Ever since the Cold War, the United States has been urging its allies to increase defense spending for burden sharing, whether it acts as the world policeman or America First. However, I have always wondered why people talk about the amount of money to be spent so much, while hardly paying attention to how it is spent and implemented. A discrepancy in defense strategy and procurement could weaken collective defense. Quite recently, retired British Army General Richard Barrons raised a serious concern about this point that I have thought of for years.
Prior to mentioning his article in detail, we have to review the security environment of the world today. The latest NSS of the Trump administration emphasizes America First more than ever, and urges allies to assume more defense burdens. The paper even bluffs that the United States will withdraw from the alliance unless its members increase defense spending more drastically. As a result, liberal democracies in Europe and Asia are forced to pursue independent and multilateral security policy coordination, with the surge in defense budgets. In addition, wise spending must be considered to arrange such new security framework more effective. Both in Europe and Asia, President Donald Trump takes an Obama-style “offshore balancer” stance in Ukraine and Taiwan, while acting predatory in the Western Hemisphere, as seen typically in Venezuela and Greenland. He gives priority to making a deal of the mining business in Donbas rather than settling the territory and sovereignty issues with Russia. Also, in the recent Sino-Japanese conflict over Taiwan, he prioritized trade talks with China rather than geopolitical checks against its expansionism. Trump would be happy with a spending increase among allies and a decrease in the burden of American security commitments from his business acumen. It seems that he does not care about the use of increased spending, nor the division of roles with allies.
In view of such a global security environment, let me talk about ex-General Barrons’s commentary about the UK-German strategic discrepancy in defense spending objectives. As one of the leaders of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, he considered two points, which are the strategic requirements in deterrence and fighting, and financial capacity over the next decade (1). In addition, Britain, like other European nations, is forced to increase its military budget within such constraints in the face of Trump’s pressure. Therefore, wise spending for the properly focused objective is critical. While Britain is investing in technological innovation to resolve financial and personnel restrictions, Germany is building the strongest conventional army in Europe by overturning fiscal authority, and even by reintroducing conscription (2). Meanwhile, Britain’s military manpower is shrinking year by year despite its global commitment.
Contrary to Germany, Britain is pursuing tech-based military reform through combat lessons from Ukraine. Newly established digital targeting web will connect any UK troop sensors through AI-managed cloud to connect any of its weapons whether locally or globally (3). Such approaches require an innovative industrial base. The SDR 2025 even states “Defence also has <
On the other hand, Britain`s ambitious scheme is not necessarily praise worthy. Barrons urges the British authority to fund and implement the project quickly, as Germany is building a conventional army rapidly. He recommends that Britain’s conceptual innovation and Germany’s efficient bureaucracy be combined to strengthen European defense capability. He criticizes the bureaucratic sectionalism of Whitehall for the delay. There is no denying that conventional plans are quicker to start than future-oriented ones. However, strategic rationality and efficiency are not the only reasons that determine the use of defense spending. The political culture of each country also matters. The primary focus of Germany’s national defense is urgent territorial defense in view of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For this objective, the Merz administration prioritized immediate military buildup, rather than future-oriented military reform. Furthermore, ethical hurdles make Germany cautious to use AI for military objectives, from the historical experience of authoritarian surveillance by Nazi and the Stasi. The German military prioritizes human control of technology and bans fully operational LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems) but admits human-overseen AI systems (7).
Such a discrepancy is found in the GCAP as well. While Britain was inclined to the command center version which is networked with ACPs (Autonomous Collaborative Platforms) or loyal wingman drones for multirole combat missions to increase combat mass and reduce damage risks, Japan prefers the manned version to replace aging F-2 immediately, which is equipped with more advanced sensors and networking technology than the F-35. Meanwhile, Italy is dissatisfied with the extremely high cost and tight restrictions for the technological transfer of the F-35. GCAP partners reached an agreement to fill these R&D objective gaps by making common manned aircraft and then, adapt them to the requirements of each air force (8).
However, the war in Ukraine has changed military tactics so drastically that the above discrepancies between Britain and Japan could shrink faster than expected. Following the New Year visit to Ise Shrine on January 5, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that her cabinet would revise the National Security Documents by the Kishida administration to focus much more on drone and AI networking systems (9). Also, she said a stronger defense industry would be a new locomotive to boost the Japanese economy in this century. Those points somewhat similar to what is stated in Britain’s SDR 2025. That could make Japan’s position in the GCAP more in line with the UK. Unlike Germany, Japan has little ethical hurdles for AI weapons.
In an era of more self-interested America with the Donroe Doctrine, the target of increased defense spending has become more important than ever. Ex-General Barrons raises a critical question as he compares defense plan of Britain and Germany. We have to consider strategic rationality and political culture of partners in mini or multilateral policy coordination. Different priorities between Britan and Germany, and Britain and Japan, are just a tip of the iceberg among numerous cases. We tend to talk about the size of firepower and weapon of choice when we boost national defense, but don’t dismiss AI networking system and problems associated with that as it is emerging increasingly important. How should we spend increased defense budget? Each nation should think again.
Footnotes:
(1) "The UK and Germany should combine their strengths to address weaknesses in European defence"; Chatham House; 19 November, 2025
(2) "Germany votes to bring in voluntary military service programme for 18-year-olds"; BBC News; 6 December 2025
(3) "I wrote the UK defence review: Britain must accelerate reform if it is to help guarantee Ukraine’s security"; Chatham House; 25 September, 2025
(4) "The Strategic Defence Review 2025"; UK Government;8 July 2025
(5) "Trump, Starmer sign $350B tech deal to spur AI, nuclear energy and quantum computing"; New York Post; September 18, 2025
(6) "New strategic partnership to unlock billions and boost military AI and innovation"; UK Government Press Release;18 September 2025
(7) "Ethical and Operational"; German Council on Foreign Relations; November 09, 2022
"AI – its risks and possible side effects"; German Ethics Council; 4 April, 2023
"Chapter 8: Privacy and Security: German Perspectives, European Trends and Ethical Implications"; Ethical Issues in Covert, Security and Surveillance Research; 2021
(8) "The New Partnership among Italy,Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)"; Istituto Affari Internazionali; 3 March, 2023
"Forget F-35, F-47 and FCAS: The GCAP Fighter Is Coming"; 1945; December 26, 2025
(9) Takaichi Security Revise; NHK World; January 5, 2026
