Should the LDP leader election sacrifice Japan’s UN diplomacy?

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said he would not run for the next LDP leader election the other day, and he was scheduled to attend the Quad summit and the US-Japanese bilateral summit on September 22, and supposed to deliver a speech at the UN General Assembly on 26th, as the wrap up of his diplomacy in his term. As Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki of Sojitz Research Institute commented, this diplomatic tour to the United States is a commemorative event for Kishida who made the Three National Security Documents to deepen the US-Japanese alliance as his legacy to his successor (“What will happen after the Kishida-Biden era?”; Tokyo Keizai; August 17, 2024). On the other hand, it is regretful that he will miss the UN General Assembly because of the LDP leader election on 27th (”Kishida to skip U.N. General Assembly speech during U.S. visit”; Japan Times; August 31, 2024).

　In the process of founding the world order, since Japan is constrained by the pacifist constitution, it cannot be involved in use of force as the law enforcement measure in the global community, whether directly or indirectly. As I mentioned in the previous post on August 4, that is a huge handicap for Japan to boost its global presence. It is widely known that Western allies provide huge military aid for Ukraine in the current Russia-Ukraine War. Moreover, even South Korea expresses consideration to provide weapons to Ukraine for their critical concerns with the Russo-North Korean alliance (”South Korea will consider supplying arms to Ukraine after Russia, North Korea sign strategic pact”; VOA News; June 27, 2024). Also, it is reported that Britain’s MI6 assisted recent Kursk Incursion by the Ukrainian troop (”As Ukraine brings war to Russia, Britain too must be bolder with sanctions”; City A.M.; 14 August, 2024). Meanwhile, Japan cannot make any kind of international contribution as mentioned above.

　Assuming it quite hard to show global presence in military aspects, Japan needs to make much efforts for international contribution in non-military aspects. Since the end of World War II, Japan has been advancing development aid and international cooperation with the Global South, particularly with South East Asia, Africa, and currently with Central Asia. Also, the Japanese government regards the United Nations as the centerpiece of its diplomacy. Nevertheless, the prime minister will miss the forthcoming UN General Assembly. When Prime Minister Kishida cannot attend an important international conference, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa is expected to go to the meeting on his behalf, but she is also unable to attend the UNGA as she runs for this LDP leader election. For Japan that is founding independent relations with the Global South while staying at the heart of G7, it would be a loss of opportunity to address its foreign policy direction to the global community if it misses the forthcoming general assembly. That will be a huge diplomatic damage.

　In view of this, can the LDP postpone the party leader election for a couple of days? Things that I mentioned above appear as if they put the party above the country. After all, is it so important to hold an event of the “neighborhood meeting of Nagatacho” as scheduled? Seen from a “panoramic view of history” beyond partisanship, the slogan of placing the United Nations at the heart of diplomacy by successive Japanese cabinets since the end of World War II, sounds doubtful due to the absence of the prime minister at the UNGA. I would see the next administration with such skepticism, accordingly. Furthermore, was the passion for Japanese bid for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, that rose so much a few years ago, actually counterfeit? I do not regard this case as just a matter of the Kishida administration. I regard it as a matter of all administrations of Japan from the past to the future.

　While on this subject, the Constitutional Democratic Party values non-military role of Japan in the world as it upholds the “protection of anti-war Article 9”, they are supposed to believe the importance of UN diplomacy much more than the LDP does from their pacifism position. Nevertheless, it does not seem that they objected strongly to Prime Minister Kishida’s absence from the UNGA. Probably, the CDP is also preoccupied with the election of their own party leader. But that is an abdication of the role of the opposition in parliamentary democracy. It appears that they are also entangled with the “neighborhood meeting of Nagatacho”.

　Here, I would like to appeal to all the political parties and some fractional groups that we have to reconfirm that Japan has a huge handicap in international politics, as it is unable to assume military role. In order to make up for that, Japan needs to take huge roles in non-military aspects. If it is not possible to postpone the LDP leader election for just a couple of days for the forthcoming UNGA, how would Japan compensate for the loss of this opportunity? Taking everything into consideration, it is critical to think how to steer this country beyond the “neighborhood meeting of Nagatacho” perspectives.

How well did Foreign Secretary Cameron act the role of Churchill to move America for defending Ukraine?

Earlier this April, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited the United States to talk further military aid to Ukraine with his counterpart Secretary of State Antony Blinken. But Trump loyalists in the Republican Party objected to the plan. Cameron needed to remove the bottleneck to pass the Ukrainian aid bill in the US House of Representatives, because Russia was pushing back Ukrainian counteroffensive and an increasing number of civilians were killed. Therefore, he proposed to meet the supposed Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and House Speaker Mike Johnson urgently. Cameron’s diplomatic tour was in parallel with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s state visit to meet President Joe Biden. The latter drew much more attention from the media and think tanks around the world, but I regard Cameron’s direct meeting with Trump as more important to move America that does not act as the superpower. Let me explain it below.

Both British and Japanese diplomatic efforts were commonly aimed at getting America more engaged with the world. Along with the peril of Trump 2.0, the rise of anti-Israeli “Hamas left” on the left raise serious concerns with populist isolationism in America. Can any foreign leader overturn such trends? In history, Winston Churchill urged the hesitant superpower to actively involved in stopping Nazi Germany. Also, when Americans were indulged in a daydream of postwar peace, he gave the Iron Curtain speech to awaken them to see the reality of international politics. Shortly after that, the United States declared the Truman Doctrine. When the Congress was bitterly divided between internationalists and nativists, America hosted leaders from key allies of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Compared the two, Ukraine aid that Cameron brought was emergent, and there were no scenarios arranged by the foreign service beforehand when he met his opponent Trump. Meanwhile, Kishida was warmly welcomed as the state guest by President Biden and leaders of both houses of the Congress, and the was nothing challenging in his diplomatic tour. More importantly, Britain is directly involved in military aid for Ukraine to defeat Russia.

On the other hand, Japan is still constrained by the pacifist constitution, which keeps this country from participating in a mission that former Secretary of Defense James Mattis called “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” when he talked about his combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (General: It's 'fun to shoot some people'; CNN; February 4, 2005). After all, that is a serious drawback for Japan to be a vital stakeholder in global security, as long as this country is unable to get involved in military aspects. Kishida spoke softly at the congressional speech, as if healing the superpower in fatigue of global tottering rather than reconfirming America’s role as the indispensable nation for the world order (“Japanese PM Fumio Kishida addresses U.S. 'self-doubt' about world role in remarks to Congress”; NBC News; April 11, 2024). That does not necessarily come from his unprovocative personality. Even more exuberant Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who expressed strong support the Iraq War by the Bush administration (“Press Conference by Prime Minister-then Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq”; Prime Minister’s Office, Japan; March 20, 2003), did not actually send combat troops. Japanese commitment was too small to worry about being caught up in America’s war. Whether “healing” Kishida or “exuberant” Koizumi, what Japanese leaders did fall short of fulfilling the Churchillian role.

Nevertheless, since no single politician today is so charismatic as Churchill was, it is quite likely that an indirect Anglo-Japanese diplomatic coordination had some effect to prompt the both parties to reach an agreement in the US congress. Kishida’s Japan was a good side kick for Britain. The aid bill was finally approved on this occasion, but quite uncertain for future. Russian President Vladimir Putin clings to reconquering Ukraine so much that the war is going to continue long. Unlike Cameron’s official meeting with Secretary Blinken, the detail of his closed-door meeting with Trump has not been publicized. He did not even mention that on Twitter, while tweeting extensively about the Israeli-Hamas war. Trump may have been reluctant to listen to Cameron, but he had to avoid negative reputation of delaying the Ukraine aid bill to pass the Congress, in view of his presidential campaign. In addition, Britain’s commitment to military aid made Cameron’s case more compelling, because Trump is obsessed with burden sharing of defense spending. That was also helpful in his meeting with Blinken to reconfirm further assistance to Ukraine by Britain and the United States. International politics is inherently leontomorphic, and therefore, strong defense and deep military commitment are essential in law enforcement for the world order.

Now, let me talk about the bottleneck for successful Cameron-Blinken foreign ministers meeting, which was Trump’s view of the world. Hal Brand of the American Enterprise Institute comments that it is simplistic to take his America First as complete disengagement from the world. Rather, it is extremely sensitive to the costs and benefits of intervention. Therefore, Trump is skeptical of helping Ukraine, and he believes that America not run the risk of getting involved in a big war for the sake of defending small countries overseas, whether in Europe or Asia. And there isn’t an Indo-Pacific exception in Trump’s mindsets despite China hawk remarks by his fellows. While showing isolationist aspects, Trump is willing to intervene abroad to impose US national interests of his understanding on other nations when he thinks it necessary. Meanwhile, he sidelines the idea that America as guarantor of the liberal world order disdainfully. That attitude led to the trade war with China, and brinkmanship diplomacy against Iran and North Korea in his last term. Therefore, Trump fellows pursue military build-up, but not interested in defending allies or invaded countries. Rather, they focus on homeland defense, and explore more investment in cyber security and missile defense. They assume international politics as rivalries of self-interested nation states, and thus, agendas like democracy promotion are useless for them (“An “America First” World: What Trump’s Return Might Mean for Global Order”; Foreign Affairs; May 27, 2024).

Of course, there is a fallacy in such viewpoints, which leads to Trump’s poor understanding of the alliance. Former US ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder criticizes that Trump sees the trans-Atlantic alliance as a liability that could drag America into a war against nuclear Russia when some eastern flank nation is invaded. Actually, the alliance deters enemy aggression. Furthermore, he is wrongly preoccupied with burden sharing of defense spending, instead of pursuing common security objectives with partners (“NATO is about security — not dollars and cents”; Politico; April 10, 2024). His six-month blocking of the Ukraine aid bill through his Republican loyalists in the House had benefitted Russia so much, which hurt mutual trust between Europe and America (The US aid package to Ukraine will help. But a better strategy is urgently needed”; Chatham House; 26 April, 2024). As long as American right wingers are entrapped in a “Hillbilly Elegy” victimhood mindset, i.e., allies freeride the security umbrella, another congressional bickering could delay necessary help for Ukraine.

Next, an overview of Britain’s trans-Atlantic diplomacy is the following. Regardless of the reelection possibility of Trump, strong Lindbergh isolationism among the American public poses constraints on UK foreign policy. Wyn Rees of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) presents an over view of Britain’s relations with NATO and the United States as follows. Britain has been America’s first choice for the partner in military and intelligence operations, which is so beneficial to its political presence NATO and worldwide. But Trump’s anti-NATO and anti-Ukrainian posture ruins this premise. Therefore, Cameron had to show European commitment to burden sharing to Trump, such as defense spending increase, intra-European defense cooperation, troop deployment in the Baltic, and so forth (“Trump, NATO and Anglo-American Relations”; RUSI; 9 May, 2024). As of February 29, this year, before the Ukraine Aid bill passed the US Congress, EU institutions donated more aid than the United States. In addition, sovereign European countries made contributions. That is to say, America, not Europe, was freeriding the alliance, unless the Ukraine Aid bill passed. See the chart.

Chart
How does U.S. aid to Ukraine compare to that from other donors?

For a Churchillian diplomacy to overturn isolationism in America, Britain needs to strengthen independent political and military resilience on the European side against Russia. Currently, Ukraine has signed a bilateral security agreement with France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Britain. For effective coordination of these deals, how much can the United Kingdom take initiatives in a European framework to support Ukraine without EU membership? Britain took leadership role of the drone coalition in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which was founded by NATO to facilitate arms procurement for Ukraine. Also, Samir Puri of Chatham House urges the United Kingdom to endorse EU proposed joint military procurement initiatives, such as the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum (European Commission; 6 May, 2024) and the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) (European Commission; 5 March, 2024), to improve European defense readiness and support Ukraine’s defense industry (“The UK should help coordinate support for Ukraine by backing EU defence initiatives”; Chatham House; 19 March, 2024). UK backed plan to fund Ukrainian war efforts from frozen Russian assets was approved at G7 Italy this year (“G7 agrees $50bn loan for Ukraine from Russian assets”; BBC News; 14 June, 2024). Currently, Britain needs to tackle the capability gap problem for “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” around the world. This country needs to upgrade its arms and equipment to defend its homeland and national interests worldwide within its own limited resources. At present, foremost threats are Russia for the short term, and China for the long-term. Along with defense spending increase, Andrew Dorman, editor of "International Affairs", comments that Britain's rearmament plans should define the focus of investment. For example, regarding the deterrence against Russia, this country must choose whether to overturn current gradual nuclear disarmament policy to make its independent nuclear umbrella stronger, or to boost rapid response deployment in the Arctic, Scandinavia, and the Baltic regions through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) (“Britain must rearm to strengthen NATO and meet threats beyond Russia and terrorism”; Chatham House; 25 March, 2024).

After a laborious persuasion meeting with Trump, Cameron talked with Blinken at the formal foreign ministers meeting to boost further assistance to Ukraine. During the press conference, there was a question about the Mar-a-Lago meeting, and Cameron replied that it was just a normal diplomatic meeting with the opposition leader on the occasion of election (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Cameron at a Joint Press Availability”; US Department of State Press Release; April 9, 2024). But apparently, Trump is still a drag in the trans-Atlantic alliance as he rejects further aid to Ukraine. He does not care about bipartisan consistency in diplomacy. Appallingly, he says he would end the war as soon as he inaugurated. Even Russia does not take it seriously (“Russia says 'let's be realistic' about Trump plan to end Ukraine war”; Reuters; July 18, 2024). The Mar-a-Lago talk would have been far from normal.

As if implying a turbulent dialogue, Trump fellows backlashed vehemently to Cameron’s Churchillian effort. Since Trump encouraged Russia to invade NATO countries, Cameron has been critical of his views on trans-Atlantic alliance (“David Cameron Rebukes Donald Trump's Divisive Remarks About Nato And Russia”; HuffPost; 12 February, 2024). It is not easy to fill the gap in just a single secret meeting. As expected, Trump’s foreign policy advisor Elbridge Colby, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, denounced Cameron’s lobbying for the pass of the Ukrainian aid bill at the Congress as intervention into American politics. Also, he expressed resentment that Cameron moralized the case for Ukraine and lectured it to Trump (“Trump ally hits out at David Cameron for ‘lecturing’ US”; Politico; May 2, 2024). But historically, Wilsonian moralism has been centerpiece of American foreign policy regardless of partisanship. Also, moralism cemented the Reagan-Thatcher conservative alliance, which ultimately brought the end of the Cold War. Deplorably, Colby’s comment shows how badly conservatism in America degraded today.

While Colby belittles Russia as China’s junior partner (“China’s Russia Support Strategy”; Politico; February 22, 2024), that is not necessarily the case in view of the Kremlin’s aggression in Europe and infiltration in the Middle East and Africa. In his article of the Washington Post, he does not care such contradictions in his advocacy of strategic refocus on China (“To avert war with China, the U.S. must prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 18, 2023). Ironically, Taiwan does not endorse Colby’s strategic shift to Asia (“Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 10, 2023). Prominent Never Trump pundits such as Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution deny lopsided China-hawks like Colby to put American foreign policy on the right track (“A Republican ‘civil war’ on Ukraine erupts as Reagan’s example fades”; Washington Post; March 15, 2023). Nevertheless, Colby praised new UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy for his compassionate attitude to Trump. However, Republican Vice President candidate JD Vance has ruined such a lukewarm friendship between Trump and Labour Britain, as he blasted this country as an Islamist state with nuclear weapons (“Rayner dismisses Trump running mate 'Islamist UK' claim”; BBC News; 17 July, 2024). Despite Cameron’s successful lobbying for Ukraine, the negative influence of MAGA Republicans is still undismissable, regardless of the results of the presidential election. As is often the case with Trump supporters, both Vance and Colby are characterized with vituperative words and confrontational attitudes. If Trump 2.0 emerged, that would be a severe diplomatic drawback for American allies.

During World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack silenced Lindbergh isolationists, which enabled President Franklin Roosevelt to fight for freedom around the world upon Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s request. But today, MAGA Republicans drag American foreign policy even under current Biden administration. Therefore, NATO is seriously considering Trump proofing to prepare for the worst scenario in the presidential election in the United States. The most critical point is to boost defense capability on the European side. While NATO member states are raising their defense spending to meet the 2% of GDP target of the organization, even that would not be enough to keep America engaged with Europe. Actually, Colby rebuffed Britain’s 2.5% spending plan by the Sunak administration meaningless. Most of the NATO members do not reach the 2% target today, but they spent over 3% during the Cold War. The real problem is not the amount of money but the focus of defense investment. Such investment on deterrence and denial capabilities against Russia should be spent efficiently to make US rescue operations in Europe less costly. Joint procurement coordination in Europe, particularly among Britain, France, and Germany will be helpful for this objective (“Trump-Proofing NATO: 2% Won’t Cut It”; RUSI; 7 March, 2024).

Currently, the impending problem is Ukraine. At the 75th anniversary of NATO in Brussels, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a proposal to insulate NATO’s role in Ukraine from American politics. That is to give more leverage of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to NATO from the United States, to facilitate the implementation of the military aid package of $100 billion for five years. However, the Biden administration did not express so much interest in this plan (On NATO’s 75th birthday, fear of Trump overshadows celebrations; Washington Post; April 4, 2024). Ironically, the incumbent Never Trump government of the United States is not supportive of a Trump proofing initiative by Europe. Nevertheless, this year will be critical in the war in Ukraine, according to Michael Clarke, ex-Director General of the Royal United Service Institute. Russia lacks the equipment and trained manpower for a major offensive until spring 2025 or later, while Ukraine desperately needs Western military aid to rebuild combat capability to retake occupied territories (“Ukraine war: Three ways the conflict could go in 2024”; BBC; 29 December, 2023).

The global community is imperiled with Trump 2.0, but the real problem is beyond Trump himself. Some anti-mainstream foreign policy pundits of both right and left appeal for so-called “restrained” diplomacy to make the case against Wilsonian globalism. Among them, rightwing nationalists make use of Trump to advance their advocacy. Although Trump behaves in notoriously high-handed manners, former Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull tells world leaders not to flatter him to avoid his anger. Trump may feel a formidable counterpart unpleasant, but he respects him or her after he calms down (“How the World Can Deal With Trump?”; Foreign Affairs; May 31, 2024). Cameron told urgent necessity to help Ukraine candidly, as shown in Colby’s malicious response. Also, Japanese Prime Minister-then Shinzo Abe told reciprocity of the US-Japanese alliance when he visited the Trump Tower, shortly after unexpected victory of Trump in the election. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Taro Aso’s visit appears unnecessary kowtow to the opposition candidate. Abe’s memoir says that Trump talked extensively about private golf even at the official bilateral summit. What did Aso talk to enjoy the meeting with him?

Despite Trump’s conviction, Western democracies have no choice but align with the United States, as commented by Leslie Vinjamuri, the director of the US and Americas programme at Chatham House. Otherwise, should they choose Russia or China as their partner (“The Global Implications of Trump’s Conviction”; Council on Foreign Relations; June 4, 2024)? Though Democratic candidate Kamala Harris is surging to edge out Trump, the “restrained” diplomacy school would draw US leadership role in the world, even under her administration. Along with rightwing think tanks such as the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and the Marathon Initiative, there is bipartisan Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft which is co-sponsored by libertarian Chrales Koch and liberal George Soros (“George Soros and Charles Koch take on the ‘endless wars’”; Politico; December 2, 2019).

In order to move America that does not act, politicians today, whether UK Foreign Secretary Cameron, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, or anyone else, must elaborate on Churchillian diplomacy without the charisma of Churchill, the hero of World War II. American allies need to coordinate with bipartisan internationalists to persuade hard-wired isolationists as Cameron did. Also, they should demonstrate the willingness to do “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys”, whether by directly involved in military actions or by providing military aid for a nation withstanding enemy invasion. In other words, it is a commitment to burden sharing of law enforcement for the world order. On the American side, it would be interesting if Harris hinted to make a staunch national security team with her pick of Vice President and other top positions in the cabinet to distinguish herself from gaffe-prone and DEI blaming Trump-Vance duo.


NB: Harris chose Governor Tim Waltz of Minnesota on August 6. National security heavy weight will be appointed to other key cabinet positions.

A Question about Former US Ambassador to Japan Hagerty’s Interview

Former US Ambassador to Japan William Hagerty had an interview with Jiji Press on February 29 to soothe anxiety among Japanese people that the US-Japanese alliance would be destabilized if Trump were to be elected. Currently, he is a Republican senator on the Capitol Hill. He emphasized that Donald Trump understood strategic importance of the alliance with Japan, and commented that the global public misunderstood Trump’s America First and isolationism. Typically, ex-Ambassador says that Trump’s bluff on NATO allies to suggest American withdrawal from the organization is his deal making technique to force some members to increase defense spending to the NATO guideline. Therefore, he says that Trump takes the threat of Russia seriously.

That was a piece of news report, and the detail of interview is not shown to the public. Therefore, it might be premature to respond to Hagerty’s comments, but that was far from being sufficient for Japanese people to embrace moshi-Tora (a possible Trump victory in the election) so favorably as he argues. Trump's bluff of NATO withdrawal, which was famously mentioned “racketeering” in the open letter against his America First by Professor Eliot Cohen of the SAIS, raised bipartisan alert so much that Democratic Senator Tim Kaine and Republican Senator Marco Rubio submitted a bill to stop any US president from withdrawing from NATO without Congressional approval, which has passed at the Senate. That bill could be helpful to maintain a psychological assurance of collective defense, which is essential for deterrence.

However, Trump would curtail US commitment to NATO drastically, despite the Kaine and Rubio bill. Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO and former US ambassador to the organization Alexander Vershbow warns that Trump would obstruct American diplomats to attend various meetings at NATO and cut American budget for Brussels headquarters. In other words, Trump could paralyze NATO legally (“Trump will abandon NATO”; Atlantic; December 4, 2023). Trump may disrespect the rule of law, but he is consummate in exploiting the loophole of the law like Brazilian leftwing populist President Lula da Silva who is inviting Russian President Vladimir Putin to the BRICS summit in his country this year despite the criminal charge by the ICC. Remember, Trump successfully let conservative dominated Supreme Court turn down the decision in Colorado and Maine to disqualify his candidacy. That is what populists are, whether right or left. After all, Hagerty did not answer the critical question regarding the sustainability of America’s global network of alliance that Vershbow mentions. In NATO organizational structure, Americans take command of military affairs while Europeans lead civilian bureaucracy. Vershbow raises his deep concerns as one who has experienced the highest position of the organization for American diplomats .

There is no doubt that burden sharing in defense is an old and new problem. Ever since the Cold War era, the United States has been urging its allies to boost defense spending. For mutual trust and confidence, a free rider is not desirable in the alliance, of course. However, that is not the fundamental problem of American national defense. Retired General Jack Keane of the US army commented in FOX News on February 16 that US national security was critically in danger as its military power was slashed during the Trump and Biden era while enemies were building up their offensive capability. Obviously, it is America’s own defense capability that vitally matters. Trump’s bashing on American allies may be cheered among his rock-solid supporters, but a serious military professional like Keane, who talks about US national defense beyond partisanship, has completely different viewpoints, even though he is a commentator of MAGA Republicans’ favorite TV channel. Therefore, any Japanese would question bitterly whether Trump really understands American and global security if he still were to cling to his idiosyncratic idea.



In addition, it is hardly imaginable that some European allies that fail to meet the NATO pledge of defense spending can invest in something of new technology to change the balance of power in our favor. They can just buy a little more US-made weapons by increasing military expenditure. That might be of some help for American defense contractors, and Trump may want to make money for himself through such deals. But his excessive obsession with blaming “small” allies is off the point. Deplorably, Trump does not talk about critical issue like defense manpower and procurement that Retired General Keane mentions, but agitates the angry working class to quibble against the tax to be used for foreign allies and ethnic minorities at home. His isolationism in foreign policy and hate ideology in domestic politics are deeply intertwined. Trump cunningly exploits the small government ideal to provoke fanaticism among his rock-solid supporters. Jiji Press should have asked Senator Hagerty about these points.

From the Jiji interview article, I have an impression that Trump associates are disrespectful to Japan’s multilateral security policy to manage global challenges and to curb Chinese threats in the region. Hagerty’s comment in the interview sounds as if Trump’s bullying on NATO allies were irrelevant to the alliance with Japan. But since Shinzo Abe launched the FOIP initiative, which includes Asian and European stakeholders, his multilateralist legacy has been inherited to the Suga and the Kishida administrations. Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa is enhancing this furthermore as indicated in her foreign policy speech on January 30, stating “The security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are inseparable.” Some Republican isolationists like Senator Josh Hawley are so NIMBY that they are willing to bash China to relieve pent-up frustration among angry working class, while dismissing the Russian threats Ukraine and the trans-Atlantic region as something distant to American national security. That is not in linw with Japan’s global strategy direction. It is vital for Japan to defend current liberal and rule-based world order.

We have to take it seriously that key former cabinet members of the previous administration speak against Trump’s candidacy, as Robert Kagan recommended in his column to the Washington Post at the end of the last year (“The Trump dictatorship: How to stop it”’ Washington Post; December 7, 2023). Following ex-Vice President Mike Pence, who refused to endorse Trump to run for the second in public, top national security officials of his last term administration expressed serious concerns with his poor understanding of America’s global network with allies and constitutional democracy. Those cabinet members include his Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, White House Chief of Staff John Kelly, Joint Chief of Staff Mark Milley, and National Security Advisor John Bolton (“Full List of Former Donald Trump Officials Refusing to Endorse Him”; Newsweek; March 23, 2024). Quite noticeably, substantial portion of them are core military professionals of the US armed forces.

Quite interestingly, Trump affiliates justify his gaffs by idiosyncratic phrases. As is often the case, his last term Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff of the NSC Alexander Gray told to understand Trump by his deeds, not by his words in an interview with a Japanese TV news media. Also, he stressed that America’s alliance with Japan deepened furthermore during the Trump era (“The impact on Japan, if Trump were reelected”; TBS News 23; March 14, 2024). But it was adults in the room and technocrats who modified Trump’s America First, and now, they stand against him. Japanese people and politicians are well-aware of it. Actually, Ex-Sec Defense Esper commented, “The first year of a second Trump term will look like the last year of the first Trump term, in other words, with all the craziness” in ‘Real Time with Bill Maher’ on HBO TV (“Trump’s Former Defense Secretary Tells Bill Maher He Is ‘Definitely Not’ Voting for Ex Boss”; Daily Beast; March 31, 2024).

Ultimately, Trump’s disdain of multilateral alliance is at odds with the views of ex-Army General David Petraeus who made America win the war through multilateral strategic coordination with numerous allies and local leaders. As Trump goes the opposite, it is quite likely that he would make America lose in any war and great power rivalries in this century. Furthermore, his rightwing populism is eroding the legitimacy of American democracy, which invigorates revisionist powers like China and Russia. Some MAGA Republicans like Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene spreads Russian propaganda within the Congress as if she were Putin’s spy.

GOP Rep. Mike Turner says it's “absolutely true" that Russian propaganda has "infected" a portion of the Republican party:

“We see directly coming from Russia ... communications that are anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia messages, some of which we even hear being uttered on the House… pic.twitter.com/cNzF1qiOIV

— Republicans against Trump (@RpsAgainstTrump) April 7, 2024

Once again Moscow Marge is busy deploying her Kremlin talking points. Is she a useful idiot or is she intentionally spreading Putin’s lies? Either way it’s pathetic and unAmerican.

pic.twitter.com/wf1w5SJbgO

— Liz Cheney (@Liz_Cheney) April 12, 2024

That is inflicting critical damages on the US-Japanese alliance, too. There is no doubt that the Japanese government needs to prepare for moshi-Tora. Meanwhile someone in Japan should resonate with Never Trumpers in the United States, in view of corrosive impacts by Trump. Therefore, the Japanese media should ask much harder questions to Trump associates, rather than treating them so politely like a tea ceremony guest.

The Corrosive Effect of Rightwing Populism on National Security

Notorious rightwing populists: Trump, Netanyahu, and Bolsonaro
Right-wingers frequently boasts their passion for patriotism and devotion to national defense over their political opponents at home. However, their self-righteous way of governing is prone to put the nation at risk. When Hamas invaded Israel to brutally kill and abuse kibbutz residents and music festival participants near the border of the Gaza Strip last October, Professor Yuval Noah Harari of Hebrew University who has written “Sapiens” and “Homo Deus” commented that it was the mismanagement of the government by the Netanyahu administration that created an information vacuum against terrorist intrusion. To begin with, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed his cabinet members based on loyalty, as he prioritizes his personal interests over the national interest. In his sixth term of his cabinet from December 2022, the team had become so extremist and religiously dogmatic that they were obsessed with blaming the “deep state” through agitating political divide and spreading conspiracy theories. Consequently, Netanyahu failed to gather necessary information about impending national security threats from security forces, intelligence agencies, and numerous experts. Through such corroded policy making interactions, Israel failed to take effective measures of deterrence against Hamas (“The Hamas horror is also a lesson on the price of populism”; Washington Post”; October 11, 2023). Former South Korean Unification Minister, Professor Kim Yeonchul at Inje University makes a similar point that the divide and rule technique simply agitates demonization of others among the public and obstructs intersectional communications within the government. In other words, Netanyahu’s failure of intelligence in the Hamas attack is an inevitable consequence of his failure in democracy (“Why is the far right so incompetent at national security?”; Hankyoreh Newspaper; October 30, 2023).

Furthermore, the Gaza war has revealed that Netanyahu self-deceived that Russia would hold tight grips on Iran, which enabled Israel to air raid Iranian proxies in Syria in 2015. Actually, Russian Predident Vladimir Putin just wanted to demonstrate Russian presence in the Middle East by striking a balance between Israel and its strategic enemies like Iran and Syria. In return, Israel refused to join Western sanction against Russian invasion of Crimea. But his friendship with Russia turned out empty when the war in Ukraine broke out, and the Kremlin was forced to depend on the Axis of Evil, notably, Iran, Syria and Hamas (“Israel and Russia: The End of a Friendship?”; Carnegie Politika; November 11, 2023). Former center left Zionist Union member of the Knesset Ksenia Svetlova comments that isolated Russia today needs Iran more than the other way around, and Israel has no reason to help Putin’s ambition lead the anti-Western bloc geopolitically (“Russia’s priorities are clear after Netanyahu-Putin call, and Israel isn’t one of them”; Times of Israel; 11 December, 2023). Netanyahu pursued pseudo-realism to deepen strategic relations with Russia while maintaining close ties with the United States, which made Israel a useful pawn for Putin’s manipulation to divide the Western alliance (“Putin’s Gaza front”; ICDS Estonia Commentary; October 30, 2023).

In the United States, rightwing populists misidentify the enemy likewise. Just as Netanyahu, Donald Trump is charmed by Putin so much that he even utters withdrawal from NATO. Also, they fondly resort to autocratic measures against democratic rule of law. Trump agitated the January 6 riot, and Netanyahu launched the “judicial reform” to enable the government to override the supreme court decision to implement his policy beyond checks and balances (“Israel judicial reform explained: What is the crisis about?”; BBC News; 11 September, 2023). Netanyahu wanted to advance Jewish settlement in the West Bank along with his coalition partner Religious Zionist Party, without judicial checks. Just as Trump’s credentials for primary candidacy is denied in Colorado and Maine, Netanyahu’s judicial reform has been turned down at the supreme court to defend the foundation of democratic governance of Israel (“Israel Supreme Court strikes down judicial reforms”; BBC News; 1 January, 2024). Remember that rightwing populists denounce responsible stakeholders of democracy the “enemy of the people” as communist revolutionaries do. That leads to critical failure of strategic communication among governmental and national security organizations once they take office, as mentioned by Harari and Kim.

With such mindsets, rightwing populists do not hesitate to prioritize their partisan agendas at the expense of national security. That is typically witnessed in the obstruction of military appointment by MAGA Republicans. The Republican Party had assumed their strength in defense before the Trump era. However, rightwing populists detest political correctness and human rights liberalism so much that they even dare to put critical national interest at risk in exchange for pushing their agendas to overjoy their rock-solid supporters. Notably, Senator Tommy Tuberville delayed military personnel nomination to defend “freedom” of white nationalist thoughts and to stop promotion of anti-abortion officers. As Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations comments, he is not interested in accelerating military personnel arrangement to defeat external threats, but defeating domestic opponents of the culture war within armed forces (“The GOP claims to be strong on defense. Tommy Tuberville shows otherwise.”; Washington Post; June 19, 2023). In addition, Retired Admiral James Stavridis of the US Navy deplores about Tuberville’s pork barreling as he manipulates to attract Space Force headquarters to his district Alabama, in obstruction of the military plan to build the facility in Colorado (“Tuberville slams lack of decision on Space Command headquarters, blames politics”; Stars and Stripes; July 26, 2023).

Much more problematically, far right House Republicans are blocking the budget deal for military aid to Ukraine and Israel in exchange for tightening border control at home. However, as Retired General Jack Keane of the US Army comments, both are different issues of their own, and the risk of Russian victory in Ukraine is critically great to national security (“What would a win in Ukraine look like? Retired Gen. Jack Keane explains.”; Washington Post; March 6, 2023). More deplorably, Representative Troy Nehls objects to Ukraine aid simply because he wants to stop reelection of President Joe Biden (“A border deal to nowhere? House GOP ready to reject Senate compromise on immigration”; CNN; January 3, 2024). Those moves are extremely partisan, and they are the conflict of interest with the state. It is such narrow-sighted partisanship that led to diplomatic vacuum when Hamas attacked Israel, because those right-wingers precluded the appointment of the ambassador to Jerusalem (“Jack Lew, Ambassador to Israel”; Wikipedia).

Furthermore, let me talk about the fallacy of perception on Ukraine, among the American rightwing. Former Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, currently at the Atlantic Council, commented that a Putin victory in Ukraine would embolden Russia to reinfiltrate into the former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact nations, many of which are NATO members. He also stressed that it is NATO that has ensured security in Europe after two World Wars, which has ultimately ensured security of the United States. Therefore, Ukrainian victory is a vital national interest of America. Most importantly, he argues that an appeasement so as not to provoke Russia and China is the most provocative diplomacy because they count on weak leadership of America.



In the past, Republicans understood the principle that Herbst mentioned. But MAGA Republicans today have no hesitation to impress such weakness to the enemy as Nehls does in the House. More disastrously, Trump’s long-time desire of withdrawal from NATO raises critical concerns between America and Europe. Democrat Tim Kaine and Republican Marco Rubio introduced a bipartisan bill to stop any US President from withdrawing from NATO, which has already passed at the Senate. But the problem is psychological, and allies would see America unreliable if Trump were elected, which would weaken deterrence of the Western alliance. In view of this, Anne Applebaum of the Atlantic quotes her interview with former US Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow that Trump could paralyze NATO by obstructing meeting attendance of American diplomats and cutting the budget for its headquarters before stopped by the Congress (“Trump will abandon NATO”; Atlantic; December 4, 2023).

Quite importantly, some political scientists and historians in America say that the Republican Party was gradually returning isolationist after the Cold War. In such a circumstance, Dan Caldwell at pro-Trump Center for Renewing America comments that Republicans are increasingly supportive of the changing role of America in the world based on “realism and restraint”, instead of leading the free world. Accordingly, the Heritage Foundation once advocated Ronald Reagan’s “Strong America”, but today, its president Kevin Roberts not just opposes the Ukraine aid, and even argues for defense spending cuts. Such America First momentums has been resurging among conservatives, as typically seen in Pat Buchanan’s repeated bid for presidency in the 1990s, according to Associate Professor Nicole Hemmer of Vanderbilt University. Quite confusingly, some isolationist conservatives like Senator Josh Hawley insist “The problem is not there but here” to urge American foreign policy makers to disengage from Europe and to focus on Chinese infringement on the well-being of the middle class and the working class at home. That is a problem beyond the rivalry between trans-Atlanticist and Asia-Pacificist. China hawk views among those rightwing populists come from Trump-like cost and profit thinking, and thus, they regard allies as the burden to America. Their strategic shift to China just reflects the anger of the working class who feel themselves victimized by globalization. Foreign policy internationalists including Robert Kagan rightly refute their stupid idea (“A Republican ‘civil war’ on Ukraine erupts as Reagan’s example fades”; Washington Post; March 15, 2023). Also, ex-General David Petraeus spoke against their pseudo realism and fake small government thinking, both of which are based on property dealer’s cost and profit mindsets, when he visited the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The man who made America win in the War on Terror urges defense planner to upgrade the procurement system to manage multifaced threats around the world.




Rightwing arguments on China sound so NIMBY as those of Japan bashers from the 1960s to the 1980s. Asian allies should not trust those NIMBY China hawks who are willing to appease Putin and to abandon Ukraine and the whole of European allies. The Kishida administration of Japan is right not to bandwagon with them, as Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa correctly stated “the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are inseparable”, which is naturally interpreted “the security of Ukraine and East Asia are inseparable”, in the foreign policy speech at the Ordinary Session of the House on January 30. Deplorably, late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a pseudo-realist mistake as Netanyahu of Israel did to befriend with that bloodthirsty Moscovite autocrat to counter the Chinese threat. The war in Ukraine has revealed that his assumption was wrong from the beginning.

FM Kamikawa adresses foreign policy of the Kishida administration at the Japanese diet.

Also, American right-wingers mishandled the Israel-Hamas war. When terrorists invaded Israel, Trump relinquished Netanyahu bluntly for his poor deterrence and preparation to fight against them. It has turned out that Netanyahu’s loyalty to Trump for shared rightwing values was one-sided, while Biden helps Israel’s fight against Hamas (“Trump’s turn against Israel offers stark reminder of what his diplomacy looks like”; CNN; October 13, 2023). But the problem was actually created by the Abrahams Accord which Trump boasts of his success. While urging Israel and Arab emirates to normalize diplomatic relations to encircle Iran, Trump aggravated Israeli-Palestinian tensions by endorsing Israeli right-wingers’ expansionism, notably, approving Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem, Jewish settlement in the West Bank, and the annexation of Golan Heights. Meanwhile, he cut American aid to Palestinians. Therefore, Max Boot commented in his Washington Post column that those Arab-Israeli normalizations do not resolve other grave conflicts in the Middle East, including those in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, and more importantly, the Israeli-Palestinian clash itself (“So much for the Abraham Accords. Trump made things worse in the Middle East.”; Washington Post; May 12, 2021). Despite that, Trump irresponsibly blamed Netanyahu when the war broke out. Trump and Netanyahu appeared like-minded, when the accord was reached, but their clash is a natural consequence of right-wing nature, which is to pursue maximum self-gain at the expense of others. That is not in fit for bilateral or multilateral partnership.

Some anti-globalists naïvely argue that rightwing populists are better than those of leftwing to deter China. That is too superficial. See what happens in Brazil. It was rightwing president Jair Bolsonaro who endorsed the Chinese plan to build the railway and the highway passing through Amazonian forests to Peru for the Belt and Road Initiative, which could be too destructive for the ecosystem for local flora and fauna and the livelihood of indigenous uncontacted peoples (“Proposed Brazil-Peru road through untouched Amazon gains momentum”; Diálogo Chino; March 10, 2022). Again, I have to stress that right-wingers are obsessed with pseudo-realism to edge out others for their tribal maximum gain, even though at the expense of indigenous people and ecosystem. Consequently, there is no reason for them care about security of other nations and the global community. It was leftwing President Lula da Silva who demanded China to reconsider those plans when he was reinaugurated in January last year (Opinion: Brazil can make green gains from China’s ‘ecological civilisation’ aims; Diálogo Chino; October 3, 2023). I do not necessarily favor leftist Lula over rightist Bolsonaro, as he revealed his indulgence in outdated anti-colonialism ideology to invite Putin to G20 and BRICS summits in Brazil this year. Remember even South Africa’s ANC-bound President Cyrill Ramaphosa gave up inviting that Russian criminal to the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, in face of fierce litigation by the Democratic Alliance to demand the government to abide by the rule of the International Criminal Court (“Lula invites Putin to Brazil, sidesteps on war crimes arrest”; Politico; December 4, 2023). It seems that both Bolsonaro and Lula are disrespectful to the rule of law, in view of their handling of Amazonian development and the BRICS summit in each. Actually, both populists are headaches for the Brazilian foreign service as they do not want unnecessary frictions with the West and indiscreet tilt to revisionist powers (“Can Brazil become a major power in international politics? Lula’s questionable tilt to authoritarian powers”; Brasil Nippou; September 26, 2023). After all, we have to bear in mind that the fear of China is no reason for taking side with rightwing populists.

Among rightwing populist threats worldwide, the US presidential election is the most critical case. How can America stop Trump from being reelected? Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution warns of pro-Trump fervors among Republican voters. No Republican rivals are capable of destroying Trump’s rock-solid base in the primary as he mentions. More problematically, MAGA Republicans justify everything of Trump, including the January 6 riot and other criminal cases on legal charges. Much more absurdly, they blame Biden for their supposed failure in Ukraine, Israel, and Afghanistan, although it is actually Trump who is really responsible for those fiascos. Sane Republicans are completely sidelined, and the “adults in the room” of the last Trump administration are reluctant to denounce him in public (“A Trump dictatorship is increasingly inevitable. We should stop pretending.”; Washington Post; November 30, 2023). In order to stop Trump, Kagan comments that Republicans, notably Nikki Haley, should question his electability for his disdain to the constitutional democracy. But all the Republican rivals think nothing of denying Trump’s credential, as they stress partisan loyalty if he were nominated. Quite noticeably, the more Trump portrays himself a victim of persecution, the more infuriated his supporters are with American judicial system and elite as a whole. Therefore, it is risky for Republicans to provoke those MAGA voters. In view of this, Kagan urges veteran Republican politicians such as Mitt Romney, Liz Cheyney, Condoleezza Rice, and James Baker, and also, former cabinet members like Mike Pence and John Kelly to lead a nationwide campaign to defend democracy in America (“The Trump dictatorship: How to stop it”’ Washington Post; December 7, 2023). After all, the key to stopping Trump is the will of orthodox Republicans. They have already launched such movements like the Lincoln Project, the Republican Accountability project, Republicans for the Rule of Law. How will veteran politicians join them?

The key to curb rightwing populism is the resilience of democracy. Last October, Keio Center for Strategy hosted an online dialogue between Professor Yuichi Hosoya of Keio University and Professor Maiko Ichihara of Hitotsubashi University to explore security implication of democratic recession in the world. In the dialogue, both scholars focused extensively on the vulnerability of Western democracy to disinformation by revisionist powers. Currently advanced democracies in Europe and North America are plagued with the rise of populism, which typically appears in the form of anti-establishment outrage and anti-immigrant nativism. Most notably, MAGA Republicans misapply small government ideals to boost hate ideology and to attack such socio-economically and culturally deprived people. Those who feel themselves victimized by globalization applaud rightwing demagogues for tough and resolute postures. But such “I alone can fix it” approaches simply make the government dysfunctional and the nation unsecured as Harari argues.




In the dialogue, Ichihara explained how Russia and China seize those opportunities of disinformation to manipulate domestic politics in the West through effective use of digital technology. Both scholars agreed that democracies need countermeasures to defend themselves from enemy manipulation. Meanwhile, we have to notice that some democracies such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, are relatively successful in curbing rightwing populism. Particularly in Japan, people still trust the government, media, and established intellectuals, which deters dubious conspiracy theories from being propagated, as Hosoya mentioned.Also, I would call an attention to both Commonwealth dominions, as they are in the sphere of Anglo-American political culture, but not facing serious upsurge of demagogy. Can the three Pacific democracies show some hints of how to manage populism to the global community?

The question of Britain’s tilt to the Indo Pacific and its relationship with China

Britain is one of the key partners of the multilateral coalition to enforce FOIP operations to defend the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in view of maritime challenges by China. Ever since the Johnson administration released the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy entitled “Global Britain in a competitive age” in March 2021, the United Kingdom has been proceeding strategic tilt to the Indo Pacific. In accordance with this strategy, Britain is deepening strategic partnership with Japan and India. Particularly with Japan, Britain signed the RAA (Reciprocal Access Agreement) this year to faciilitate access to mutual troop facilities and bilateral operational and training cooperation between their armed forces. Also, both countries conduct joint research and development of the GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) with Italy. With India, Britain provides technological assistance for its indigenous next fighter project to supplant Russian sponsored FGFA (Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft). Furthermore, the United Kingdom singed the AUKUS deal with the United States and Australia. In view of those agreements, Britain is supposed to be deeply committed to the FOIP against China along with regional powers like Japan, India, and Australia, and most importantly, through the “special relationship” with America. However, some restraints of domestic politics, notably the Labour Party and the financial lobby, could erode Britain’s solid commitment to the deterrence against China. Also, the Sunak administration is not necessarily harmonious in their stances against China, unlike their approaches against Russia.

Let me mention the Labour Party first. Shadow Defence Secretary John Healey questioned Tory national security strategy of the tilt to the Indo Pacific initiated by the Johnson administration, in view of growing threat of Russia since the outbreak of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Secretary Healey said that Britain should focus its limited budgetary resource on the defense of its home turf and the Euro Atlantic, as commented "The first priority for Britain's armed forces must be where the threats are greatest, not where the business opportunities lie” (“Labour defence chief questions using UK's 'scarce resources' in Indo-Pacific”; Forces Net; 8 February, 2023). The point of Labour argument is that Britain should rearm to meet the requirement to defend Europe, the Atlantic and the Arctic, while its military stockpile at home is depleting to support Ukraine (“Labour calls for UK rearmament and end to military cuts”; UK Defence Journal; February 7, 2023). But does the Labour Party belittle the threat of China, although it encroaches Britain’s homeland via secret agents, cyber manipulations, etc? Current party leader Keir Starmer assumes himself a Blairite, but his party’s defense initiative seems more like Harold Wilson’s who decided to withdraw British troops from east of Aden in 1968, rather than Tony Blair’s whose global trotting foreign policy explored to let Britain punch above its weight.

If the Labour Party is not obsessed with anti-colonialist woke ideology, how would they strike a balance between Britain’s strategic necessity around the globe? Rather than denying the tilt to the Indo Pacific, Veerle Nouwens of the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) suggests that the Labour Party tailor the tilt to their priorities. Geographical distance is no reason to disengage from the Indo Pacific. After all, the Tory defense plan does not argue that Britain keep solid permanent military presence in Japan or Australia. The Labour should bear in mind that the Indo Pacific strategies of France and Japan stretch from East Africa to the South Pacific. Furthermore, she comments that Britain does not necessarily keep military presence to the furthest in the Indo Pacific, but it has to make full use of existing UK facilities in Indian Ocean, ie, the Middle East, East Africa, and Singapore. That would be helpful for the British troop to react to an emergency in the Far East, when China or North Korea defy global rules and norms such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and nuclear nonproliferation in this region. While Shadow Defence Secretary Healey stresses limited budgetary resource, Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy does not deny the tilt, but proposes the “three Cs”. That is, Britain should challenge and compete against China geopolitically, but cooperate with them on some issues such as climate change when necessary (“How Labour Can Reform, Rather Than Do Away With, the UK’s Indo-Pacific Tilt”; RUSI Commentary; 14 February 2023). After all, I would argue that Healey’s vison is a sheer denial of Britain’s historical status as a maritime trade nation.

For diplomatic consistency, Britain’s Indo Pacific partners, notably Japan and Australia, need to talk with the Labour shadow cabinet to reconfirm the imperative of the FOIP for global security and common interests in this region. Quite importantly, the general election in Britain is scheduled no later than January 28, 2025, which is quite closely dated to the US presidential election on November 5, 2024. According to the latest opinion poll by Ipsos from August 11 to 14, 56% of UK voters think that Starmer will defeat Sunak in the forthcoming election. While Starmer leads 9 out of 12 points, particularly on being in touch with ordinary people, understanding the problems facing Britain, and being an experienced leader, Sunak leads on being good in a crisis (“Majority of Britons think it is likely Keir Starmer will become Prime Minister”; Ipsos Political Pulse; 24 August, 2023).

The FOIP is multilateral by nature, and Quad members and other regional and global stakeholders need to send a message so that a Labour Britain would not fall into radical anti-colonialist. Above all, Starmer needs to outline a Labour national security strategy, around the world. He told that his cabinet would seek a bilateral security and defense treaty with Germany quickly if he were elected (“UK Labour would seek security and defense treaty with Germany”; Politico; May 16, 2023). But it is not clear how he would adjust Healey’s Euro-Atlantic focused defense and Lammy’s three Cs against China in the Indo Pacific.

The left is not the only problem. Former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne who was an architect of the Anglo-Chinese Golden Era under the Cameron administration, has become a fintech lobbyist to embrace money from China and Russia to the London financial market, after his retirement from politics. Even though David Cameron quit his political career after the Brexit referendum, Osborne remained in the House of Commons as a backbencher. However, he was forced to resign as he was appointed to the editor of the Evening Standard though he was an MP. Ever since he was the chancellor, Osborne wanted to make London a global hub of fintech (“Osborne wants London to be 'global centre for fintech”; Financial Times; November 11, 2015), but his policy was critically concerned, because it seemed that he prioritized the relationship with China at the expense of human rights and US-UK relations. Also, Cameron refused security commitment Britain’s traditional allies in South East Asia when he visited Singapore in 2015 so as not to provoke China (“In for a Yuan, in for a Pound: Is the United Kingdom Making a Bad Bet on China?”; Council on Foreign Relations Blog; October 20, 2015). Osborne also had some dubious ties with Russia, as he accepted donations from a Russian oligarch in 2008 (“George Osborne admits 'mistake' over Russian oligarch”; Guardian; 27 October, 2008). Brexit is a disaster for Britain and the global community, but had Cameron stayed in the office, Osborne would have advanced his pro-Sino-Russian fintech policy at the expense of national security.

As if representing the financial lobby led by Osborne, Sherard Cowper-Coles, head of public affairs at HSBC Holdings PLC, criticized the British government so “weak” as to follow America to curtail business ties with China (“HSBC Executive Slams ‘Weak’ UK for Backing US Against China”; Bloomberg News; August 7, 2023). His remark is “too market-oriented”. Certainly, London has been an offshore financial market where traders can deal with currencies out of American regulation, notably the Eurodollar from the Soviet Union and the petrodollar from OPEC nations. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Cold War notions of rational deterrence, and the financial market is required to reject politically risky foreign money more strictly today. Nevertheless, it is quite hard to keep Britain’s open economy, while stopping money laundering by China, Russia, and other revisionist powers (“Why Britain’s Tories are addicted to Russian money”; Politico; March 7, 2022). Regarding the supply chain with China and energy dependence on Russia, Germany and France are frequently criticized, but we have to watch Britain’s handling of these issues as well.

The Sunak administration may not explore the Golden era with China, but the prime minister’s background is business oriented. Having graduated from Oxford University with a BA in PPE, Rishi Sunak acquired an MBA from Stanford University, where he met his wife Akshata Murty whose father is an Indian IT business tycoon Narayana Murty. Sunak himself made his career in hedge fund business before entering politics. In view of his business instinct, he could be tempted to prioritize economic interests with China and take lukewarm attitudes to its threats in the Indo Pacific and the UK homeland, although he declared the end of the Golden Era (“Rishi Sunak: Golden era of UK-China relations is over”; BBC News; 29 November, 2022). Therefore, House Foreign Affairs Committee MPs raised critical concerns with Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, when he visited China at the end of this August. This backlash was led by Conservative MP Alicia Kearns who chairs the committee, arguing that he should have been tough on Chinese espionage in the UK homeland, human rights abuse in Xinjian Uyghur and Tibet, and UK security role in the FOIP operation (“James Cleverly urged to be ‘crystal clear’ with China on ‘the rule of law and human rights’”; Politico; August 30, 2023). Criticism comes not only from Sunak’s party, also from his own cabinet. Minister of State for Security Tom Tugendhat has been a renowned China hawk, and he was banned from entering the country in 2021 (“Cleverly asks Bryant to withdraw ‘Chinese stooge’ claim amid row over Beijing”; Independent; 13 June, 2023). As an HM army veteran, he was so alert to China’s overseas police station in the United Kingdom that he eliminated them, because they were not permitted by the British government (“Chinese 'police stations' in UK are 'unacceptable', says security minister”; Sky News; 6 June 2023).

China appeasers are witnessed beyond partisanship. On the left, there are anti-colonialist wokes. On the right, there are financial lobbyists and their sympathizers. Old fashioned right-left dichotomy is meaningless to analyze correlation of foreign and domestic policy. Britain’s Indo Pacific partners need to be deeply in contact with both ruling and opposition parties to reconfirm security environment in this region and international agreements such as the G7 declaration and the UK-Japanese accord in Hiroshima. Also, it is necessary to reexamine Britain’s own security guidelines like the Integrated Review of Security in 2021, the Strategic Review in 2023, and House Foreign Affairs report led by Kearns this August. Most importantly, Britain’s military presence in Asia would be helpful in the special relationship with the United States, which would ensure a successful Global Britain. At the House of Lords, ex-Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen argued that Americans were more concerned with military adventurism of China than ongoing war in Ukraine, and it would be advantageous for Britain to show its shared security objectives with them in the Pacific (“British carrier in Pacific bolsters US-UK alliance”; UK Defence Journal; September 30, 2023). Though Lord Owen was a secretary of state in the Callaghan administration of the Labour party, his views on the Indo Pacific tilt is completely different from that of current Shadow Defence Secretary Healey. Shadow Foreign Secretary Lammy upholds the “three Cs”, but it is still unclear. After all, it is not ideological label or partisanship, but views and understandings on the Indo Pacific tilt and the Chinese threat that critically matter. Beware of domestic politics in Britain.

Democracy in Africa and Western countermeasures against Russian penetration

The global community has been astonished at unexpected influence of some pro-Russian and autocratic nations in Africa at UN General Assembly vote on the Ukrainian crisis. However, the African Union reaffirmed to suspend the membership of pro-Russian military dictatorship regimes in the Sahel region, that is, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan to show zero tolerance against unconstitutional changes of government at the 36th AU summit in Addis Ababa in February this year. Just before this summit, the ECOWAS also (Economic Community of West African States) announced to maintain halting the membership of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea (“African Union reaffirms suspension of Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Sudan”; Africa News; 20 February, 2023). Those actions by the AU and the ECOWAS are hopeful signs for democracy in Africa. Therefore, we should not fall into “pessimistic realism” to embrace the fall of democracy and the fall of the West in a supposedly forthcoming multipolar world. In a revisionist world order that Russia and China uphold, our history would devolve and degrade into repression and chaos. The consequence of our defeatism would be fatal to the global community. We have to reconfirm that values of democracy, freedom, and human rights are not restricted within the West, and not completely alien to Africa.

To begin with, we have to understand the overview of democracy in Africa. According to Freedom House, freedom index in Africa has been declining for years recently, as with the case of the trend worldwide. That is in resonance with penetration of Russia and China in this region. However, “African countries have also showed signs of improvement and resilience”, according to Tiseke Kasambala, Director of Africa Programs, though resurgence of military dictatorship, particularly in the Sahel, destabilizes the continent. Quite importantly, the AU adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981, which is supposed to be very progressive to defend human rights, but many member states are reluctant to implement it. Meanwhile, the government is weakening constitutional rule of law in South Africa, although it was invited to the Democracy Summit by US President Joe Biden both in 2021 and 2023. However, the judiciary, civil society, and media barely manage to maintain democracy collectively, against populist autocratic attempts by the ruling ANC (“How African Democracies Can Rise and Thrive Amid Instability, Militarization, and Interference”; Freedom House Perspectives; September 1, 2022). In view of long one-party rule after the fall of apartheid, more attention needs to be paid to the Ramaphosa administration’s invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the BRICS summit in Johannesburg this August, to assess the rule of law in this country as a member of the International Criminal Court.

Interestingly, a reverse of world history is witnessed in Africa, that is Russian penetration. Remember that shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, East European nations including some former Soviet republics jumped into joining the EU and NATO. That is entirely their own sovereign preference. Rationally, nothing of Russia is appealing in view of its poor governance, economy, technology, and also, its anachronistic neo-Eurasianism. But strangely, African countries do not necessarily think so. At the UN General Assembly on Russian invasion of Ukraine in March last year, nearly half of African nations did not support the resolution to condemn the aggression. Some ruling élites in southern Africa feel nostalgic of their cooperation with the Soviet Union in their struggle against colonialism and apartheid during the Cold War era, but that is merely at the governmental level. Unlike commonly believed, Africans are not necessarily obsessed with anti-colonialism today. Also, they are not concerned with the great power conflict on geopolitics and ideology in Europe and Asia. They choose partners through their perceived self-interest, whether Russia, China, or the West. Regarding African views on Russia and the ongioing invasion of Ukraine, the Economist and Premise conducted opinion polls in six leading African nations including Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali, which reveals that people in those countries do not necessarily agree to foreign policy direction of their government. While South Africa, Uganda, and Mali abstained from the UNGA vote to condemn Russian invasion of Ukraine, the rest of them approved it. Among those ruled by pro-Russian government, South Africa is a sample of democracy in southern Africa where the ruling party is engrossed in anti-apartheid nostalgia, while Mali is a sample of military dictatorship in the Sahel where anti-Western regime depends on Wagner in counterterrorism.

As shown in Table 1, the approval rate of Russian invasion of Ukraine is the lowest in democratic South Africa, but highest in Wagner sponsored Mali. Also, as shown in Table 2, people in Mali are the most likely to blame the West for the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, those in South Africa are the least likely to blame NATO and the United States (“Why Russia wins some sympathy in Africa and the Middle East”; Economist; March 12, 2022).

TABLE 1

TABLE 2

After the military coup d’état in 2020, Mali has been isolated from the global community, as France withdrew counterterrorism troops and the membership of the AU and the ECOWAS was suspended. Wagner seized this opportunity to infiltrate there. Impoverished and poorly educated people are easily misled by propagandas that Russia and the military regime spread.

That is not the case with South Africa, where checks and balances by parliamentary opposition, the judiciary, and the media are balking the ANC’s revisionist foreign and domestic policies. Particularly, the Democratic Alliance (DA) which succeeds from anti-apartheid white liberal Progressive Party, is launching a fierce campaign against President Cyril Ramaphosa’s invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the BRICS summit in Johannesburg this August. The DA applied for litigation so that the Gauteng High Court can enforce the ICC rule to arrest Putin upon his arrival to South Africa to attend the BRICS summit (“DA launches court application to compel the arrest of Putin in South Africa”; DA News; 30 May, 2023). Also, DA leader John Steenhuisen even warned that the ANC administration sent some weapons to Russia in an interview with CNN, according to Briefly News, a South African digital media, which displays “Stand with Ukraine” banner on its web site (“John Steenhuisen Says President Cyril Ramaphosa Is a “Political Swindler” Who Fooled the Country”; Briefly.co.za; June 1, 2023). Furthermore, he criticizes Ramaphosa’s intermediation between Russia and Ukraine as a waste of taxpayers’ money and diplomatic stunt. More importantly, the DA blames the ANC’s close association with autocracy like Putin’s Russia (“How much did South Africans pay for Ramaphosa’s failed diplomatic PR stunt?”; DA News; 17 June, 2023). As shown in the recent draft of race quotas for water use, which would impose huge burden on farmland owners that consume 60% of the resource, the ANC seems to be obsessed with an ideology of class struggle and victimhood (“Parched Earth: ANC introduces Race Quotas for water use”; DA News; 1 June, 2023). Right or left, such victimhood minded populists would easily befriend dictators like Putin.

We should also discuss the Russian presence in Africa from Russian perspective. Joseph Siegle at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies testified about Russian activities in Africa at the hearing of the US House of Representatives. He mentioned three main pillars of Russian strategy in Africa. The fist pillar is to gain influence on the sea lane from southern Mediterranean to the Red Sea through Suez and Djibouti. The second pillar is to remove Western influence from the continent. Wagner activities in Central Africa and Mali are one of the most noticeable. The third pillar is to reshape rule-based world order, by disrespecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states, which is displayed in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin’s involvement in Africa pleases only autocrats and disinformed people, as its strategy of those pillars just destabilizes political economy of this region (“Russia’s Strategic Objectives and Influences in Africa”; Africa Center for Strategic Studies; July 14, 2022). After all, Russia hardly cares about local development, empowerment, and well-being and simply wants to make use of Africa for siloviki’s perceived national interests. That is entirely at odds with the ideal of the AU, the ECOWAS, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Most fundamentally, Paul Stronski at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace quotes a speech by US Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Mills that Wagner presence in the Sahel aggravates human sufferings without resolving real causes of instability, such as poor governance, broken institutions, long term displacement, and armed groups proliferation (“Russia’s Growing Footprint in Africa’s Sahel Region”; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; February 28, 2023).

Russia is too opportunist in its charm offensive in Africa, because its influence is declining in former Soviet CIS, Eurasian Economic Union, and CSTO, since the invasion of Ukraine, but the Kremlin still wants to display their diplomatic power in a multipolar rivalry of geopolitics in this century. That is the background of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to seven African countries including South Africa, Eswatini, Mali, Mauritania, and Sudan early this year. However, Vadim Zaytsev, an independent expert on Russian policy in Africa, comments that most of the African nations take cautious neutrality, and do not want to risk their ties with the West, although they rhetorically resonate with Russia’s contradictory denouncement of neocolonialism that dismisses the colonial nature of the invasion of Ukraine (“What’s Behind Russia’s Charm Offensive in Africa?”; Carnegie Politika; 17 February, 2023). It is not only Western experts who are critical to Russian penetration. African experts also warn the danger of Russian presence. Peter Fabricius at a South African think tank Institute for Security Studies (ISS) comments that Russia deepens its relations with Africa through military dimensions, rather than increasing the amount of trade and investment. He argues that Russia penetrates in Africa through exploiting instability in the target country. In Mali and Burkina Faso, Wagner filled the vacuum after the withdrawal of French troops. That weakens AU deterrence against military dictatorship. Meanwhile in Cameroon, Russia provokes separatists in the Anglophone region. It is likely that they want to overturn the regime to use this country a gateway to export natural resources from the Central African Republic. Such natural resource export is one of the means for Russia to finance its war in Ukraine and elsewhere, along with organized crimes such as trade of illegal weapons and drugs, money laundering, hacking to cryptocurrency, etc (“Africa shouldn’t ignore Russia’s destabilising influence”; ISS Today; 24 February, 2023). Fabricius is a white South African, and submitted some policy recommendations on African development to the World Economic Forum from African point of view.

After the Prigozhin mutiny, the foresight of Wagner activities and Russian influence in Africa is unpredictable. Kimberly Marten at Columbia University comments that it would be relatively easy for the Russian defense establishment to replace Yevgeny Prigozhin with someone else. Meanwhile, Jędrzej Czerep at the Polish Institute of International Affairs argues that everything depends on whether African clients perceive Russia strong and reliable enough to achieve their goals (“What next for Wagner’s African empire?”; Economist; June 27, 2023). Either way, what should America and its allies do to edge out Russia from Africa? Last August, the Biden administration released “US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa” to address new opportunities and partnership between the United States and African nations. Joseph Sany at the US Institute of Peace comments the following. Not only does it pledge aid surge to resolve regional problems such as food security, agriculture, supply chains, and climate change, but also stresses the necessity of listening to Africans. Thus, US embassies need sufficient work force led by accredited ambassadors. Furthermore, he argues that America enable African nations to resolve their problems by their own initiative (“The New U.S. Africa Strategy Is a Moment We Must Seize”; USIP; August 11, 2022). Regarding Wagner presence, Sany says that moral condemnation does not work. African clients are forced to sign with brutal Wagner out of desperation because international counterinsurgency operations have not wiped-out terrorism. But he mentions that bipartisan American policymakers have found past US policies are too myopic and too narrowly focused on military aspects, without giving sufficient consideration to governance and the economy of target countries (“In Africa, Here’s How to Respond to Russia’s Brutal Wagner Group”; USIP; April 6, 2023).

Despite Russian penetration through Wagner, Africa shares our values of freedom and democracy. At G7 Hiroshima, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida may have had to invite AU Chairman Azali Assoumani and South African DA leader John Steenhuisen to confirm this, rather than Wagner supported Mozambiquan President Filipe Nyusi. In order to deepen partnership with this region, the Western alliance needs to upgrade their diplomatic presence. For this objective, the United States should reconsider the Jacksonian system of political appointment of ambassadors. Senate confirmations are delayed frequently, and appointed ambassadors are not necessarily well qualified. One of such examples is Lana Marks, a handbag designer, whom the Trump administration nominated to the ambassador to South Africa for her contribution to their election campaign. Remember, those who make great contribution to the campaign are not necessarily well-acquainted with foreign policy. Some of them are narrow-sighted vote grubbers. I would like to talk about such an example from my experience. In the past, I had some opportunity to see a Japanese LDP diet member’s office from inside. One day, when a senior staff of the office was watching TV news during the lunch break, and he paid keen attention to reports about Nagata-cho politics and domestic election, but no sooner had the news reported about international affairs than he shut out information from the TV with contempt. It was very startling, and he appeared quite a strange creature for me. Though he graduated from Kyoto University, he behaved like a poorly educated bumpkin. Therefore, any US president should abstain from appointing such an irresponsible vote grubber to the ambassador. After all, it is our firm commitment that would enable us to outcompete with Russia in Africa.