I am pleased to notify that an IT company named FindTheBest showed interest in Global American Discouse, and they included this blog in their blog list. FindTheBest is located in Santa Barbara, California, whose mission is to present simple facts to remove biases in the market so that consumers can make their own decisions quickly and accurately.
Global American Discourse is included in “News & Politics” category of their blog list. Popular American blogs from liberal Huffington Post and Daily Kos to conservative Town Hall and News Busters are listed in this category. Hopefully, this blog can compete well with numerous rivals, in terms of popularity, quality, and influence.
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Wednesday, May 30, 2012
Sunday, May 20, 2012
The Scar by Hatoyama on the US-Japanese Alliance Is Deeper than Expected
Since the seiken kohtai (power rotation) in 2009, policymakers on both sides of the Pacific are obsessed with the Okinawa base issue, which has obscured the most critical issue of the US-Japanese alliance. That is the validity of Obama strategy. In the words of a Japanese journalist Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Yukio Hatoyama was so exultant with the success of overthrowing the rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 1955 that he failed to understand fatal consequences of his remark to revise the bilateral agreement on Okinawa. In the name of resetting postwar Japanese politics, Yukio Hatoyama insisted on cutting US troops in Okinawa by canceling the Futemma deal, which was signed with the United States through long and laborious negotiations. Later, Hatoyama admitted strategic importance of Okinawa to say “The further I learn, the better I understand the real meaning of deterrence [provided by US military presence to defend Japan].” However, it is no use crying over spilt milk. Now, Japan must heal this damage to restore trust by the United States. Current Japanese government is hardly in a position to exert influence on foreign policy making in Washington, and discuss the big picture of regional and global security partnership beyond the Okinawa base issue and the Senkaku territorial dispute.
I would like to mention one episode that implies this. Shortly after the historical victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), I had an opportunity to attend a meeting of diplomats and businessmen from both Japan and the United States. The primary focus of that session was Nagatacho politics under the DPJ government. Futemma was one of main topics. I was struck to hear American participants say “It seems that newly elected DPJ administration faces some difficulties in handling US-Japanese relations, but things were utterly up to the Japanese side, and there were no problems with the American side. If the agreement fails, American forces just continue to stay in Futemma.” Almost all the attendants agreed to this viewpoint. The key point for me is its psychological effect on the US-Japanese alliance, rather than technical details of Okinawa. Implicitly, they said, “Whatever happens between both countries, Japan is responsible for everything, and America has nothing to be blamed.” In other words, Japan has lost eligibility to say something to America, even if Washington’s strategy is utterly wrong. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda may have begun to move toward improving US-Japanese relations on his April 30th visit to the White House, but the scar of Hatoyama’s mishandling is much deeper than commonly expected. To my regret, I failed to mention concerns on the American side, as the discussion focused on the storm in a teacup of Nagatacho politics.
Let me talk about fatal frauds of the Obama strategy, which will ruin alliances with any major partners of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, including Japan. The fundamental assumption of such worldwide alliances is the superpower position of the United States. However, since the inauguration, President Barack Obama expresses his willingness to commit a “superpower suicide”. His apologist attitude in the Prague and the Cairo speeches was bitterly criticized. While many Japanese policymakers express “gratitude” to the pivot to Asia despite budget constraints, the reality of this strategy is hollow. The Middle East still needs American military presence. Also, quite ironically, the pivot to Asia does not necessarily increase US military power in the Asia pacific region. Despite emphasis on air sea battle, American naval and sea power has been downsized substantially in Obama’s plan. The horrible delay to develop F-35 joint strike fighter is a typical case.
McKenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, presents critical analysis on the pivot to Asia. Under Obama’s plan, military personnel will be reduced dramatically, and 100,000 soldiers of the army and the Marine Corps will be laid off. That goes beyond correcting “overstretch” during long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, procurement and research are cut on all services of the armed forces. The navy and the air force are hit much harder. It is not just the size of both services but research and development have been sacrificed more seriously. Although investment in anti-access and area denial capability is the key to maintain US preeminence against China, the Obama administration cuts this. Furthermore, Eaglen argues that the air force is the biggest victim of Obama’s defense plan. It buys fewer aircrafts than the army and the navy next year. More critically, expenditures on cutting the edge technology such as stealth fighter/bombers and unmanned aircrafts are curtailed (“Obama's shift to Asia budget is a hollow shell game”; AOL Defense; March 15, 2012). It is utterly contradictory that Obama’s “shift to Asia” is making America strategically vulnerable to China, and not to mention to Middle East threats, notably Iran and terrorists.
While Obama stresses that US forces be upgraded in software rather than hardware, we must remember the farewell speech by Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The size of armed forces must be sufficient to achieve national security goals. In discussing this, I would like to mention some failures of Britain’s Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010. The Cameron administration placed emphasis on software rather than hardware to redesign British defense plan under fiscal austerity. What is the consequence? In the war in Libya, Britain’s combat performance was not sufficiently well. The 30th anniversary of the Falkland War this year provokes nationalism in Argentina, and it is tough for downsized British forces to manage this challenge confidently. The Obama administration makes the same and “friendly” mistakes with the British counterpart.
From the above aspects, I would like to discuss contradictions in the Obama strategy furthermore. Applying statistical data of the Department of Defense, Eaglen argues about fundamental weaknesses of the Obama strategy in a joint article with Douglas Birkey, Director for Government Relations at the Air Force Association (“Nearing coffin corner: US air power on the edge”; AEI National Security Outlook; March 2012). The key point is, “Allies’ commitment to the United States and its interests depends directly on their perceptions regarding American presence, staying power, and resolve.” Drastic cuts in air power lowers American presence substantially. Quoting 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, both authors argue that the Unites States “increase in investment in long-range strike systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment” to deal with growing Chinese threats. Strategic bombers and anti-A2/AD capabilities are key issues to strengthen air sea battle power both in terms of quality and quantity. Let me talk about long range bombers first. As shown in the table below, bomber inventory has dropped from 500 during the Viet Nam War to 134 today.
Though modern technology enables individual bomber to attack multiple targets, each airplane cannot be in two places simultaneously, which makes it impossible to conduct parallel concurrent attacks. NATO experience in Libya suggests that extensive strikes with cruise missiles are too costly to sustain. Considering such insufficiency of long range attack capability, Ichiro Ozawa, Member of the House of Representatives, is utterly wrong to say that all US forces must be relocated outside Japan such as Guam, except the 7th fleet. Also, forward base bombers can fly more sorties than those in rear base. Okinawa has its own role, and so does Guam. The same logic can be applied to Iran. Forward bases in the Gulf have their own roles, and so does Diego Garcia. A sword is used as a sword, and a long lance is used as a long lance.
Successful long range strike needs to be combined with tactical air raid from forward bases. Therefore fighter jets must be modernized and increased. This is a critical problem particularly upgrading anti-A2/AD capabilities. While China is developing 5th generation A2/AD platforms such as J-20 stealth fighters and advanced anti-ship missiles, the United States possesses only 185 F-22 fighters and B-2 bombers. As indicated in the table below, US air force needs further modernization.
Eaglen and Birkey insist “Policymakers’ investment priorities should focus on the next-generation bomber; F-35, KC-46, and F-22 modernization; acquiring long-range, low-observable, carrier-based strike and air dominance platforms; and joint electronic warfare capabilities.” They conclude that resources must match the reality, but there are any contradictions in the Obama administration’s strategy of pivot to Asia and emphasis on air sea battle.
As I discuss in this post, American policymaking is not necessarily perfect. However, the scar of Hatoyama diplomacy is so deep that any kind of mistakes on the American side are obscured. This is largely because unconscious mindset of “Japanese inconsistency worsens bilateral relations, but there is nothing to be blamed on the American side” dominates current atmosphere between both countries. As the Futemma problem has eroded Japan’s position, it is hardly in a position to say “no” to America even if incumbent administration at the White House adopts a wrong policy. Those who were at the meeting were deeply involved in Japanese political corridor, and they showed understanding, patience, and respect to Japan, despite Hatoyama. However, quite a few key policymakers in Washington are experts on Europe and the Middle East, and they may not be so generous to Japan. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda must tackle such dreadful legacy of Hatoyama. The opposition parties have their own advantages. While the ruling party is preoccupied with tasks at hand, they can spend much energy to reconstruct the alliance from long-term and fundamental viewpoints, in order to prevent any step toward superpower suicide and the rise of isolationist mindset in the United States. “Immaturity” of DPJ is too well-known among the Japanese public. The opposition parties must act beyond the storm in a teacup ob Nagatacho.
I would like to mention one episode that implies this. Shortly after the historical victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), I had an opportunity to attend a meeting of diplomats and businessmen from both Japan and the United States. The primary focus of that session was Nagatacho politics under the DPJ government. Futemma was one of main topics. I was struck to hear American participants say “It seems that newly elected DPJ administration faces some difficulties in handling US-Japanese relations, but things were utterly up to the Japanese side, and there were no problems with the American side. If the agreement fails, American forces just continue to stay in Futemma.” Almost all the attendants agreed to this viewpoint. The key point for me is its psychological effect on the US-Japanese alliance, rather than technical details of Okinawa. Implicitly, they said, “Whatever happens between both countries, Japan is responsible for everything, and America has nothing to be blamed.” In other words, Japan has lost eligibility to say something to America, even if Washington’s strategy is utterly wrong. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda may have begun to move toward improving US-Japanese relations on his April 30th visit to the White House, but the scar of Hatoyama’s mishandling is much deeper than commonly expected. To my regret, I failed to mention concerns on the American side, as the discussion focused on the storm in a teacup of Nagatacho politics.
Let me talk about fatal frauds of the Obama strategy, which will ruin alliances with any major partners of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, including Japan. The fundamental assumption of such worldwide alliances is the superpower position of the United States. However, since the inauguration, President Barack Obama expresses his willingness to commit a “superpower suicide”. His apologist attitude in the Prague and the Cairo speeches was bitterly criticized. While many Japanese policymakers express “gratitude” to the pivot to Asia despite budget constraints, the reality of this strategy is hollow. The Middle East still needs American military presence. Also, quite ironically, the pivot to Asia does not necessarily increase US military power in the Asia pacific region. Despite emphasis on air sea battle, American naval and sea power has been downsized substantially in Obama’s plan. The horrible delay to develop F-35 joint strike fighter is a typical case.
McKenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, presents critical analysis on the pivot to Asia. Under Obama’s plan, military personnel will be reduced dramatically, and 100,000 soldiers of the army and the Marine Corps will be laid off. That goes beyond correcting “overstretch” during long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, procurement and research are cut on all services of the armed forces. The navy and the air force are hit much harder. It is not just the size of both services but research and development have been sacrificed more seriously. Although investment in anti-access and area denial capability is the key to maintain US preeminence against China, the Obama administration cuts this. Furthermore, Eaglen argues that the air force is the biggest victim of Obama’s defense plan. It buys fewer aircrafts than the army and the navy next year. More critically, expenditures on cutting the edge technology such as stealth fighter/bombers and unmanned aircrafts are curtailed (“Obama's shift to Asia budget is a hollow shell game”; AOL Defense; March 15, 2012). It is utterly contradictory that Obama’s “shift to Asia” is making America strategically vulnerable to China, and not to mention to Middle East threats, notably Iran and terrorists.
While Obama stresses that US forces be upgraded in software rather than hardware, we must remember the farewell speech by Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The size of armed forces must be sufficient to achieve national security goals. In discussing this, I would like to mention some failures of Britain’s Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010. The Cameron administration placed emphasis on software rather than hardware to redesign British defense plan under fiscal austerity. What is the consequence? In the war in Libya, Britain’s combat performance was not sufficiently well. The 30th anniversary of the Falkland War this year provokes nationalism in Argentina, and it is tough for downsized British forces to manage this challenge confidently. The Obama administration makes the same and “friendly” mistakes with the British counterpart.
From the above aspects, I would like to discuss contradictions in the Obama strategy furthermore. Applying statistical data of the Department of Defense, Eaglen argues about fundamental weaknesses of the Obama strategy in a joint article with Douglas Birkey, Director for Government Relations at the Air Force Association (“Nearing coffin corner: US air power on the edge”; AEI National Security Outlook; March 2012). The key point is, “Allies’ commitment to the United States and its interests depends directly on their perceptions regarding American presence, staying power, and resolve.” Drastic cuts in air power lowers American presence substantially. Quoting 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, both authors argue that the Unites States “increase in investment in long-range strike systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment” to deal with growing Chinese threats. Strategic bombers and anti-A2/AD capabilities are key issues to strengthen air sea battle power both in terms of quality and quantity. Let me talk about long range bombers first. As shown in the table below, bomber inventory has dropped from 500 during the Viet Nam War to 134 today.
Though modern technology enables individual bomber to attack multiple targets, each airplane cannot be in two places simultaneously, which makes it impossible to conduct parallel concurrent attacks. NATO experience in Libya suggests that extensive strikes with cruise missiles are too costly to sustain. Considering such insufficiency of long range attack capability, Ichiro Ozawa, Member of the House of Representatives, is utterly wrong to say that all US forces must be relocated outside Japan such as Guam, except the 7th fleet. Also, forward base bombers can fly more sorties than those in rear base. Okinawa has its own role, and so does Guam. The same logic can be applied to Iran. Forward bases in the Gulf have their own roles, and so does Diego Garcia. A sword is used as a sword, and a long lance is used as a long lance.
Successful long range strike needs to be combined with tactical air raid from forward bases. Therefore fighter jets must be modernized and increased. This is a critical problem particularly upgrading anti-A2/AD capabilities. While China is developing 5th generation A2/AD platforms such as J-20 stealth fighters and advanced anti-ship missiles, the United States possesses only 185 F-22 fighters and B-2 bombers. As indicated in the table below, US air force needs further modernization.
Eaglen and Birkey insist “Policymakers’ investment priorities should focus on the next-generation bomber; F-35, KC-46, and F-22 modernization; acquiring long-range, low-observable, carrier-based strike and air dominance platforms; and joint electronic warfare capabilities.” They conclude that resources must match the reality, but there are any contradictions in the Obama administration’s strategy of pivot to Asia and emphasis on air sea battle.
As I discuss in this post, American policymaking is not necessarily perfect. However, the scar of Hatoyama diplomacy is so deep that any kind of mistakes on the American side are obscured. This is largely because unconscious mindset of “Japanese inconsistency worsens bilateral relations, but there is nothing to be blamed on the American side” dominates current atmosphere between both countries. As the Futemma problem has eroded Japan’s position, it is hardly in a position to say “no” to America even if incumbent administration at the White House adopts a wrong policy. Those who were at the meeting were deeply involved in Japanese political corridor, and they showed understanding, patience, and respect to Japan, despite Hatoyama. However, quite a few key policymakers in Washington are experts on Europe and the Middle East, and they may not be so generous to Japan. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda must tackle such dreadful legacy of Hatoyama. The opposition parties have their own advantages. While the ruling party is preoccupied with tasks at hand, they can spend much energy to reconstruct the alliance from long-term and fundamental viewpoints, in order to prevent any step toward superpower suicide and the rise of isolationist mindset in the United States. “Immaturity” of DPJ is too well-known among the Japanese public. The opposition parties must act beyond the storm in a teacup ob Nagatacho.
Monday, April 30, 2012
Britain’s “Re-Prioritisation” of Asia
It is not just the United States and Russia, but Britain also pivots to the Asia Pacific region. This implies that nations outside the region will play significant role in major power interactions in East Asia. What does Britain pursue in Asia?
Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and Burma this April is a landmark of Britain’s involvement in Asia. Prime Minister Cameron discussed bilateral defense partnership with Japan. A couple of years ago, Britain’s active sales promotion of Euro Fighter Typhoon had drawn much attention, but this is nothing new. Shortly after the victory in the Falkland War, Prime Minister-then Margaret Thatcher urged Japan to buy Harrier. Cameron’s visit can be interpreted as a step toward a long awaited aspiration in Britain’s Japan policy.
Cameron’s trip to Burma is a noteworthy event. As the former colonial ruler, Britain is the first European country to have a summit with the Burmese government to pave the way for democracy from current military dictatorship. Britain can play crucial role in political reform in Burma, as well as the United States and Japan.
In view of Foreign Secretary William Hague’s visit to Brunei to attend the EU-ASEAN foreign ministers meeting, Ambassador to Indonesia Mark Canning stresses Britain’s relationship with Asia in the blog of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (“EU has Arrived”; FCO Blogs; April 27, 2012). Britain, along with EU members, explores more trade and investment opportunities in rapidly growing Asian market. Also, global security issue like extremist threat and climate change are key agendas in the Brunei meeting.
It is commonly understood that Europeans do not find vital strategic interest in East Asia. However, Britain has historical ties with this region, and English language and British styled educational system are requisite to produce local elites. When we talk of power interactions in the Asia Pacific, we have to bear in mind that influence of non regional actors like Britain and other EU nations not be dismissed.
Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and Burma this April is a landmark of Britain’s involvement in Asia. Prime Minister Cameron discussed bilateral defense partnership with Japan. A couple of years ago, Britain’s active sales promotion of Euro Fighter Typhoon had drawn much attention, but this is nothing new. Shortly after the victory in the Falkland War, Prime Minister-then Margaret Thatcher urged Japan to buy Harrier. Cameron’s visit can be interpreted as a step toward a long awaited aspiration in Britain’s Japan policy.
Cameron’s trip to Burma is a noteworthy event. As the former colonial ruler, Britain is the first European country to have a summit with the Burmese government to pave the way for democracy from current military dictatorship. Britain can play crucial role in political reform in Burma, as well as the United States and Japan.
In view of Foreign Secretary William Hague’s visit to Brunei to attend the EU-ASEAN foreign ministers meeting, Ambassador to Indonesia Mark Canning stresses Britain’s relationship with Asia in the blog of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (“EU has Arrived”; FCO Blogs; April 27, 2012). Britain, along with EU members, explores more trade and investment opportunities in rapidly growing Asian market. Also, global security issue like extremist threat and climate change are key agendas in the Brunei meeting.
It is commonly understood that Europeans do not find vital strategic interest in East Asia. However, Britain has historical ties with this region, and English language and British styled educational system are requisite to produce local elites. When we talk of power interactions in the Asia Pacific, we have to bear in mind that influence of non regional actors like Britain and other EU nations not be dismissed.
Saturday, April 28, 2012
Change of the Profile Photo
The profile photo of Global American Discourse changed
on April 23 as shown below. The description of the photo changed accordingly.
Old
The photo is a coin of the Macedonian Empire.
Alexander the Great wears a lion's skin as Hercules does.
New
The photo is an armored figure of Alexander the Great holding a lion helmet as Hercules does.
Hopefully, this blog will be a much stauncher advocate for defending our liberal world order.
Sunday, April 22, 2012
Russia Needs to Clarify What It Wants in East Asia
Remember Former Governor of Alaska Sarah Palin was severely criticized when she made a poor remark on Russia in 2008 presidential election. However, come to think of it, Russia’s vision of the Asia Pacific region is quite vague. Palin may be a provincial politician who has little understanding on foreign policy. But had it been vital for her state interest,she would have shown much keener awareness of Russian challenge to national security. Some policymakers argue that Russia would play a vital role in the Big Three power game of East Asia among the United States, China,and Japan. Russia itself needs a pivot to Asia. This year, APEC summit will be held in Vladivostok in September. Also, it is one of key domestic policy agendas for Russia to fill regional gaps between underdeveloped Far East and prosperous European area, as the former was left behind during the oil boom at the beginning of this century. Russia’s shift to East Asia will lead to some changes in foreign policy, particularly, vis-à-vis China, the Korean Peninsula,and Japan.
Russia’s pivot to Asia can provoke lurking tensions with China, though both powers jointly form an axis against the West. Sparsely populated, people in Far East Russia feel uneasy with the gigantic neighbor of China. Dmitry Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center,comments Russo-Chinese relations “Despite their overlapping interests [to challenge US hegemony], the two countries are not allies. Moscow will not accept a junior position vis-à-vis Beijing,while the Chinese regard Russia as a fading power”, in a recent report bounded by the Centre for European Reform (“True Partners?: How Russia and China see each other”; Centre for European Reform Report; February 2012). According to Trenin, Russian foreign policy has turned into “post-imperial” after the fall of the Soviet Union, which is completely different from expansionist one during the czarist and the Soviet eras. Current Russia is neither a colonial great power nor a superpower, and manages to stabilize itself as a second class player. Russia faces NATO’s overwhelming conventional forces in Europe, and it barely manages the balance against the West with nuclear arsenals. Therefore, it is Russia’s interest to keep strong relations with China. Also, China does not want a liberal Russia that is closely tied with the European Union. The vital interest for both Russia and China is to challenge the international system dominated by the United States, and explore more leverages in global governance. From the above points of view, Russia regards the rise of China very positively. Unlike neoconservatives in the United States, Trenin understands the Russo-Chinese axis in terms of geopolitics rather than the nature of the regime.
However there are some concerns in Russia’s relations with China. Trenin mentions political and economic problems. Politically, Chinese officials often remark something sensitive with regard to Russia’s Far East territory, like Lake Baikal is the “common heritage” of both countries. On the other hand, Russia stays neutral, and does not endorse China’s territorial claim to Senkaku and Spratly islands. More fundamentally, Russians are beginning to see the rise of Chinese military power with mixed feeling. A large scale Chinese military exercise in the Shenyang district got on Russia’s nerves in 2006. Trenin quotes a comment by Lieutenant General Skokov, Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, regarding a potential adversary in the Asia Pacific region saying that “[It is a] multi-million-strong force guided by traditional views to combat operations: straightforward, with massive concentration of manpower and firepower on key axes”. In the economy, Russia needs Chinese capital to develop Far East border area, but critics worry Chinese businesses simply exploit Siberian raw materials without helping the growth of job opportunities for local Russians. Since Russia inherited just over a half of the population of the Soviet Union, it needs Chinese workers to overcome labor shortage. However, massive influx of Chinese businesses and laborers provokes fear of land take over and criminal mafia growth among Russians in the Far East.
A Siberian tiger in Russia is staring at East Asia for prey.
In addition to political and economic problems, I would like to mention Chinese threat posed to natural environment in Russia. Chinese companies destroy Siberian boreal forest through illegal logging, in order to satisfy voracious demand for wood in China (“Corruption Stains Timber Trade”; Washington Post; April 1, 2007). The vast taiga of Siberia is a common heritage to the global public, and its environmental implication is no less important than tropical rain forest in Amazon. Regarding biodiversity,Russian Far East is the home of some well known endemic species, such as Siberian tiger, Amur Leopard, and Baikal Seal. Furthermore, the role of taiga to stop global warming needs more attention. Peat bog soil in boreal forests stores a huge amount of carbon dioxide. Wanton logging leads to a dreadful release of global warming gas from the soil. Also, illegal logging inflicts considerable damages on fisheries in the Okhotsk Sea, as the Amur River provides nutrients from Siberian forest to marine creatures there.
Russia’s role in East Asian security, the Korean Peninsula is a key place. Currently, North Korea defies global nonproliferation regime, under the new leader Kim Jong-un. Historically, the Korean Peninsula is an arena of the Great Game among Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. As to denuclearization of North Korea, in an interview with a Japanese journalist Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage laments precipitous decline of Russian influence on North Korea after the fall of the Soviet Union (“US-Japanese Alliance vs. China and North Korea” or 『日米同盟vs中国・北朝鮮』; p. 120). However, Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, points out that next President Vladimir Putin has published an article on nuclear nonproliferation in which he explores much more positive role in North Korea than he does in Iran (“Putin’s Grand Plan for Asia”; Diplomat Magazine; March 13, 2012). There is every reason for it. Russia wants to link the trans-Korean railway with the Russian rail system, in order to provide a transit route for South Korea to trade with Europe. Also, Russia wants to construct energy pipelines through North Korean territory.
Regarding the relationship with Japan, people tend to talk about the Northern territory dispute. Japanese media are obsessed with the effect of Putin’s victory in the presidential election this year on the territorial negotiation. However,whoever the president is, we have to understand the overview of Russia’s East Asia policy. Kremlin may explore further economic ties with Japan, regardless of political strains. However, we cannot accept such an idea so generously, considering Russia's behavior to close gas pipelines over the Ukrainian crisis, that panicked almost the whole of Europe. On the other hand, Japan can help protect Siberian forest, in order to defend vital interests for the global commons. When talking of Russo-Japanese relations, Japanese policymakers need to think of perception gaps between the East Siberian public and state-centric Kremlin as witnessed in the Japanese secondhand car conflict in2009 (“Russian motorists in Far East protest new rules, taxes”; RIA Novosti; October 24, 2009). People in Far East Russia rose up against Prime Minister Putin’s decision to restrict import of Japanese secondhand car to defend Russian auto industry from international competition.
Russia hosts APEC Vladivostok summit this September, and Russians need to speak out their policy and business objectives in East Asia. Russians have to shed their old czarist and Soviet mindset, and send messages globally. Up to now, Russia’s East Asia policy has not drawn much attention. But clearly, underdeveloped Russian Far East needs investment from Asian neighbors, notably, China, Japan, and South Korea. As Russia is shifting to Asia, American policymakers need to watch closer on Russia’s Asia Pacific policy. Also, people in East Asia must explore more opportunities to talk with Russians, from politicians and diplomats to Kuril fishermen. It is Russia’s shame rather than Sarah Palin’s that she gave a casual comment during 2008 presidential election campaign.
Russia’s pivot to Asia can provoke lurking tensions with China, though both powers jointly form an axis against the West. Sparsely populated, people in Far East Russia feel uneasy with the gigantic neighbor of China. Dmitry Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center,comments Russo-Chinese relations “Despite their overlapping interests [to challenge US hegemony], the two countries are not allies. Moscow will not accept a junior position vis-à-vis Beijing,while the Chinese regard Russia as a fading power”, in a recent report bounded by the Centre for European Reform (“True Partners?: How Russia and China see each other”; Centre for European Reform Report; February 2012). According to Trenin, Russian foreign policy has turned into “post-imperial” after the fall of the Soviet Union, which is completely different from expansionist one during the czarist and the Soviet eras. Current Russia is neither a colonial great power nor a superpower, and manages to stabilize itself as a second class player. Russia faces NATO’s overwhelming conventional forces in Europe, and it barely manages the balance against the West with nuclear arsenals. Therefore, it is Russia’s interest to keep strong relations with China. Also, China does not want a liberal Russia that is closely tied with the European Union. The vital interest for both Russia and China is to challenge the international system dominated by the United States, and explore more leverages in global governance. From the above points of view, Russia regards the rise of China very positively. Unlike neoconservatives in the United States, Trenin understands the Russo-Chinese axis in terms of geopolitics rather than the nature of the regime.
However there are some concerns in Russia’s relations with China. Trenin mentions political and economic problems. Politically, Chinese officials often remark something sensitive with regard to Russia’s Far East territory, like Lake Baikal is the “common heritage” of both countries. On the other hand, Russia stays neutral, and does not endorse China’s territorial claim to Senkaku and Spratly islands. More fundamentally, Russians are beginning to see the rise of Chinese military power with mixed feeling. A large scale Chinese military exercise in the Shenyang district got on Russia’s nerves in 2006. Trenin quotes a comment by Lieutenant General Skokov, Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, regarding a potential adversary in the Asia Pacific region saying that “[It is a] multi-million-strong force guided by traditional views to combat operations: straightforward, with massive concentration of manpower and firepower on key axes”. In the economy, Russia needs Chinese capital to develop Far East border area, but critics worry Chinese businesses simply exploit Siberian raw materials without helping the growth of job opportunities for local Russians. Since Russia inherited just over a half of the population of the Soviet Union, it needs Chinese workers to overcome labor shortage. However, massive influx of Chinese businesses and laborers provokes fear of land take over and criminal mafia growth among Russians in the Far East.
A Siberian tiger in Russia is staring at East Asia for prey.In addition to political and economic problems, I would like to mention Chinese threat posed to natural environment in Russia. Chinese companies destroy Siberian boreal forest through illegal logging, in order to satisfy voracious demand for wood in China (“Corruption Stains Timber Trade”; Washington Post; April 1, 2007). The vast taiga of Siberia is a common heritage to the global public, and its environmental implication is no less important than tropical rain forest in Amazon. Regarding biodiversity,Russian Far East is the home of some well known endemic species, such as Siberian tiger, Amur Leopard, and Baikal Seal. Furthermore, the role of taiga to stop global warming needs more attention. Peat bog soil in boreal forests stores a huge amount of carbon dioxide. Wanton logging leads to a dreadful release of global warming gas from the soil. Also, illegal logging inflicts considerable damages on fisheries in the Okhotsk Sea, as the Amur River provides nutrients from Siberian forest to marine creatures there.
Russia’s role in East Asian security, the Korean Peninsula is a key place. Currently, North Korea defies global nonproliferation regime, under the new leader Kim Jong-un. Historically, the Korean Peninsula is an arena of the Great Game among Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. As to denuclearization of North Korea, in an interview with a Japanese journalist Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage laments precipitous decline of Russian influence on North Korea after the fall of the Soviet Union (“US-Japanese Alliance vs. China and North Korea” or 『日米同盟vs中国・北朝鮮』; p. 120). However, Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, points out that next President Vladimir Putin has published an article on nuclear nonproliferation in which he explores much more positive role in North Korea than he does in Iran (“Putin’s Grand Plan for Asia”; Diplomat Magazine; March 13, 2012). There is every reason for it. Russia wants to link the trans-Korean railway with the Russian rail system, in order to provide a transit route for South Korea to trade with Europe. Also, Russia wants to construct energy pipelines through North Korean territory.
Regarding the relationship with Japan, people tend to talk about the Northern territory dispute. Japanese media are obsessed with the effect of Putin’s victory in the presidential election this year on the territorial negotiation. However,whoever the president is, we have to understand the overview of Russia’s East Asia policy. Kremlin may explore further economic ties with Japan, regardless of political strains. However, we cannot accept such an idea so generously, considering Russia's behavior to close gas pipelines over the Ukrainian crisis, that panicked almost the whole of Europe. On the other hand, Japan can help protect Siberian forest, in order to defend vital interests for the global commons. When talking of Russo-Japanese relations, Japanese policymakers need to think of perception gaps between the East Siberian public and state-centric Kremlin as witnessed in the Japanese secondhand car conflict in2009 (“Russian motorists in Far East protest new rules, taxes”; RIA Novosti; October 24, 2009). People in Far East Russia rose up against Prime Minister Putin’s decision to restrict import of Japanese secondhand car to defend Russian auto industry from international competition.
Russia hosts APEC Vladivostok summit this September, and Russians need to speak out their policy and business objectives in East Asia. Russians have to shed their old czarist and Soviet mindset, and send messages globally. Up to now, Russia’s East Asia policy has not drawn much attention. But clearly, underdeveloped Russian Far East needs investment from Asian neighbors, notably, China, Japan, and South Korea. As Russia is shifting to Asia, American policymakers need to watch closer on Russia’s Asia Pacific policy. Also, people in East Asia must explore more opportunities to talk with Russians, from politicians and diplomats to Kuril fishermen. It is Russia’s shame rather than Sarah Palin’s that she gave a casual comment during 2008 presidential election campaign.
Saturday, March 31, 2012
Nagatacho Must Reconsider Japan’s Relations with Iran
As I mentioned before, Japanese leaders and citizens dismiss that horrific nature of current regime in Iran is utterly incompatible with our national identity. In view of this, the dietary debate between Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba and Dietman Takao Fujii of the Liberal Democratic Party, at the Budget Committee in the House of Councilors on March 26 is appalling. Both of them lauded Japan’s “friendship” with a communist Prime Minister Mohhamad Mossadegh during the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. That means, they declared in public that they would stand up for Joseph Stalin against Sir Winston Churchill. Considering geopolitics of Iranian modern history, their remarks are absolutely reckless.
Let me narrate geopolitical history of Iran in the modern era. Iran has been an arena of Great Power clash since the 19th century. In the era of colonial imperialism, Britain and Russia competed there in the Great Game. During World War Ⅱ, the Allied Forces used Iran a military supply route for the Soviet Union. However, Stalin maintained Soviet military presence in northern Iran, even though the war had already ended. The Iran crisis in 1946 is the first case brought to United Nations Security Council, and with strong support by the United States and Britain, the imperial government of Iran succeeded in driving the Red Army out of its territory.
Considering such a critical position that Iran holds in great power rivalries, Mossadegh was too reckless to hint Soviet influences behind him. During the Anglo Iranian oil dispute, Japan did not follow sanction initiatives by Britain and America. Idemitsu Kosan sent a tanker to import oil from Iran through British naval blockade. However, that is not so glorious as Gemba and Fujii said in the diet. It was not Idemitsu that led to Japanese postwar recovery and economic miracle. Had the Mossadegh administration survived, it could have caused a domino effect of red nationalism throughout the Gulf region. Contrary to what Gemba and Fijii remarked in the House of Councilors, Japan was able to “free ride” stability in the Middle East from the 1950s to 1970s, and concentrate on being a “transistor radio sales man” to pursue economic growth, because the coup d’état by Britain and America succeeded to overthrow Mossadegh and re-throne the shah. We all understand that the shah's Iran provided global public goods of security in the Middle East as the Guard of the Persian Gulf, since then.
During the 1960 and the 70s, Japan had a friendly relation with the Pahlavi regime. The Iran Japan Petro Chemical project was agreed with the shah. We, Japanese, shall never be able to make a deal with neither communist Mossadegh nor Dark Age minded mullahs. Both Gemba and Fujii should rather quit the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party respectively, and join the Communist Party instead, as they expressed their favor of Stalin over Churchill. Strangely, there were no hecklers to such dreadful remarks at the Councilor session. Nagatacho politicians are utterly insensitive to Japan’s position in the Middle East, though it is a key member of Western democracies.
Also, we must remember that President Barack Obama’s Cairo speech was bitterly blamed in America because it was too apologetic to the CIA-MI6 coup d’état in the Anglo Iranian oil dispute. A real Iran-Japan friendship was achieved when Western educated elites took leadership in the shah’s regime. Many of them are now in exile in America and Europe. They act for freedom of their home land, along with Green Movement supporters in Iran. Therefore, I regard any kind of appeasement to current Shiite theocracy and praise of communist Mossadegh, which Gemba and Fujii remarked in the House of Councilors, is an insult and a betrayal to our real friends fighting against the evil regime.
As in the case of the Mossadegh regime, we must consider short term gains and long term loss to allow Iran’s misguided behavior. Regretfully, Japanese opinion leaders are preoccupied with short term surge of oil price, but history tells us that Chamberlainian pacifism will help the threat grow substantially in the long term. If we were to contain a nuclear ambitious Iran, we must manage various destabilizing activities, notably supporting terrorism, by the Shiite regime in Tehran (“Containing Iran will cost untold blood, treasure”; Jerusalem Post; March 18, 2012). That could be more costly than preemptive attack against Iran in the long term. A right understanding of history is a prerequisite for a right choice of policy. Nagatacho politicians must reconsider our national identity and modern history of Iran.
Let me narrate geopolitical history of Iran in the modern era. Iran has been an arena of Great Power clash since the 19th century. In the era of colonial imperialism, Britain and Russia competed there in the Great Game. During World War Ⅱ, the Allied Forces used Iran a military supply route for the Soviet Union. However, Stalin maintained Soviet military presence in northern Iran, even though the war had already ended. The Iran crisis in 1946 is the first case brought to United Nations Security Council, and with strong support by the United States and Britain, the imperial government of Iran succeeded in driving the Red Army out of its territory.
Considering such a critical position that Iran holds in great power rivalries, Mossadegh was too reckless to hint Soviet influences behind him. During the Anglo Iranian oil dispute, Japan did not follow sanction initiatives by Britain and America. Idemitsu Kosan sent a tanker to import oil from Iran through British naval blockade. However, that is not so glorious as Gemba and Fujii said in the diet. It was not Idemitsu that led to Japanese postwar recovery and economic miracle. Had the Mossadegh administration survived, it could have caused a domino effect of red nationalism throughout the Gulf region. Contrary to what Gemba and Fijii remarked in the House of Councilors, Japan was able to “free ride” stability in the Middle East from the 1950s to 1970s, and concentrate on being a “transistor radio sales man” to pursue economic growth, because the coup d’état by Britain and America succeeded to overthrow Mossadegh and re-throne the shah. We all understand that the shah's Iran provided global public goods of security in the Middle East as the Guard of the Persian Gulf, since then.
During the 1960 and the 70s, Japan had a friendly relation with the Pahlavi regime. The Iran Japan Petro Chemical project was agreed with the shah. We, Japanese, shall never be able to make a deal with neither communist Mossadegh nor Dark Age minded mullahs. Both Gemba and Fujii should rather quit the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party respectively, and join the Communist Party instead, as they expressed their favor of Stalin over Churchill. Strangely, there were no hecklers to such dreadful remarks at the Councilor session. Nagatacho politicians are utterly insensitive to Japan’s position in the Middle East, though it is a key member of Western democracies.
Also, we must remember that President Barack Obama’s Cairo speech was bitterly blamed in America because it was too apologetic to the CIA-MI6 coup d’état in the Anglo Iranian oil dispute. A real Iran-Japan friendship was achieved when Western educated elites took leadership in the shah’s regime. Many of them are now in exile in America and Europe. They act for freedom of their home land, along with Green Movement supporters in Iran. Therefore, I regard any kind of appeasement to current Shiite theocracy and praise of communist Mossadegh, which Gemba and Fujii remarked in the House of Councilors, is an insult and a betrayal to our real friends fighting against the evil regime.
As in the case of the Mossadegh regime, we must consider short term gains and long term loss to allow Iran’s misguided behavior. Regretfully, Japanese opinion leaders are preoccupied with short term surge of oil price, but history tells us that Chamberlainian pacifism will help the threat grow substantially in the long term. If we were to contain a nuclear ambitious Iran, we must manage various destabilizing activities, notably supporting terrorism, by the Shiite regime in Tehran (“Containing Iran will cost untold blood, treasure”; Jerusalem Post; March 18, 2012). That could be more costly than preemptive attack against Iran in the long term. A right understanding of history is a prerequisite for a right choice of policy. Nagatacho politicians must reconsider our national identity and modern history of Iran.
Friday, March 16, 2012
Attention to China on the Iran Crisis
In a previous post, I argued that China’s westward expansion to Central Asia and the Middle East is no less dangerous than its eastward expansion to the Asian sea lane. Particularly, China’s ties with Iran and Pakistan are critical to global security, because Beijing’s assistance in nuclear and missile technology to both countries has inflicted negative impacts on nonproliferation. Also, I warned that a premature US withdrawal from the Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan, would provoke Chinese penetration to this region. Therefore, I questioned whether China acts for global public interest or geopolitical rivalry against the West. However, as the tension over the Iran nuclear crisis is growing increasingly strained since the IAEA report last November, Sino-Iranian relations stand at the crossroads now. This is a vital test whether Western and Asian democracies can really found a peaceful and win-win relation with China.
After the fall of the shah regime, Iran has been a keystone in China’s Middle East policy. China exported Silkworm surface to ship missile secretly to Iran despite strong concerns over the safety of the Strait of Hormuz (“U.S. Knew of Iran Arms, Officials Say”; New York Times; June 16, 1987), until the Reagan administration demanded to stop it (“China Says It Will Stop Arms for Iran”; New York Times; November 4, 1987). In addition to providing military assistance to Iran for many years, senior officials of the Chinese military have been exploring to build a naval outpost there to dominate the sea lane east of Suez. Will China really abandon such a long term ambition for the sake of peace and security in the Middle East?
Quite interestingly, China and Iran emerge as two major ideological and strategic adversaries to the West. Let me review an article by a Manila based foreign policy analyst Javad Heydarian, to explore the Sino-Iranian relationship over the nuclear crisis (“China and Iran Breaking up?”; Diplomat Magazine; March 8, 2012). He points out a historical analogy between both countries, that is, “The Persian Empire and Imperial China served as the two pillars of power at the far ends of the Asian continent.” In terms of the economy, China and Iran are mutually complementary. Iran is a key supplier of oil and natural gas for China to satisfy its growing economy. As the West adopts tougher sanctions, Iran is becoming increasingly dependent on the Chinese market. However, he comments that China needs a Strait of Hormuz safe to import oil from the Gulf. Therefore, he says that China opposes Iran’s military action in the area, and demands transparency of suspected sites for international verification.
The problem is that Heydarian’s analysis is rather optimistic. Does China act so willingly to explore joint security initiatives with the West? Nonproliferation may be a vital security agenda for both China and the West. However, China perceives the threat of a nuclear Iran less serious than the West, which makes it difficult to pursue a win-win relation between both sides. China can get along with a nuclear Iran, because both of them share common ideological and geopolitical standpoints to rival against the West. Also, their “understandings of history” overlap each other. In case of Iraq, China fiercely opposed to the Anglo-American intervention for fear of a unipolar world order rather than removing the threats of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambition and potential links between autocrats and terrorists. China can give priority to power politics against the West over global public interest.
Previously, I criticized Yoichi Masuzoe, Leader of the New Renaissance Party of Japan, for his lenient view on China. But I strongly agree with him that we must not allow China to expand business chance in Iran, while Japan tightens sanctions along with Western allies including Israel. I mentioned him bitterly just because we are not in a position to “solicit” their cooperation to manage the Iran crisis. Such an attitude reminds me of a kowtow, and I would reject it firmly as George Macartney and William Amherst did. We must watch this deeply embedded and unpredictable relationship between China and Iran vigilantly to manage this nuclear crisis.
After the fall of the shah regime, Iran has been a keystone in China’s Middle East policy. China exported Silkworm surface to ship missile secretly to Iran despite strong concerns over the safety of the Strait of Hormuz (“U.S. Knew of Iran Arms, Officials Say”; New York Times; June 16, 1987), until the Reagan administration demanded to stop it (“China Says It Will Stop Arms for Iran”; New York Times; November 4, 1987). In addition to providing military assistance to Iran for many years, senior officials of the Chinese military have been exploring to build a naval outpost there to dominate the sea lane east of Suez. Will China really abandon such a long term ambition for the sake of peace and security in the Middle East?
Quite interestingly, China and Iran emerge as two major ideological and strategic adversaries to the West. Let me review an article by a Manila based foreign policy analyst Javad Heydarian, to explore the Sino-Iranian relationship over the nuclear crisis (“China and Iran Breaking up?”; Diplomat Magazine; March 8, 2012). He points out a historical analogy between both countries, that is, “The Persian Empire and Imperial China served as the two pillars of power at the far ends of the Asian continent.” In terms of the economy, China and Iran are mutually complementary. Iran is a key supplier of oil and natural gas for China to satisfy its growing economy. As the West adopts tougher sanctions, Iran is becoming increasingly dependent on the Chinese market. However, he comments that China needs a Strait of Hormuz safe to import oil from the Gulf. Therefore, he says that China opposes Iran’s military action in the area, and demands transparency of suspected sites for international verification.
The problem is that Heydarian’s analysis is rather optimistic. Does China act so willingly to explore joint security initiatives with the West? Nonproliferation may be a vital security agenda for both China and the West. However, China perceives the threat of a nuclear Iran less serious than the West, which makes it difficult to pursue a win-win relation between both sides. China can get along with a nuclear Iran, because both of them share common ideological and geopolitical standpoints to rival against the West. Also, their “understandings of history” overlap each other. In case of Iraq, China fiercely opposed to the Anglo-American intervention for fear of a unipolar world order rather than removing the threats of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambition and potential links between autocrats and terrorists. China can give priority to power politics against the West over global public interest.
Previously, I criticized Yoichi Masuzoe, Leader of the New Renaissance Party of Japan, for his lenient view on China. But I strongly agree with him that we must not allow China to expand business chance in Iran, while Japan tightens sanctions along with Western allies including Israel. I mentioned him bitterly just because we are not in a position to “solicit” their cooperation to manage the Iran crisis. Such an attitude reminds me of a kowtow, and I would reject it firmly as George Macartney and William Amherst did. We must watch this deeply embedded and unpredictable relationship between China and Iran vigilantly to manage this nuclear crisis.
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