Geopolitics and values behind King Charles III`s state visit to Trump’s America for the 250th anniversary

I have been watching Britain’s tightrope diplomacy between Trump’s America and Europe since last May. UK-US relations in Trump 2.0 started relatively friendly, but as the trans-Atlantic chasm grows due to the Donroe doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the special relationship is critically questioned now. The British Royal Family is visiting Trump’s America in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, when intergovernmental relations are in discord. And ironically, Donald Trump is the most unconstitutional president in history, as shown in National Guard and ICE deployment in Blue States, and tariff diplomacy, which are completely incompatible with the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Despite such controversies, King Charles III and Queen Camilla are scheduled to visit from April 27 to 30, and subsequently, the Prince and Princess of Wales are expected to visit in June or July.

1. [Britain’s royal diplomacy in America]
Prior to talking about current bilateral relations, let me mention the history of the royal family and the American people. The Boston Tea Party, which led to the American Revolutionary War, was not a protest against the British monarchy originally, but an appeal for the rights as Englishmen as declared “no taxation, without representation”. In the early days, newly independent America was anti-British, but as its democracy matured, its border dispute with Canada was settled, and its internationalism rose towards the new century, the Anglo-American relationship gradually developed into the special relationship of the latter days. Ever since the future Edward VII visited the United States as a prince in 1860, royal visits were very helpful in nurturing a favorable image of Britain among the American public. In 1939, when World War II was almost breaking out, George VI and the future Queen Mother Elizabeth met President Franklin Roosevelt to mitigate the epidemic of America First isolationism among American citizens.

Most importantly, Elizabeth II and Prince Phillip visited the United States in 1957 on the occasion of the 350th anniversary of the English settlement in Jamestown, to heal ruptured Anglo-American relations by the Suez Crisis. However, will King Charles and Prince William foster a friendship between the two countries? Remember, President Donald Trump mocked Prime Minister Keir Starmer during the Iran war. Trump called independently deployed Royal Navy aircraft carriers in the East Mediterranean toys, and denounced Starmer as a coward because he did not give complete permission for the USAF to use RAF air bases. (1) Ultimately, would the king give credit to Trump’s right-wing populism? To answer those questions, let me talk about British diplomacy with Trump’s America in his second term.

2. [The special relationship with America in Trump 2.0]
It was Britain’s imperative to stabilize the special relationship with the United States, no matter how disruptive the incoming president was, and repair the damage of Brexit in Europe, while the Russian invasion of Ukraine poses critical threats to the Euro-Atlantic sphere. In such a trans-Atlantic security environment, the Starmer administration was inaugurated shortly before Donald Trump was reelected. When Trump’s second term started, Britain reached relatively favorable agreements, compared with the EU and Japan. Notorious Trump tariffs were lower, and a huge US investment in the UK tech industry was agreed through the TPD (Technology Prosperity Deal). Furthermore, the invitation to the royal dinner at Buckingham Palace satisfied Trump’s childish vanity. It appeared that Starmer managed to stabilize the relationship with Trump’s America.

However, towards the end of the last year, Trump resorted to assaults on NATO allies increasingly, such as claiming annexation of Canada and Greenland, raising tariffs furthermore, and withdrawing support for Ukraine. The regime ousting of Venezuela was done almost effortlessly, and Starmer embraced the consequence. But he suspended intelligence sharing with the United States, because global concerns were raised about the legality of US attacks on a Venezuelan drug smuggling boat in the Caribbean Sea, where Britain and other European nations have overseas territories. (2) And then, the war in Iran inflicted a fatal blow on UK-US relations. Globally, Trump’s attack on Iran is criticized for a lack of international legal grounds, poorly defined strategic goals of the war, Israeli influence on American decision-making, and so forth.

Along with problems such as asymmetric warfare, energy price, and the Hormuz Strait, Peter Ricketts, who served as the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Blair administration and the National Security Advisor of the Cameron administration, comments that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to eliminate the threats of Iran and its proxies for the legislative elections by late this October. (3) Meanwhile, Trump’s first-term National Security Advisor John Bolton says that Trump wanted a quick and efficient war against Iran as he did in Venezuela for the midterm elections this November. (4) Though both leaders do not share the same intention, we have to remember that they are quite election-oriented.

From British perspectives, Trump’s war against Iran is disrespectful to postwar Anglo-American relations. Jean-Marc Vigilant at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) contrasts British and French trans-Atlantic strategy after the Suez Crisis. In order to avoid an unexpected clash. Britain stepped toward close strategic contacts with the United States to have some influence on its decision-making and keep its military presence in Europe. On the other hand, France sought strategic autonomy from the United States by developing its sovereign and independent nuclear weapons and withdrawing from NATO's integrated military command. (5) In the Gulf War by George H. W. Bush and the Iraq War by George W. Bush, Britain was in strategic contact with America. But in the Iran War, Trump talked with Netanyahu only, and Britain was sidelined. Why should Starmer help him?

Quite importantly, the Iran War is so unpopular in Europe that any support for Trump and Netanyahu could ruin the pledge to increase defense spending against Russia among NATO allies. (6) Therefore, Britain is taking increasingly French-styled strategic autonomy and hosted a conference on freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Strait. (7) Pro-Trump MPs such as Reform UK Leader Nigel Farage and Conservative Leader Kemi Badenoch demanded that Starmer join the war for the special relationship when it broke out, but now, they have withdrawn their support for Trump. This is also the case with ex-Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is a senior executive of Trump’s controversial Board of Peace. (8) They should have remembered that even a Thatcherite Lord Chris Patten argues that Britain should not assume the special relationship with Trump’s America. (9)

3. [America and the world order in chaos]
Furthermore, I would like to mention American foreign policy. Last June, when the war in Iran was not imminent, Robert Kagan at the Brookings Institution commented that Trump turned the US military into his private army when he deployed National Guard and ICE in Blue States unconstitutionally. Also, he aligns with Netanyahu as both share ethnoreligious nationalism, which is completely at odds with universal liberal values of the Founding Fathers. As Kagan argues, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is advancing anti-DEI initiatives in the US military, and he even likens the war in Iran to a crusade, both of which are deeply rooted in white Christian nationalism. Therefore, Kagan concludes that any success Trump claims in Iran will be a victory for autocracies around the world. (10) Continual frictions between Trump and US allies make China and Russia pleased. America has lost trust from allies, furthermore, in the Iran War. This would accelerate not only the isolation of America in geopolitics but also the fall of the Enlightenment, which would turn the world, including America itself, less secure. (11)

To my eyes, ex-President Barack Obama was also too post-American, but his foreign policy could have been compatible with the world order of the middle power alignment, which was proposed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. On the other hand, Trump is excessively post-Enlightenment, which has made America completely isolated. That is savage enough to return the world really to the Stone Age. In his latest article of the Atlantic Journal, Kagan calls Trump’s America a rogue superpower. He mentions the ongoing war, “The Iran war is global intervention “America First”–style: no public debate, no vote in Congress, no cooperation or, in many cases, even consultation with allies other than Israel, and, apparently, no concern for potential consequences to the region and the world.” That makes America lonely and dangerous, but never great. (12) Thereby, Trump destroys the world order that has brought innumerable benefits to the United States and its allies.

4. [The post-Enlightenment trend and the rise of the civilizational state]
The final point of the discussion is the political transition in the global context. Aaron McKeil at the London School of Economics mentions that in the post-Enlightenment era, as seen in viral right-wing populism in the West and geopolitical challenges by authoritarian powers, civilizational state values would replace liberal cosmopolitan ideals. Then what is a civilizational state? It is a kind of ethnocultural sphere of influence claimed by a great power or a regional power as a body of governance beyond its own territory. This is typically seen in Russia’s Russkiy Mir and China’s “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation". Domestically, a civilizational state focuses on national unity through ethnocentric traditionalism. Trump has trashed America’s hegemonic advantage in universal cosmopolitan ideals with White Christian nationalism and turned it into an authoritarian civilizational state like Russia and China. Those civilizational state advocates are not necessarily retrospective, according to McKeil. They are often aligned with new techno futurists who are keen on winning the great power rivalry in the tech industry. (13) This is typically seen in the TPD in current Anglo-American relations.

[Conclusion]
Deplorably, America elected the least qualified president to commemorate the 250th anniversary, though King Charles is visiting this historic landmark of democracy in America. The shift of Starmer’s diplomatic stances shows us that it is no use flattering Trump just to avoid a clash with him. Even pro-Trump Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni rejects Trump’s demand to admit the USAF to use air bases in Italy. In domestic politics, Trump fired so many loyalists. Returns are hardly expected through sycophancy. Among G7 leaders, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is so eager to conform to Trump. Her crazy dance was ridiculed both at bilateral meetings in Tokyo and Washington, DC. But I would rather call attention to her impolite laugh at the autopen portrait of former President Joe Biden. That implicitly indicates that she lost the sense of political balance. I would suggest that Takaichi rename MAGAichi, as she is dishonorably fascinated with Trump so much.

Among the British public, this visit is unpopular, and they want the King to cancel the tour, according to the You.gov poll last March. (14) Considering the nature of the Trump administration and his character, even this state visit is unlikely to improve the state-to-state relations of both countries. Therefore, there is no need for King Charles to make an impression as if giving credit to Trump. Meanwhile, Britain’s royal diplomacy has nurtured a friendship with the United States for more than a century. Focusing on people, instead of Trump, the King’s visit for the 250th anniversary would be an opportunity for them to recall the ideals of the Founding Fathers. The British royal family is popular among Americans, historically.

Since Trump’s America is a civilizational state incorporating new techno futurism, a huge business deal such as the TPD will be a “hostage” to stop Trump from fatally breaking up the bilateral relationship, even though he escalates blaming Starmer as relations with Britain grow worse. He never suggested withdrawing this tech deal, despite his penchant for madman diplomacy. This is a lesson for world leaders who want to stabilize the relationship with Trump’s America through flattery.

In this historic event, despite the chaos that Trump brings at home and worldwide, will King Charles III have a favorable impact on democracy in America and trans-Atlantic relations? He spoke of the late Queen Elizabeth II’s legacy of optimism that "goodness will always prevail and that a brighter dawn is never far from the horizon", before the state visit to the United States of America. (15)




Footnotes:

(1) “As a state visit looms … can King Charles tame Trump?”; Guardian; 4 April. 2026

(2) “U.K. withholds intelligence on alleged drug boats over U.S. strikes, sources say”; NBC News; November 13, 2025

(3) PeterRickett, BBC Breakfast; 4 March, 2026

(4) “John Bolton Warns How Trump’s Big Mouth Has Weakened U.S.” Daily Beast; April 20, 2026

(5) “Europeanising” NATO: A Utopia or an Obvious Necessity for Europeans?”; IRIS; 16 May 2025

(6) “Trump wants to strongarm NATO into a new Gulf war. Here’s why Europe must resist”; Centre for European Reform; 18 March 2026

(7) “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, and others on the Strait of Hormuz”: UK Government Press Release; 19 March 2026

(8) “The UK’s right wing is suddenly silent about supporting war in Iran”; News Agents; 11 March, 2026

(9) "Britain Must Downgrade the Special Relationship"; Project Syndicate; February 28, 2025

(10) “American Democracy Might Not Survive a War With Iran”; Atlantic Journal; June 21, 2025

(11) “America vs. the World”; Atlantic Journal; January 18, 2026

(12) “America Is Now a Rogue Superpower”; Atlantic Journal; March 30, 2026

(13) “How to navigate global disorder”; Engelsberg IDEAS; March 23, 2026

(14) “By 49% to 33%, Britons say King Charles should cancel official visit to USA”;You.gov; 26 March 2026

(15) “William and Catherine praise late Queen's 'lifetime of duty'”; BBC News; 22 April, 2026

Real national defense capability matters rather than the GDP ratio of spending

Ever since the Cold War, the United States has been urging its allies to increase defense spending for burden sharing, whether it acts as the world policeman or America First. However, I have always wondered why people talk about the amount of money to be spent so much, while hardly paying attention to how it is spent and implemented. A discrepancy of defense strategy and procurement could weaken collective defense. Quite recently, retired British Army General Richard Barrons raised a serious concern about this point that I have thought of for years.

Prior to mentioning his article in detail, we have to oversee the security environment of the world today. The latest NSS of the Trump administration emphasizes America First more than ever, and urging allies to assume more defense burdens. The paper even bluffs that the United States withdraw from the alliance unless its members increase defense spending more drastically. As a result, liberal democracies in Europe and Asia are forced to pursue independent and multilateral security policy coordination, with the surge of defense budget. In addition, wise spending must be considered to arrange such new security framework more effective. Both in Europe and Asia, President Donald Trump takes an Obama-styled “offshore balancer” stance in Ukraine and Taiwan, while acting predatory in the Western Hemisphere as seen typically in Venezuela and Greenland. He gives priority to making a deal of mining business in Donbas rather than settling the territory and sovereignty issues with Russia. Also, in the recent Sino-Japanese conflict over Taiwan, he prioritized trade talks with China rather than geopolitical check against its expansionism. Trump would be happy with spending increase among allies and burden decrease of American security commitment from his business acumen. It seems that he does not care about the use of increased spending, nor the division of roles with allies.

In view of such global security environment, let me talk about ex-General Barrons’s commentary about UK-German strategic discrepancy in defense spending objectives. As one of the leaders of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, he considered two points, which are the strategic requirements in deterrence and fighting, and financial capacity in a decade (1). In addition, Britain, like other European nations, is forced to increase the military budget within such constraints in the face of Trump’s pressure. Therefore, wise spending for the properly focused objective is critical. While Britain is investing in technological innovation to resolve financial and personnel restrictions, Germany is building the strongest conventional army in Europe by overturning fiscal authority, and even by reintroducing conscription (2). Meanwhile, Britain’s military manpower is shrinking year by year despite its global commitment.

Contrary to Germany, Britain is pursuing tech-based military reform through combat lessons from Ukraine. Newly established digital targeting web will connect any UK troop sensors through AI-managed cloud to connect any of its weapons whether locally or globally (3). Such approaches require an innovative industrial base. The SDR 2025 even states “Defence also has <> at the heart of the UK’s economic strategy (4).” The Starmer administration’s TPD (Technology Prosperity Deal) with Trump’s America draws $350 billion in investments from U.S. firms into the UK's technology ecosystem, particularly in AI, quantum computing, and civil nuclear energy (5). Defence Secretary John Healey commented proudly that the deal would boost Britain’s leadership in defense, data and AI technology and as an ideal location for investment (6).

On the other hand, Britain`s ambitious scheme is not necessarily praise worthy. Barrons urges the British authority to fund and implement the project quickly, as Germany is building conventional army rapidly. He recommends Britain’s conceptual innovation and Germany’s efficient bureaucracy be combined to strengthen European defense capability. He criticizes bureaucratic sectionalism of Whitehall for the delay. There is no denying that conventional plans are quicker to start that future-oriented ones. However, strategic rationality and efficiency is not the only reason that determine the use of defense spending. Political culture of each country also matters. The primary focus of Germany’s national defense is urgent territorial defense in view of Russian invasion of Ukraine. For this objective, the Merz administration prioritized immediate military buildup, rather than future-oriented military reform. Furthermore, ethical hurdle makes Germany cautious to use AI for military objectives, from historical experience of authoritarian surveillance by Nazi and Stasi. The German military prioritizes human control of technology, and bans fully operational LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems) but admits human-overseen AI systems (7).

Such a discrepancy is found in the GCAP as well. While Britain was inclined to the command center version which is networked with ACPs (Autonomous Collaborative Platforms) or loyal wingman drones for multirole combat missions to increase combat mass and reduce damage risks, Japan prefers the manned version to replace aging F-2 immediately, which is equipped with more advanced sensor and networking technology than the F-35. Meanwhile, Italy is dissatisfied with extremely high cost and tight restrictions for technological transfer of the F-35. GCAP partners reached an agreement to fill these R&D objective gaps by making common manned aircrafts and then, adapt them to the requirements of each air force (8).

However, the war in Ukraine has changed military tactics so drastically that the above discrepancies between Britain and Japan could shrink faster than expected. Following the New Year visit to Ise Shrine on January 5, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that her cabinet would revise the National Security Documents by the Kishida administration to focus much more on drone and AI networking system (9). Also, she said a stronger defense industry would be a new locomotive to boost the Japanese economy in this century. Those points somewhat similar to what is stated in Britain’s SDR 2025. That could make Japan’s position in the GCAP more in line with the UK. Unlike Germany, Japan has little ethical hurdles for AI weapons.

In an era of more self-interested America with the Donroe Doctrine, the target of increased defense spending has become more important than ever. Ex-General Barrons raises a critical question as he compares defense plan of Britain and Germany. We have to consider strategic rationality and political culture of partners in mini or multilateral policy coordination. Different priorities between Britan and Germany, and Britain and Japan, are just a tip of the iceberg among numerous cases. We tend to talk about the size of firepower and weapon of choice when we boost national defense, but don’t dismiss AI networking system and problems associated with that as it is emerging increasingly important. How should we spend increased defense budget? Each nation should think again.

Again, never nominate President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize

At the plenary session of the House of Representatives on November 4th, Constitutional Democratic Party leader Yoshihiko Noda asked Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi a question about the endorsement of U.S. President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Takaichi cunningly avoided replying in detail. We must not allow this matter to be closed with such underhanded tactics. After all, Takaichi even went so far as to mimic President Trump's "eat cats and dogs" remark by using the "kick the deer" trope. Furthermore, in the LDP presidential election and the prime ministerial nomination elections for both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, no other candidate resorted to such Trump-style demagoguery. It appears Takaichi is strongly MAGA-brained.

Today, geopolitical paradigm shifts are frequently discussed in international politics, but if Trump were to win the Nobel Peace Prize, it could even lead to a paradigm shift in values, in which universal international norms are disregarded. The spread of right-wing populism today poses a threat to international security comparable to the intensifying interstate conflicts. Japan also nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize during the Abe era, but at the time, that president's childish displays of vanity were seen as a kind of joke. However, in his second term, it should be noted that Trump's personal desires have taken on a powerful tinge of madness.

In my previous post, I explained at length why I oppose nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. In this article, I would like to focus on the following three points.

First, the Trump administration's deployment of troops at home has been severely criticized by the public. Proper use of military forces is fundamental to national governance, and politicians who cannot do so are unlikely to achieve peace. In any country, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces must use military force in accordance with due process. In an attempt to exert political pressure on Democratic state and city governments, Trump has mobilized the National Guard across the country under the pretext of eradicating crime and undocumented immigrants. His overly heavy-handed tactics have led to growing criticism that the military is pointing its guns at its own citizens. President Trump with military command authority is like "a madman with a knife." As a result, courts across the United States have ruled that the deployment of the National Guard is illegal. A familiar story, even in Japan, is that NDLON (National Day Laborers Organizing Network) submitted numerous signatures to the Los Angeles Dodgers, this year's World Series champions, in protest of anti-immigration sentiment, calling for them to decline to meet with President Trump.

Second, President Trump has announced a plan to restart nuclear testing, a move that will set back long-standing momentum toward nuclear disarmament. Trump administration Secretary of Energy Chris Wright announced that the resumption of testing would involve subcritical nuclear tests that do not involve a nuclear explosion. Although this may not be prohibited by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Russia shortly thereafter also announced a resumption of nuclear testing. There are concerns that other nuclear-weapon states, such as China, may follow suit. A president who claims America First and disregards international cooperation is unworthy of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Third, we must consider the negative impact of President Trump's triumphant self-promotion once he were awarded. Given his brash and strong attention seeking character, Trump may use this as an opportunity to further his insistence on running for a third term. He is a man who has a penchant for pushing everything hard, even inciting the January 6th riot after losing the 2020 presidential election. Japan must not give a hand to the deterioration of democracy in crisis caused by such right-wing populism.

However, Takaichi is also said to be stubborn and unyielding in her own opinions. Given this, only very prominent politicians would be able to advise the current prime minister. Of the three issues mentioned above, there are former prime ministers with extensive knowledge of the first and second points. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has made nuclear disarmament his lifework, and former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is known as a military geek. Up to now, neither of these former prime ministers is implicated in the "politics and money" scandals that contributed to the LDP's downturn. This may also be a strength of both of them.

As my primary focus is international politics, partisan politics and factional power politics within Nagatacho are secondary or thirdly interests for me. I view the destruction of the world order and the potential of paradigm shift in universal values and norms caused by the spread of right-wing populism as a serious threat to international security. From this standpoint, I urge that the issue of the Japanese government's nomination of U.S. President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize must not be dismissed.

The case against Prime Minister Takaichi’s flattery to MAGA

I was appalled when newly appointed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi endorsed US President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize at the last US-Japanese summit. I was preparing to post about another issue, but this incident was too critical for me to dismiss, and therefore, I've decided to postpone the previously planned post, and instead write about this unexpectedly emerging agenda.

I've always viewed Takaichi's behavior as dangerous, ever since the last LDP presidential election. The most desirable candidate for the LDP president was then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi. What sparked my growing view of Takaichi as a danger was her "deer kicking" remark. The remark was criticized as xenophobic, and she was forced to withdraw it. However, the look in Takaichi's eyes when she made that remark instinctively filled me with fear. It was suggesting as if she was determined to beat her rivals by arguing them down and agitating the public by all means, whether fairly or unfairly. In order to understand this, further expert analysis by psychologists is required. In any case, this kind of nonsensical demagogy in order to seize power is in line with Trump's "cats and dogs eating" remarks. Right-wing populism is really scary.

And shortly after taking office, the new LDP president even held coalition talks with Sanseito. Although this did not come true, it demonstrated the right-wing nature of the Takaichi administration. The endorsement of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize is in line with these words and deeds. This is why I was appalled by Takaichi's flattery to MAGA at the last US-Japanese summit.

But does Trump deserve a Nobel Peace Prize? First, if we evaluate his achievements in the international community, the two major issues are the peace settlements in Gaza and Ukraine, but there is no sign of peacebuilding in either case. In Gaza, Trump made a big show of exchanging hostages between Israel and Hamas boastfully, but there is no prospect of Hamas disarming since then. The Biden administration has actually released more Israeli hostages. And in Ukraine, Russian attacks show no signs of abating. The good personal chemistry between President Vladimir Putin and President Trump is completely useless in promoting peace. In the Indo-Pakistani conflict, Pakistan is satisfied, but India is dissatisfied with Trump's mediation. Trump's other mediation efforts have not completely resolved the problem. He has not achieved any results worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize.

And what countries are nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize? None of them are among the world's most highly accredited liberal democracies. First, Israel claims to be the only democratic nation in the Middle East, but the Netanyahu administration's attacks on Gaza have been internationally condemned for their humanitarian impact due to the disproportionate damage to civilians. Other supporters are all autocratic states or countries governed by right-wing populism. These include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Gabon, Rwanda, Argentina, Hungary, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has striven to join the ranks of the world's civilized and first-class nations. Prime Minister Takaichi's declaration to recommend the Nobel Peace Prize runs counter to modern Japan's historical direction and places Japan in the "Shameless League."

The most troubling aspect of Trump's eligibility for the Nobel Peace Prize is that he does not know how to use armed forces properly. This hardly makes him a politician of peace. President Trump has mobilized the military in the domestic political struggle over undocumented immigration, but this disqualifies his leadership whether for war or peace. As the famous Latin proverb goes, "Si vis pacem, para bellum" (If you want peace, prepare for war), there can be no peace with the misuse of military force. The Trump administration has deployed the National Guard to Democratic cities like Chicago and Portland, ostensibly to combat crime and undocumented immigration. Such deployments should not be possible on the president's unilateral orders. Furthermore, under the pretext of combating drugs, the administration has attacked Venezuelan ships without congressional approval. The Trump administration claims the right to kill anyone, anywhere, without reason, evidence, or accountability to Congress and the public. Such arguments have been harshly criticized by William Kristol, a leading conservative Never Trump commentator. In any case, such a president would easily resume nuclear testing without consideration to others. President Trump is unworthy of the Nobel Peace Prize, not only from the perspective of international politics but also from the perspective of domestic politics. Why is Prime Minister Takaichi so willing to nominate such a person? If Japan's top leader has already fallen into MAGA-taste thinking and emotions, this is a serious problem.

However, since the Trump administration is based on the rock-solid MAGA base that harbors paranoia about globalization, it is conceivable that a certain degree of appeasement will be unavoidable in reaching a deal with them. Japanese liberals are so naïve as to dismiss this, and simply criticize "submission to America." Trump himself and those who wear bright red MAGA hats and vent their anti-globalist and anti-elite sentiment are truly difficult to deal with. In the tariff disputes launched by the Trump administration around the world, the Starmer administration in the UK managed to reach deals on relatively favorable terms. However, the reciprocal tariff was raised to 10%, which is higher than before.

Of particular note is the tech investment agreement and state guest treatment Trump received during his recent visit to the UK. This tech agreement has divided public opinion in the UK. The idea of boosting the tech industry by attracting investment from the US, supported by former Conservative Foreign Secretary William Hague, is clearly a bipartisan national policy. On the other hand, former Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg, who served as Deputy Prime Minister in the Cameron coalition administration, expressed concern that the deal would not lead to support for domestic startups and would only turn the UK into a data center for major US tech companies. Despite this divided public opinion, it should not be forgotten that the Lee Jae-myung administration of South Korea also reached a tech investment deal during President Trump's last visit.

Furthermore, while Trump shamelessly flaunts his childish vanity over his pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize, the Starmer administration satisfied his vulgar greed with royal hospitality. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, a Labour politician with a serious personality, would not have been a good match for President Trump, either in terms of ideology or personal chemistry. Therefore, it was quite likely that the series of negotiations and reception required considerable patience. However, it was in line with the fundamental direction of postwar British foreign policy, which emphasizes relations with the United States regardless of party affiliation or ideology. Even Britain, which is said to have reached a relatively favorable deal, had to proceed the talks like this. Other countries needed more struggling to strike a deal with the Trump administration, which views the world through idiosyncratic, and rigid perspective. Are Japanese liberals who criticize the "subservience to the United States" at the last summit so knowledgeable about the specific issues under negotiation? If so, they need to be more focused in their criticism. Whether you like or dislike Prime Minister Takaichi, such vague criticism is meaningless. It should be noted that former British Deputy Prime Minister Clegg, mentioned above, focused on specific points when he criticized the UK-US agreement. Above all, even with such a humble stance, I would like to reemphasize that Starmer does not endorse Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

In any case, the Nobel Peace Prize nomination issue is intertwined with Takaichi's right-wing words and deeds, so the argument that the "glass ceiling" has been broken in Japanese politics is questionable. Right-wing politicians tend to be authoritarian, like autocrats. Under their rule, the glass ceilings based on gender, race, and so forth, are rarely broken. Reviewing history, the reign of Russia's enlightened despot, Catherine the Great, did not break any glass ceilings. As is well known, Catherine the Great's authoritarian domestic and foreign policies have served as a model for the Putin administration, which is invading Ukraine under the ideology of Russkiy Mir. It should also be noted that the current Kremlin is remarkably machismo-oriented, even by global standards. Therefore, there is absolutely no need to treat Prime Minister Takaichi as a female politician with any special consideration. The new prime minister's leadership should be examined objectively, focusing on her governance, ideology, and demagoguery techniques. Just like when discussing Catherine the Great or President Vladimir Putin.

The right-wing authoritarian Prime Minister Takaichi advocated a "work, work, work, work" political stance during the last LDP presidential election. However, as in the case of the Nobel Prize endorsement, if a leader is leading the country in a negative direction, it is preferable for them not to work too hard. Indeed, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo during World War II "worked, worked, worked, worked hard," which caused devastating damage to the Japanese nation and its people. While Trump may hold the position of President of the United States, he is essentially merely the president of MAGA. Therefore, such an unprincipled Nobel Prize recommendation seems like a challenge to anti-MAGA Americans. Currently, in Japan, as in European countries, there is discussion about the risk hedge from Trump's diplomacy by lowering Japan's security dependence on the United States. However, as a "Fragile Blossom" militarily, it is difficult to imagine Japan implementing sovereign and independent defense, and we cannot place excessive expectations on multilateral partnerships with Europe and Indo-Pacific countries without the United States. In this sense, cooperation with anti-MAGA Americans. could be seen as the strongest risk hedge against Trump's diplomacy. From this perspective, excessive prostration toward President Trump should be reconsidered.

At the last US-Japanese summit, the Abe legacy was repeatedly emphasized, and it seems that the Japanese government and media placed excessive emphasis on the personal chemistry between the two leaders. However, as the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself wrote in his memoir, that is completely unreliable. In fact, Trump has been ruthless in cutting off his loyalists, both in domestic and international politics. Among the leaders of powerful countries, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India had been in a good relationship with Trump during his first term, but that has deteriorated during his second term. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Starmer is striving to maintain a good relationship with the administration. In light of the trends in the U.S. and around the world described in this post, I hope Prime Minister Takaichi to withdraw her endorsement of the Nobel Peace Prize for President Trump.

The last House of Councillors election and Japanese internationalism

The results of the last House of Councillors election on July 20th were quite like a vulgar reality show. Right-wing populist party Sanseito made great gains, but like the Trump administration and its like-minded far-right groups in Europe and the United States, they are shouting xenophobia and inciting hatred toward those who oppose them based on a "thin centered ideology ". To prevent such extremists from taking over our nation, I call for trans-partisan solidarity among internationalists.

As seen in most of the issues that I usually take up, I am not a Nagatacho watcher. Japanese domestic politics is not my primary focus. Therefore, this post will neither analyze the recent election nor discuss the prospect political interactions. Nor will I question whether Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba should remain in office or not. Here, I would like to explore what Japan's internationalism should be, how it should be reflected in domestic and foreign policy, and how we should counter xenophobic and hate-based populism. Shortly after the House of Councillors election, Nagatacho is currently in a "storm in a teacup", rife with partisan politics. However, I cannot remain silent and ignore right-wing populism, which has now become a disruptor of the world order. While the rise of Sanseito drew attention in the last election, numerous other right-wing nationalist parties, such as the Conservative Party of Japan, the Japan Seishinkai, and the NHK Party, have also sprung up like mushrooms after a rain.

Japan's prosperity and stability require a free and open society, both externally and internally. The free movement of people, goods, and capital that such a society brings has enriched the quality and quantity of people's lives. Furthermore, both Japan's domestic and foreign policies have benefited greatly from the postwar liberal world order. Ever since Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire brought about the glory of Hellenistic civilization, globalization has driven the evolution of human history. Conversely, an era of anti-globalization has seen a regression of history. Examples include Europe after the fall of Rome and China, which was left behind by the Ming Dynasty's maritime ban. Even in modern-day Japan, we cannot sit idly by and watch the rise of xenophobia, which is bringing about a devolution of history.

What's so bad about radical nationalism is that it's based on a sense of exclusion toward others. In other words, a zero-sum worldview—"we sacrifice, they gain"—is at the heart of their thinking. This sense of exclusion extends not only to foreigners but also to their fellow citizens. During the recent House of Councillors election, Sohei Kamiya, leader of Sanseito, sparked controversy with his statement, "Only young women can give birth. Men, and I'm sorry to say, older women, can't have children." I immediately recognized that this was not just a women's issue; it suggested something extraordinary. That is, those who are not involved in reproduction and production are a burden to the state and should not receive the country's welfare benefits. Kamiya's thinking echoes the actions of the Nazis, who labeled the physically and intellectually handicapped as the social misfit and sent them to concentration camps. His advocacy of "Japanese First" is as blatantly exclusionary as U.S. President Donald Trump's "America First," even toward his own people.

In the last House of Councillors election, it's said that conservative votes flowed to right-wing populist parties because the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is no longer a conservative party that is supposed to be. However, from a global perspective, the definition of conservatism is swinging. In exploring the notion of Japan's internationalism in this post, I would like to begin my discussion with this point in mind. A major difference can be seen between the conservatism of the Reagan-Thatcher era and that of the Trump era. The former conservatism is not based on xenophobia and a victimhood mindset, while the latter is openly xenophobic and victimhood mentality. This is why, in a contribution to Project Syndicate, Lord Chris Patten, who held key positions under the Thatcher administration (and was the last Governor of Hong Kong under the successor Major administration), valued the transatlantic alliance with "Reagan's America" but was skeptical of relations with "Trump's America." Given the above-mentioned flip-flops in the definition of conservatism around the world, I would like to question the argument that the LDP's defeat in the last House of Councillors election was due to an outflow of conservative votes to right-wing parties such as Sanseito. Also, the mainstream conservatism of the LDP in Japan is the loyal heir of the Yoshida Doctrine, and its direction of international cooperation, which advocates Japan as a major trading nation. Rather, while historical LDP prime ministers and party leaders have assumed themselves mainstream conservatives, haven't their actual policies been consistently quite liberal?

To answer these questions, I applied the four archetypes of American foreign policy proposed by Walter Russell Mead of the Hudson Institute to past LDP prime ministers and party leaders. They all fall into the "Hamiltonian" category. Prime Ministers Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda are typical examples. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, known as the "Ghost of the Showa Era," may have been an imperial nationalist at heart, but his actual policies were based on developing trade-oriented nation. The same can be said of Kishi's grandson, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In other words, the LDP's mainstream conservative base was strongly liberal by nature. The conservative votes that supposedly flowed out in the last House of Councillors election were not the LDP's core supporters, but rather its outliers. Among the right-wing LDP candidates who lost their seats as a result, Mio Sugita was too controversial due to her extreme nationalism and discriminatory profanity, and she was a candidate whom the LDP's core supporters disliked. Politicians like Sugita, whose ideology is considered closer to that of Sanseito, are "Jacksonians" who aggressively proclaim their own country's interests and are not afraid to incur friction with the international community. Indeed, President Andrew Jackson was infamous for his support of slavery and the genocide of Native Americans, and is considered one of the most racist figures in U.S. history. The Japanese equivalent of the liberal "Jeffersonians," who advocate international non-interventionism, is the left-wing constitutionalists who advocate unilateral pacifism.

Regarding "Wilsonian" who advocates the realization of universal human ideals through active international intervention by the United States, there are no corresponding politicians in Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated a "free and open Indo-Pacific," and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has proclaimed that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow." However, neither of these approaches is strong enough to enable Japan to lead the international public interest. While Abe's vision appears to aim to strengthen the liberal world order, it is also blended with the nationalist and realist perspectives of his grandfather, Prime Minister Kishi. During Kishida's state visit to the United States at the end of his term, he called for the continuation of American internationalism in Congress. However, his success did not garner the same level of internationalist support as did World War II hero UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill. As with the case of postwar LDP prime ministers and party leaders, both remain within the "Hamiltonian" category. Based on the above discussion, the view that the loss of fringe nationalist votes was a blow to the LDP needs to be reconsidered.

Based on this classification, what should Japan's version of internationalism be? Prior to answering this question, let me review it in other countries briefly. To begin with, American internationalism emerged during the eras of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, which came from a growing call for the United States to move beyond its traditional isolationism and assume a role in international politics befitting a major power. As a result, they explored to prevail American values, such as freedom and democracy. However, as the Trump administration dismisses human rights issues, the uniquely American approach to value-based diplomacy is fading. In contrast, Europe, having experienced two world wars, sought regional integration based on multilateralism and a break with the colonial empires of the past. In the UK, a latecomer to the EC, rising nationalist sentiment led to Brexit. However, subsequent Conservative administrations led by pro-Brexit prime ministers also adopted internationalist foreign policies in the name of Global Britain, including a strategic tilt toward the Indo-Pacific region and leading support for Ukraine. Since Starmer's Labour administration came to power, relations with Germany, France, and other European countries have improved, partly due to their response to the Ukraine crisis, although they have not yet rejoined the EU. Brexit does not necessarily bring a decline of internationalism.

So, what kind of ideals should Japan's version of internationalism, one that transcends party lines, look like? In recent years, growing threats from neighboring countries have led the Japanese people to reevaluate postwar pacifism. Even so, Japan's forte remains soft power, centered on non-military matters, rather than hard power diplomacy. As seen in Japan's diplomacy surrounding the FOIP and the war in Ukraine, it will likely also emphasize universal principles such as the rule of law and the denial of the use of force to change the status quo. Despite the recent signing of the first-ever large-scale arms export contract to Australia for the Mogami-class frigates, Japan's foreign policy will likely remain fundamentally Hamiltonian. However, it should move beyond its traditional position as a trading nation friendly to the world and lean more toward a Wilsonian approach that advocates adherence to the principles of the international order. However, Japan will likely not become a "world policeman," as American neoconservatives and others advocate for foreign policy of their country.

While Japan is expected to demonstrate leadership in non-military areas such as development aid and empowerment, the validity of the argument for a stronger international presence on gender issues is questionable. Japan's ranking in the women's power index is lower than that of major developed countries, even developing countries. Meanwhile, there is a survey results showing that “women, the elder, and the poorly educated” are happier than “men, younger, and highly educated” in Japan, a finding that contradicts global trends. While these contradictory results raise doubts about the notion of international leadership on gender issues, they also raise the possibility that this could be an important issue for Japan's soft power diplomacy.

It is important to note here that the women’s power index statistical data focuses only on a select few who have achieved success through social advancement. For the vast majority, these figures are completely unrelated. In the 2016 US presidential election, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton attracted worldwide attention as a potential first female president. However, it should not be forgotten that many rural female voters in the US viewed this as an issue for elites like Clinton, and that it had nothing to do with them. On the other hand, when it comes to happiness statistics, the background to the results is not clearly explained. In any case, Japan's leadership on gender issues has many unexplored issues.

Internationalism is not limited to foreign policy. In domestic politics, the influx of foreign capital and foreign labor was a major issue in the recent House of Councillors election. Both are essential for the country's economic development, and hate is ethically unacceptable. However, concerns about national security and domestic public security should be wiped out. Aside from these practical issues, I would like to propose that, in order to counter the nationalist sentiment fueled by the recent election results, we adopt the argument for making English an official language, as advocated by then Asahi Shimbun editorial board member Yoichi Funabashi during the Obuchi era. The direct goal of this would be to maintain an open society while also satisfying security and public order demands. Making Chinese an official language would be just problematic in the latter two points. Therefore, Japanese society should present a desirable image of foreigners. This should be a clear, hate-free standard: "Regardless of blood and color, they should be legitimate members of global society in taste, opinions, morals, and intellect." Making English an official language is the first step toward this goal.

There are competent people in Japanese politics who can support internationalism. It wouldn't be surprising if political heavyweights like LDP Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, former Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, and Democratic Party for the People leader Yuichiro Tamaki formed a Harvard University faction that transcends party lines. As for other prestigious overseas universities, former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiji Kihara, who served as a policy advisor for the Kishida administration, is an alumnus of the London School of Economics. While there are such cabal of people to support Japanese-style internationalism across party lines, right-wing populist leader Sohei Kamiya of the Sanseito graduated from Kansai University's law school. While Kamiya majored in law, his proposed constitutional amendments lacked the fundamentals of modern constitutions, such as the guarantee of fundamental human rights, freedom of thought and conscience, and freedom of religion. This is not even a question of Kamiya's vision of the nation. Incidentally, I did not major in law both as an undergraduate and a graduate student, but even so, I understand just how terrible his mistakes were. What exactly did Kamiya study at law school?

It hasn't been long since the last election, and lawmakers in Nagatacho seem busy debating who will be prime minister and how to form party alliances. In any case, it is strange that politics of this country is being swayed by someone like the party leader Kamiya. It's said that Sanseito will eventually lose momentum, but we mustn't forget that the recent election saw a proliferation of right-wing populist parties spring up like mushrooms after a rain. To defeat them, we must explore a trans-partisan internationalism of Japanese version in both domestic and foreign affairs. Every policy will be valid only when it is made with a solid foundation of principles.

The Trump chaos of “thin centered ideology”

Academics and policy watchers explore various information sources to find the key to understanding the unpredictability of the Trump administration. To understand specific policies, some publications and comments by cabinet members and other senior officials are helpful. However, it is President Donald Trump himself who makes the final decision about everything. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the driving force behind his offensive and sometimes self-destructing words and deeds.

The keyword to explain his populist thoughts and behavior is called “thin centered ideology” by a Dutch political scientist, Associate Professor Cas Mudde at the University of Georgia in the United States. I came across this word when I read one post about populism and Trump tariffs in "LSE British Politics and Policy Blog" (1). In that blog post, the notion of “thin centered ideology” is explained as an anti-elitist ideology without solid values and policies. Mudde’s theory draws much attention from Japanese academics, too. Professor Yoshihiko Takahashi at Hokkai Gakuen University comments that Populism is defined as a “thin-centered ideology” that sees society as ultimately divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, that is, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt élites", and this worldview asserts that politics should be an expression of the "general will" of the people. Interestingly, he mentions that populists ask the right questions about social contradictions, but respond with wrong answers (2). I would like to talk about Trump’s thin-centered ideology on three issues: trade, anti-Semitism, and Iran.

1. Trade
Since the first term, Trump tariffs have been the tool of bluff in his trade negotiations. But it is quite doubtful what he has achieved through such high-handed postures. Those tariff assaults seem to be reality shows to entertain frustrated MAGA voting base. In the first term, Trump tariffs broke NAFTA but similar regional free trade deal was made with Canada and Mexico. Similarly, Trump withdraw his tariff hike on China, once he reached an interim deal. In the second term, Trump’s trade policy turns more erratic, and instrumentalizes for broader political objectives such as imposing pressure on Canada and Latin American countries regarding deported immigrants and illegal drug flows. Historically, populist trade agendas are anti- élitist and politically perverted to charm angry mobs. Quite interestingly, when such high-handed negotiation turns unfavorable, Trump withdraws his demand immediately. Therefore, he is nicknamed TACO, Trump Always Chickens Out.

Among America’s trade partners, Trump hits China most bitterly to appeal his tough posture to his MAGA base in the Rust Belt. But sane economists snub such a reality show since Trump’s election campaign. It is not China but labor movement to the Sun Belt that has led to job losses in the Rust Belt. Trump’s tariff attack is completely off the point (3). More typically, "thin-centered ideology" is seen in the trade talks with Brazil. He threatens President Lula da Silva with a 50% tariff bluff, unless his country releases former President Jair Bolsonaro who is currently in custody for his failed coup attempt after the presidential election in 2022. Trump infringes on criminal jurisdiction of other country, which is intolerable from the rule of law perspective. Furthermore, the United States has been in surplus in trade with Brazil since 2007 (4). What is the objective of Trump’s tariff hike? Are those trade talks just reality shows of bullying foreign trade partners and free trade inclined establishment?

2. Anti-Semitism
Blaming college research and education as left-oriented, Trump infringes on academic freedom. Along with denouncing DEI movements in college campuses, Trump labels student rallies against Israeli attack on Gaza as woke and anti-Semitist. But it does not make sense as Trump and his associates have been endorsing far right movements in Europe. In the first term, Trump’s ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, was vehemently criticized for urging the rise of pro-Trump right-wing movements throughout Europe. Such political interference infringes Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relationships (5). In the second term, Elon Musk launched notorious MEGA campaign. Also, Trump’s election campaign was boosted by social media activist Nick Fuentes who is a notorious holocaust denier. In addition, some Trump administration officials are closely tied with anti-Semitists to promote their right-wing views. Paul Ingrassia, White House liaison to the Department of Homeland Security, is closely in contact with holocaust deniers including Fuentes. At the Department of Justice, Trump’s pick of Ed Martin to the Attorney for the District of Columbia (currently, Pardon Attorney) raised concerns for his praise of a Nazi sympathizer Hale-Cusanelli. Also, FBI Director Kash Patel hosted a holocaust denier Stew Peters to his podcast before his inauguration (6). If anti-Semitism matters so much, why did Trump appoint them?

Nevertheless, “thin centered ideology” does not care such logical contradictions. MAGA mobs align with Zionist extremist not because they are pro-Jewish but because they are driven by anti-establishment and xenophobia, particularly Muslims hate sentiments. Those anti-intellectualists label protests against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Gaza policy as woke and pro-terrorist. That is Trump’s definition of anti-Semitism. Therefore, there is nothing strange that holocaust deniers, Christian nationalists and other right-wingers resonate with Trump’s case. However, Israelis do not necessarily support Netanyahu on Gaza as it gives insufficient consideration to hostages taken by Hamas (7). Also, Jews in the USA are not necessarily blind supporters of Israel (8). Quite a few Jews are critical to Zionist extremism. Trump’s anti-Semitism is poorly grounded, but "thin centered ideology" interprets the term in its own preference.

3. Iran
The recent conflict with Iran is another case of Trump’s thin-centered ideology as he swung from isolationism to military adventurism. While Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in his first term, he initiated “peaceful” bilateral negotiations with Iran for nuclear nonproliferation in the second term. As seen in Syria and Afghanistan in his first term, Trump wanted to lower US military involvement in the Middle East. However, Netanyahu drew Trump’s America into Israeli attack on Iran. From Arab viewpoints, Israel and the United States share common enemies, notably, anti-Zionist extremists and Iran. Also, Arabs are impressed with Netanyahu’s political skill to control America regardless of partisanship (9). Israel has leverage to keep the United States on its side through pro-Israeli lobbying and Christian right-wingers. Among successive prime ministers of this country, Netanyahu is outstandingly good at communicating with those groups and American audiences (10). Also, he may have exploited Trump’s distrust of US intelligence as shown in his sidelining of DNI Director Tulsi Gabbard. Trump attacked Iran based on Mossad information (11).

Drawn into an unwanted skirmish against Iran, Trump remarked quite an unlikely word of “regime change” in Iran as opposed to his MAGA election pledge. Trump has been mocking internationalist foreign policy as “establishment” and “neocon”. More critically, his administration is slashing the number of personnel in the National Security Council and the Foreign Service. Remember, America invested so much brainpower in postwar Germany and Japan. A DOGE-driven small government is too under-staffed to make a plan for such a huge project. Obviously, this administration too ill-prepared for regime change, even if Trump changed his foreign policy direction suddenly. He did not show any ideals and policies about Iran after the current Shiite theocracy. In addition, the oligarchic nature of his administration makes its foreign policy increasingly driven by “thin centered ideology”, because of conflict of interest between the state and its members' business. Currently, the United States have three difficult diplomatic negotiations on Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran, and Trump sends his business friend Steve Witkoff for all of them. Such caudillismo comes from anti-establishment and anti-intellectualist disdain of nonpartisan and professional foreign service, which is closely associated with DOGE-lead personnel cut at the Department of State (12). Professor Nicholas Burns of Harvard University mentioned critical concerns about that in an interview with NPR (13), as the Bush administration’s ambassador to NATO and the Biden administration’s ambassador to China.

Despite Trump’s flamboyant appeal of the abrupt attack on Iran, it was not effective enough to wipe out all the nuclear facilities and their will to continue the project. Unlike Ba’athist Iraq and Syria, Iran has institutions to withstand a long war. even if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and IRGC generals were killed (14). Trump is quite “thin-centered” about Iranian denuclearization. Reviewing the case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution mentions that bombing is no guarantee to remove nuclear threats. Rather, he warns that Trump wants to seize the opportunity to tighten dictatorial control over law enforcement through those showy attacks, as seen in his National Guard deployment in the Los Angels protests this June. If Iran retaliated the United States by terrorism, Trump would declare the state of emergency. Therefore, Kagan is concerned that whatever success Trump makes in Iran would undermine liberal democracy globally (15).

Conclusion
Even though, Turmp’s “thin-centered ideology” shows no coherent policy directions, regardless of issues, his rule is driven by his own greed to exhibit his presence to the nation and the world. That is typically seen in strong quest for the Nobel Peace Prize. By winning the prize, he may want to demonstrate his superiority against his archrival, ex-President Barack Obama. Since the Norwegian committee, not MAGA Americans, selects the laureate, it is quite unlikely that he wins the prize. Nevertheless, Trump can make his MAGA base exuberated by challenging Obama. His repetitive anti-establishment and anti-intellectualist posture is intended to demonstrate his superiority to the élite and foreign nations, which draws applause from mobs who are obsessed with hate for others. Considering rightful criticism by Burns and Kagan, it is utterly wrong to assume Trump as something of the Zeitgeist (epoch spirit) of Americans today.

“Thin-centered ideology” may be inconsistent logically, but very consistent emotionally. This is a keyword to explore unpredictable nature of the Trump rule. The notion of the focal terminology of this article is quite old and new, as Bertrand Russell stated “The first step [in a fascist movement] is to fascinate fools and muzzle the intelligent, by emotional excitement on the one hand and terrorism on the other,” in 1940 (16). As we understand, populism and fascism are deeply intertwined each other.



Footnotes:
(1) “The populist logic behind Trump’s tariffs”; LSE British Policy and Politics blog; April 2, 2025

(2) “【Book Review】Mudde, Cas; Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017).[Populism: A Very Short Introduction]. Oxford: Oxford University Press"; Tokyo Foundation; May 17, 2021

(3) “Shifts, Not Shocks: Rethinking Rust Belt Decline”; CATO at Liberty; May 23, 2025

(4) “Trump threatens 50% tariffs on Brazil if it doesn’t stop the Bolsonaro ‘witch hunt’ trial”; CNN; July 11, 2025

(5) “Trump's Ambassador Finds Few Friends in Germany”; Spiegel; January 11, 2019

(6) “Multiple Trump White House officials have ties to antisemitic extremists”; NPR; May 14, 2025

(7) “Netanyahu hopes for boost from Iran conflict - but do Israelis still trust him?”; BBC; 28 June 2025

(8) “'I left one conflict zone to enter another': Harvard's Jewish foreign students on Trump row”; BBC; 30 May 2025

(9) “From Clinton to Trump, Netanyahu fights with presidents and wins”; Arab Weekly; 22 June, 2025

(10) “Exactly Why Is It that All American Presidents Dance to Bibi’s Tune?”; The New Republic; June 20, 2025

(11) “US strikes failed to destroy Iran's nuclear sites, intelligence report says”; Reuters; June 25, 2025,br>
(12) “Israel’s attack on Iran underscores Trump’s failures as a peacemaker”; Washington Post; June 13, 2025

(13) “Former U.S. ambassador to NATO discusses downsizing in the State Department”; NPR; July 12, 2025

(14) “Regime change in Iran seems unlikely amid war with Israel, Middle East scholar says”; PBS; Jun 21, 2025

(15) “American Democracy Might Not Survive a War With Iran”; Atlantic; June 21, 2025
Or, AOL
(16) p253 in “Freedom and Government”, Bertrand Russell; “Freedom: Its Meaning”, Ruth Nanda Anshen (ed); 1940

How does a generative AI tell us about a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world?

US President Donald Trump articulates more radicalized MAGA and America First position in his second term, without being moderated by adults in the room. As seen in his transactional pursuit of a peace deal in Ukraine, the world is turning toward a disorder. In such a world, Liberal Democracies need a risk hedge to override the chaos by MAGA-jacked America. A Euro-Japanese alliance could serve this objective, but it would not be an alternative but a supplement of the trans-Atlantic and the US-Japanese alliances. It is still unrealistic for American allies worldwide to throw away the security umbrella completely. In an increasingly complicated world like this, can generative AI show some policy directions for the future? As an example, I would like to talk about Grok answers to my questions on a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world.

Grok is a recently added generative AI application on Twitter (Currently, X). Based on the profile summary from my tweets, it explained briefly about a Euro-Japanese alliance as follows. There are strategic rationales from three points, Russian threats in both Europe and Asia, Chinese BRI worldwide and anti-FOIP challenges, and predatory America First by Trump. In practice, Europe and Japan would be able to pursue military cooperation such as intelligence sharing and joint R&D of weapons, and economic policy coordination. Politically, a united Euro-Japanese voice at the UN and G7 would boost the rule-based world order, which would help small nations such as Ukraine, Baltic states, and Taiwan stand up against predatory great powers in their neighborhood like Russia and China. The problem is geographical remoteness of both sides and American discomfort with being sidelined from the alliance.

This is just a typical textbook introduction of the main agenda, and further conversations are necessary to judge the real thinking capability of generative AI. Among those questions, I would like to focus on whether Grok understands lengthy and complicated questions properly, not just words but nuances, and how it streamlines the direction of the argument lucidly. Let’s see some unorthodox ones of my own interest, rather than something orthodox and expectable about Euro-Japanese relations and Trump's America (1).

【Question 1】: Trump told the media that only the monkey model of the F-47, the next generation fighter jets, is available for allies. That is what the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. His brain is Russified so much. Should American allies invest more in independent high-tech weapons such as GCAP and FCAS fighters? Also, Trump's remark does not make sense, as Iran's F-14s have been in poor condition since the Islamic Revolution. It seems that he is interested in sales profit from the next-generation fighter rather than global security.

In reply, Grok admitted my concerns with monkey model provisionally, that Trump may not have “Russified” his mindsets but he prioritizes export profit of the F-47 for the United States to the security of allies. Regarding whether allies should invest in the GCAP by Britain, Japan, and Italy, or the FCAS by France, Germany, and Spain, instead of “dubious” F-47 (2)(3), Grok outlines both R&D projects, and concluded that the GCAP meets Japan’s timetable for deployment(4) against China, but future acquisition of the F-47 should not be ruled out even though it is downgraded. I understand this reply that it takes years for R&D of the next generation fighter, and the future US administration could permit regular model exports of it. Also, it did not mention a shock of supply chain cut if a Trump-like nationalist stop component exports of this fighter jet as it happened in the case of Iranian F-14s(5). AI does not answer everything.

Nevertheless, this AI application mentioned the vital point of my question that Soviet-styled monkey model export by Trump illustrates his deep-rooted America First mindsets. As to this question, though lengthy and not so simple, generative AI understands my intention so profoundly. Quite interestingly, I mistyped GCAP for GPAC in the question, but Grok interpreted it correctly.

【Question 2】: Now, a question about nuclear deterrence. Should Japan help R&D to boost British and French nuclear capability while not possessing its own nuclear weapons? Japan, as an independent nuclear power, would accelerate the collapse of the global non-proliferation regime, which in turn would pose critical threats to its national security. Also, how about Japan's nuclear sharing with both countries, in case Trump's America abdicates its allies?

This question is quite controversial as Japan maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons into its territory. However, since America’s nuclear umbrella is turning unreliable in Trump’s second term, a risk hedge is a critical issue for Japan. Grok replied to my question from two points, R&D and nuclear sharing. While it mentions positively about the former, somewhat cautiously about the latter. Japan has money and technology to help Britain and France bost their nuclear capability. Also, it is not the interest of the global community if Japan runs the risk of provoking proliferation to other non-nuclear powers to destroy the global arms control regime by possessing its own nuclear arsenals. This is also the case with Japan’s nuclear sharing with Britain and France. However, nuclear sharing could trigger anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan more seriously for fear of escalating tensions with China. Also, an increasingly nationalist United States might doubt Japan’s loyalty to the alliance if such a risk hedge were explored.

But I do not necessarily agree to Grok’s concerns with “nukes on home soil is taboo” among the Japanese because British and French nuclear weapons would not be deployed permanently as most of them are not land-based. They just come to naval or air force facilities in Japan when necessary. After all, a sovereign and independent nuclear deterrence is the last of the last of the last resort for Japan. Therefore, I would argue that it necessary to think about a nuclear security partnership with Britain and France both in terms of quality and quantity, to fill a vacuum of superpower suicide by a populist-jacked America regardless of partisanship. Currently, their nuclear deterrence is too small, even if combined (6).

Quite interestingly, Britain is reconsidering its dependence on the US-made Trident SLBM as the governance of Trump’s America is a critical risk to its national security. Currently, the following three options are considered for its sovereign independent nuclear weapons. That is to build up deterrence by itself or with France. But in both cases, the economy of scale for nuclear R&D is restricted. Therefore, the third option that is to boost Britain’s nuclear deterrence within the Euro-Atlantic multilateral framework such as NATO is considered (7). In that case, some Pacific nations like Japan, Australia, etc. could join the project.

【Question 3】: The problem is not just geopolitics. The fall of democracy in Trump's America is a fatal problem, as mentioned in a recent article by Chris Patten in Project Syndicate. Though he was very close to pro-American Thatcher, as opposed to pro-EU Heseltine, he insists that Britain be more sovereign and autonomous from MAGA-jacked America. He understands both Europe and Asia through his career in politics. Given this, how would a Euro-Japanese alliance lead value-oriented diplomacy of the world when America is withdrawing the freedom ideal and humanitarianism?

As I mention in the question, UK Lord Chris Patten was a devoted Atlanticist and a darling of the Reagan-Thatcher world order, and a consummate British diplomat both in Asia and Europe as the last governor of Hong Kong and former European Commissioner for External Relations. From this career background, Patten argues Britain downgrade the decades-long special relationship with the United States because Trump’s America is no longer the bearer of freedom values as seen in the January 6 riot. As the ex-Chancellor of Oxford University, he reflects on the history of the Anglo-American alliance since Winston Churchill academically, to argue that Trump destroyed the fundamental premise of shared values. Therefore, Patten urges Prime Minister Keir Starmer that Britain not to give in to every demand that Trump makes (8). Quite appallingly, Starmer is repealing hate speech laws in return for a favorable trade deal with Trump’s America (9). What a horrible kowtow that the Labour adopts a MAGA policy! In addition, Trump’s sheer lack of knowledge in history and geopolitics is revealed in his big power-focused diplomacy, because World Wars began from small countries such as Sebia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as Patten mentions.

Considering chaotic governance in current America and poor understanding of international affairs by its incumbent president, a Euro-Japanese alliance could complement the lack of US leadership in value-oriented diplomacy. Let me review the Grok reply. Besides shared values of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, both sides are committed to humanitarian issues such as disaster relief and the environment. Their respect for a rule-based world order leads them to object to Trump’s way of racketeering of small nations in the name of deal diplomacy. That makes the global security environment favorable for authoritarian powers, but Trump does not care. From the experience of negotiating with China regarding democratic governance of Hong Kong, Patten learned the danger of making an impetuous compromise with authoritarian power. If Trump is really abdicating Ukraine and Taiwan, a Euro-Japanese alliance could fill the vacuum to help Patten’s vison of reorganizing the League of Democracies. But we have to remember that neither Europe nor Japan can replace the current US-centered alliance with the alliance of democratic middle power simply though moral high grounds, because the United States is too big and strong despite Trump, and separated geography may split strategic priority of Europe and Japan.

Finally, the most critical issue of the world order today is Trump tariffs. How should a Euro-Japanese alliance manage the trade war with Trump’s America? I asked the following question recently(10).

【Question 4】: The trade negotiations are not only about the global economic regime, but also about geopolitics. Although more multilateral approaches are desirable, some countries seem to prioritize their deal-making with Trump rather than standing against his America First trade policy through multilateral solidarity. Among them, I would like to ask about two major economies.
(1) Japan is willing to reach an early agreement with Trump, but if it is hasty, will it set a bad precedent for other countries’ trade talks? Is the Ishiba administration too Japan First?
(2) Britain suggested repealing hate speech laws in return for tariff cuts. If the Labour cabinet accepts MAGA agendas so easily, the Conservative Party could move farther to the right, which could prompt an ideological surenchère in Britain’s domestic politics. Will it help Elon Musk’s MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) initiative to provoke right-wing populism in Europe, which would ultimately disunify NATO and the EU?

Regarding Japan, Grok admits the risk of becoming a bad precedent, but comments that Ishiba is not so much Japan First with his close policy coordination with FOIP participants and NATO. This counterargument has some points as Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba stressed Japan’s role to mediate the United States and ASEAN nations in the trade war on his recent visit to Vietnam and the Philippines (11). Still, there is a concern that Japan’s rush for a hasty agreement could break up the world trade order. In the trade talk with Trump’s America, Ishiba officials mention almost entirely about Japan’s national interest. That sounds quite Japan First for a staunch proponent of the liberal world order and Never Trumper like me.

As to Britain, Grok admits my concern that Starmer’s concession to MAGA would embolden Conservative rightwing or even Reform UK. Furthermore, infiltration of MAGA political culture would boost anti-EU or anti-NATO sentiments throughout Europe, which would Elon Musk’s MEGA agitation. Grok refers to my previous question about Patten’s warning in its reply that a U.S. democratic backslide empowers Europe’s illiberal fringes, and Labour’s concessions could grease that slide. While acting cautiously, pro-EU Starmer explores new trade and security partnership with the EU to counter Trump (12).

Prior to this, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for an international coordination in macroeconomic and financial policy to overcome worldwide recession and inflation by Trump tariffs as the global community did in the 2008 financial crisis (13). Also, he advocates collective initiatives for the new world order of reconstructed rule of law that incorporates emerging economies. A Euro-Japanese alliance that I mention can listen to them to rearrange rule-based multilateralism against sharp power transactionalism by Trump's America, Putin's Russia, and Xi Jinping's China. For this objective, Brown urges the UK to restore strategic partnership with the EU in security and the economy to override the post-Brexit shock (14).

Generative AI is quite helpful in streamlining thoughts and occasionally, realizing overlooked points, particularly in exploring complicated issue like a Euro-Japanese alliance in the world of increasing uncertainty. Also, it would be helpful for teachers to get used to AI thinking, in order to check AI cheating by students when they submit reports and essays. Finally, we have to notice that Elon Musk uses AI for his controversial work at the DOGE, and a familiarity with this application would be useful to understand his strange ways of thinking. After all, AI is no panacea to resolve the problem. The answer by the AI depends on the quality of question by each person. Also, various AIs are emerging and evolving one after another, and each of them has its own strength and weakness. We have to bear it in mind to discuss the issue of a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world. More questions and deeper questions to AI are necessary to explore this matter furthermore.



Footnotes:
(1) Grok Chat

(2) "Sixth-Generation Fighter Showdown: F-47, GCAP, FCAS, and J-36 (Baidi)"; European Defence Review; 24 March, 2025

(3) "Will Boeing’s F-47 ‘KILL’ European GCAP & FCAS Programs As U.S. Could Export 6th-Gen Jets To Allies?"; Eurasian Times; March 23, 2025

(4) "Global Combat Air Programme Joint Statement"; UK Government; 20 November 2024

(5) "How Iran manages to keep its F-14 Tomcats flying"; Key Aero; August 2, 2022

(6) "Can Europe Build Its Own Nuclear Umbrella?"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; April 3. 2025

(7) "The UK’s nuclear deterrent relies on US support – but there are no other easy alternatives"; Chatham House; 24 March, 2025

(8) "Britain Must Downgrade the Special Relationship"; Project Syndicate; February 28, 2025

(9) "Starmer told UK must repeal hate speech laws to protect LGBT+ people or lose Trump trade deal"; Independent; 16 April, 2025

(10) Grok Chat

(11) "Japan's role for ASEAN increasingly crucial amid US tariff standoff"; Mainichi Shimbun; April 30, 2025

(12) "UK and EU defy Trump with new strategic partnership to boost trade and security"; Guardian; 29 April, 2025

(13) "Trump is pushing the world towards recession. By learning the lessons of 2008, we can still prevent it"; Giardian; 10 April, 2025

(14) "The ‘new world order’ of the past 35 years is being demolished before our eyes. This is how we must proceed"; Guardian; 12 April, 2025