China’s Notion of Sovereignty Could Split the Sino-Russian Axis

China is a vocal critic of current international rules and norms, because they regard the rule-based world order today as being based on Western values. Accordingly, Chinese policymakers claim idiosyncratic notions of national sovereignty and international law, which leads them to face frequent territorial dispute with their neighbors and philosophical conflict with the global community. In view of this, there is some possibility of a future conflict between China and Russia despite their common defiance against the Western liberal world order, as Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye made a gaffe that the sovereignty of post-Soviet republics was questionable (“China’s ambassador to France questions 'sovereign status' of former Soviet nations”; France 24; 23 April, 2023). In other words, the Sino-Russian axis is breakable, and the notion of sovereignty is one of the causes to accelerate the split.

The ambassador’s remark was so controversial that Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded quickly to deny this to soothe criticism from the global community, and emphasized that China respected the sovereignty of former Soviet countries (“China affirms ex-Soviet nations’ sovereignty after ambassador comments”; PBS News; April 24, 2023). However, Masanobu Abe, a Japanese journalist based in Paris, argues that Western experts regard Ambassador Lu’s comment as common understanding of post-Soviet national sovereignty among Chinese foreign policy makers (“China’s Real Intention? Why the Ambassador to France Casted Doubt on Ukrainian Sovereignty?”; Toyo Keizai; April 27, 2023). Lu may have wanted to deny Ukrainian territorial legitimacy in Crimea, but theoretically, it implies that China does not recognize the sovereignty of Russia as well. Potentially, that could trigger a Sino-Russian clash in Outer Manchuria or the Russian Far East. For China, this is a historical range of Manchurian Qing Empire, but taken forcibly by Russia through the treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the treaty of Peking in 1860. At the end of the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet border conflict broke out, relations between both countries turned worse.

In view of such historical context, recent remark by Chinese President Xi Jinping could provoke a bilateral territorial dispute in the Russian Far East again, as he demanded that Russian geographical place names in this region be renamed in Chinese, such as Vladivostok into Haishenwai. That implicitly suggests China’s deeply rooted territorial grudge against Russia, although Outer Manchuria was out of the Han Chinese sphere throughout history. Despite the anti-Western axis, China wants to prompt Russian decline in the economy and demography, to make this country more dependent on them to gain more access to natural resource in Siberia (“Goodbye Vladivostok, Hello Hǎishēnwǎi!”; CEPA; July 12, 2022). Xi’s remark insinuates China’s hidden territorial zeal to retake this area as Russia is exhibiting in Ukraine now, which could spark a bilateral conflict in the future.

The potential territorial dispute could develop into a further problem. Currently, Russia exports oil and gas to China and India through huge discount to alleviate the impact of Western sanctions on its economy since the invasion of Ukraine. The export price of Russian oil from Baltic ports is deducted by $11 per barrel for China and $14 to 17 for India (“India and China snap up Russian oil in April above 'price cap'”; Reuters; April 19, 2023). But that sort of bargain sale is self-defeating and unsustainable in the long run, from a fair-trade point of view. Particularly, China would also exploit other natural resource in Far Eastern Siberia, at the expense of the taiga environment. Actually, Chinese lumbermen were notorious for illegal logging there, even long before the war in Ukraine (“Corruption Stains Timber Trade”; Washington Post; April 1, 2007). As Russia loses bargaining power through the ongoing war, China’s selfish appetite for natural resource would devastate the local ecosystem and livelihood of the people. Experts of international politics focuses on state-to-state power interactions so much that they do not pay sufficient attention to conflicts related to global commons. Also, Western environmentalists should be more active to defend Siberian forests as they were to defend Amazonian forests in the 1980s. The issue of natural resource and territorial sovereignty in the Russian Far East is deeply interconnected each other. This is another cause to split the Sino-Russian axis.

Both countries do not abide by the rule-based world order, and therefore, they often behave disrespectfully to mutual accords. Though China and Russia share anti-Western and revisionist views of the world, Russia fears Chinese expansionism in its Far East territory, leading to the Kremlin's imperfect compliance with bilateral trade and investment deals (“The Beijing-Moscow axis: The foundations of an asymmetric alliance”; OSW Report; November 15, 2021). On the other hand, China claims that current international law is insufficient to protect their core interests, and therefore, they have to defend the interest through domestic legislation even if that law is incompatible with global rules. One of the most critical examples of China’s defiance to international law is its infringement of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. Professor Emeritus Shigeki Sakamoto of Kobe University denounces that such arbitrary interpretation of international law would inflict tremendous damage on international maritime order. The focal point is that China does not clarify the condition to prioritize domestic legislation to global rules and norms (“The Anatomy of Chinese Maritime Strategy: Violation of International Maritime Order through Domestic Legislation and Arbitrary Interpretation of UNCLOS”; JFIR; February 13, 2023) If China goes its own way so aggressively, it would face bitter frictions with other countries throughout the world, including Russia. Remember the Sino-Soviet split since the denunciation of Stalinist cult by Soviet Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Just being anti-American cannot keep the solidarity of both countries.

The Sino-Russian axis has been splitting our alliance and democracy, and their manipulations have grown more invigorated after the Cold War. Particularly, Russian election intervention for Brexit and Trump has shaken the foundation of Western democracy. Now, China is intervening the Taiwanese presidential election through inviting Kuomintang candidate Ma Yingjeou to the mainland (“Ma Ying-jeou’s historic trip: Can former Taiwan president help ease cross-strait tensions?”; Japan Times; April 7, 2023). Therefore, we must find every weakness of the Sino-Russian axis to retaliate against those crafty actions. Their solidarity is breakable. While G7 nations made efforts to rift the Global South from China and Russia at the Hiroshima summit, it is more important to drive a wedge between these great powers.

Can Britain Draw India into the West?

The war in Ukraine has starkly divided the world into Western democracies and Russo-Chinese autocracies. However, some democratic nations that were invited to the Democracy Summit by US President Joseph Biden, stay neutral and abstained from denouncing the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the UN Security Council in February and the UN Human Rights Council in April. Among them, India has long and deep relations with Russia since the Cold War era to counter Pakistan. Even today, Russia is the primary exporter of weapons for this country. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect India to join Western sanctions against Russia, at this stage.

On the other hand, India has been deepening security partnership with the United States since the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Today, she joins the Quad to enhance the FOIP against China’s maritime expansionism. Therefore, it is a strategic imperative for Western Democracies to draw India into their side. For this objective, it is necessary to provide some defense and economic incentives from long term perspectives. The 21st century Cold War between the Sino-Russian axis and the Western alliance would go beyond the Russo-Ukrainian war. Prior to the Quad summit in Tokyo on May 24, Britain and France made some deals with India. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited India to meet his counterpart Narendra Modi on April 22, in order to enhance strategic partnership between both countries regarding the economy, security, climate change, etc. (“PM: UK-India partnership ‘brings security and prosperity for our people’”; GOV.UK; 22 April, 2022). Among numerous issues, the most deeply related to the focus of this post is Britain’s assistance of India’s next generation fighter aircraft project (“UK, India promise partnership on new fighter jet technology”; Defense News; April 22, 2022).

Prior to the deal with Britain, India cancelled the FGFA project, whose design was based on the Su-57 of Russia. Actually, this project has been delayed repeatedly and turned out too costly, as Russia faced financial and technological problems to develop the original Sukhoi stealth fighter aircraft (“$8.63-billion advanced fighter aircraft project with Russia put on ice”; Business Standard; April 20, 2018). Quite importantly, India was dissatisfied with the proto-type of the Russian design, and wanted more than 40 changes in engine, stealth and weapon-carrying capabilities (“India and Russia Fail to Resolve Dispute Over Fifth Generation Fighter Jet”; Diplomat; January 06, 2016). It seems that operational history of this fighter substantiates those concerns. In 2018, the Su-57 made a battlefield débuts in Syria (“Russia's most advanced fighter arrives in Syria”; CNN; February 24, 2018), but strangely, it is not used so much in the contested air space of Ukraine, where Russia is supposed to need a stealth fighter to establish air superiority (“Russia's much-touted Su-57 stealth fighter jet doesn't appear to be showing up in Ukraine”; Business Insider; Jun 14, 2022).

The Russian defense industry had been a formidable rival to the Western counterpart until the 1980s. But their technological strength lies in hardware, not in software. For example, the West was startled to see the level of Russian aerodynamics of fighter aircraft, when the Su-27 demonstrated Pugachev’s Cobra maneuver at the Paris Air show in 1989. However, as a consequence of the progress in computer electronics and information technology, avionics have become more important than maneuverability, which has given the West a much more advantageous position vis-à-vis Russia. At the beginning of the 1990s, when the Soviet Union was crumbling, Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University mentioned about Russian manufacturing, “The Stalinist economy was successful in mastering relatively unsophisticated technologies and producing basic goods on a massive scale. … The biggest problem , however, is that Soviet central planners lack the flexibility to keep up with the quickened pace of today’s information-based economy. … An information-based economy requires broadly shared and freely flowing information to reap maximum gains” (“Bound to Lead”; Chapter 4, p. 120~121; 1990). Throughout the Yeltsin and the Putin era, Russia still fails to resolve this old Soviet problem. How dare can Vladimir Putin is compare himself with Peter the Great who successfully modernized and enlightened this country?

Currently, Britain is providing technological assistance for major regional powers to develop their indigenous next generation stealth fighters such as Turkey’s TAI TF-X and Japan’s Mitsubishi F-3. These projects proceed in parallel with Britain’s Tempest project, while technology transferees are allowed to maintain their sovereign initiative. Since the Modi administration launches the “Make in India” initiative to strengthen manufacturing sector, Britain’s offer will be helpful for India. Other Western countries such as the United States and France are launching export campaigns of their weapons actively, but Britain is quite assisting India’s stealth fighter to counter China's J-20 and J-31, from the R&D stage (“India bolsters arms ties with West to sever Russian dependence”; Nikkei Asia; June 17, 2022). Historically, Britain did not rule the whole of the Empire directly, but permitted some sort of self-rule by local lords to some extent in some areas. This traditional imperial skill will be helpful for the British defense circle to engage with stealth fighter projects in Turkey, Japan, and India.
　
BAE Systems that lead the Tempest R&D, is one of the top suppliers of high-tech components for advanced American weapon systems, which is technologically the most competitive defense market in the world. This implies that British defense technology is more reliable than Russian one. The war in Ukraine impresses Western advantage furthermore. Russia has fired numerous precision guided missiles, but unlike Western ones, 60% of those missiles failed to attack the target (“Exclusive: U.S. assesses up to 60% failure rate for some Russian missiles, officials say”; Reuters; March 26, 2022). Appallingly, Russian missile attacks are more poorly accurate than a layman’s throw in playing catch. Sanctions will broaden the gap of industrial technology between Russia and the West. China is not going to supply Russia with sanctioned technology, for fear of secondary sanctions on itself (“Russia's economy in for a bumpy ride as sanctions bite”; BBC News; 15 June, 2022). Russian weapon systems are less expensive and need less maintenance work than Western ones. But India today has grown richer and stronger enough to deploy more advanced Western arsenals, and ultimately, that will lower dependence on Russia.
　
Britain’s engagement with India’s stealth fighter project is also associated with its Indo-Pacific strategy. Last year, before Ruussian invasion of Ukraine, the British Prime Minister’s Office released “Global Britain in a competitive age”, which shows how Britain’s foreign and security policy anchors the “tilt” toward the Indo-Pacific within the Euro-Atlantic region. It states that Russia is the foremost threat, while China, India, and Japan are the key strategic focuses in the Indo-Pacific from their respective natures. Among the three, Britain regards China as an authoritarian state that poses the “biggest state-based threat” to its economic security and a “systemic challenge” to its security, prosperity and values. Meanwhile, India is recognized as “ “the largest democracy in the world” and as an “international actor of growing importance” to be aligned with Britain’s partner in this region, notably, the United States, Japan, and Australia, in terms of security, economy, and the environment (“Understanding the UK's ‘tilt’ towards the Indo-Pacific”; IISS Analysis; 15 April, 2021).

The “tilt” was designed to augment Britain’s global standings in the post-Brexit era, through deepening security and economic engagement with the Indo-Pacific region, to curb Chinese threats and to open up business opportunities in this fast-growing market. It is endorsed by diverse actors in Britain, including the government, business, and think tanks. Also, stakeholders in the region welcome the “tilt” (“What is behind the UK’s new ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’?”; LSE International Relations Blog; October 6, 2021). Regarding the Anglo-Indian partnership in the “tilt”, Visiting Professor Tim Wiliasey-Wilsey mentioned the following in a joint commentary by defense experts of the King’s College London (“The Integrated Review in Context: A Strategy Fit for the 2020s?”; King’s College London; July 2021). The fundamental point is that we should observe the strategic partnership bilaterally and multilaterally. The latter includes the Quad plus, the AUKUS, and other regional security and economic arrangements. Historically, India regarded Britain as pro-Pakistani, because the Muslim League of Pakistan was treated more favorably than the Congress Party of India during the colonial era and upon independence. Also, Pakistan joined the CENTO, a UK-led anti-communist military alliance in the Middle East. However, as the Taliban obstructed NATO operations in Afghanistan, Britain had begun to turn to India rather than Pakistan. Today, Britain is even inviting India to join the Five Eyes. When the FGFA project has stalled, the United Kingdom is drawing India into the West, both in terms of defense procurement and intelligence. That would be helpful to decouple this country from the Kremlin in the long run, despite current disagreements on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Hindu nationalism can grow into a critical hurdle to develop the strategic partnership between India and Britain, and also, other Western countries. First of all, we have to reexamine the assumption that India is the largest democracy in the world. According to the Freedom House index, India is not as free and democratic as advanced democracies. Regarding political rights, though India inherited British political system, ethnic and religious minorities are under-represented in the parliament. The scores in civil liberties are much worse. Current Prime Minister Modi is more antagonistic to press freedom than his Cambridge and Oxford-educated Sikh predecessor Manmohan Singh. Also, religious freedom is not guaranteed, as the Hindu majority launches aggressive anti-Muslim campaign in line with Modi’s BJP. The judicial authority is not independent enough to stop such populist upheaval (“FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2022: India”; Freedom House). Had a January 6 riot occurred in New Delhi instead of Capitol Hill, India might have failed to stop ribald vandalism. The West has a technological advantage to supplant Russia in defense procurement. But the question is how much we share common values with India.

Quite interestingly, Hindu nationalists have some similarities with Russky Mir devotees for Putin and January 6 rioters for Trump. All of them are extremely vindictive and tribalist. According to Gareth Price, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, most of the support for Modi’s BJP comes from the most populous and generally poorer Hindi ‘heartland’ states in the northern inland like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. They are resentful of English-speaking globalist elites who brought socio-economic inequality. Those nationalist populists satisfy their pride by scapegoating “privileged” ethno-sectarian minorities, notably Muslims and Dalits, just as Trump Republicans blame affirmative actions for blacks and Hispanics, and Putin supporters label pro-Western independentists in Ukraine as neo-Nazis. Most of the media and experts dismiss this point, although that seems to be deeply related to the reason why Modi’s India is so tolerant to savage, brutal, and immoral deeds by Russian troops in Ukraine. A developing country may have impending priority in the economy, but India even hesitates to condemn Russian conduct just verbally. For further consideration of Hindu nationalism in foreign affairs, we have to bear in mind that this ideology is so xenophobic that it is not so hostile to other homegrown religions such as Sikhism and Jainism, but antagonistic to exotic ones, notably Islam and Christianity (“Democracy in India”; Chatham House; 7 April, 2022).

Therefore, the West should not be so wishful as to call India the largest democracy in the world. Of course, this country share common geopolitical interest with the West, notably, "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". But with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, India’s deep and inextricable relationship with Russia is reconfirmed among the global public, which poses a critical question how much we share common values with this country. As shown in Britain’s defense cooperation, the West can outcompete with Russia in the defense market of India, with more advanced and sophisticated technology. Geostrategically, that is a worthy effort for the West to weaken the Russo-Indian ties. Modi’s Hindu nationalist India in the Indo-Pacific is like Erdoğan’s Islamist Turkey in the NATO. Coincidentally, Britain is providing Tempest technology for both countries to help their indigenous fighter projects. While deepening strategic partnership with India on common interest issues to dilute Russo-Chinese influence on this country, we should not fall into wishful thinking to regard this country as the largest democracy in the world. For the time being, it is not recommendable to take provocative reaction to Hindu nationalism at governmental level. We should rather let non-governmental actors engage with ethno-sectarian and other social minorities to improve governance in India.

The Ambiguity of the Indo-Pacific Strategy

At the end of the last year, I had some opportunities to attend a couple of public forums on the Indo-Pacific strategy to defend the freedom of navigation and the rule of law in this huge region. Literally speaking, the Indo-Pacific region means the area beyond the east of Suez, but policy debates focus on managing Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea so much that it seems to me that this grand design is confused with, or even contract into the Asia-Pacific strategy. That may be why most of the debates sound rather reactive to Chinese expansion, than proactive to take an initiative for the new order in this region. Therefore, I would like to review the background of the Indo=Pacific strategy from the beginning.

The genesis of the Indo-Pacific strategy today was presented by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) Nairobi in 2016. Abe stressed importance of the sea lane that connects Asia and Africa, and stated that Japan would endorse freedom of navigation and the rule of law for African development and security ("Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at TICAD VI"; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan; August 27, 2016 and TICAD Yokohama Declaration states the "Indo-Pacific Initiative"; Nihon Keizai Shimbun; August 30, 2019).Abe’s idea is nothing new. Historically, there were some precursors. In the Middle Age, Arab-Muslim merchants dominated trade of goods and slaves from Africa to the Far East on the sea. In the colonial era, the British Empire defended the sea lane from Suez to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Also, the Royal Navy enforced the rule of law to stop slave export from Africa. More recently, the Bush administration launched the Greater Middle East Initiative to fight the War on Terror against Islamic extremism, and to promote democracy throughout the region.

Compared with these historic precedences, it seems to me that current Indo-Pacific strategy lacks panoramic views and consistency. China is a critical challenge, but I would argue that it is necessary to manage threats in the Middle East and Africa like Iran and terrorism, in connection with Chinese geopolitical ambition. Also, we need to consider the multilateral framework for this objective. Actually, Professor Ken Jimbo of Keio University comments that America’s Pacific strategy had evolved virtually into the Indo-Pacific strategy, when the 7th fleet began to fill the vacuum in the Indian Ocean after British withdrawal from the east of Suez in the 1960s and 70s. Nevertheless, we witness how the Western strategy against Iran is poorly coordinated these days. In view of such multidimensional aspects, let me talk about the involvement by regional stakeholders beyond the Asia-Pacific.

Just as Asia-Pacific nations have different interests and priorities each other, so do the nations of the Indian Ocean. Most noticeably, India wants to maintain strategic autonomy from the United States, though she assumes China as the primary threat in her “Look East” defense strategy. Meanwhile, African nations wonder how much they can embrace China’s BRI. While they do not want the West to preach democracy and human rights, some countries like Kenya worries that China would dominate them through 5G telecommunication systems and tied aid, and even drag them into East Asian conflicts in which they are hardly interested (“Focus: the Potential of the Indo=Pacific Initiative”; JIIA International Affairs; December 2019). Also, we have to accommodate major powers outside the region into the Indo-Pacific strategy. From this point of view, US-European partnership is quite important. However, as President Donald Trump courts conservative base at home to prioritize his reelection to diplomacy, the transatlantic clash of values over new human rights, such as abortion rights and LGBTQ issues, grows further. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo mocks them “unreliable rights” ("The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Decomber 18, 2019).

As policy coordination among allies stall, another challenger to the Indo-Pacific strategy emerges. Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution, comments that Russian influence in the Middle East is growing, while America and Europe split over Iran (“The only winner of the US-Iran showdown is Russia”; Brookings Institution; January 9, 2020). Abe has launched an ambitious initiative to show Japanese political presence in the absence of American leadership. But today, everything has become more complicated than in the days of Arab traders and British imperialists, to implement a grand design to connect Africa and Asia that Abe stated at the TICAD 6 in Nairobi. On one hand, we have to manage specific and imminent problem like Chinese expansionism, but on the other hand, we have to review the concept of the Indo-Pacific strategy in the whole region.

How Can Atlantic Democracies and Japan Coact against Russia and China?

The transition of international politics of values to geopolitics turns the world increasingly more unstable. During the Cold War, the cohesion of liberal democracies was relatively strong. However, in the New Cold War against Russia and China, the democratic alliance does not necessarily act in solidarity. This is typically seen in quibbles by Europeans and Americans that Japanese are too preoccupied with China, but pay not much attention to Russia. Meanwhile, Japanese often complain that Europeans and Americans are not well-aware of China’s dangerous ambition associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Historically, there was a similar example, which was the relationship between Britain and white dominions of the British Commonwealth during World War II. There are some geopolitical analogies of revisionist powers between Nazi Germany and Russia, and also the Imperial Japan and China.Likewise, we can regard the British homeland as NATO nations, and the Australian Dominion as Japan today.

The British Commonwealth in the prewar era was more closely associated with British imperialism than the Commonwealth of Nations today. Through World War I, Britain’s white dominions had grown more important actor on the global stage, and they were admitted domestic and diplomatic autonomy, while maintaining special bonds with Britain to bolster the Empire, based on common socio-cultural heritage of the Anglo Saxon and loyalty to the British crown. However, when World War II broke out and geopolitics grew more important, the cohesion of the Commonwealth was critically tested. While Britain gave priority to defeat Germany, Pacific dominions of Australia and New Zealand faced an increasing threat of Japan, particularly after the fall of Singapore. Some cities, notably Darwin, were hit by Japanese air raids repeatedly. In other dominion like South Africa, Afrikaners even defied the British rule, and explored to align with Germany. History tells us that the world order of geopolitics is so fragile, and therefore, it is critical to revitalize the alliance of liberal democracies to manage worldwide challenges by revisionist powers.

In terms of present day security context, NATO nations and Japan have different priorities. However, unlike Nazi Germany and the Imperial Japan, Russia and China are potential geopolitical rivals each other, as they share long borders in the Far East, and compete for superiority in Central Asia. Actually, they had territorial clashes in the Cold War era, over the Damansky Island on the Usiri River in the east and Tielieketi in Xinjian Uyghur in the west, though both of them confronted with America. Their mutual distrust has not been wiped out. Therefore, Japanese policymakers need to draw more attention from NATO nations to the Russo-Chinese rivalry in the Far East, in order to fill the gap of strategic interests and scopes, between Atlantic and Pacific democracies. There is no doubt that Europeans and Americans are more keenly aware of Russia than Japanese, but their focuses are disproportionately concentrated on her actions in Europe and the Middle East, particularly, military threats in the Baltic, annexation of Crimea, sponsorship to Assad in Syria, close alignment with Iran, and so forth. However, these Russian actions are not separated from, but correlated with those in East Asia.

Having mentioned strategic gaps between Atlantic and Pacific democracies, let me talk about Russo-Chinese geopolitical partnership and rivalry. Though Russia and China share common interests to pursue a more multipolar world against Western superiority, their geostrategic goals are not necessarily congruent over the Far East and Central Asia. Globally, while Russia wants to overturn the liberal world order, China has been already incorporated into the global economy, as shown in her WTO membership and numerous subcontractors to Western businesses in manufacturing. Meanwhile, Russia worries about the growing Chinese economic presence in Central Asia and the Far East. In Central Asia, China accommodates Russian interests in the Belt and Road Initiative. But due to critical concern with the growing instability in Central Asia and Afghanistan, China is boosting security engagement in the region, which could edge out Russian military influence in the future. In the Far Eastern Siberia, the Sino-Russian partnership and rivalry is more complicated. It is a strategic imperative for Putin’s Russia to proceed economic development plans in the sparsely populated and underdeveloped region, in order to solidify the sovereign rule there. For this objective, Russia hosts Chinese investments in energy resource and infrastructure in the Far East. Despite friendly personal relations between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, local governments are critically alarmed at the growing influence of Chinese business and gangsters. Unlike Central Asia, the clash of the two major powers arises in the Russian homeland in the Far East. (“Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic”; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; February 28, 2018). In view of such geopolitical backgrounds, Euro-Atlantic nations cannot dismiss security impacts of Putin’s pivot to Asia.

Beyond Russo-Chinese geopolitics, there are some points in the Far Eastern Siberia that deserve attention from Euro-Atlantic democracies. Komsomolsk-on-Amur is the center of Russian aerospace and defense industry, because huge air space of this region is more advantageous to test fighter jets and missiles than congested air space of European parts. Also, Putin started to build Vostochny Cosmodrome in 2011, which is already in use now. Vast Siberian taiga is critically endangered by illegal Chinese loggers, and it is important for the global environment as much as tropical rain forests in the Amazon and the rest of the world. Further to the east, the Bering Strait will be a strategic place between the United States and Russia, in an era of Arctic navigation. Historically, Asian horse riders like Huns, Pannonian Avars, and Mongolians invaded Europe through the Eurasian Steppe that stretches from northern China to Romania and Hungary. Therefore, the new age of geopolitics does not necessarily imply the age of myopic localism. Pacific and Atlantic democracies can fill perception gaps, if both sides understand the link of their primary threats.

On the other hand, Japan needs to reconsider her handling of Russo-Chinese geopolitics. There is no denying that Japan needs assurance of regional power balance in an age of America First populism in the United States. But that does not mean that Japan should make a loophole in the democratic alliance. As seen in the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, it is Japan’s vital interest to maintain the liberal world order in the absence of American leadership under the Trump administration. However, Japan has been hollowing Western sanctions against repetitive Russian transgression like the invasion of Crimea, the nerve gas attack against Sergei Skripal, and the sponsorship to the Assad regime in Syria that continually uses chemical weapons against unarmed civilians. Those “independent” actions simply pose the risk of isolation within western democracies to Japan, while she does not have powerful and reliable partners in Asia for her own national survival. More importantly, savage competition of geopolitics makes Japan’s position in the world increasingly vulnerable and fragile (“A New Cold War With Russia Forces Japan to Choose Sides”; Diplomat; April 23, 2018). Nationalists may feel proud of a Japan that is totally “independent” from any regional powers, including China, Russia, and even America, as she was in the prewar era. But Russo-Chinese geopolitics is too big for Japan to handle alone. This is clearly shown in Putin’s blunt comment that Russia had no intention of returning the disputed Kuril islands, because Japan is in alliance with the United States. Remember, prewar Japan was not proudly independent as nationalists argue, but forcefully cut off from the alliance with Britain.

Without the Ambassador in Seoul, How Can Trump Have Leverage over North Korea?

In the North Korean crisis, there is a growing chasm between Sunshine policy-oriented South Korea and pressure-oriented Japan and the United States. But it is utterly wrong to blame President Moon Jaein of South Korea one-sidedly, though his pro-North posture since the election has been posing constraints to the trilateral partnership with the United States and Japan. We need to pay more attention to an inherent problem of President Donald Trump’s management of the US government, notably, the Foreign Service. Ever since his inauguration, senior governmental positions are still vacant, and the ambassador to South Korea is one of them. In view of Trump’s notorious America First creed, there is no wonder that Moon worries about American commitment to the security of the Korean Peninsular, and appease North Korea. Even if South Korean president were more pro-American than Moon, this country would lean toward balancer diplomacy with the North and China, rather than a staunch partnership with the United States and Japan. In my eyes, the more one knows about Korean affairs, the more liable to dismiss this basic point.

With a highly qualified ambassador in Seoul, America and South Korea would be able to discuss North Korea policy on a daily basis in every detail. The role of the US ambassador in South Korea is not just policy consultations with the Blue House. The American ambassador in Seoul can watch and control Moon so that he will not deviate from the common ground with other US allies in the region. The Commander of the US Forces in Korea is not in a position to be involved in political affairs. It is the ambassador who can have leverage over the Blue House, whether through compassionate consultation or ruthless pressure. We need to remember geopolitics that South Korea is adjacent to North Korea like China, thus, she is tempted to an appeasement to Pyong Yang for fear of instability of the Peninsular and a huge influx of refugees in her territory. Only a strong diplomatic presence of the United States can keep South Korea closely aligned with Asia-Pacific democracies. The Trump administration was so upset to send Vice President Mike Pence to the opening ceremony of the Pyeongchnag Olympics, in order to drive a wedge between South Korea and North Korea (“The Last Moratorium that the US gave to South Korea”; Gendai Business; February 16, 2018). Furthermore, the administration even sent Ivanka Trump to the closing ceremony, that spurred bitter criticism to her poor credentials in diplomacy (“Ivanka Trump's chronic problem”; Chicago Tribune; February 28, 2018). Anyway, they stayed only a few days there, while an ambassador can meet Moon almost daily.

As shown in Trump’s notorious plan to cut State Department budget and personnel based on cost and benefit perspectives, his disrespect to the Foreign Service is terribly lopsided. But considering the emphasis on North Korea in the New Security Strategy last December (“President Trump's New National Security Strategy”; CSIS Commentary; December 18, 2017), Trump needs to recognize the importance of Foreign Service professionalism, rather than clinging to populism and cost-and-benefit thinking. From this point of view, Trump has to reconsider the appropriate balance of diplomatic bargaining and military pressure against Kim Jongun. He may want to send his own appointee to South Korea after Barack Obama’s ambassador Mark Lippert. However, as long as he disdains expertise of the Foreign Service, he will not find the right nominee by himself. This is why former National Security Council Victor Cha in the Bush administration did not accept Trump’s nomination (“Trump Finally Taps Ambassador to South Korea”; Diplomat; December 16, 2017 and “Still No US Ambassador in South Korea”; Diplomat; February 10,2018).

The fundamental problem goes beyond the ambassador to South Korea. The populist businessman is not well acquainted with those who have close contacts with the government. Also, Trump himself has little experience working for the government. Therefore, his appointment of senior officials has been delayed so much. As of February 28, Trump fails to nominate 41 ambassador positions, including those in some strategically critical countries such as Turkey, Qatar, and Jordan (“More than 40 countries lack a U.S. ambassador. That’s a big problem.”; Think Progress; February 28, 2018). In addition, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s Department reorganization plan to cut sections and positions raises serious concerns among national security experts that it will erode the capability to defend the homeland from global problems like crime and terrorism, and weaken diplomatic presence on the global stage (“Rep. Nita Lowey: Trump is destroying America's status as a global leader and endangering national security”; NBC News; March 1, 2018). These messes were foreseeable when Trump bid for the presidency. Trump’s lopsidedly business-oriented thinking and disdain to the government are shown in his appointment of his cabinet members. From the presidency of George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama, more than 80 % of the cabinet secretaries have governmental experience, but only 47% has in the Trump administration. On the other hand, CEOs account for 28% in the Trump team, but they accounted below 18% in the predecessors’ team since 1989 (“Donald Trump’s Cabinet is radically unorthodox”; Washington Post; January 11, 2018).

The Trump administration is neither comfortable for qualified political appointees to work, nor is it respectful to existing governmental professionals. During the transition period shortly after Trump won the election, Professor Eliot Cohen at the Paul Nitze School of the Johns Hopkins was so discouraged to hear incoherent policy and acrimonious atmosphere in the Trump team that he recommended his fellow conservatives not to work for this administration (“I told conservatives to work for Trump. One talk with his team changed my mind.”; Washington Post; November 15, 2016). A few months after Trump’s inauguration, things went so negatively as Cohen said. His administration disinformed the public that Obama wiretapped him, his dismissal of human rights eroded America’s influence and reputation on the global stage, and his nepotism brought conflict of interests to the White House (“Eliot Cohen was right: Work for Trump, lose your soul”; Washington Post; April 3, 2017). As a result, this administration is forced to appoint unfit people to the ambassador and senior governmental positions. This is typically seen in the case of Ambassador Pete Hoekstra to the Netherlands. Former Republican Congressman without diplomatic experience, he was severely questioned about his past remark to agitate fears about Muslims in the Netherlands, at the first press conference as the ambassador (“Trump's ambassador to Netherlands finally admits 'no-go zone' claims”; BBC News; 12 January, 2018).

Trump may want to replace Obama’s appointees with his favorite ones from his inner circle, but that causes frictions at home and abroad. Therefore, I would suggest that Trump be more respectful to America’s venerable Foreign Service to rebuild diplomacy. Considering talent depletion in his network, he should appoint career diplomats to unfilled ambassadorial positions. Furthermore, Trump and Tillerson should overturn the State Department reorganization plan to keep qualified candidates for ambassador vacancies. This is not just a problem of US-Korean relations.Among industrialized democracies, the Civil and Foreign Services are merit-based, and the ambassador represents the state, not the incumbent administration. Why doesn’t Trump follow this global standard? How can Moon trust current America whose government and diplomacy are in a terrible confusion?,br>

Japan Should Leave the Job to India to Split the Russo-Chinese Axis

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe plans to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin early this December in Yamaguchi prefecture, Abe’s home constituency(“Abe to Meet Putin in December”; Sankei Shimbun; September 1, 2016). Both leaders will talk about the bilateral peace treaty of World War II, the Kuril Island territorial dispute, and bilateral economic cooperation in the Russian Far East. Some people in Japan argue that Abe seize this opportunity to split the Russo-Chinese axis, in order to manage the world of uncertainties. However, I would insist that Japan not run such a risk to jeopardize the Western alliance, and leave the job to India instead. Let me explain it below.

First, it is necessary to mention the Russo-Chinese axis. Superficially, both great powers are allies against the West, notably the American world order. However, the Russian Far East is sparsely inhabited, thus, hugely populated China across the border is a potential national security threat. There are only 4.3 million people in the Russian Far East border area, including the Amur oblast, Primorsky Krai, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and Khabarovsk Krai. On the other hand, the Chinese Northeast overwhelms the neighbor with the population of 109 million (“Russia, China and the Far East Question”; Diplomat; January 20, 2016). In addition to such a state-to-state level threat, Snakehead criminal gangs and illegal loggers from China pose threats to civil and environmental security. In view of Russia’s hidden distrust to China, it is understandable that some Japanese talk of developing a strategic partnership with the Kremlin in order to split both countries to check the threat of the PLA.

However, I would argue that the forthcoming summit should focus on bilateral issues such as the peace treaty and the Kuril dispute. Japan is at the heart of the Western alliance, and therefore, it is not in a good position to get involved in the Russo-Chinese power game. Rather, Americans and Europeans would simply see it suspiciously whether Japan wanted to “Make Russia Great Again”, when tensions over the Baltic and Crimea continue. Just as Japan feels uncomfortable with European appeasement for China, Europe does so with Japanese appeasement for Russia. The notable case of European appeasement is the Anglo-Chinese nuclear deal led by Chancellor of the Exchequer-then George Osborne, which raised critical concerns with Chinese espionage on Britain among the British national security community. Also, Japan and the United States were severely dismayed with such a controversial agreement.

However, current Prime Minister Theresa May said that she would reconsider the deal, in order to weaken Chinese influence on nuclear plants at Hinkley Point and Bradwell (“UK's Theresa May to review security risks of Chinese-funded nuclear deal”; Reuters; September 4, 2016). As the Home Secretary in the Cameron cabinet, May raised national security concerns with the nuclear deal, along with Downing Street Chief of Staff Nick Timothy and MI5 (“Hinkley Point: Theresa May's China calculus”; BBC News; 31 July 2016). May’s action will deter penetration of PLA influence in Europe through China General Nuclear. Japan should act accordingly on Russia.

Meanwhile, India is in a very good position to intervene in the Russo-Chinese power game. None of Western nations raise eyebrows at close Russo-Indian defense cooperation to check China, like the FGFA stealth fighter project for India. Historically, India had close ties with the Soviet Union to rival against pro-Chinese Pakistan. India imported numerous Soviet weapons, such as MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29 fighters. After the Cold War, India still deploys Russian weapons, as typically seen in Su-30MKI, which is built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited under the license from Russia. Despite such strong and enduring relations with Russia since the Soviet era, India had kept nonalignment foreign policy, and never joined the Soviet bloc in history.

On the other hand, India had deepened military ties with the West during the Cold War era, and those relations are still developing in this century. India bought Mirage 2000 from France in the past, and during the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, the Indian Navy deployed the Vikrant, which was a second hand aircraft carrier from Britain. After 9-11 terrorist attacks, India’s strategic partnership with the United States develops rapidly, as typically seen in the nuclear deal between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush. Under the Obama administration, this security cooperation has developed furthermore to invite Japan to the Malabar joint naval exercise (“US, Japan, and India Kick off 2016 Malabar Exercise”; Diplomat; June 12, 2016), in order to deter Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea (“India, Japan Call on China not to Use Force in South China Sea Disputes”; Diplomat; June 15, 2016).

India has been an independent actor in the great power rivalries, and its close relationship with Russia will not change geopolitical balances dramatically. For the West, India is a friendly nation and prospective market. Also, the West balances this country and Pakistan in the War on Terror in Afghanistan, since the latter is frequently unreliable. In view of such close relations with both Russia and the West, India is more fit to the role of splitting the Russo-Chinese axis. For this objective, both Japan and the United States must deepen foreign policy partnership with India, and explore common understandings in Asian security with them. Also, Abe should focus on bilateral issues when he meets Putin this December, in order to avoid unnecessary frictions with America and Europe.

Rubio’s Four Measures against North Korea

The “hydrogen bomb” test, which North Korea conducted on January 6, has inflicted a tremendous impact on the world ("World Powers Unite In Condemnation of North Korea's H-Bomb Test Claim"; Buzz Feed News; January 6, 2016). Since they test nuclear bomb so repeatedly, it has become apparent that the global community needs to take more effective measures than those up to now. In view of this, Republican Senator Marco Rubio who is the most well-versed with national security among US presidential candidates of this election, suggests four measures ("Here Are Four Things Marco Would Do to Take On North Korea"; Marco Rubio.com). First, he argues that the United States put North Korea back on the list of terrorist sponsoring states. Second, he insists on tightening economic sanctions. Furthermore, his third idea is to rebuild the alliance with Asia Pacific nations and re-strengthen the US navy. Fourth, he suggests building up missile defense capability.

Among Rubio’s ideas, we can expect that the fourth measure of bolstering deterrence, notably building up missile defense, is very effective and relatively quick to carry out. The third measure of naval expansion is necessary and effective, but it cannot be done soon. It takes a long time to build war ships. Above all, we must enforce means stronger than economic sanctions, and tell North Korea that they shall never win in a victory over us. Moreover, the Chosun Ilbo insists that US forces in South Korea redeploy tactical nuclear weapon, which was withdrawn in early 1990s (“America Should Redeploy Tactical Nukes in Korea”; Jiji Press; January 7, 2016). The Korea Herald, an English language paper in South Korea, argues furthermore that the IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defense: See "US Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System Defeats Cruise-Missile Target"; Defense News; November 13, 2015) be build, among the United States, Japan, and South Korea ("U.S. likely to step up efforts to build IAMD with Seoul, Tokyo"; Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance; January 7, 2016). We must demonstrate our defensive and offensive capability like this way, and never make them overconfident as to believe that they are stronger than us.

There is no doubt that economic sanctions are important. However, we must keep in mind that the global community has imposed sanctions on North Korea again and again. Also, it is inevitable that there are loopholes in economic sanctions, however strict they are. Above all, people who are already accustomed to poverty will hardly feel pains, even though we tighten sanctions. Past cases show that it takes a long time to see the effect of economic sanctions. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, mainly the Western alliance imposed sanctions on them, but that did not urge the Red Army to withdraw from there. Rather, it was military buildup of the Reagan administration like the 600 ship navy and the SDI (Strategic defense Initiative) that led the Soviet Union to adopt perestroika, as they found themselves incapable of keeping up with arms race with the United States. In another case, South Africa was imposed a sanction of oil embargo by Arab nations during the Apartheid era, but they managed to overcome it by coal liquefaction. Rather, South Africa in those days was the richest nation in Africa. Moreover, the United States and Britain regarded South Africa as buffer against communism, in view of strategic importance since the British imperial rule, as a geographic connecting link of Asia and Europe, and they were reluctant to join international sanctions.

Reviewing history as I mention above, I can hardly imagine that we can lead North Korea to yield to us simply by economic sanctions. After all, it is necessary to go into negotiations with North Korea through power-oriented diplomacy. Also, while China is a critical stakeholder in the Six-party talk, we should rather not over-evaluate their influence on North Korea. Even though India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests each other to heighten tensions in the 1990s, they have already stopped the test now. Only North Korea continues nuclear tests in the 21st century, and they do not care any persuasion by China. We can no longer expect that conventional measures will take effect to stop North Korea’s outrageous behavior. If we continued to leave North Korea overconfident, Iran would also act like this way, as they repeat clashes with the United States and Saudi Arabia from the very beginning of this year.

Is China Really Strong as Broadly Percieved?

The rise of China is one of the top issues among the students of international relations. At various international conferences, pundits from all over the world say that we must accept the ascendency of this emerging giant and its “Manifest Destiny” for greater leverage in global issues, regardless of their nationalities, whether Americans, Europeans, Asians, or Japanese. Some of them even argue so passively as to say that established powers like us accept the decline without resisting the trend of global power transition. It sounds very Buddhist to accept the impermanence of all things and whatever happens, whether desirable or undesirable. But in a Hobbesian world, when a state leader takes such self resigned attitude, his or her country will fall into at the mercy of an ambitious emerging power. We have to make a proper assessment of the power of the challenger, and think of the strategy to manage it.

After all, is China really strong, as many pundits and people say? There is no doubt that this country is a rising giant, which could have substantial impact on the world order and global security. But should we assume China an economic giant? For this question, we need to note ambivalence of its economy, extremely huge total size but disproportionately low per capita income. According to 2014 gross national income per capita ranking by the World Bank, China is merely 101st in the Atlas method, and 105th in purchasing power parity. Quite often, businessmen are so impressed with rapid economic growth and urban development that they are infatuated with a rising China like former Japanese Ambassador Uichiro Niwa who was the Chairman of C. Itoh & Co., before entering diplomatic service. The gross size of the Chinese economy is almost dependent on its huge population. A world economic power in poverty has been unprecedented in history, from Spain, the Netherlands, France, Britain, Germany, the United States, to Japan. That makes it extremely difficult to grade the real economic strength of China. After all, it is utterly absurd to assume that China is the foremost and a formidable economic rival to the United States. Actually, it has not overtaken Japan and major European powers. China is even far poorer than Russia. Is China surpassing the United States in the near future? But when?

I wonder why pundits from all over the world dismiss such a simple fact, regardless of their national, cultural, and career backgrounds. The danger of such mis-evaluation of the Chinese power is that the Beijing Communist Party can harness psychological illusion to suppress international norms, in order to win more advantageous positions. It seems to me that eminent people know so much in depth about China as to put aside the basic and simple fact that I mention here. The receptive attitude to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a typical case of “Buddhistic” appeasement to China’s pushy self claim for the apex great power in Asia. Besides concerns with social and environmental consideration, I can hardly imagine that China has any know how or expertise to manage a multilateral organization. This country has never led regional organization, nor security alliance. It has been isolated from the Western, the Soviet, and the Nonalignment blocs. There are not so many renowned Chinese economists to run a multilateral development bank. Furthermore, can a poor country afford to manage a multilateral bank virtually in a unilateral way? We must understand China’s aspiration to win respect from the United States, Japan, and the global community, but their competence to run a multilateral financial organization is questionable.

Another point that we must question is manufacturing. China is called the world factory, and their competitiveness in low value added products and consumer goods is indisputable. But when it comes to high tech products, China is not a top runner. PLA fighters are mostly copies of the Russian Air Force ones. For example, J-11 is from Su-27, and J-15 is from Su-33. Even China’s indigenous stealth fighter J-31 uses the same engine as that of MiG 29. Actually, Chinese engines are old and weak (“Why China’s Air Force Needs Russia's SU-35”; Diplomat; June 1, 2015). Though J-31 is supposed to be a hacking copy of American F-35, its performance at the Zuhai Air Show in 2014 was graded terribly (“Even Chinese Media Bashed Immaturity of the PLA’s Latest Stealth Fighter”; Iza Sankei Digital; December 17, 2014). However, imitation is no more than imitation, whether legitimate or illegitimate. An interesting example is a German technological transfer of Type 214 submarine to South Korea. Though Koreans were admitted license to build an advanced German submarine, they failed in it, because their bolt connection technology was not developed enough. In other words, technological imitation without a fundamental level of engineering is something like a layman’s cuisine simply dependent on a recipe written by a super cook. Therefore, whether by license or hacking, copied technology is not real technology.

In addition to fighter planes, China’s missiles are also dependent on Russian technology, either imported or copied. In advanced technology, China is so dependent on Russian and hacked American technology. This implies that China’s manufacturing base is extremely poor. In terms of the economy, China is not an irresistible rising power, and it is far from overtaking America, Japan, major European nations, and Russia. The vision of G2 is a daydream. Nor is China a military superpower. China is just a gigantic underdeveloped power. Quite a few people believe that China will make a “declining” Russia their junior partner. That is hardly foreseeable. Applying Susan Strange’s theory of structural power, I would argue that it is Russia that exerts the power to determine the vision of defense, not China. Dependence on Russian technology makes China’s defense system, accordingly. From this point of view, I am impressed with the final line in the article by Kenichi Ito, President of the Japan Forum on International Relations, “Nevertheless, Chinese President Xi Jinping came to such a ceremony, and I wonder whether it was good for China. I am quite doubtful of it”, regarding Xi’s visit to the 70th VE Day ceremony in Moscow (“Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future”; JFIR Commentary; May 27, 2015).

Consequently, I would like to ask a question again. Why are pundits from all over the world so receptive to the rise of China, and tolerant to their “decline” in the global pecking order? Buddhistic self resignation is not an attitude of policy making. If there is something undesirable, we have to make it desirable. If there is something desirable, we have to make it more desirable. For this objective, we must make an assessment of the real strength of China, without fear or favor.

US Foreign Policy in an Increasingly Complicated Asia

I attended the Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue, entitled “The Asia-Pacific in Global Power Transition: How Many Great Powers?”, which was hosted by Global Forum Japan and Meiji University on December 12. Panelists at the Dialogue, notably Professor John Mearsheimer of Chicago University, presented a lucid picture of Asia-Pacific power games based on realist perspectives.

Actually, I was rather astonished to hear Wall Street Journal’s editor Bret Stevens talk suspiciously at the Munk Debates on November 5 that Japan’s plutonium facilities could be used for nuclear weapons, if the threat of China grows more critical. Though I agree on his criticism to Obama’s superpower suicide, it was somewhat perplexing that an influential opinion leader like him spoke so alarmingly as if Japan were in the same league with North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. I am well aware that nuclear nonproliferation is a high priority issue in US foreign policy, and therefore, it sounded like he saw Japan a potential “enemy” to the United States. The problem is not just proliferation itself, but the rise of regional tensions beyond America’s control as we saw exchanges of nuclear tests between India and Pakistan in 1998.

However, Stevens’s comment may not be so “unfriendly” to America’s foremost ally in the Asia Pacific as I worried, according to Professor Mearsheimer’s realist perspectives. The state explores to maximize its national power and prestige, and tries to establish a solid sphere of influence in its neighborhood, for better chances of survival and more freedom in policy options. Therefore, realists see it natural that Japan acquire nuclear weapons, if the United States appeared too weak and unreliable to check growing threats of China. That is because it is the most cost effective deterrence against Beijing.

Granted such arguments, do Japanese leaders dare to get involved in power games with both America and China in their quest for nuclear weapons? Historically, the United States did not accept any dominant power in Asia, as shown in Secretary of State-then John Hay’s Open Door Policy in 1899. Even if seemingly appeasing to China, it is quite unlikely that the United States throws away its grip on Asia, nor does it want unmanageable Far East like the Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry in 1998. Therefore, Japanese leaders should act and speak carefully on wartime history, as prominent opinion leaders like Mearsheimer and Stevens speak about the potential of a nuclearized Japan so openly.

The Dialogue was so impressive and insightful, and I would like to raise the following points to consider. The first one is the Pivot to Asia. Certainly, market opportunities in emerging economies in Asia are important. But does that mean that America should be less involved in Europe and the Middle East? Is the Ukrainian crisis simply a diversion from Asia? No, because Russia intrudes Japan’s northern airspace frequently. It is a threat to us both in Europe and Asia. In addition, China defies America globally. Remember China objected to the Iraq War along with Russia for fear of a unipolar world, though the PLA has no power projection capability in the Middle East. Also, China explores to expand influence in Africa through controversial aid. Therefore, I believe that the shift away from Europe and the Middle East is no guarantee of strengthening American presence in Asia. To my regret, this is the real consequence of Obama’s pivot to Asia as typically seen in the rise of ISIS, while China grows increasingly provocative in East Asia.

Regarding China’s global challenge to the United States, we should reconsider why this country frequently mentions itself “still a developing country”. This is not out of modesty, but megalomaniac ambition. I would rather interpret its implicit meaning, “Developing countries of the world, unite! Rise against Western (and also Japanese) imperialism!”. Remember China is a revolutionary state, and there is every reason for them to defy Pax Americana on a global scale. In order to check China’s expansionism, I would argue that the broken window theory be applied. That is, when American enemies find some weak spots, they will be emboldened like gangs who found broken windows on the street.

The second point is a presumed case of hegenomic transition. Should China take over the American world order, the gap with its precursor’s will be huge. Pax Americaca inherited liberal values, culture, and political systems from Pax Britannica. In face of rising rivals in early 20th century, Britain saw America preferable to Germany to share the burdens of a global superpower. This Greece and Rome relations shall never emerge, should China rise furthermore, because the hegemonic fault line between Pax Americana and Pax Sinica would be immense. If it were to happen, China would be Attla’s Hun that devastated Rome and left nothing for the following generations.

The third point is whether the nature of the regime does not matter in great power rivalries even from realist viewpoints. I would like to mention one example which is Iran, because this country has been in quest of the great power in the Gulf region, whether modernist or Islamic theocracy. During the Pahlavi era, Iran sought to rise as America’s guard of the Gulf. The shah was an enlightened despot, and pursued a nation building through Western styled modernization. The shah even appealed great history of the Persians and their superiority to Arabs by de-Islamification. That made Iran very pro-American and pro-Israeli both in terms of realpolitik and ideology. On the other hand, current theocracy wants to rise by defying American supremacy, and extremely anti-Israeli by nature. They advocate solidarity with Shiite mostazafins among their fellow Arabs. There is nothing strange that they sponsor terrorism, both in terms of realpolitik and ideology.

The dialogue was very helpful to understand an increasingly complicated picture of the Asia Pacific region, and sent a critical message to Japanese leaders to behave carefully regarding sensitive issues. Among three questions I mentioned, the most critical one is the real meaning of the Pivot to Asia. Is this just a rhetoric, or kow-tow to market opportunities in China, or real strategic commitment in this region? That is the problem.

Is China a Carbon Copy of the Imperial Japan?

I was startled to hear Chinese President Xi Jingping’s controversial speech of “Asia for Asians” at CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia) this May (“Chinapresident speaks out on security ties in Asia “; BBC News; 21 May 2014). The underlying idea of this speech overlaps the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, insisted by wartime Japan. In view of regional concerns with Chinese maritime expansionism and growing self-assertiveness, Xi’s “Leave Asia for Asians” speech is understood negatively in the global community. There are so many points in common between wartime and current Asian powers. Let me talk of them.

In terms of geopolitics, both wartime Japan and current China are anti-West. Wartime Japan tried to expel European and American influence from Asia in the name of decolonization and liberation from White dominance. However, the Imperial Japan, itself was a colonial empire, and Asians found no fundamental differences between White sahibs and a Yellow sahib. Today, China also explores to establish their sphere of influence in Asia by ousting US presence in the region.

More importantly, both wartime Japan and present day China are autocracies to defy liberal world order, and exploring to found an axis against democratic nations. Japan allied with fascist Germany and Italy, while China plots to make the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and CICA raise voices against Western democracies. Japan’s wartime axis with Germany and Italy was not well coordinated for joint strategy and operations, and China has not made successful axis to stand against the United States and its democratic allies. Nor do both Asian powers advocate universally acceptable values for global public interest.

It is quite noteworthy that Asians do not welcome the rise or advance of both anti-West autocracies. The fall of Singapore may have impressed Asian people, but when the Allied forces launched counter offense under Douglas MacArthur and Lord Louis Mountbatten, they did not fight side by side with Japanese troops to bounce back white sahibs. Likewise, China’s “Asia for Asians” initiative causes high alert among Asian neighbors, particularly those having territorial clashes over the East China and the South China seas. Also, as Asia is politically and culturally diversified, none of regional organizations will be platforms for Chinese predominance (“Don'tbet on China's 'Asia for Asians only' vision yet”; Strait Times; 30 May 2014). Today, white ruled colonial empires have gone, and Asian nations shall not be interested in a Chinese-led Asia to oust American influence.

Rather than well being of Asian nations, both autocracies are expanding southwards, in quest of natural resource. Wartime Japan wanted oil, tin, rubber, and other mineral and plantation products in South East Asia. Today, it is widely understood that China’s territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea are based on its quest for oil and gas in those waters. Their calls for Asian unity to expel the West are strongly associated with their appetite for natural resource.

Quite ironically, Chinese fishery boats dash themselves to attack Coast Guard ships of their maritime neighbors to claim Chinese territorial rights on south sea islands. Attacks like these are pre-modern like Kamikaze raids to US warships by the Imperial Japan. Is China really a carbon copy of wartime Japan? Interestingly, Former US Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank Curtis Chin also compares current Chin to wartime Japan (“Xi Jinping's'Asia for Asians' mantra evokes imperial Japan”; South China Morning Post; 14 July2014).

In view of Asian alert to China’s aggressive behavior, I have to cast doubt whether China has any credential to blame Japan on wartime history. In my eyes, it is China that acts unprecedentedly similar ways to those of the Imperial Japan. China may want to behave as a winner of World War II continually, but remember the vital point. It is not the Japanese public that lost the war, but wartime fascism. If China really were to act as a winner of the war, bear this in mind!

China and Islam

It is generally assumed that confrontations between Islam and the West are one of the most critical clashes of civilizations since the battle of Tours and Poitiers. However, China may emerge as another main collision counterpart to the Islamic world, because China has replaced the United States as the top oil importer of the world last September, before “overtaking” its GDP (“China surpasses US as biggest oil importer”; NewYork Post; October 10, 2013). This implies that China will have more contacts with Islamic nations overseas, and more frictions with them are expected as seen in Africa. This will undermine China’s self-assumed position as the liberator of Islam from Western dominance and the leader of developing nations. Also, the Chinese economy will be more vulnerable to political challenges in the Islamic sphere than the West.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency’s “China Country Report 2012”, main oil exporters to China among Islamic nations are Saudi Arabia (1st), Iran (3rd), Oman (5th), Iraq (6th), Sudan (7th), Kazakhstan (9th), followed by Kuwait (10th) and so forth (“Fueling a NewOrder? The New Geopolitical and Security Consequences of Energy”; BrookingsInstitution; April 15, 2014). So heavily dependent on Islam oil, China needs to adopt tightrope foreign and domestic policies in the Middle East and Central Asia, in order to secure its economic interests and strengthen its power on the global stage.

In the Middle East, China’s primary strategic focuses are Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Iran has been in close relations with China since the Islamic Revolution. However, it is an archrival against Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, and China needs to strike a subtle balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unlike Israel that Tehran’s fears nuclear threats, Saudi Arabia worries Iran’s hegemony in the Gulf through Shiite encirclement from Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, to its own eastern territory (“Next Test for Obama: Soothing the Saudis”; Los Angels Times; March24, 2014). In a military exercise this spring, Saudi　Arabia demonstrated Dengfeng 3 ballistic missiles from China. Though Saudi purchased this missile in 1988, they kept it secret until this exercise. According to CIA, they imported more advanced Dengfeng 21 from China in 2007, which was not displayed in public yet (“Saudi missile parade a signal to Iran, Israelidefense expert tells ‘Post’”; Jerusalem Post; May 1, 2014).

Saudi Arabia is critically concerned with the Obama administration’s engagement with Iran. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel had to soothe anxieties among Arab allies that the United States would not sacrifice security ties with Persian Gulf allies as it restarted nuclear talks with Iran, at the Gulf Cooperation Council this May (“Hagel Says Iran Deal Won’tWeaken Gulf Security”; Eurasia Review; May 15, 2014). There is nothing strange that Saudi Arabia turns to China as the security umbrella of the United States appears unreliable, and China needs oil from there. But is China really willing to get involved in geopolitical and religious rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran? Despite such a problem, China is in no position to behave  as a lovable and good customer of oil, while leaving dangerous responsibilities entirely to the United States, and to some extent to Britain and France, as Japan took it for granted from the 1960s to the 80s. China has to manage the power game in the region on its own, in order to augment influence and secure oil supply. Arms export is a key policy for these objectives.

Even a non-oil exporter like Turkey is a potential market for China’s arms export. Under Islamist Erdoğan administration, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu envisions Turkey at the heart of the Afro-Eurasian sphere, and moving closer to Islam and Asia, rather than the West, which is a deviation from Kemalism. China seeks more influence on a keystone country for its Middle East and Eurasian strategy. This is typically seen in the Chinese missile controversy between Turkey and its Western allies. The Chinese Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) offered generous conditions to sell their anti-air missile systems, including lower price and less restrictive requirements for technological transfer. Western rivals such as Raytheon/Lochkeed Martin and Eurosam were about to be edged out by Red China, which could have dissolved the Trans Atlantic alliance. However, with pressures from NATO allies, Turkey’s missile deal with China was annulled (“WhyTurkey May Not Buy Chinese Missile Systems After All”; Diplomat Magazine; May7, 2014). Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was involved in persuading Turkey to cancel the deal when he met Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan last October (“TurkeyCancelled the Missile Deal with China, due to the meeting with Abe?”; Xinhua News;October 31, 2013). However, the missile deal shows China’s formidable potential to penetrate defense markets in the emerging economies, according to Denise Der, Research Intern at the National Defense University.

Despite such a Great Leap Forward, China has an inherent disadvantage to tighten its grip on the Middle East. In the recent operation to search the missing Malaysian airliner in the southern Indian Ocean, China sent a huge squadron of 18 warships, coastguard vessels, a civilian cargo ship and an Antarctic icebreaker. It has become apparent that China needs overseas naval logistic network if it really were to be a blue water navy. China uses Australian ports for this mission, but most of the Indo-Pacific sea lane countries are allied with the United States (“Search for MH370 reveals amilitary vulnerability for China”; Reuters News; April 22, 2014). More political and economic presence implies more contact with people in the region, which leads it more likely that Chinese are attacked by extremists. Despite rapid naval build up as shown in aircraft carrier Liaoning, poor backup will undermine China’s independent power projection capability in the Middle East.

Central Asia is landlocked and adjacent, thus, China does not have to worry about navy backup. However, China is already notorious for natural resource exploitation and environmental destruction in Africa, and even in the Far Eastern territory of Russia, its anti-Western comrade. More business with the Islamic sphere will cause more frictions between China and local people accordingly. This may have some impact on Xinjiang. Quite interestingly, Rabiya Kadeer, President of the World Uyghur Congress, comments that China takes repressive approaches to Uyghurs but not to other Muslim minorities so as not to offend Central Asian neighbors (“Incidents of unrest in the East Turkestanreflect a Uighur Awakening”; The New Turkey; November 6, 2013). How long can China adopt such a divide and rule approach in Xinjiang? Economic and cultural frictions with Central Asian residents can easily spill over into China’s north west frontier. Uyghur resistance is growing sharply this year (“Q & A: Xinjiang and tensionsin China's restive far west”; CNN; May 23, 2014). China’s gas guzzling economy can trigger further conflicts there.

The Sino-Islam clash will bring unprecedented uncertainties in the Middle East and Central Asia. Traditionally, China has assumed itself the leader of developing nations against Western imperialism, as typically seen in the aid to the TANZARA railway. But today, China is more likely to become another target of hatred among local extremists, along with the West. Remember that kaffirs are kaffirs for Islamic radicals, whether Christians or non-Christians, white or non-white. What influence will the clash bring to China’s relationship with geostrategic rivlals, primarily with the United States and Japan, and also, with Europe?