President Barack Obama went on a trip to Europe at the end of this May, starting from Ireland, Britain, France, and Poland. Jan Techau, Director the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, comments that his visit to Poland has more important security implications than the bilateral strategic discussion on Libya in Britain and the Deauville Summit of G8 in France.
It is no exaggeration to say that history of Poland is history of Europe from the 20th century onward. World War Ⅱ began from here. The Anglo-Soviet clash on Poland during the war grew into the Cold War. The Solidarity movement led by Lech Walesa was a precursor of the Berlin Wall fall down. Poland is in such a critical position in the Russo-Western geopolitical rivalry. According to Techau, Obama’s visit to Poland is expected to ease widespread anxieties among Central European nations that the United States resets relations with Russia at the expense of newly expanded NATO members in the east. Reassuring American security umbrella to the Eastern fringe will help the trans-Atlantic Alliance become more integrated. In the eyes of Poland, Obama’s decision to withdraw missile defense systems from there appears conciliatory to Russia. In order to soothe Poland, a squadron of US fighters will be stationed there from 2013. As Techau argues, a staunch alliance between America and Europe is the key to world peace and stability. Despite the rise of emerging economies, it is only the West that can make principles, ideas, and mechanisms of global policymaking (“Doing Geopolitics in Eastern Europe”; Carnegie Commentary; May 25, 2011). Obama’s visit to Poland poses significant implications to the Western alliance and power games with Russia.
Currently, the Russo-Western relationship is extremely delicate and complex. On one hand, both sides are deepening security cooperation as cited in the declaration of NATO Lisbon Summit last November. On the other hand, they are at odds with fundamental visions of global policymaking. While the West wants to promote a liberal world order, Russia envisions a multipolar and multi-valued world. Also, geopolitical rivalries between Russia and the West are still substantial. At Deauville, just before President Obama’s visit to Poland, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev demanded assurance that missile interceptors were not targeted on Russia while endorsing NATO led attack to Libya to oust Khadafy. See the Video below.
Mark Brzezinski, foreign policy advisor in Obama’s presidential election campaign, comments that it takes a long time to improve Russo-Polish relations because disagreements on the massacre of Katyn Forest. Strains between both countries deters the US-Russian reset, he says (“Obama, Poland, and Russia”; New York Times; May 26, 2011). As in the last century, Brzezinski’s article suggests that Poland is a key country of Russo-Western geopolitics in the 21st century. At the press conference after the bilateral talks with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, President Obama applauded Poland a model for democracy to Arab nations. Also, he assured US defense involvement in Poland. See the video below.
Russia was not the only agenda at the Obama-Tusk meeting. Along with economic issues like energy and trade, and security in Afghanistan, civil society repression in Belarus was discussed (“Warsaw visit concludes Obama’s four-nation European trip” Washington Post; May 29, 2011). Security in Eastern Europe is still volatile.
The Deauville Summit may have advanced the Russo-Western reset and deepened trans-Atlantic ties, but this détente has not eased East-West geopolitical tensions completely. Therefore, we need continual attention to NATO’s eastern frontiers such as Poland, Czech, and Romania, and former Soviet republics.
Thursday, June 02, 2011
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
A Critical Review of Obama’s 5-19 Speech on Israel
President Barack Obama delivered speech to address fundamental approaches for Middle East reform in view of successful attack to Osama bin Laden. Among a wide range of issues in the speech, the Israeli-Palestine mention has drawn a focal attention by the media. The global community applauded to hear Obama’s message on May 19 that Israel withdraw to the 1967 border for Middle East peace process. Is this really a breakthrough as widely expected? Let me comment briefly.
From Israeli viewpoints, Obama demanded Israel to swap the land without requesting anything to the Palestinian side. David Horovitz of the Jerusalem Post points out that Obama failed to mention historical ties between the Jews and current Israeli territory in the Cairo speech in 2009. Unless this history-sovereignty ties are accepted, real compromise between Israel and Palestine cannot be achieved, he says (“Obama’s failure to internalize Palestinian intolerance”; Jerusalem Post; May 20, 2011). Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu interprets that Obama’s speech overturns the 2004 agreement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, that is, no complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 line and Palestinian refugees’ incorporation into the future Palestinian state. Herb Keinon of the Jerusalem Post criticizes Obama’s remark from the following three points. First, as Obama said the 1967 borders be the baseline for the peace process, Israel must hand over all the territory acquired in the Six Day War to the Palestinian side. This is to say that Obama defends Palestinian policy goal while demanding a complete compromise for Israel. Second, Obama did not reconfirm the 2004 agreement that Palestinian refugees return to a Palestinian state. This makes the refugee issue vague and provokes concerns on the Israeli side. Third, Obama suggested to engage Hamas without clearly demanding fundamental principles: curbing terrorism, recognizing Israel, and accepting previous agreements (”Analysis: What rankled Netanyahu in the Obama speech”; Jerusalem Post; May 20, 2011).
Let me mention some critical comments to Obama’s proposal on the American side. Though complete withdrawal of Israel is unlikely, American policymakers expect that the national border will be somewhat similar to the 1967 lines. The 2004 agreement is interpreted like this way on both the American and the Israeli side. However, Danielle Pletka, Vice President at the American Enterprise Institute, mentions that the timing and the balance of this speech are inappropriate. Obama himself decided to insert the 1967 line just before the speech without listening to his senior advisers. There is no wonder Prime Minister Netanyahu was startled to hear this controversial speech as he stood by President Obama at the joint press conference. As to the balance, Obama failed to condemn terrorism by Hamas and poor governance in the Palestine area. She says this imbalance is rooted to Obama’s antipathy to Israel, which is unacceptable to American values and interests (“A Little More on the 1967 Lines, Obama and Israel”; Enterprise Blog; May 20, 2011). In any case, I would argue that Obama has made the same mistake to overturn previous agreements without giving sufficient consideration to the timing and the balance as former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama did on Futemma Air Base.
It is premature to praise Obama’s new proposal for the Israeli-Palestinian peace talk. On the other hand, Barack Obama outlined to reconfirm Bush administration’s policy to promote democracy in the Middle East, and the global community must pay more attention to this primary message in the 5-19 speech. Without airy fairy performance to shock Benyamin Netanyahu, this speech would have been more meaningful, and it is a pity.
From Israeli viewpoints, Obama demanded Israel to swap the land without requesting anything to the Palestinian side. David Horovitz of the Jerusalem Post points out that Obama failed to mention historical ties between the Jews and current Israeli territory in the Cairo speech in 2009. Unless this history-sovereignty ties are accepted, real compromise between Israel and Palestine cannot be achieved, he says (“Obama’s failure to internalize Palestinian intolerance”; Jerusalem Post; May 20, 2011). Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu interprets that Obama’s speech overturns the 2004 agreement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, that is, no complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 line and Palestinian refugees’ incorporation into the future Palestinian state. Herb Keinon of the Jerusalem Post criticizes Obama’s remark from the following three points. First, as Obama said the 1967 borders be the baseline for the peace process, Israel must hand over all the territory acquired in the Six Day War to the Palestinian side. This is to say that Obama defends Palestinian policy goal while demanding a complete compromise for Israel. Second, Obama did not reconfirm the 2004 agreement that Palestinian refugees return to a Palestinian state. This makes the refugee issue vague and provokes concerns on the Israeli side. Third, Obama suggested to engage Hamas without clearly demanding fundamental principles: curbing terrorism, recognizing Israel, and accepting previous agreements (”Analysis: What rankled Netanyahu in the Obama speech”; Jerusalem Post; May 20, 2011).
Let me mention some critical comments to Obama’s proposal on the American side. Though complete withdrawal of Israel is unlikely, American policymakers expect that the national border will be somewhat similar to the 1967 lines. The 2004 agreement is interpreted like this way on both the American and the Israeli side. However, Danielle Pletka, Vice President at the American Enterprise Institute, mentions that the timing and the balance of this speech are inappropriate. Obama himself decided to insert the 1967 line just before the speech without listening to his senior advisers. There is no wonder Prime Minister Netanyahu was startled to hear this controversial speech as he stood by President Obama at the joint press conference. As to the balance, Obama failed to condemn terrorism by Hamas and poor governance in the Palestine area. She says this imbalance is rooted to Obama’s antipathy to Israel, which is unacceptable to American values and interests (“A Little More on the 1967 Lines, Obama and Israel”; Enterprise Blog; May 20, 2011). In any case, I would argue that Obama has made the same mistake to overturn previous agreements without giving sufficient consideration to the timing and the balance as former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama did on Futemma Air Base.
It is premature to praise Obama’s new proposal for the Israeli-Palestinian peace talk. On the other hand, Barack Obama outlined to reconfirm Bush administration’s policy to promote democracy in the Middle East, and the global community must pay more attention to this primary message in the 5-19 speech. Without airy fairy performance to shock Benyamin Netanyahu, this speech would have been more meaningful, and it is a pity.
Sunday, May 08, 2011
The World after Osama bin Laden
The most wanted terrorist Osama bin Laden was killed in the attack by US Navy SEALSs in Abbottabad Pakistan on May 2. This is a landmark in the War on Terror, and a heavy blow to terrorist organizations notably Al Qaeda. However, it does not mean the end of Islamic terrorism. As Bin Laden’s hideout was not so far from Pakistani capital Islamabad, relations between Pakistan and the West are straining.
Let me talk about its implications to the war in Afghanistan. Liberals such as Gilles Dorronsoro, Associate Member at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies, argues that the United States make use of this chance to talk to the Taliban to get out of this long war, as he thinks it unlikely that things in Afghanistan and Pakistan improve soon (“Bin Laden Death Points to Way out of Trap”; Bloomberg News; May 3, 2011). On the other hand, Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, insists that conflicts among local ethnic groups and tribes will be eased only when the United States are sufficiently involved both politically and militarily. He urges Obama to accept field commanders’ advise to maintain the largest possible number of troops in Afghanistan (“Creating New Facts on the Ground”; Carnegie Policy Brief; May 2011).
The key to Western involvement in Afghanistan is how much critical threat Al Qaeda will continue to pose in the Middle East and South Asia. According to BBC, Al Qaeda and its affiliations are determined to launch attack in Pakistan in tribute to Osama, which poses substantial risks to Afganistan, Pakistan ,and India (“Osama's death: What next for al-Qaeda?”; BBC News; 2 May 2011). Daniel Byman, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, comments that the loss of charismatic and unifying personality like bin Laden has given a tremendous damage to Al Qaeda (“What Next for Al Qaeda?”; Brookings Opinion; May 2, 2011). However, hardly any experts see that the War on Terror is over.
Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, presents a concise viewpoint to understand global terrorism after bin Laden. The killing of Osama is an important achievement, and Al Qaeda has been weakened. Since the surge in Iraq by the Bush administration, they lost their franchises there. Also, he says that they are losing in Afghanistan. However, he warns that premature retreat from the War on Terror by the United States and its allies will allow remaining Al Qaeda leaders to find another franchise somewhere else (“Bin Laden, No More”; National Review Online Symposium; May 3, 2011). Fouad Ajami, Professor of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, argues furthermore that bin Laden was a loser, rejected in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also says that bin Laden was killed when his jihadist legacy was being eclipsed in the Arab Spring (“Osama Bin Laden, Weak Horse”; Wall Street Journal; May 3, 2011).
British experts express almost the same views as those of Americans. Paul Cornish, Head of International Security Programme at Chatham House, comments that symbolic effect of the death of the most notorious murderer cannot be underestimated, and perils of jihadists in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have become less dreadful (“Osama bin Laden: Gone but not Forgotten”; Chatham House Comment; 3 May 2011). Of course, jihadist threats have not been wiped out. Xenia Dormandy, Senior Fellow at the Chatham House, warns the US Congress not to cut resources invested in this war simply for the sake of fiscal austerity (“Death of Osama bin Laden: The Threat Remains”; Chatham House Comment; 2 May 2011).
At present, Pakistan is an impending problem. The discovery of bin Laden in Abbottabad is strengthening distrusts to Pakistan among American policymakers. Since the hideout was close to military garrisons, the United States suspects that Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence sheltered him. Both American and Pakistani officials are puzzled with this (“Amid Skepticism, Pakistan Calculates Its Response”; New York Times; May 2, 2011). British leaders are also shocked to hear this news. Since the fall of Pervez Musharraf, UK-Pakistani counterterrorism ties have deepened under President Asif Al Zardari. In order to overturn a drawback in bilateral relations, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistani High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, announced that the Pakistani government had no information about bin Laden before the attack by US SEALs (“MP 'shocked' at bin Laden Pakistan discovery”; Independent; 2 May 2011).
The vital issue is bin Laden’s secret network in Pakistan. John Brennan, Counterterrorism Advisor to President Obama, questions whether bin Laden had some support system in Pakistan. Pakistan’s position in counterterrorism is delicate and complicated. While Pakistani intelligence community could make use of bin Laden threat to demand US military aid, a stable democracy in Afghanistan having close ties with India can encircle Pakistan itself (”American secrecy lays bare deep distrust of its Pakistani 'allies'”; Independent; 3 May, 2011). In view of Western criticism and suspicion, Husain Haqqani, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, appeared in CNN to admit that Osama bin Laden had support system in Pakistan. However, Haqqani denied that the Pakistani government knew Osama hiding in its territory. In addition, he emphasized Pakistan’ contribution to the War on Terror in arresting terrorist leaders such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (“Osama had support system in Pak: Haqqani”; Hindu; May 3, 2011).
The successful attack to Osama bin Laden is a symbolic and great achievement. However, there are critical problems to be resolved. Considering connections with Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals, secret support system of terrorism is a foremost threat to global security. In the past, Pakistan was criticized for notorious Khan Network, tied to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Also, state sponsorship to radicals must be investigated. As I mentioned in the last post, Iran has connections with Al Qaeda. It supports Shiite radicals like Hezzbolah in Lebanon and Bahrain to overturn pro-Western regimes and wipe out Israel. Those issues are more dreadful than revenge attacks in tribute to Osama.
Let me talk about its implications to the war in Afghanistan. Liberals such as Gilles Dorronsoro, Associate Member at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies, argues that the United States make use of this chance to talk to the Taliban to get out of this long war, as he thinks it unlikely that things in Afghanistan and Pakistan improve soon (“Bin Laden Death Points to Way out of Trap”; Bloomberg News; May 3, 2011). On the other hand, Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, insists that conflicts among local ethnic groups and tribes will be eased only when the United States are sufficiently involved both politically and militarily. He urges Obama to accept field commanders’ advise to maintain the largest possible number of troops in Afghanistan (“Creating New Facts on the Ground”; Carnegie Policy Brief; May 2011).
The key to Western involvement in Afghanistan is how much critical threat Al Qaeda will continue to pose in the Middle East and South Asia. According to BBC, Al Qaeda and its affiliations are determined to launch attack in Pakistan in tribute to Osama, which poses substantial risks to Afganistan, Pakistan ,and India (“Osama's death: What next for al-Qaeda?”; BBC News; 2 May 2011). Daniel Byman, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, comments that the loss of charismatic and unifying personality like bin Laden has given a tremendous damage to Al Qaeda (“What Next for Al Qaeda?”; Brookings Opinion; May 2, 2011). However, hardly any experts see that the War on Terror is over.
Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, presents a concise viewpoint to understand global terrorism after bin Laden. The killing of Osama is an important achievement, and Al Qaeda has been weakened. Since the surge in Iraq by the Bush administration, they lost their franchises there. Also, he says that they are losing in Afghanistan. However, he warns that premature retreat from the War on Terror by the United States and its allies will allow remaining Al Qaeda leaders to find another franchise somewhere else (“Bin Laden, No More”; National Review Online Symposium; May 3, 2011). Fouad Ajami, Professor of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, argues furthermore that bin Laden was a loser, rejected in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also says that bin Laden was killed when his jihadist legacy was being eclipsed in the Arab Spring (“Osama Bin Laden, Weak Horse”; Wall Street Journal; May 3, 2011).
British experts express almost the same views as those of Americans. Paul Cornish, Head of International Security Programme at Chatham House, comments that symbolic effect of the death of the most notorious murderer cannot be underestimated, and perils of jihadists in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have become less dreadful (“Osama bin Laden: Gone but not Forgotten”; Chatham House Comment; 3 May 2011). Of course, jihadist threats have not been wiped out. Xenia Dormandy, Senior Fellow at the Chatham House, warns the US Congress not to cut resources invested in this war simply for the sake of fiscal austerity (“Death of Osama bin Laden: The Threat Remains”; Chatham House Comment; 2 May 2011).
At present, Pakistan is an impending problem. The discovery of bin Laden in Abbottabad is strengthening distrusts to Pakistan among American policymakers. Since the hideout was close to military garrisons, the United States suspects that Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence sheltered him. Both American and Pakistani officials are puzzled with this (“Amid Skepticism, Pakistan Calculates Its Response”; New York Times; May 2, 2011). British leaders are also shocked to hear this news. Since the fall of Pervez Musharraf, UK-Pakistani counterterrorism ties have deepened under President Asif Al Zardari. In order to overturn a drawback in bilateral relations, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistani High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, announced that the Pakistani government had no information about bin Laden before the attack by US SEALs (“MP 'shocked' at bin Laden Pakistan discovery”; Independent; 2 May 2011).
The vital issue is bin Laden’s secret network in Pakistan. John Brennan, Counterterrorism Advisor to President Obama, questions whether bin Laden had some support system in Pakistan. Pakistan’s position in counterterrorism is delicate and complicated. While Pakistani intelligence community could make use of bin Laden threat to demand US military aid, a stable democracy in Afghanistan having close ties with India can encircle Pakistan itself (”American secrecy lays bare deep distrust of its Pakistani 'allies'”; Independent; 3 May, 2011). In view of Western criticism and suspicion, Husain Haqqani, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, appeared in CNN to admit that Osama bin Laden had support system in Pakistan. However, Haqqani denied that the Pakistani government knew Osama hiding in its territory. In addition, he emphasized Pakistan’ contribution to the War on Terror in arresting terrorist leaders such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (“Osama had support system in Pak: Haqqani”; Hindu; May 3, 2011).
The successful attack to Osama bin Laden is a symbolic and great achievement. However, there are critical problems to be resolved. Considering connections with Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals, secret support system of terrorism is a foremost threat to global security. In the past, Pakistan was criticized for notorious Khan Network, tied to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Also, state sponsorship to radicals must be investigated. As I mentioned in the last post, Iran has connections with Al Qaeda. It supports Shiite radicals like Hezzbolah in Lebanon and Bahrain to overturn pro-Western regimes and wipe out Israel. Those issues are more dreadful than revenge attacks in tribute to Osama.
Saturday, April 30, 2011
Stability in Iraq and Dark Influences of Iran
While the global public is preoccupied with recent unrests in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, a reminder article on Iraq was released by Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Kimberly Kagan, President of the Institute for the Study of War (“Stand with Iraq”; Weekly Standard; April 18, 2011). On one hand, the Arab Spring is a great opportunity to advance democracy throughout the Middle East. But on the other hand, the collapse of the balance of power can provoke Iran’s ambition to expand its influence in the Gulf area and furthermore. Therefore, stable and strong democracy in Iraq is vital to lead Arab Spring movements to more favorable direction.
Both Kagans criticize a preoccupation with ending the war in Iraq and a notion that the US-Iraqi relations should focus on nonmilitary fields. Actually, the United States has not made meaningful progress in developing nonmilitary ties with Iraq, while Iran penetrates there through trade and investment businesses, many of which are tied to the Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, Iran deepens ties with Iraqi leaders drawing little attention from the United States. Both authors argue that the United States cannot develop bilateral partnership with Iraq by simply relying on soft power. They say that continuous presence of US peacekeeping forces will foster Arab-Kurd peace. Also, Iraqi security forces are still weak to curb Iranian-backed militias and Sunni insurgents including Al Qaeda. The United States played significant roles to manage such security challenges in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, I agree with them that the Obama administration be psychologically involved in Iraq to make continuous commitment to maintain security there. Furthermore, Max Boot, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, says, “We are still in Kosovo, South Korea and other post-conflict zones that are far more stable. We need to be in Iraq too” (“It's in America's Interest to Stay in Iraq”; Real Clear World; April 18, 2011).
American political and military presence is the key to stop Iranian ambition in the Middle East and Central Asia. Particularly, Iran is keen to penetrate its influence into the Gulf area. Bahrain is a primary target, as populated by Shiite majority. Iran sponsors Hezbollah-led uprisings there, which intensifies tensions with Arab emirates and the United States (“Bahrain Sees Hezbollah Plot in Protest”; Wall Street Journal; April 25, 2011).
Radical Shiites like Hezbollah is not the only organization sponsored by Iran. Sunni networks, notably Al Qaeda, receive substantial assistance from Iran to pursue their destructive activities throughout the Middle East. Stephen F. Hayes, Senior Writer of the Weekly Standard, and Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracy, talk of dreadful cases of Iran-Al Qaeda ties. In 2009, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia told President Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser John Brennan that Iran hosted Saudis to agitate uprisings in his country. In 2007, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman and President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan agreed Iran provided small fire weapons to Afghan insurgents. More importantly, CIA Director Michael Hayden said such support had been approved “at the highest levels” of the Iranian regime in 2008 (“The Iran Connection”; Weekly Standard; December 13, 2010).
Considering Iran’s ties with terrorists and radicals, stability in Iraq is interconnected with successful political transitions in the Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan. As terrorist networks are so widespread and so deeply connected with autocrats, it is utterly wrong to insist that we focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, while leaving Arab dictatorship like Libya and Syria as they are. American presence and leadership are essential to help the Arab Spring and defeat terrorists. The Obama administration’s excessive modest stance on Libya is counterproductive to the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, I agree with Charles Krauthammer’s comment “Leading from behind is not leading” (“The Obama doctrine: Leading from behind”; Washington Post; April 29, 2011).
Meanwhile, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would announce how many US troops stay after December this year in several weeks. The challenge posed by a radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is a key issue of US-Iraqi security talks before Maliki decides the status of US forces (“Iraq must decide in "weeks" on U.S. troops: Mullen”; Reuters; April 23, 2011). Don’t forget Iraq. Democracy promotion, along with the War on terror and nuclear nonproliferation in the Middle East started from here.
Both Kagans criticize a preoccupation with ending the war in Iraq and a notion that the US-Iraqi relations should focus on nonmilitary fields. Actually, the United States has not made meaningful progress in developing nonmilitary ties with Iraq, while Iran penetrates there through trade and investment businesses, many of which are tied to the Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, Iran deepens ties with Iraqi leaders drawing little attention from the United States. Both authors argue that the United States cannot develop bilateral partnership with Iraq by simply relying on soft power. They say that continuous presence of US peacekeeping forces will foster Arab-Kurd peace. Also, Iraqi security forces are still weak to curb Iranian-backed militias and Sunni insurgents including Al Qaeda. The United States played significant roles to manage such security challenges in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, I agree with them that the Obama administration be psychologically involved in Iraq to make continuous commitment to maintain security there. Furthermore, Max Boot, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, says, “We are still in Kosovo, South Korea and other post-conflict zones that are far more stable. We need to be in Iraq too” (“It's in America's Interest to Stay in Iraq”; Real Clear World; April 18, 2011).
American political and military presence is the key to stop Iranian ambition in the Middle East and Central Asia. Particularly, Iran is keen to penetrate its influence into the Gulf area. Bahrain is a primary target, as populated by Shiite majority. Iran sponsors Hezbollah-led uprisings there, which intensifies tensions with Arab emirates and the United States (“Bahrain Sees Hezbollah Plot in Protest”; Wall Street Journal; April 25, 2011).
Radical Shiites like Hezbollah is not the only organization sponsored by Iran. Sunni networks, notably Al Qaeda, receive substantial assistance from Iran to pursue their destructive activities throughout the Middle East. Stephen F. Hayes, Senior Writer of the Weekly Standard, and Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracy, talk of dreadful cases of Iran-Al Qaeda ties. In 2009, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia told President Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser John Brennan that Iran hosted Saudis to agitate uprisings in his country. In 2007, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman and President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan agreed Iran provided small fire weapons to Afghan insurgents. More importantly, CIA Director Michael Hayden said such support had been approved “at the highest levels” of the Iranian regime in 2008 (“The Iran Connection”; Weekly Standard; December 13, 2010).
Considering Iran’s ties with terrorists and radicals, stability in Iraq is interconnected with successful political transitions in the Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan. As terrorist networks are so widespread and so deeply connected with autocrats, it is utterly wrong to insist that we focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, while leaving Arab dictatorship like Libya and Syria as they are. American presence and leadership are essential to help the Arab Spring and defeat terrorists. The Obama administration’s excessive modest stance on Libya is counterproductive to the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, I agree with Charles Krauthammer’s comment “Leading from behind is not leading” (“The Obama doctrine: Leading from behind”; Washington Post; April 29, 2011).
Meanwhile, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would announce how many US troops stay after December this year in several weeks. The challenge posed by a radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is a key issue of US-Iraqi security talks before Maliki decides the status of US forces (“Iraq must decide in "weeks" on U.S. troops: Mullen”; Reuters; April 23, 2011). Don’t forget Iraq. Democracy promotion, along with the War on terror and nuclear nonproliferation in the Middle East started from here.
Monday, April 18, 2011
Think again Our Relations with China
Despite political rivalries with free nations, business societies regard China as an indispensable partner for growth opportunities. Moreover, some policymakers see China a locomotive for the world economy while developed nations are aging. However, relations with the Beijing regime need to be reconsidered both in terms of politics and the economy. Is it really our interest to “bow down and praise” autocrats as President Barack Obama did in his speech at APEC summit in Singapore?
First, let me talk about political aspects. Ellen Bork, Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, criticizes that the Obama administration’s engagement policy has not changed repressive nature of the Communist China. Since the Jasmine Revolutions in the Arab world, the Chinese authority has been arresting numerous activists, lawyers, and bloggers for freedom. While American human rights lawyer organizations such as the New York City Bar Association and the American Bar Association demand the Chinese government to release them, human rights issues are not the agenda at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington this May. Bork says that the Obama administration puts too much emphasis on the economy over democracy (“Meanwhile, in Beijing ...”; Weekly Standard; April 11, 2011). In view of Western pressure to release Ai Weiwei (“Amid crackdown, U.S. groups strive to improve China's legal system”; USA Today; April 14, 2011), Chinese police accuses Ai of evading tax, committing bigamy, and spreading pornography (“China police building tax case against detained artist”; Reuters; April 14, 2011). As China is manipulating criminal cases against human rights activists just to crackdown Jasmine movements at home, the Obama administration needs to reconsider business first diplomacy with Beijing.
Geopolitical conflicts like the Senkaku dispute also need attention. I suspect that China has been emboldened to see apologetic global policy of the Obama administration. This is not only in East Asia, but worldwide. Regarding Libya, Lluís Bassets, Vice-Director of a Spanish daily El Pais, argues that President Obama is too modest to take leadership for Western democracies, which disappoints European allies (“EU and NATO in a tail spin”; Presseurop; 15 April, 2011). Quite regretfully, both Japanese and American opinion leaders blame Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama for allowing China to make use of worsening relations between both countries, but they hardly analyze critically on President Obama’s China policy. Hatoyama advocated the regular triangle relationship among Japan, the United States, and China. Also, he tried to overturn the bilateral deal on Futenma Air Base. The Washington Post is right to call Hatoyama loopy. However, speculation to Hatoyama has obscured faults on the Obama side. Had Obama acted steadfast, China would not have committed dangerous adventure to provoke the US-Japanese alliance, however loopy Japanese leaders were.
Moreover, we need to cast doubt to widely spread opinions among many economists and businessmen that China’s economic growth will contribute to our economy, and market opportunities there should not be missed. The Economist discusses the balance of gains and losses from trade between the United Sates and China on its blog. As Adam Smith and David Ricardo insist, free trade with China brings economic gains to the United States. However, this is offset by unemployment. As this blog argues, American welfare system may have to adjust to global economic competition (“Better safety nets needed”; Economist—Free Exchange; February 22, 2011). However, I would argue that cheap and massive labor of China poses compelling threats to workers in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Finally, 3-11 earthquake and subsequent Fukushima nuclear accident has brought us home that Japan is in no position of meddling America and China. It has turned out that Hatoyama’s vision of the regular triangle is utterly wrong, and the Operation Tomodachi reminds Japanese people that a strong US-Japanese alliance is the vital and foremost national interest. Furthermore, in the nuclear accident, the United States and France offered technological help to manage the crisis, and Russia proposed new governance for nuclear energy based on the Chernobyl experience. Has China done anything? In the area of knowledge, China is no rival for the West and Russia. Remember this, my fellow Japanese.
We must think again when we evaluate real power of China and its importance to our national interest. Applying the theory of Susan Strange, Chinese power is relational, not structural. China can hard power muscle to impose its will on others, but it unable cannot set international norms and show solutions to global challenges. We should never kowtow to Red China for the sake of short term economic interests. Bear it in mind, businessmen and “pragmatic” politicians. China is not necessarily the savior to boost our economy.
First, let me talk about political aspects. Ellen Bork, Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, criticizes that the Obama administration’s engagement policy has not changed repressive nature of the Communist China. Since the Jasmine Revolutions in the Arab world, the Chinese authority has been arresting numerous activists, lawyers, and bloggers for freedom. While American human rights lawyer organizations such as the New York City Bar Association and the American Bar Association demand the Chinese government to release them, human rights issues are not the agenda at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington this May. Bork says that the Obama administration puts too much emphasis on the economy over democracy (“Meanwhile, in Beijing ...”; Weekly Standard; April 11, 2011). In view of Western pressure to release Ai Weiwei (“Amid crackdown, U.S. groups strive to improve China's legal system”; USA Today; April 14, 2011), Chinese police accuses Ai of evading tax, committing bigamy, and spreading pornography (“China police building tax case against detained artist”; Reuters; April 14, 2011). As China is manipulating criminal cases against human rights activists just to crackdown Jasmine movements at home, the Obama administration needs to reconsider business first diplomacy with Beijing.
Geopolitical conflicts like the Senkaku dispute also need attention. I suspect that China has been emboldened to see apologetic global policy of the Obama administration. This is not only in East Asia, but worldwide. Regarding Libya, Lluís Bassets, Vice-Director of a Spanish daily El Pais, argues that President Obama is too modest to take leadership for Western democracies, which disappoints European allies (“EU and NATO in a tail spin”; Presseurop; 15 April, 2011). Quite regretfully, both Japanese and American opinion leaders blame Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama for allowing China to make use of worsening relations between both countries, but they hardly analyze critically on President Obama’s China policy. Hatoyama advocated the regular triangle relationship among Japan, the United States, and China. Also, he tried to overturn the bilateral deal on Futenma Air Base. The Washington Post is right to call Hatoyama loopy. However, speculation to Hatoyama has obscured faults on the Obama side. Had Obama acted steadfast, China would not have committed dangerous adventure to provoke the US-Japanese alliance, however loopy Japanese leaders were.
Moreover, we need to cast doubt to widely spread opinions among many economists and businessmen that China’s economic growth will contribute to our economy, and market opportunities there should not be missed. The Economist discusses the balance of gains and losses from trade between the United Sates and China on its blog. As Adam Smith and David Ricardo insist, free trade with China brings economic gains to the United States. However, this is offset by unemployment. As this blog argues, American welfare system may have to adjust to global economic competition (“Better safety nets needed”; Economist—Free Exchange; February 22, 2011). However, I would argue that cheap and massive labor of China poses compelling threats to workers in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Finally, 3-11 earthquake and subsequent Fukushima nuclear accident has brought us home that Japan is in no position of meddling America and China. It has turned out that Hatoyama’s vision of the regular triangle is utterly wrong, and the Operation Tomodachi reminds Japanese people that a strong US-Japanese alliance is the vital and foremost national interest. Furthermore, in the nuclear accident, the United States and France offered technological help to manage the crisis, and Russia proposed new governance for nuclear energy based on the Chernobyl experience. Has China done anything? In the area of knowledge, China is no rival for the West and Russia. Remember this, my fellow Japanese.
We must think again when we evaluate real power of China and its importance to our national interest. Applying the theory of Susan Strange, Chinese power is relational, not structural. China can hard power muscle to impose its will on others, but it unable cannot set international norms and show solutions to global challenges. We should never kowtow to Red China for the sake of short term economic interests. Bear it in mind, businessmen and “pragmatic” politicians. China is not necessarily the savior to boost our economy.
Monday, April 11, 2011
Shut down Nuclear Plants? Wait!: Peaceful Use and Non-proliferation
After the Fukushima shock, an increasing number of people insist that nuclear power plants be shut down immediately to avoid radioactive pollution to the environment. Some say that renewable resource such as biomass, geothermal, solar, wind, and tidal energy, supplant atomic power as post-petroleum energy resource. However, we should remember that technological assistance to build nuclear reactors for peaceful use is a bargaining tool for nonproliferation. Atomic energy and nuclear weapons are deeply correlated. Therefore, complete elimination of nuclear power plants can remove constraints to rising proliferators, which will lead to more nuclear tests and more radioactive contamination. This paradox is very important when we think of peaceful use of nuclear energy and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons after Fukushima.
Relations between peaceful use of atomic energy and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons can be described from the following points. First, established nuclear great powers like P5 and developed nations offer technological assistance for otherwise proliferators to build nuclear reactors. In return, countries accepting the assistance are demanded to stop developing or proliferating nuclear weapons. Once developed nations shut down nuclear power plants, they will lose this vital bargaining tool. Second, providers of technological assistance can demand verification, even though the customer country is out of the NPT regime.
The US-Indian nuclear deal is the most successful case of reactor for nonproliferation. In return for technological help, India accepted to stop nuclear tests. This deal has become a paradigm for other industrialized and emerging economies keen to pioneer the Indian market. Among them, Japan finally decided to shed anti-nuclear sentiments through Hiroshima-Nagasaki experience, and join the nuclear deal with India. Despite pacifist emotion, Japanese companies such as Hitachi, Toshiba, and Japan Steel Works subcontract General Electric and Areva to build nuclear reactors (“U.S., France press for Japan-India nuclear deal – Nikkei”; Reuters; June 9, 2010).
Reactor for nonproliferation deal is also explored in negotiations with Iran and North Korea. Whether we can talk with them or not, helping reactor building is one of carrots accompanied by a stick of economic sanction. As nuclear power plant projects are suspended in developed countries, negotiations with Iran and North Korea will be stalled.
It is too naïve to demand nuclear power plans be shut down immediately. Once we shut down, we will lose a means to bind potential nuclear proliferators. While the tsunami was a natural disaster once in a thousand years of Japanese history, nuclear testing is an act of human will that can happen anytime. Rising proliferators have poor technological solutions to manage the testing site, which would result in more serious radioactive pollution on the earth.
If we stop peaceful use of nuclear power, the problem will grow beyond energy and the environment. It is regretful that opinion leaders fail to discuss the impact of the Fukushima accident on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.
Relations between peaceful use of atomic energy and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons can be described from the following points. First, established nuclear great powers like P5 and developed nations offer technological assistance for otherwise proliferators to build nuclear reactors. In return, countries accepting the assistance are demanded to stop developing or proliferating nuclear weapons. Once developed nations shut down nuclear power plants, they will lose this vital bargaining tool. Second, providers of technological assistance can demand verification, even though the customer country is out of the NPT regime.
The US-Indian nuclear deal is the most successful case of reactor for nonproliferation. In return for technological help, India accepted to stop nuclear tests. This deal has become a paradigm for other industrialized and emerging economies keen to pioneer the Indian market. Among them, Japan finally decided to shed anti-nuclear sentiments through Hiroshima-Nagasaki experience, and join the nuclear deal with India. Despite pacifist emotion, Japanese companies such as Hitachi, Toshiba, and Japan Steel Works subcontract General Electric and Areva to build nuclear reactors (“U.S., France press for Japan-India nuclear deal – Nikkei”; Reuters; June 9, 2010).
Reactor for nonproliferation deal is also explored in negotiations with Iran and North Korea. Whether we can talk with them or not, helping reactor building is one of carrots accompanied by a stick of economic sanction. As nuclear power plant projects are suspended in developed countries, negotiations with Iran and North Korea will be stalled.
It is too naïve to demand nuclear power plans be shut down immediately. Once we shut down, we will lose a means to bind potential nuclear proliferators. While the tsunami was a natural disaster once in a thousand years of Japanese history, nuclear testing is an act of human will that can happen anytime. Rising proliferators have poor technological solutions to manage the testing site, which would result in more serious radioactive pollution on the earth.
If we stop peaceful use of nuclear power, the problem will grow beyond energy and the environment. It is regretful that opinion leaders fail to discuss the impact of the Fukushima accident on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Smart Power in US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice on Libya and Japan
Last month, I talked about a new security concept of smart power and US foreign policy. The word of “smart” captures the heart of many people, occasionally without exploring the real meaning of it. Quite often, “smart” or “efficient” organizations fail to manage something unexpected. Regarding smart power, Joseph Nye,Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, and Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, discussed this concept in US foreign policy in PBS's “Ideas in Action” on March 4. See the video below.
Nye is an authority of smart power and a close advisor to the Obama administration, while Kagan is a leading neoconservative commentator who was a foreign policy consultant for John McCain in the last presidential election. Therefore, this program illustrates how the new concept is viewed among American foreign policy makers. In the program, Professor Nye explains that smart power is a combination of hard power, which is economic and military power, and soft power, which is persuasion and attraction. Nye says that the United States is still the preeminent power, because of ideological supremacy. Robert Kagan agrees that power is multidimensional and smart use of those powers will be helpful to US diplomacy. However, Kagan insists that soft power is effective only when associated with strong hard power, as typically seen in US security umbrella during the Cold War.
Today, security challenges are intertwined. While global issues like financial disorder, environmental degradations, and non-state actor threats need transnational cooperation, traditional state to state rivalries are growing. Quite importantly, as Kagan argues, charm of Obama has not had any effect to curb Chinese and Iranian challenges. Nye also agrees importance of military power in this century. Through the discussion by both opinion leaders, we understand that the use of hard power and soft power is correlated.
When we talk of smart power, we must remember that the nature of security challenges is evolving increasingly intertwined. This is not only an agenda of US foreign policy. The strategic security concept adopted at NATO Lisbon summit in November last year states, “A comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management”, in order to tackle such security challenges discussed by Nye and Kagan.
Currently, humanitarian intervention to Libya and the nuclear crisis in Japan are critical cases to discuss smart power in practice. The former is a traditional power rivalry of “The West and the Rest”, as China, Russia, and India did not vote for the war at the UN Security Council. The latter, however, requires transnational cooperation. Since nuclear energy and environmental issues are critical agenda of global commons, problems are beyond national and ideological clashes.
The case of Libya is quite puzzling. At the beginning, the Obama administration was too cautious of humanitarian intervention, while France and Britain urged American commitment. This is completely opposite to the Iraq War. Solid Western alliance is essential to help rebels against the Kadafi regime. In addition to policy coordination with allies, the Obama administration is psychologically traumatized with anti-American protests during the Iraq War. This is not the only reason for Obama’s hesitation to “boots on the ground”. Those who urge US commitment are neoconservatives who advocate regime change and liberals who insist on humanitarian intervention. Meanwhile, the Congress demanded Obama to clarify war objectives and the limit of intervention (“Pressure building on Obama to clarify mission in Libya”; Washington Post; March 24, 2011). Quite embarrassingly, “Mr. Obama’s administration, however, has clearly tried to avoid the debate over a strategy beyond that by shifting the burden of enforcing the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing force on to France, Britain and other allies, including Arab nations like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which on Thursday said that it would contribute warplanes to the effort. In other words, the American exit strategy is not necessarily the coalition’s exit strategy.” (“Allies Are Split on Goal and Exit Strategy in Libya”; New York Times; March 25, 2011)
As the debate on the Libya strategy became intensified, Senator John McCain urged the Obama administration to act beyond air attack, and not to allow Kadafi to massacre Libyan citizens (“McCain Wants Obama to Oust Qaddafi”; FOX News; March 25, 2011). On the other hand Professor Joseph Nye defended Obama’s approach. The United States avoids unilateralism and behaves humbly by leaving command responsibility to NATO. Also, Nye endorses Obama’s restraint on strategic objectives and fighting duration (“Four reasons to support Obama on Libya strikes”; Power & Policy; March 22, 2011).
But we should remember that In response to pressure from inside and outside the United States, Obama extolled America’s special role and universal values, and rejected realism in the speech at the National Defense University on March 28. Robert Kagan comments his speech Kennedy-esque (“In Obama’s speech, echoes of JFK”; Washington Post—Post Partisan; March 28, 2011). See the video below.
At the London Conference hosted by British Foreign Secretary William Hague, Secretary Hillary Clinton met Libyan opposition leader Mahmoud Jebril, and discussed democratic transition of Libya. However, the United States prefers political pressure to oust Kadafi. Though majority of rebel fighters are responsible Libyans, NATO Commander Admiral James Stavridis testified at Capitol Hill that some of them were associated with Al Qaeda and Hezbollah (“Summit swings behind Libyan rebels”; Financial Times; March 29, 2011). In addition to domestic opinions against unlimited war expansion and relations with European allies, this makes the Obama administration still cautious of “boots on the ground” decision.
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident caused by the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake requires transnational policy coordination beyond national strategic interests and ideology. Above all, the United States has more resources to manage this crisis than any other countries, a cabal of nuclear experts and the most well-equipped armed forces in the world. Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise, urged US armed forces to help Japanese earthquake victims. As Japan has only 100 military helicopters, he recommends more US heavy-lift helicopters to be sent (“Japan Needs Its Own Berlin Airlift”; FOX News; March 15, 2011). The earthquake and subsequent tsunami has inflicted dreadful damages to the Japanese economy, and the United States must support this ally that cannot help becoming inward-looking for years. Despite difficult economic ties, political ties of both countries are strengthened by the joint rescue and reconstruction mission of the Operation Tomodachi (“The US Military's Role”; New York Times Room for Debate; March 16, 2011). Rescue teams from other countries also give substantial help to Japanese victims.
In addition to multinational rescue and reconstruction activities, new global governance for nuclear safety must be established. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed to expand nuclear safety regulations by international organizations. Also, Medvadev said that Russia would be willing to offer technological help to safe nuclear plants in developing countries（”Russian standards of safety for nuclear power industry should be adopted internationally”; President of Russia News; March 24, 2011).
Libya and Japan are vital cases to explore practical use of smart power in American foreign policy. The former needs traditional power oriented approaches, as insisted by Kagan. The latter needs multi-multilateral coordination including civil societies and local communities, as maintained by Nye. Being smart does not necessarily mean achieving something with smaller capital and manpower. Smart power diplomacy must deepen American involvement in global security. Any presidents must be psychologically into the world.
Nye is an authority of smart power and a close advisor to the Obama administration, while Kagan is a leading neoconservative commentator who was a foreign policy consultant for John McCain in the last presidential election. Therefore, this program illustrates how the new concept is viewed among American foreign policy makers. In the program, Professor Nye explains that smart power is a combination of hard power, which is economic and military power, and soft power, which is persuasion and attraction. Nye says that the United States is still the preeminent power, because of ideological supremacy. Robert Kagan agrees that power is multidimensional and smart use of those powers will be helpful to US diplomacy. However, Kagan insists that soft power is effective only when associated with strong hard power, as typically seen in US security umbrella during the Cold War.
Today, security challenges are intertwined. While global issues like financial disorder, environmental degradations, and non-state actor threats need transnational cooperation, traditional state to state rivalries are growing. Quite importantly, as Kagan argues, charm of Obama has not had any effect to curb Chinese and Iranian challenges. Nye also agrees importance of military power in this century. Through the discussion by both opinion leaders, we understand that the use of hard power and soft power is correlated.
When we talk of smart power, we must remember that the nature of security challenges is evolving increasingly intertwined. This is not only an agenda of US foreign policy. The strategic security concept adopted at NATO Lisbon summit in November last year states, “A comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management”, in order to tackle such security challenges discussed by Nye and Kagan.
Currently, humanitarian intervention to Libya and the nuclear crisis in Japan are critical cases to discuss smart power in practice. The former is a traditional power rivalry of “The West and the Rest”, as China, Russia, and India did not vote for the war at the UN Security Council. The latter, however, requires transnational cooperation. Since nuclear energy and environmental issues are critical agenda of global commons, problems are beyond national and ideological clashes.
The case of Libya is quite puzzling. At the beginning, the Obama administration was too cautious of humanitarian intervention, while France and Britain urged American commitment. This is completely opposite to the Iraq War. Solid Western alliance is essential to help rebels against the Kadafi regime. In addition to policy coordination with allies, the Obama administration is psychologically traumatized with anti-American protests during the Iraq War. This is not the only reason for Obama’s hesitation to “boots on the ground”. Those who urge US commitment are neoconservatives who advocate regime change and liberals who insist on humanitarian intervention. Meanwhile, the Congress demanded Obama to clarify war objectives and the limit of intervention (“Pressure building on Obama to clarify mission in Libya”; Washington Post; March 24, 2011). Quite embarrassingly, “Mr. Obama’s administration, however, has clearly tried to avoid the debate over a strategy beyond that by shifting the burden of enforcing the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing force on to France, Britain and other allies, including Arab nations like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which on Thursday said that it would contribute warplanes to the effort. In other words, the American exit strategy is not necessarily the coalition’s exit strategy.” (“Allies Are Split on Goal and Exit Strategy in Libya”; New York Times; March 25, 2011)
As the debate on the Libya strategy became intensified, Senator John McCain urged the Obama administration to act beyond air attack, and not to allow Kadafi to massacre Libyan citizens (“McCain Wants Obama to Oust Qaddafi”; FOX News; March 25, 2011). On the other hand Professor Joseph Nye defended Obama’s approach. The United States avoids unilateralism and behaves humbly by leaving command responsibility to NATO. Also, Nye endorses Obama’s restraint on strategic objectives and fighting duration (“Four reasons to support Obama on Libya strikes”; Power & Policy; March 22, 2011).
But we should remember that In response to pressure from inside and outside the United States, Obama extolled America’s special role and universal values, and rejected realism in the speech at the National Defense University on March 28. Robert Kagan comments his speech Kennedy-esque (“In Obama’s speech, echoes of JFK”; Washington Post—Post Partisan; March 28, 2011). See the video below.
At the London Conference hosted by British Foreign Secretary William Hague, Secretary Hillary Clinton met Libyan opposition leader Mahmoud Jebril, and discussed democratic transition of Libya. However, the United States prefers political pressure to oust Kadafi. Though majority of rebel fighters are responsible Libyans, NATO Commander Admiral James Stavridis testified at Capitol Hill that some of them were associated with Al Qaeda and Hezbollah (“Summit swings behind Libyan rebels”; Financial Times; March 29, 2011). In addition to domestic opinions against unlimited war expansion and relations with European allies, this makes the Obama administration still cautious of “boots on the ground” decision.
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident caused by the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake requires transnational policy coordination beyond national strategic interests and ideology. Above all, the United States has more resources to manage this crisis than any other countries, a cabal of nuclear experts and the most well-equipped armed forces in the world. Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise, urged US armed forces to help Japanese earthquake victims. As Japan has only 100 military helicopters, he recommends more US heavy-lift helicopters to be sent (“Japan Needs Its Own Berlin Airlift”; FOX News; March 15, 2011). The earthquake and subsequent tsunami has inflicted dreadful damages to the Japanese economy, and the United States must support this ally that cannot help becoming inward-looking for years. Despite difficult economic ties, political ties of both countries are strengthened by the joint rescue and reconstruction mission of the Operation Tomodachi (“The US Military's Role”; New York Times Room for Debate; March 16, 2011). Rescue teams from other countries also give substantial help to Japanese victims.
In addition to multinational rescue and reconstruction activities, new global governance for nuclear safety must be established. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed to expand nuclear safety regulations by international organizations. Also, Medvadev said that Russia would be willing to offer technological help to safe nuclear plants in developing countries（”Russian standards of safety for nuclear power industry should be adopted internationally”; President of Russia News; March 24, 2011).
Libya and Japan are vital cases to explore practical use of smart power in American foreign policy. The former needs traditional power oriented approaches, as insisted by Kagan. The latter needs multi-multilateral coordination including civil societies and local communities, as maintained by Nye. Being smart does not necessarily mean achieving something with smaller capital and manpower. Smart power diplomacy must deepen American involvement in global security. Any presidents must be psychologically into the world.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)