the special relationship is critically questioned now. The British Royal Family is visiting Trump’s America in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, when intergovernmental relations are in discord. And ironically, Donald Trump is the most unconstitutional president in history, as shown in National Guard and ICE deployment in Blue States, and tariff diplomacy, which are completely incompatible with the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Despite such controversies, King Charles III and Queen Camilla are scheduled to visit from April 27 to 30, and subsequently, the Prince and Princess of Wales are expected to visit in June or July.

1. [Britain’s royal diplomacy in America]
Prior to talking about current bilateral relations, let me mention the history of the royal family and the American people. The Boston Tea Party, which led to the American Revolutionary War, was not a protest against the British monarchy originally, but an appeal for the rights as Englishmen as declared “no taxation, without representation”. In the early days, newly independent America was anti-British, but as its democracy matured, its border dispute with Canada was settled, and its internationalism rose towards the new century, the Anglo-American relationship gradually developed into the special relationship of the latter days. Ever since the future Edward VII visited the United States as a prince in 1860, royal visits were very helpful in nurturing a favorable image of Britain among the American public. In 1939, when World War II was almost breaking out, George VI and the future Queen Mother Elizabeth met President Franklin Roosevelt to mitigate the epidemic of America First isolationism among American citizens.

Most importantly, Elizabeth II and Prince Phillip visited the United States in 1957 on the occasion of the 350th anniversary of the English settlement in Jamestown, to heal ruptured Anglo-American relations by the Suez Crisis. However, will King Charles and Prince William foster a friendship between the two countries? Remember, President Donald Trump mocked Prime Minister Keir Starmer during the Iran war. Trump called independently deployed Royal Navy aircraft carriers in the East Mediterranean toys, and denounced Starmer as a coward because he did not give complete permission for the USAF to use RAF air bases. (1) Ultimately, would the king give credit to Trump’s right-wing populism? To answer those questions, let me talk about British diplomacy with Trump’s America in his second term.

2. [The special relationship with America in Trump 2.0]
It was Britain’s imperative to stabilize the special relationship with the United States, no matter how disruptive the incoming president was, and repair the damage of Brexit in Europe, while the Russian invasion of Ukraine poses critical threats to the Euro-Atlantic sphere. In such a trans-Atlantic security environment, the Starmer administration was inaugurated shortly before Donald Trump was reelected. When Trump’s second term started, Britain reached relatively favorable agreements, compared with the EU and Japan. Notorious Trump tariffs were lower, and a huge US investment in the UK tech industry was agreed through the TPD (Technology Prosperity Deal). Furthermore, the invitation to the royal dinner at Buckingham Palace satisfied Trump’s childish vanity. It appeared that Starmer managed to stabilize the relationship with Trump’s America.

However, towards the end of the last year, Trump resorted to assaults on NATO allies increasingly, such as claiming annexation of Canada and Greenland, raising tariffs furthermore, and withdrawing support for Ukraine. The regime ousting of Venezuela was done almost effortlessly, and Starmer embraced the consequence. But he suspended intelligence sharing with the United States, because global concerns were raised about the legality of US attacks on a Venezuelan drug smuggling boat in the Caribbean Sea, where Britain and other European nations have overseas territories. (2) And then, the war in Iran inflicted a fatal blow on UK-US relations. Globally, Trump’s attack on Iran is criticized for a lack of international legal grounds, poorly defined strategic goals of the war, Israeli influence on American decision-making, and so forth.

Along with problems such as asymmetric warfare, energy price, and the Hormuz Strait, Peter Ricketts, who served as the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Blair administration and the National Security Advisor of the Cameron administration, comments that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to eliminate the threats of Iran and its proxies for the legislative elections by late this October. (3) Meanwhile, Trump’s first-term National Security Advisor John Bolton says that Trump wanted a quick and efficient war against Iran as he did in Venezuela for the midterm elections this November. (4) Though both leaders do not share the same intention, we have to remember that they are quite election-oriented.

From British perspectives, Trump’s war against Iran is disrespectful to postwar Anglo-American relations. Jean-Marc Vigilant at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) contrasts British and French trans-Atlantic strategy after the Suez Crisis. In order to avoid an unexpected clash. Britain stepped toward close strategic contacts with the United States to have some influence on its decision-making and keep its military presence in Europe. On the other hand, France sought strategic autonomy from the United States by developing its sovereign and independent nuclear weapons and withdrawing from NATO's integrated military command. (5) In the Gulf War by George H. W. Bush and the Iraq War by George W. Bush, Britain was in strategic contact with America. But in the Iran War, Trump talked with Netanyahu only, and Britain was sidelined. Why should Starmer help him?

Quite importantly, the Iran War is so unpopular in Europe that any support for Trump and Netanyahu could ruin the pledge to increase defense spending against Russia among NATO allies. (6) Therefore, Britain is taking increasingly French-styled strategic autonomy and hosted a conference on freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Strait. (7) Pro-Trump MPs such as Reform UK Leader Nigel Farage and Conservative Leader Kemi Badenoch demanded that Starmer join the war for the special relationship when it broke out, but now, they have withdrawn their support for Trump. This is also the case with ex-Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is a senior executive of Trump’s controversial Board of Peace. (8) They should have remembered that even a Thatcherite Lord Chris Patten argues that Britain should not assume the special relationship with Trump’s America. (9)

3. [America and the world order in chaos]
Furthermore, I would like to mention American foreign policy. Last June, when the war in Iran was not imminent, Robert Kagan at the Brookings Institution commented that Trump turned the US military into his private army when he deployed National Guard and ICE in Blue States unconstitutionally. Also, he aligns with Netanyahu as both share ethnoreligious nationalism, which is completely at odds with universal liberal values of the Founding Fathers. As Kagan argues, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is advancing anti-DEI initiatives in the US military, and he even likens the war in Iran to a crusade, both of which are deeply rooted in white Christian nationalism. Therefore, Kagan concludes that any success Trump claims in Iran will be a victory for autocracies around the world. (10) Continual frictions between Trump and US allies make China and Russia pleased. America has lost trust from allies, furthermore, in the Iran War. This would accelerate not only the isolation of America in geopolitics but also the fall of the Enlightenment, which would turn the world, including America itself, less secure. (11)

To my eyes, ex-President Barack Obama was also too post-American, but his foreign policy could have been compatible with the world order of the middle power alignment, which was proposed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. On the other hand, Trump is excessively post-Enlightenment, which has made America completely isolated. That is savage enough to return the world really to the Stone Age. In his latest article of the Atlantic Journal, Kagan calls Trump’s America a rogue superpower. He mentions the ongoing war, “The Iran war is global intervention “America First”–style: no public debate, no vote in Congress, no cooperation or, in many cases, even consultation with allies other than Israel, and, apparently, no concern for potential consequences to the region and the world.” That makes America lonely and dangerous, but never great. (12) Thereby, Trump destroys the world order that has brought innumerable benefits to the United States and its allies.

4. [The post-Enlightenment trend and the rise of the civilizational state]
The final point of the discussion is the political transition in the global context. Aaron McKeil at the London School of Economics mentions that in the post-Enlightenment era, as seen in viral right-wing populism in the West and geopolitical challenges by authoritarian powers, civilizational state values would replace liberal cosmopolitan ideals. Then what is a civilizational state? It is a kind of ethnocultural sphere of influence claimed by a great power or a regional power as a body of governance beyond its own territory. This is typically seen in Russia’s Russkiy Mir and China’s “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation". Domestically, a civilizational state focuses on national unity through ethnocentric traditionalism. Trump has trashed America’s hegemonic advantage in universal cosmopolitan ideals with White Christian nationalism and turned it into an authoritarian civilizational state like Russia and China. Those civilizational state advocates are not necessarily retrospective, according to McKeil. They are often aligned with new techno futurists who are keen on winning the great power rivalry in the tech industry. (13) This is typically seen in the TPD in current Anglo-American relations.

[Conclusion]
Deplorably, America elected the least qualified president to commemorate the 250th anniversary, though King Charles is visiting this historic landmark of democracy in America. The shift of Starmer’s diplomatic stances shows us that it is no use flattering Trump just to avoid a clash with him. Even pro-Trump Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni rejects Trump’s demand to admit the USAF to use air bases in Italy. In domestic politics, Trump fired so many loyalists. Returns are hardly expected through sycophancy. Among G7 leaders, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is so eager to conform to Trump. Her crazy dance was ridiculed both at bilateral meetings in Tokyo and Washington, DC. But I would rather call attention to her impolite laugh at the autopen portrait of former President Joe Biden. That implicitly indicates that she lost the sense of political balance. I would suggest that Takaichi rename herself MAGAichi, as she is dishonorably fascinated with Trump so much.

Among the British public, this visit is unpopular, and they want the King to cancel the tour, according to the You.gov poll last March. (14) Considering the nature of the Trump administration and his character, even this state visit is unlikely to improve the state-to-state relations of both countries. Therefore, there is no need for King Charles to make an impression as if giving credit to Trump. Meanwhile, Britain’s royal diplomacy has nurtured a friendship with the United States for more than a century. Focusing on people, instead of Trump, the King’s visit for the 250th anniversary would be an opportunity for them to recall the ideals of the Founding Fathers. The British royal family is popular among Americans, historically.

Since Trump’s America is a civilizational state incorporating new techno futurism, a huge business deal such as the TPD will be a “hostage” to stop Trump from fatally breaking up the bilateral relationship, even though he escalates blaming Starmer as relations with Britain grow worse. He never suggested withdrawing this tech deal, despite his penchant for madman diplomacy. This is a lesson for world leaders who want to stabilize the relationship with Trump’s America through flattery.

In this historic event, despite the chaos that Trump brings at home and worldwide, will King Charles III have a favorable impact on democracy in America and trans-Atlantic relations? The king spoke of the late Queen Elizabeth II’s legacy of optimism that "goodness will always prevail and that a brighter dawn is never far from the horizon", before the state visit to the United States of America. (15)




Footnotes:

(1) “As a state visit looms … can King Charles tame Trump?”; Guardian; 4 April. 2026

(2) “U.K. withholds intelligence on alleged drug boats over U.S. strikes, sources say”; NBC News; November 13, 2025

(3) PeterRicketts, BBC Breakfast; 4 March, 2026

(4) “John Bolton Warns How Trump’s Big Mouth Has Weakened U.S.” Daily Beast; April 20, 2026

(5) “Europeanising” NATO: A Utopia or an Obvious Necessity for Europeans?”; IRIS; 16 May 2025

(6) “Trump wants to strongarm NATO into a new Gulf war. Here’s why Europe must resist”; Centre for European Reform; 18 March 2026

(7) “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, and others on the Strait of Hormuz”: UK Government Press Release; 19 March 2026

(8) “The UK’s right wing is suddenly silent about supporting war in Iran”; News Agents; 11 March, 2026

(9) "Britain Must Downgrade the Special Relationship"; Project Syndicate; February 28, 2025

(10) “American Democracy Might Not Survive a War With Iran”; Atlantic Journal; June 21, 2025

(11) “America vs. the World”; Atlantic Journal; January 18, 2026

(12) “America Is Now a Rogue Superpower”; Atlantic Journal; March 30, 2026

(13) “How to navigate global disorder”; Engelsberg IDEAS; March 23, 2026

(14) “By 49% to 33%, Britons say King Charles should cancel official visit to USA”;You.gov; 26 March 2026

(15) “William and Catherine praise late Queen's 'lifetime of duty'”; BBC News; 22 April, 2026

Real national defense capability matters rather than the GDP ratio of spending

Ever since the Cold War, the United States has been urging its allies to increase defense spending for burden sharing, whether it acts as the world policeman or America First. However, I have always wondered why people talk about the amount of money to be spent so much, while hardly paying attention to how it is spent and implemented. A discrepancy in defense strategy and procurement could weaken collective defense. Quite recently, retired British Army General Richard Barrons raised a serious concern about this point that I have thought of for years.

Prior to mentioning his article in detail, we have to review the security environment of the world today. The latest NSS of the Trump administration emphasizes America First more than ever, and urges allies to assume more defense burdens. The paper even bluffs that the United States will withdraw from the alliance unless its members increase defense spending more drastically. As a result, liberal democracies in Europe and Asia are forced to pursue independent and multilateral security policy coordination, with the surge in defense budgets. In addition, wise spending must be considered to arrange such new security framework more effective. Both in Europe and Asia, President Donald Trump takes an Obama-style “offshore balancer” stance in Ukraine and Taiwan, while acting predatory in the Western Hemisphere, as seen typically in Venezuela and Greenland. He gives priority to making a deal of the mining business in Donbas rather than settling the territory and sovereignty issues with Russia. Also, in the recent Sino-Japanese conflict over Taiwan, he prioritized trade talks with China rather than geopolitical checks against its expansionism. Trump would be happy with a spending increase among allies and a decrease in the burden of American security commitments from his business acumen. It seems that he does not care about the use of increased spending, nor the division of roles with allies.

In view of such a global security environment, let me talk about ex-General Barrons’s commentary about the UK-German strategic discrepancy in defense spending objectives. As one of the leaders of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, he considered two points, which are the strategic requirements in deterrence and fighting, and financial capacity over the next decade (1). In addition, Britain, like other European nations, is forced to increase its military budget within such constraints in the face of Trump’s pressure. Therefore, wise spending for the properly focused objective is critical. While Britain is investing in technological innovation to resolve financial and personnel restrictions, Germany is building the strongest conventional army in Europe by overturning fiscal authority, and even by reintroducing conscription (2). Meanwhile, Britain’s military manpower is shrinking year by year despite its global commitment.

Contrary to Germany, Britain is pursuing tech-based military reform through combat lessons from Ukraine. Newly established digital targeting web will connect any UK troop sensors through AI-managed cloud to connect any of its weapons whether locally or globally (3). Such approaches require an innovative industrial base. The SDR 2025 even states “Defence also has <> at the heart of the UK’s economic strategy (4).” The Starmer administration’s TPD (Technology Prosperity Deal) with Trump’s America draws $350 billion in investments from U.S. firms into the UK's technology ecosystem, particularly in AI, quantum computing, and civil nuclear energy (5). Defence Secretary John Healey commented proudly that the deal would boost Britain’s leadership in defense, data and AI technology and as an ideal location for investment (6).

On the other hand, Britain`s ambitious scheme is not necessarily praise worthy. Barrons urges the British authority to fund and implement the project quickly, as Germany is building a conventional army rapidly. He recommends that Britain’s conceptual innovation and Germany’s efficient bureaucracy be combined to strengthen European defense capability. He criticizes the bureaucratic sectionalism of Whitehall for the delay. There is no denying that conventional plans are quicker to start than future-oriented ones. However, strategic rationality and efficiency are not the only reasons that determine the use of defense spending. The political culture of each country also matters. The primary focus of Germany’s national defense is urgent territorial defense in view of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For this objective, the Merz administration prioritized immediate military buildup, rather than future-oriented military reform. Furthermore, ethical hurdles make Germany cautious to use AI for military objectives, from the historical experience of authoritarian surveillance by Nazi and the Stasi. The German military prioritizes human control of technology and bans fully operational LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems) but admits human-overseen AI systems (7).

Such a discrepancy is found in the GCAP as well. While Britain was inclined to the command center version which is networked with ACPs (Autonomous Collaborative Platforms) or loyal wingman drones for multirole combat missions to increase combat mass and reduce damage risks, Japan prefers the manned version to replace aging F-2 immediately, which is equipped with more advanced sensors and networking technology than the F-35. Meanwhile, Italy is dissatisfied with the extremely high cost and tight restrictions for the technological transfer of the F-35. GCAP partners reached an agreement to fill these R&D objective gaps by making common manned aircraft and then, adapt them to the requirements of each air force (8).

However, the war in Ukraine has changed military tactics so drastically that the above discrepancies between Britain and Japan could shrink faster than expected. Following the New Year visit to Ise Shrine on January 5, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that her cabinet would revise the National Security Documents by the Kishida administration to focus much more on drone and AI networking systems (9). Also, she said a stronger defense industry would be a new locomotive to boost the Japanese economy in this century. Those points somewhat similar to what is stated in Britain’s SDR 2025. That could make Japan’s position in the GCAP more in line with the UK. Unlike Germany, Japan has little ethical hurdles for AI weapons.

In an era of more self-interested America with the Donroe Doctrine, the target of increased defense spending has become more important than ever. Ex-General Barrons raises a critical question as he compares defense plan of Britain and Germany. We have to consider strategic rationality and political culture of partners in mini or multilateral policy coordination. Different priorities between Britan and Germany, and Britain and Japan, are just a tip of the iceberg among numerous cases. We tend to talk about the size of firepower and weapon of choice when we boost national defense, but don’t dismiss AI networking system and problems associated with that as it is emerging increasingly important. How should we spend increased defense budget? Each nation should think again.



Footnotes:
(1) "The UK and Germany should combine their strengths to address weaknesses in European defence"; Chatham House; 19 November, 2025

(2) "Germany votes to bring in voluntary military service programme for 18-year-olds"; BBC News; 6 December 2025

(3) "I wrote the UK defence review: Britain must accelerate reform if it is to help guarantee Ukraine’s security"; Chatham House; 25 September, 2025

(4) "The Strategic Defence Review 2025"; UK Government;8 July 2025

(5) "Trump, Starmer sign $350B tech deal to spur AI, nuclear energy and quantum computing"; New York Post; September 18, 2025

(6) "New strategic partnership to unlock billions and boost military AI and innovation"; UK Government Press Release;18 September 2025

(7) "Ethical and Operational"; German Council on Foreign Relations; November 09, 2022

"AI – its risks and possible side effects"; German Ethics Council; 4 April, 2023

"Chapter 8: Privacy and Security: German Perspectives, European Trends and Ethical Implications"; Ethical Issues in Covert, Security and Surveillance Research; 2021

(8) "The New Partnership among Italy,Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)"; Istituto Affari Internazionali; 3 March, 2023

"Forget F-35, F-47 and FCAS: The GCAP Fighter Is Coming"; 1945; December 26, 2025

(9) Takaichi Security Revise; NHK World; January 5, 2026

How does a generative AI tell us about a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world?

US President Donald Trump articulates more radicalized MAGA and America First position in his second term, without being moderated by adults in the room. As seen in his transactional pursuit of a peace deal in Ukraine, the world is turning toward a disorder. In such a world, Liberal Democracies need a risk hedge to override the chaos by MAGA-jacked America. A Euro-Japanese alliance could serve this objective, but it would not be an alternative but a supplement of the trans-Atlantic and the US-Japanese alliances. It is still unrealistic for American allies worldwide to throw away the security umbrella completely. In an increasingly complicated world like this, can generative AI show some policy directions for the future? As an example, I would like to talk about Grok answers to my questions on a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world.

Grok is a recently added generative AI application on Twitter (Currently, X). Based on the profile summary from my tweets, it explained briefly about a Euro-Japanese alliance as follows. There are strategic rationales from three points, Russian threats in both Europe and Asia, Chinese BRI worldwide and anti-FOIP challenges, and predatory America First by Trump. In practice, Europe and Japan would be able to pursue military cooperation such as intelligence sharing and joint R&D of weapons, and economic policy coordination. Politically, a united Euro-Japanese voice at the UN and G7 would boost the rule-based world order, which would help small nations such as Ukraine, Baltic states, and Taiwan stand up against predatory great powers in their neighborhood like Russia and China. The problem is geographical remoteness of both sides and American discomfort with being sidelined from the alliance.

This is just a typical textbook introduction of the main agenda, and further conversations are necessary to judge the real thinking capability of generative AI. Among those questions, I would like to focus on whether Grok understands lengthy and complicated questions properly, not just words but nuances, and how it streamlines the direction of the argument lucidly. Let’s see some unorthodox ones of my own interest, rather than something orthodox and expectable about Euro-Japanese relations and Trump's America (1).

【Question 1】: Trump told the media that only the monkey model of the F-47, the next generation fighter jets, is available for allies. That is what the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. His brain is Russified so much. Should American allies invest more in independent high-tech weapons such as GCAP and FCAS fighters? Also, Trump's remark does not make sense, as Iran's F-14s have been in poor condition since the Islamic Revolution. It seems that he is interested in sales profit from the next-generation fighter rather than global security.

In reply, Grok admitted my concerns with monkey model provisionally, that Trump may not have “Russified” his mindsets but he prioritizes export profit of the F-47 for the United States to the security of allies. Regarding whether allies should invest in the GCAP by Britain, Japan, and Italy, or the FCAS by France, Germany, and Spain, instead of “dubious” F-47 (2)(3), Grok outlines both R&D projects, and concluded that the GCAP meets Japan’s timetable for deployment(4) against China, but future acquisition of the F-47 should not be ruled out even though it is downgraded. I understand this reply that it takes years for R&D of the next generation fighter, and the future US administration could permit regular model exports of it. Also, it did not mention a shock of supply chain cut if a Trump-like nationalist stop component exports of this fighter jet as it happened in the case of Iranian F-14s(5). AI does not answer everything.

Nevertheless, this AI application mentioned the vital point of my question that Soviet-styled monkey model export by Trump illustrates his deep-rooted America First mindsets. As to this question, though lengthy and not so simple, generative AI understands my intention so profoundly. Quite interestingly, I mistyped GCAP for GPAC in the question, but Grok interpreted it correctly.

【Question 2】: Now, a question about nuclear deterrence. Should Japan help R&D to boost British and French nuclear capability while not possessing its own nuclear weapons? Japan, as an independent nuclear power, would accelerate the collapse of the global non-proliferation regime, which in turn would pose critical threats to its national security. Also, how about Japan's nuclear sharing with both countries, in case Trump's America abdicates its allies?

This question is quite controversial as Japan maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons into its territory. However, since America’s nuclear umbrella is turning unreliable in Trump’s second term, a risk hedge is a critical issue for Japan. Grok replied to my question from two points, R&D and nuclear sharing. While it mentions positively about the former, somewhat cautiously about the latter. Japan has money and technology to help Britain and France bost their nuclear capability. Also, it is not the interest of the global community if Japan runs the risk of provoking proliferation to other non-nuclear powers to destroy the global arms control regime by possessing its own nuclear arsenals. This is also the case with Japan’s nuclear sharing with Britain and France. However, nuclear sharing could trigger anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan more seriously for fear of escalating tensions with China. Also, an increasingly nationalist United States might doubt Japan’s loyalty to the alliance if such a risk hedge were explored.

But I do not necessarily agree to Grok’s concerns with “nukes on home soil is taboo” among the Japanese because British and French nuclear weapons would not be deployed permanently as most of them are not land-based. They just come to naval or air force facilities in Japan when necessary. After all, a sovereign and independent nuclear deterrence is the last of the last of the last resort for Japan. Therefore, I would argue that it necessary to think about a nuclear security partnership with Britain and France both in terms of quality and quantity, to fill a vacuum of superpower suicide by a populist-jacked America regardless of partisanship. Currently, their nuclear deterrence is too small, even if combined (6).

Quite interestingly, Britain is reconsidering its dependence on the US-made Trident SLBM as the governance of Trump’s America is a critical risk to its national security. Currently, the following three options are considered for its sovereign independent nuclear weapons. That is to build up deterrence by itself or with France. But in both cases, the economy of scale for nuclear R&D is restricted. Therefore, the third option that is to boost Britain’s nuclear deterrence within the Euro-Atlantic multilateral framework such as NATO is considered (7). In that case, some Pacific nations like Japan, Australia, etc. could join the project.

【Question 3】: The problem is not just geopolitics. The fall of democracy in Trump's America is a fatal problem, as mentioned in a recent article by Chris Patten in Project Syndicate. Though he was very close to pro-American Thatcher, as opposed to pro-EU Heseltine, he insists that Britain be more sovereign and autonomous from MAGA-jacked America. He understands both Europe and Asia through his career in politics. Given this, how would a Euro-Japanese alliance lead value-oriented diplomacy of the world when America is withdrawing the freedom ideal and humanitarianism?

As I mention in the question, UK Lord Chris Patten was a devoted Atlanticist and a darling of the Reagan-Thatcher world order, and a consummate British diplomat both in Asia and Europe as the last governor of Hong Kong and former European Commissioner for External Relations. From this career background, Patten argues Britain downgrade the decades-long special relationship with the United States because Trump’s America is no longer the bearer of freedom values as seen in the January 6 riot. As the ex-Chancellor of Oxford University, he reflects on the history of the Anglo-American alliance since Winston Churchill academically, to argue that Trump destroyed the fundamental premise of shared values. Therefore, Patten urges Prime Minister Keir Starmer that Britain not to give in to every demand that Trump makes (8). Quite appallingly, Starmer is repealing hate speech laws in return for a favorable trade deal with Trump’s America (9). What a horrible kowtow that the Labour adopts a MAGA policy! In addition, Trump’s sheer lack of knowledge in history and geopolitics is revealed in his big power-focused diplomacy, because World Wars began from small countries such as Sebia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as Patten mentions.

Considering chaotic governance in current America and poor understanding of international affairs by its incumbent president, a Euro-Japanese alliance could complement the lack of US leadership in value-oriented diplomacy. Let me review the Grok reply. Besides shared values of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, both sides are committed to humanitarian issues such as disaster relief and the environment. Their respect for a rule-based world order leads them to object to Trump’s way of racketeering of small nations in the name of deal diplomacy. That makes the global security environment favorable for authoritarian powers, but Trump does not care. From the experience of negotiating with China regarding democratic governance of Hong Kong, Patten learned the danger of making an impetuous compromise with authoritarian power. If Trump is really abdicating Ukraine and Taiwan, a Euro-Japanese alliance could fill the vacuum to help Patten’s vison of reorganizing the League of Democracies. But we have to remember that neither Europe nor Japan can replace the current US-centered alliance with the alliance of democratic middle power simply though moral high grounds, because the United States is too big and strong despite Trump, and separated geography may split strategic priority of Europe and Japan.

Finally, the most critical issue of the world order today is Trump tariffs. How should a Euro-Japanese alliance manage the trade war with Trump’s America? I asked the following question recently(10).

【Question 4】: The trade negotiations are not only about the global economic regime, but also about geopolitics. Although more multilateral approaches are desirable, some countries seem to prioritize their deal-making with Trump rather than standing against his America First trade policy through multilateral solidarity. Among them, I would like to ask about two major economies.
(1) Japan is willing to reach an early agreement with Trump, but if it is hasty, will it set a bad precedent for other countries’ trade talks? Is the Ishiba administration too Japan First?
(2) Britain suggested repealing hate speech laws in return for tariff cuts. If the Labour cabinet accepts MAGA agendas so easily, the Conservative Party could move farther to the right, which could prompt an ideological surenchère in Britain’s domestic politics. Will it help Elon Musk’s MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) initiative to provoke right-wing populism in Europe, which would ultimately disunify NATO and the EU?

Regarding Japan, Grok admits the risk of becoming a bad precedent, but comments that Ishiba is not so much Japan First with his close policy coordination with FOIP participants and NATO. This counterargument has some points as Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba stressed Japan’s role to mediate the United States and ASEAN nations in the trade war on his recent visit to Vietnam and the Philippines (11). Still, there is a concern that Japan’s rush for a hasty agreement could break up the world trade order. In the trade talk with Trump’s America, Ishiba officials mention almost entirely about Japan’s national interest. That sounds quite Japan First for a staunch proponent of the liberal world order and Never Trumper like me.

As to Britain, Grok admits my concern that Starmer’s concession to MAGA would embolden Conservative rightwing or even Reform UK. Furthermore, infiltration of MAGA political culture would boost anti-EU or anti-NATO sentiments throughout Europe, which would Elon Musk’s MEGA agitation. Grok refers to my previous question about Patten’s warning in its reply that a U.S. democratic backslide empowers Europe’s illiberal fringes, and Labour’s concessions could grease that slide. While acting cautiously, pro-EU Starmer explores new trade and security partnership with the EU to counter Trump (12).

Prior to this, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for an international coordination in macroeconomic and financial policy to overcome worldwide recession and inflation by Trump tariffs as the global community did in the 2008 financial crisis (13). Also, he advocates collective initiatives for the new world order of reconstructed rule of law that incorporates emerging economies. A Euro-Japanese alliance that I mention can listen to them to rearrange rule-based multilateralism against sharp power transactionalism by Trump's America, Putin's Russia, and Xi Jinping's China. For this objective, Brown urges the UK to restore strategic partnership with the EU in security and the economy to override the post-Brexit shock (14).

Generative AI is quite helpful in streamlining thoughts and occasionally, realizing overlooked points, particularly in exploring complicated issue like a Euro-Japanese alliance in the world of increasing uncertainty. Also, it would be helpful for teachers to get used to AI thinking, in order to check AI cheating by students when they submit reports and essays. Finally, we have to notice that Elon Musk uses AI for his controversial work at the DOGE, and a familiarity with this application would be useful to understand his strange ways of thinking. After all, AI is no panacea to resolve the problem. The answer by the AI depends on the quality of question by each person. Also, various AIs are emerging and evolving one after another, and each of them has its own strength and weakness. We have to bear it in mind to discuss the issue of a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world. More questions and deeper questions to AI are necessary to explore this matter furthermore.



Footnotes:
(1) Grok Chat

(2) "Sixth-Generation Fighter Showdown: F-47, GCAP, FCAS, and J-36 (Baidi)"; European Defence Review; 24 March, 2025

(3) "Will Boeing’s F-47 ‘KILL’ European GCAP & FCAS Programs As U.S. Could Export 6th-Gen Jets To Allies?"; Eurasian Times; March 23, 2025

(4) "Global Combat Air Programme Joint Statement"; UK Government; 20 November 2024

(5) "How Iran manages to keep its F-14 Tomcats flying"; Key Aero; August 2, 2022

(6) "Can Europe Build Its Own Nuclear Umbrella?"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; April 3. 2025

(7) "The UK’s nuclear deterrent relies on US support – but there are no other easy alternatives"; Chatham House; 24 March, 2025

(8) "Britain Must Downgrade the Special Relationship"; Project Syndicate; February 28, 2025

(9) "Starmer told UK must repeal hate speech laws to protect LGBT+ people or lose Trump trade deal"; Independent; 16 April, 2025

(10) Grok Chat

(11) "Japan's role for ASEAN increasingly crucial amid US tariff standoff"; Mainichi Shimbun; April 30, 2025

(12) "UK and EU defy Trump with new strategic partnership to boost trade and security"; Guardian; 29 April, 2025

(13) "Trump is pushing the world towards recession. By learning the lessons of 2008, we can still prevent it"; Giardian; 10 April, 2025

(14) "The ‘new world order’ of the past 35 years is being demolished before our eyes. This is how we must proceed"; Guardian; 12 April, 2025

How well did Foreign Secretary Cameron act the role of Churchill to move America for defending Ukraine?

Earlier this April, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited the United States to talk further military aid to Ukraine with his counterpart Secretary of State Antony Blinken. But Trump loyalists in the Republican Party objected to the plan. Cameron needed to remove the bottleneck to pass the Ukrainian aid bill in the US House of Representatives, because Russia was pushing back Ukrainian counteroffensive and an increasing number of civilians were killed. Therefore, he proposed to meet the supposed Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and House Speaker Mike Johnson urgently. Cameron’s diplomatic tour was in parallel with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s state visit to meet President Joe Biden. The latter drew much more attention from the media and think tanks around the world, but I regard Cameron’s direct meeting with Trump as more important to move America that does not act as the superpower. Let me explain it below.

Both British and Japanese diplomatic efforts were commonly aimed at getting America more engaged with the world. Along with the peril of Trump 2.0, the rise of anti-Israeli “Hamas left” on the left raise serious concerns with populist isolationism in America. Can any foreign leader overturn such trends? In history, Winston Churchill urged the hesitant superpower to actively involved in stopping Nazi Germany. Also, when Americans were indulged in a daydream of postwar peace, he gave the Iron Curtain speech to awaken them to see the reality of international politics. Shortly after that, the United States declared the Truman Doctrine. When the Congress was bitterly divided between internationalists and nativists, America hosted leaders from key allies of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Compared the two, Ukraine aid that Cameron brought was emergent, and there were no scenarios arranged by the foreign service beforehand when he met his opponent Trump. Meanwhile, Kishida was warmly welcomed as the state guest by President Biden and leaders of both houses of the Congress, and the was nothing challenging in his diplomatic tour. More importantly, Britain is directly involved in military aid for Ukraine to defeat Russia.

On the other hand, Japan is still constrained by the pacifist constitution, which keeps this country from participating in a mission that former Secretary of Defense James Mattis called “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” when he talked about his combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (General: It's 'fun to shoot some people'; CNN; February 4, 2005). After all, that is a serious drawback for Japan to be a vital stakeholder in global security, as long as this country is unable to get involved in military aspects. Kishida spoke softly at the congressional speech, as if healing the superpower in fatigue of global tottering rather than reconfirming America’s role as the indispensable nation for the world order (“Japanese PM Fumio Kishida addresses U.S. 'self-doubt' about world role in remarks to Congress”; NBC News; April 11, 2024). That does not necessarily come from his unprovocative personality. Even more exuberant Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who expressed strong support the Iraq War by the Bush administration (“Press Conference by Prime Minister-then Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq”; Prime Minister’s Office, Japan; March 20, 2003), did not actually send combat troops. Japanese commitment was too small to worry about being caught up in America’s war. Whether “healing” Kishida or “exuberant” Koizumi, what Japanese leaders did fall short of fulfilling the Churchillian role.

Nevertheless, since no single politician today is so charismatic as Churchill was, it is quite likely that an indirect Anglo-Japanese diplomatic coordination had some effect to prompt the both parties to reach an agreement in the US congress. Kishida’s Japan was a good side kick for Britain. The aid bill was finally approved on this occasion, but quite uncertain for future. Russian President Vladimir Putin clings to reconquering Ukraine so much that the war is going to continue long. Unlike Cameron’s official meeting with Secretary Blinken, the detail of his closed-door meeting with Trump has not been publicized. He did not even mention that on Twitter, while tweeting extensively about the Israeli-Hamas war. Trump may have been reluctant to listen to Cameron, but he had to avoid negative reputation of delaying the Ukraine aid bill to pass the Congress, in view of his presidential campaign. In addition, Britain’s commitment to military aid made Cameron’s case more compelling, because Trump is obsessed with burden sharing of defense spending. That was also helpful in his meeting with Blinken to reconfirm further assistance to Ukraine by Britain and the United States. International politics is inherently leontomorphic, and therefore, strong defense and deep military commitment are essential in law enforcement for the world order.

Now, let me talk about the bottleneck for successful Cameron-Blinken foreign ministers meeting, which was Trump’s view of the world. Hal Brand of the American Enterprise Institute comments that it is simplistic to take his America First as complete disengagement from the world. Rather, it is extremely sensitive to the costs and benefits of intervention. Therefore, Trump is skeptical of helping Ukraine, and he believes that America not run the risk of getting involved in a big war for the sake of defending small countries overseas, whether in Europe or Asia. And there isn’t an Indo-Pacific exception in Trump’s mindsets despite China hawk remarks by his fellows. While showing isolationist aspects, Trump is willing to intervene abroad to impose US national interests of his understanding on other nations when he thinks it necessary. Meanwhile, he sidelines the idea that America as guarantor of the liberal world order disdainfully. That attitude led to the trade war with China, and brinkmanship diplomacy against Iran and North Korea in his last term. Therefore, Trump fellows pursue military build-up, but not interested in defending allies or invaded countries. Rather, they focus on homeland defense, and explore more investment in cyber security and missile defense. They assume international politics as rivalries of self-interested nation states, and thus, agendas like democracy promotion are useless for them (“An “America First” World: What Trump’s Return Might Mean for Global Order”; Foreign Affairs; May 27, 2024).

Of course, there is a fallacy in such viewpoints, which leads to Trump’s poor understanding of the alliance. Former US ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder criticizes that Trump sees the trans-Atlantic alliance as a liability that could drag America into a war against nuclear Russia when some eastern flank nation is invaded. Actually, the alliance deters enemy aggression. Furthermore, he is wrongly preoccupied with burden sharing of defense spending, instead of pursuing common security objectives with partners (“NATO is about security — not dollars and cents”; Politico; April 10, 2024). His six-month blocking of the Ukraine aid bill through his Republican loyalists in the House had benefitted Russia so much, which hurt mutual trust between Europe and America (The US aid package to Ukraine will help. But a better strategy is urgently needed”; Chatham House; 26 April, 2024). As long as American right wingers are entrapped in a “Hillbilly Elegy” victimhood mindset, i.e., allies freeride the security umbrella, another congressional bickering could delay necessary help for Ukraine.

Next, an overview of Britain’s trans-Atlantic diplomacy is the following. Regardless of the reelection possibility of Trump, strong Lindbergh isolationism among the American public poses constraints on UK foreign policy. Wyn Rees of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) presents an over view of Britain’s relations with NATO and the United States as follows. Britain has been America’s first choice for the partner in military and intelligence operations, which is so beneficial to its political presence NATO and worldwide. But Trump’s anti-NATO and anti-Ukrainian posture ruins this premise. Therefore, Cameron had to show European commitment to burden sharing to Trump, such as defense spending increase, intra-European defense cooperation, troop deployment in the Baltic, and so forth (“Trump, NATO and Anglo-American Relations”; RUSI; 9 May, 2024). As of February 29, this year, before the Ukraine Aid bill passed the US Congress, EU institutions donated more aid than the United States. In addition, sovereign European countries made contributions. That is to say, America, not Europe, was freeriding the alliance, unless the Ukraine Aid bill passed. See the chart.

Chart
How does U.S. aid to Ukraine compare to that from other donors?

For a Churchillian diplomacy to overturn isolationism in America, Britain needs to strengthen independent political and military resilience on the European side against Russia. Currently, Ukraine has signed a bilateral security agreement with France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Britain. For effective coordination of these deals, how much can the United Kingdom take initiatives in a European framework to support Ukraine without EU membership? Britain took leadership role of the drone coalition in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which was founded by NATO to facilitate arms procurement for Ukraine. Also, Samir Puri of Chatham House urges the United Kingdom to endorse EU proposed joint military procurement initiatives, such as the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum (European Commission; 6 May, 2024) and the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) (European Commission; 5 March, 2024), to improve European defense readiness and support Ukraine’s defense industry (“The UK should help coordinate support for Ukraine by backing EU defence initiatives”; Chatham House; 19 March, 2024). UK backed plan to fund Ukrainian war efforts from frozen Russian assets was approved at G7 Italy this year (“G7 agrees $50bn loan for Ukraine from Russian assets”; BBC News; 14 June, 2024). Currently, Britain needs to tackle the capability gap problem for “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” around the world. This country needs to upgrade its arms and equipment to defend its homeland and national interests worldwide within its own limited resources. At present, foremost threats are Russia for the short term, and China for the long-term. Along with defense spending increase, Andrew Dorman, editor of "International Affairs", comments that Britain's rearmament plans should define the focus of investment. For example, regarding the deterrence against Russia, this country must choose whether to overturn current gradual nuclear disarmament policy to make its independent nuclear umbrella stronger, or to boost rapid response deployment in the Arctic, Scandinavia, and the Baltic regions through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) (“Britain must rearm to strengthen NATO and meet threats beyond Russia and terrorism”; Chatham House; 25 March, 2024).

After a laborious persuasion meeting with Trump, Cameron talked with Blinken at the formal foreign ministers meeting to boost further assistance to Ukraine. During the press conference, there was a question about the Mar-a-Lago meeting, and Cameron replied that it was just a normal diplomatic meeting with the opposition leader on the occasion of election (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Cameron at a Joint Press Availability”; US Department of State Press Release; April 9, 2024). But apparently, Trump is still a drag in the trans-Atlantic alliance as he rejects further aid to Ukraine. He does not care about bipartisan consistency in diplomacy. Appallingly, he says he would end the war as soon as he inaugurated. Even Russia does not take it seriously (“Russia says 'let's be realistic' about Trump plan to end Ukraine war”; Reuters; July 18, 2024). The Mar-a-Lago talk would have been far from normal.

As if implying a turbulent dialogue, Trump fellows backlashed vehemently to Cameron’s Churchillian effort. Since Trump encouraged Russia to invade NATO countries, Cameron has been critical of his views on trans-Atlantic alliance (“David Cameron Rebukes Donald Trump's Divisive Remarks About Nato And Russia”; HuffPost; 12 February, 2024). It is not easy to fill the gap in just a single secret meeting. As expected, Trump’s foreign policy advisor Elbridge Colby, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, denounced Cameron’s lobbying for the pass of the Ukrainian aid bill at the Congress as intervention into American politics. Also, he expressed resentment that Cameron moralized the case for Ukraine and lectured it to Trump (“Trump ally hits out at David Cameron for ‘lecturing’ US”; Politico; May 2, 2024). But historically, Wilsonian moralism has been centerpiece of American foreign policy regardless of partisanship. Also, moralism cemented the Reagan-Thatcher conservative alliance, which ultimately brought the end of the Cold War. Deplorably, Colby’s comment shows how badly conservatism in America degraded today.

While Colby belittles Russia as China’s junior partner (“China’s Russia Support Strategy”; Politico; February 22, 2024), that is not necessarily the case in view of the Kremlin’s aggression in Europe and infiltration in the Middle East and Africa. In his article of the Washington Post, he does not care such contradictions in his advocacy of strategic refocus on China (“To avert war with China, the U.S. must prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 18, 2023). Ironically, Taiwan does not endorse Colby’s strategic shift to Asia (“Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 10, 2023). Prominent Never Trump pundits such as Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution deny lopsided China-hawks like Colby to put American foreign policy on the right track (“A Republican ‘civil war’ on Ukraine erupts as Reagan’s example fades”; Washington Post; March 15, 2023). Nevertheless, Colby praised new UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy for his compassionate attitude to Trump. However, Republican Vice President candidate JD Vance has ruined such a lukewarm friendship between Trump and Labour Britain, as he blasted this country as an Islamist state with nuclear weapons (“Rayner dismisses Trump running mate 'Islamist UK' claim”; BBC News; 17 July, 2024). Despite Cameron’s successful lobbying for Ukraine, the negative influence of MAGA Republicans is still undismissable, regardless of the results of the presidential election. As is often the case with Trump supporters, both Vance and Colby are characterized with vituperative words and confrontational attitudes. If Trump 2.0 emerged, that would be a severe diplomatic drawback for American allies.

During World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack silenced Lindbergh isolationists, which enabled President Franklin Roosevelt to fight for freedom around the world upon Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s request. But today, MAGA Republicans drag American foreign policy even under current Biden administration. Therefore, NATO is seriously considering Trump proofing to prepare for the worst scenario in the presidential election in the United States. The most critical point is to boost defense capability on the European side. While NATO member states are raising their defense spending to meet the 2% of GDP target of the organization, even that would not be enough to keep America engaged with Europe. Actually, Colby rebuffed Britain’s 2.5% spending plan by the Sunak administration meaningless. Most of the NATO members do not reach the 2% target today, but they spent over 3% during the Cold War. The real problem is not the amount of money but the focus of defense investment. Such investment on deterrence and denial capabilities against Russia should be spent efficiently to make US rescue operations in Europe less costly. Joint procurement coordination in Europe, particularly among Britain, France, and Germany will be helpful for this objective (“Trump-Proofing NATO: 2% Won’t Cut It”; RUSI; 7 March, 2024).

Currently, the impending problem is Ukraine. At the 75th anniversary of NATO in Brussels, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a proposal to insulate NATO’s role in Ukraine from American politics. That is to give more leverage of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to NATO from the United States, to facilitate the implementation of the military aid package of $100 billion for five years. However, the Biden administration did not express so much interest in this plan (On NATO’s 75th birthday, fear of Trump overshadows celebrations; Washington Post; April 4, 2024). Ironically, the incumbent Never Trump government of the United States is not supportive of a Trump proofing initiative by Europe. Nevertheless, this year will be critical in the war in Ukraine, according to Michael Clarke, ex-Director General of the Royal United Service Institute. Russia lacks the equipment and trained manpower for a major offensive until spring 2025 or later, while Ukraine desperately needs Western military aid to rebuild combat capability to retake occupied territories (“Ukraine war: Three ways the conflict could go in 2024”; BBC; 29 December, 2023).

The global community is imperiled with Trump 2.0, but the real problem is beyond Trump himself. Some anti-mainstream foreign policy pundits of both right and left appeal for so-called “restrained” diplomacy to make the case against Wilsonian globalism. Among them, rightwing nationalists make use of Trump to advance their advocacy. Although Trump behaves in notoriously high-handed manners, former Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull tells world leaders not to flatter him to avoid his anger. Trump may feel a formidable counterpart unpleasant, but he respects him or her after he calms down (“How the World Can Deal With Trump?”; Foreign Affairs; May 31, 2024). Cameron told urgent necessity to help Ukraine candidly, as shown in Colby’s malicious response. Also, Japanese Prime Minister-then Shinzo Abe told reciprocity of the US-Japanese alliance when he visited the Trump Tower, shortly after unexpected victory of Trump in the election. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Taro Aso’s visit appears unnecessary kowtow to the opposition candidate. Abe’s memoir says that Trump talked extensively about private golf even at the official bilateral summit. What did Aso talk to enjoy the meeting with him?

Despite Trump’s conviction, Western democracies have no choice but align with the United States, as commented by Leslie Vinjamuri, the director of the US and Americas programme at Chatham House. Otherwise, should they choose Russia or China as their partner (“The Global Implications of Trump’s Conviction”; Council on Foreign Relations; June 4, 2024)? Though Democratic candidate Kamala Harris is surging to edge out Trump, the “restrained” diplomacy school would draw US leadership role in the world, even under her administration. Along with rightwing think tanks such as the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and the Marathon Initiative, there is bipartisan Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft which is co-sponsored by libertarian Chrales Koch and liberal George Soros (“George Soros and Charles Koch take on the ‘endless wars’”; Politico; December 2, 2019).

In order to move America that does not act, politicians today, whether UK Foreign Secretary Cameron, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, or anyone else, must elaborate on Churchillian diplomacy without the charisma of Churchill, the hero of World War II. American allies need to coordinate with bipartisan internationalists to persuade hard-wired isolationists as Cameron did. Also, they should demonstrate the willingness to do “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys”, whether by directly involved in military actions or by providing military aid for a nation withstanding enemy invasion. In other words, it is a commitment to burden sharing of law enforcement for the world order. On the American side, it would be interesting if Harris hinted to make a staunch national security team with her pick of Vice President and other top positions in the cabinet to distinguish herself from gaffe-prone and DEI blaming Trump-Vance duo.


NB: Harris chose Governor Tim Waltz of Minnesota on August 6. National security heavy weight will be appointed to other key cabinet positions.

The question of Britain’s tilt to the Indo Pacific and its relationship with China

Britain is one of the key partners of the multilateral coalition to enforce FOIP operations to defend the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in view of maritime challenges by China. Ever since the Johnson administration released the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy entitled “Global Britain in a competitive age” in March 2021, the United Kingdom has been proceeding strategic tilt to the Indo Pacific. In accordance with this strategy, Britain is deepening strategic partnership with Japan and India. Particularly with Japan, Britain signed the RAA (Reciprocal Access Agreement) this year to faciilitate access to mutual troop facilities and bilateral operational and training cooperation between their armed forces. Also, both countries conduct joint research and development of the GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) with Italy. With India, Britain provides technological assistance for its indigenous next fighter project to supplant Russian sponsored FGFA (Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft). Furthermore, the United Kingdom singed the AUKUS deal with the United States and Australia. In view of those agreements, Britain is supposed to be deeply committed to the FOIP against China along with regional powers like Japan, India, and Australia, and most importantly, through the “special relationship” with America. However, some restraints of domestic politics, notably the Labour Party and the financial lobby, could erode Britain’s solid commitment to the deterrence against China. Also, the Sunak administration is not necessarily harmonious in their stances against China, unlike their approaches against Russia.

Let me mention the Labour Party first. Shadow Defence Secretary John Healey questioned Tory national security strategy of the tilt to the Indo Pacific initiated by the Johnson administration, in view of growing threat of Russia since the outbreak of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Secretary Healey said that Britain should focus its limited budgetary resource on the defense of its home turf and the Euro Atlantic, as commented "The first priority for Britain's armed forces must be where the threats are greatest, not where the business opportunities lie” (“Labour defence chief questions using UK's 'scarce resources' in Indo-Pacific”; Forces Net; 8 February, 2023). The point of Labour argument is that Britain should rearm to meet the requirement to defend Europe, the Atlantic and the Arctic, while its military stockpile at home is depleting to support Ukraine (“Labour calls for UK rearmament and end to military cuts”; UK Defence Journal; February 7, 2023). But does the Labour Party belittle the threat of China, although it encroaches Britain’s homeland via secret agents, cyber manipulations, etc? Current party leader Keir Starmer assumes himself a Blairite, but his party’s defense initiative seems more like Harold Wilson’s who decided to withdraw British troops from east of Aden in 1968, rather than Tony Blair’s whose global trotting foreign policy explored to let Britain punch above its weight.

If the Labour Party is not obsessed with anti-colonialist woke ideology, how would they strike a balance between Britain’s strategic necessity around the globe? Rather than denying the tilt to the Indo Pacific, Veerle Nouwens of the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) suggests that the Labour Party tailor the tilt to their priorities. Geographical distance is no reason to disengage from the Indo Pacific. After all, the Tory defense plan does not argue that Britain keep solid permanent military presence in Japan or Australia. The Labour should bear in mind that the Indo Pacific strategies of France and Japan stretch from East Africa to the South Pacific. Furthermore, she comments that Britain does not necessarily keep military presence to the furthest in the Indo Pacific, but it has to make full use of existing UK facilities in Indian Ocean, ie, the Middle East, East Africa, and Singapore. That would be helpful for the British troop to react to an emergency in the Far East, when China or North Korea defy global rules and norms such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and nuclear nonproliferation in this region. While Shadow Defence Secretary Healey stresses limited budgetary resource, Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy does not deny the tilt, but proposes the “three Cs”. That is, Britain should challenge and compete against China geopolitically, but cooperate with them on some issues such as climate change when necessary (“How Labour Can Reform, Rather Than Do Away With, the UK’s Indo-Pacific Tilt”; RUSI Commentary; 14 February 2023). After all, I would argue that Healey’s vison is a sheer denial of Britain’s historical status as a maritime trade nation.

For diplomatic consistency, Britain’s Indo Pacific partners, notably Japan and Australia, need to talk with the Labour shadow cabinet to reconfirm the imperative of the FOIP for global security and common interests in this region. Quite importantly, the general election in Britain is scheduled no later than January 28, 2025, which is quite closely dated to the US presidential election on November 5, 2024. According to the latest opinion poll by Ipsos from August 11 to 14, 56% of UK voters think that Starmer will defeat Sunak in the forthcoming election. While Starmer leads 9 out of 12 points, particularly on being in touch with ordinary people, understanding the problems facing Britain, and being an experienced leader, Sunak leads on being good in a crisis (“Majority of Britons think it is likely Keir Starmer will become Prime Minister”; Ipsos Political Pulse; 24 August, 2023).

The FOIP is multilateral by nature, and Quad members and other regional and global stakeholders need to send a message so that a Labour Britain would not fall into radical anti-colonialist. Above all, Starmer needs to outline a Labour national security strategy, around the world. He told that his cabinet would seek a bilateral security and defense treaty with Germany quickly if he were elected (“UK Labour would seek security and defense treaty with Germany”; Politico; May 16, 2023). But it is not clear how he would adjust Healey’s Euro-Atlantic focused defense and Lammy’s three Cs against China in the Indo Pacific.

The left is not the only problem. Former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne who was an architect of the Anglo-Chinese Golden Era under the Cameron administration, has become a fintech lobbyist to embrace money from China and Russia to the London financial market, after his retirement from politics. Even though David Cameron quit his political career after the Brexit referendum, Osborne remained in the House of Commons as a backbencher. However, he was forced to resign as he was appointed to the editor of the Evening Standard though he was an MP. Ever since he was the chancellor, Osborne wanted to make London a global hub of fintech (“Osborne wants London to be 'global centre for fintech”; Financial Times; November 11, 2015), but his policy was critically concerned, because it seemed that he prioritized the relationship with China at the expense of human rights and US-UK relations. Also, Cameron refused security commitment Britain’s traditional allies in South East Asia when he visited Singapore in 2015 so as not to provoke China (“In for a Yuan, in for a Pound: Is the United Kingdom Making a Bad Bet on China?”; Council on Foreign Relations Blog; October 20, 2015). Osborne also had some dubious ties with Russia, as he accepted donations from a Russian oligarch in 2008 (“George Osborne admits 'mistake' over Russian oligarch”; Guardian; 27 October, 2008). Brexit is a disaster for Britain and the global community, but had Cameron stayed in the office, Osborne would have advanced his pro-Sino-Russian fintech policy at the expense of national security.

As if representing the financial lobby led by Osborne, Sherard Cowper-Coles, head of public affairs at HSBC Holdings PLC, criticized the British government so “weak” as to follow America to curtail business ties with China (“HSBC Executive Slams ‘Weak’ UK for Backing US Against China”; Bloomberg News; August 7, 2023). His remark is “too market-oriented”. Certainly, London has been an offshore financial market where traders can deal with currencies out of American regulation, notably the Eurodollar from the Soviet Union and the petrodollar from OPEC nations. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Cold War notions of rational deterrence, and the financial market is required to reject politically risky foreign money more strictly today. Nevertheless, it is quite hard to keep Britain’s open economy, while stopping money laundering by China, Russia, and other revisionist powers (“Why Britain’s Tories are addicted to Russian money”; Politico; March 7, 2022). Regarding the supply chain with China and energy dependence on Russia, Germany and France are frequently criticized, but we have to watch Britain’s handling of these issues as well.

The Sunak administration may not explore the Golden era with China, but the prime minister’s background is business oriented. Having graduated from Oxford University with a BA in PPE, Rishi Sunak acquired an MBA from Stanford University, where he met his wife Akshata Murty whose father is an Indian IT business tycoon Narayana Murty. Sunak himself made his career in hedge fund business before entering politics. In view of his business instinct, he could be tempted to prioritize economic interests with China and take lukewarm attitudes to its threats in the Indo Pacific and the UK homeland, although he declared the end of the Golden Era (“Rishi Sunak: Golden era of UK-China relations is over”; BBC News; 29 November, 2022). Therefore, House Foreign Affairs Committee MPs raised critical concerns with Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, when he visited China at the end of this August. This backlash was led by Conservative MP Alicia Kearns who chairs the committee, arguing that he should have been tough on Chinese espionage in the UK homeland, human rights abuse in Xinjian Uyghur and Tibet, and UK security role in the FOIP operation (“James Cleverly urged to be ‘crystal clear’ with China on ‘the rule of law and human rights’”; Politico; August 30, 2023). Criticism comes not only from Sunak’s party, also from his own cabinet. Minister of State for Security Tom Tugendhat has been a renowned China hawk, and he was banned from entering the country in 2021 (“Cleverly asks Bryant to withdraw ‘Chinese stooge’ claim amid row over Beijing”; Independent; 13 June, 2023). As an HM army veteran, he was so alert to China’s overseas police station in the United Kingdom that he eliminated them, because they were not permitted by the British government (“Chinese 'police stations' in UK are 'unacceptable', says security minister”; Sky News; 6 June 2023).

China appeasers are witnessed beyond partisanship. On the left, there are anti-colonialist wokes. On the right, there are financial lobbyists and their sympathizers. Old fashioned right-left dichotomy is meaningless to analyze correlation of foreign and domestic policy. Britain’s Indo Pacific partners need to be deeply in contact with both ruling and opposition parties to reconfirm security environment in this region and international agreements such as the G7 declaration and the UK-Japanese accord in Hiroshima. Also, it is necessary to reexamine Britain’s own security guidelines like the Integrated Review of Security in 2021, the Strategic Review in 2023, and House Foreign Affairs report led by Kearns this August. Most importantly, Britain’s military presence in Asia would be helpful in the special relationship with the United States, which would ensure a successful Global Britain. At the House of Lords, ex-Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen argued that Americans were more concerned with military adventurism of China than ongoing war in Ukraine, and it would be advantageous for Britain to show its shared security objectives with them in the Pacific (“British carrier in Pacific bolsters US-UK alliance”; UK Defence Journal; September 30, 2023). Though Lord Owen was a secretary of state in the Callaghan administration of the Labour party, his views on the Indo Pacific tilt is completely different from that of current Shadow Defence Secretary Healey. Shadow Foreign Secretary Lammy upholds the “three Cs”, but it is still unclear. After all, it is not ideological label or partisanship, but views and understandings on the Indo Pacific tilt and the Chinese threat that critically matter. Beware of domestic politics in Britain.

International Affairs Surrounding the JEF of Britain and Northern Europe

I would like to explain the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force) that I mentioned in the 2nd paragraph from the bottom in the post of this blog on November 7, and to tell how it is related to various international problems, notably ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. As cited in the post, this is a multilateral coalition of Scandinavian and Baltic nations led by Britain. Currently, the following counties join the coalition.


Britain, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden

First, let me talk about the genesis of the JEF. Originally, Britain had the JRRF (Joint Rapid Reaction Force) , which was composed the three services of its armed forces, and the troop was sent in response to emergencies such as the Sierra Leone Civil War in 2000 and the conflict in North Macedonia in 2001. However, since the 9-11 terrorist attacks onward, Britain had been forced to spare military personnel to Afghanistan and Iraq disproportionately, and therefore, it had become quite difficult for this country to meet the requirement for a rapid response troop by itself. In view of this, former Commander of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), based on advices by HM Army General David Richards ("Speech by General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff"; RUSI; 17 December, 2012), multilateral coalition force was founded in parallel with NATO Wales Summit in 2014. That is the JEF ("The UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)"; IFS Insights; May 2018).

It can be said that the foundation of the JEF is an actual implementation of Britain’s strategy to “boost the tilt to the Indo Pacific, while augmenting presence in the Euro Atlantic region” ("Global Britain in a Competitive Age"; March 2021). Then, what sort of organization the JEF is? It is a multilateral coalition force to respond to the emergency in Northern Europe and the High North, ie, from Greenland to the Barents Sea national border region between Norway and Russia. Along with its own missions, the JEF can collaborate with international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, and each sovereign state like the United States, France, Germany, etc, to defend its operational areas ("Ready to Respond: What is JEF?"; Strategic Command; 11 May 2021). The distinctive feature of this coalition is that its troop is organized on ad hoc basis by countries that can manage the situation on specific occasion to meet the requirements for rapid response, rather than unanimous approval and participation of all the members. This March, Prime Minister-then Boris Johnson boasted that the JEF was the most rapid to respond to the expansion of threat to Scandinavia and the Baltic area from Russian invaded Ukraine ("The Joint Expeditionary Force: Global Britain in Northern Europe?"; CSIS Commentary; March 25, 2022).

Incidentally, since the operational areas of the JEF are Scandinavia, the Baltic, and High North, it is necessary to watch whether independence campaigns of Scotland would pose negative impacts on military cooperation among Britain, Northern Europe, and Baltic nations, as it is located at the center of the above regions. The British Supreme Court rejected the bid by the Scottish government for judicial procedure to hold a referendum for independence without approval of the British parliament, on November 23 ("Blow for Scottish nationalists as UK court rejects independence vote bid"; Reuters News; November 24, 2022). Above all, could Scotland govern a sovereign the state on its own, even if it won independence and joined the EU successfully? The incumbent Sturgeon administration implements quite a high level of welfare policy such as providing period products for all the women for free. That requires strong foundation of the economy, but there is not so much value-added industry in Scotland today. It is too wishful to pursue such a highly developed welfare state, while dependent on the primary industry.

In England, the are some world class IT industry bases such as Cambridge, but not in Scotland. Also, most of the Britain’s aerospace businesses are based in England. Under such circumstances, it is British defense industry that brings value-added business there, and particularly, the Royal Navy creates demand for high-tech warships in the ship building industry, in which Scotland is strong traditionally. If First Minister Nicola Sturgeon really were to materialize her ideal of welfare state, she should be well aware of economic relations with the United Kingdom.

Britain and Scotland are in win-win relations on defense, too. Since the Cold War era, Russian threat comes from the Murmansk area via air and sea. Against such threats from the north, Britain has been checking them with its navy and air force, in cooperation with NATO allies. Particularly, Scotland is strategically important in those missions. Among numerous military bases, Clyde naval base in Faslane is favorable to keep confidentiality of nuclear submarines thanks to complex terrain, and the US navy and air force also have their bases in Scotland. Does Sturgeon believe that their autonomous state can manage Russian threats without being defended by Britain and America? It does not make any sense for Scotland to bring uncertainty to the JEF.

However, more critical international problem that needs attention in relation to ongoing Ukrainian crisis is that Sweden and Finland apply for NATO membership while Turkey insists on reserving the approval of the bid because both countries protect asylum seekers who are designated terrorists in the Turkish homeland. Britain and Scandinavian nations have been in deep-rooted friendship since the old EFTA era, which is also a background component of recent foundation of the JEF. On the other hand, Anglo-Turkish relations have been close, because both countries have been EU outsiders each other. Britain’s bids for EEC membership were rejected twice by De Gaulle’s France, and though this country finally managed to join the Community in 1973, it dragged the progress of further integration of Europe frequently. Meanwhile, successive administrations of Turkey have made efforts to join the EU, but that has not been accomplished yet. Prior to an agreement with the EU, Turkey concluded the bilateral trade deal with Britain in December, 2020. Also in military cooperation, Turkey receives technological assistance from Britain in its next generation fighter jet project.

Currently, Turkey provides Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 as a NATO member country, and launched corvettes for the Ukrainian navy in October last year, which were ordered in 2020 ("Turkey Launches 326-Foot Warship For Ukraine, Won’t Arrive Until 2024"; The War Zone; October 3, 2022). At the United Nations, Turkey votes consistently for denouncement and sanctions on Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, this country impresses its political presence to the world by intermediating Russia and Ukraine to settle a grain export deal. Turkey can assume such a role due to deep economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine in construction and tourism, wheat import, and fruit export. Furthermore, Turkey is a leading exporter of pasta and flour with wheat import from both countries ("Turkey not to suffer shortage in grains: Ministry"; Hurriyet Daily News; February 26, 2022). In view of this, would Britain fulfill some role along with the United States, the NATO leader, considering its vital strategic relations with both Turkey and the two Scandinavian nations? As mentioned in the explanation about the JEF in this post, Sweden and Finland are no longer neutral, but deeply associated with the Western alliance. NATO expansion is intended to bolster the alliance furthermore, and it is also a vital issue to envision the world order after the war between Ukraine and Russia.

Both international and Japanese media may not report about British military organization frequently. However, its international relations are beyond Britain and its neighbors. Since the Anglo-Japanese defense cooperation is deepening these days, we have to pay more attention to British national security.