How does a generative AI tell us about a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world?

US President Donald Trump articulates more radicalized MAGA and America First position in his second term, without being moderated by adults in the room. As seen in his transactional pursuit of a peace deal in Ukraine, the world is turning toward a disorder. In such a world, Liberal Democracies need a risk hedge to override the chaos by MAGA-jacked America. A Euro-Japanese alliance could serve this objective, but it would not be an alternative but a supplement of the trans-Atlantic and the US-Japanese alliances. It is still unrealistic for American allies worldwide to throw away the security umbrella completely. In an increasingly complicated world like this, can generative AI show some policy directions for the future? As an example, I would like to talk about Grok answers to my questions on a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world.

Grok is a recently added generative AI application on Twitter (Currently, X). Based on the profile summary from my tweets, it explained briefly about a Euro-Japanese alliance as follows. There are strategic rationales from three points, Russian threats in both Europe and Asia, Chinese BRI worldwide and anti-FOIP challenges, and predatory America First by Trump. In practice, Europe and Japan would be able to pursue military cooperation such as intelligence sharing and joint R&D of weapons, and economic policy coordination. Politically, a united Euro-Japanese voice at the UN and G7 would boost the rule-based world order, which would help small nations such as Ukraine, Baltic states, and Taiwan stand up against predatory great powers in their neighborhood like Russia and China. The problem is geographical remoteness of both sides and American discomfort with being sidelined from the alliance.

This is just a typical textbook introduction of the main agenda, and further conversations are necessary to judge the real thinking capability of generative AI. Among those questions, I would like to focus on whether Grok understands lengthy and complicated questions properly, not just words but nuances, and how it streamlines the direction of the argument lucidly. Let’s see some unorthodox ones of my own interest, rather than something orthodox and expectable about Euro-Japanese relations and Trump's America (1).

【Question 1】: Trump told the media that only the monkey model of the F-47, the next generation fighter jets, is available for allies. That is what the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. His brain is Russified so much. Should American allies invest more in independent high-tech weapons such as GCAP and FCAS fighters? Also, Trump's remark does not make sense, as Iran's F-14s have been in poor condition since the Islamic Revolution. It seems that he is interested in sales profit from the next-generation fighter rather than global security.

In reply, Grok admitted my concerns with monkey model provisionally, that Trump may not have “Russified” his mindsets but he prioritizes export profit of the F-47 for the United States to the security of allies. Regarding whether allies should invest in the GCAP by Britain, Japan, and Italy, or the FCAS by France, Germany, and Spain, instead of “dubious” F-47 (2)(3), Grok outlines both R&D projects, and concluded that the GCAP meets Japan’s timetable for deployment(4) against China, but future acquisition of the F-47 should not be ruled out even though it is downgraded. I understand this reply that it takes years for R&D of the next generation fighter, and the future US administration could permit regular model exports of it. Also, it did not mention a shock of supply chain cut if a Trump-like nationalist stop component exports of this fighter jet as it happened in the case of Iranian F-14s(5). AI does not answer everything.

Nevertheless, this AI application mentioned the vital point of my question that Soviet-styled monkey model export by Trump illustrates his deep-rooted America First mindsets. As to this question, though lengthy and not so simple, generative AI understands my intention so profoundly. Quite interestingly, I mistyped GCAP for GPAC in the question, but Grok interpreted it correctly.

【Question 2】: Now, a question about nuclear deterrence. Should Japan help R&D to boost British and French nuclear capability while not possessing its own nuclear weapons? Japan, as an independent nuclear power, would accelerate the collapse of the global non-proliferation regime, which in turn would pose critical threats to its national security. Also, how about Japan's nuclear sharing with both countries, in case Trump's America abdicates its allies?

This question is quite controversial as Japan maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons into its territory. However, since America’s nuclear umbrella is turning unreliable in Trump’s second term, a risk hedge is a critical issue for Japan. Grok replied to my question from two points, R&D and nuclear sharing. While it mentions positively about the former, somewhat cautiously about the latter. Japan has money and technology to help Britain and France bost their nuclear capability. Also, it is not the interest of the global community if Japan runs the risk of provoking proliferation to other non-nuclear powers to destroy the global arms control regime by possessing its own nuclear arsenals. This is also the case with Japan’s nuclear sharing with Britain and France. However, nuclear sharing could trigger anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan more seriously for fear of escalating tensions with China. Also, an increasingly nationalist United States might doubt Japan’s loyalty to the alliance if such a risk hedge were explored.

But I do not necessarily agree to Grok’s concerns with “nukes on home soil is taboo” among the Japanese because British and French nuclear weapons would not be deployed permanently as most of them are not land-based. They just come to naval or air force facilities in Japan when necessary. After all, a sovereign and independent nuclear deterrence is the last of the last of the last resort for Japan. Therefore, I would argue that it necessary to think about a nuclear security partnership with Britain and France both in terms of quality and quantity, to fill a vacuum of superpower suicide by a populist-jacked America regardless of partisanship. Currently, their nuclear deterrence is too small, even if combined (6).

Quite interestingly, Britain is reconsidering its dependence on the US-made Trident SLBM as the governance of Trump’s America is a critical risk to its national security. Currently, the following three options are considered for its sovereign independent nuclear weapons. That is to build up deterrence by itself or with France. But in both cases, the economy of scale for nuclear R&D is restricted. Therefore, the third option that is to boost Britain’s nuclear deterrence within the Euro-Atlantic multilateral framework such as NATO is considered (7). In that case, some Pacific nations like Japan, Australia, etc. could join the project.

【Question 3】: The problem is not just geopolitics. The fall of democracy in Trump's America is a fatal problem, as mentioned in a recent article by Chris Patten in Project Syndicate. Though he was very close to pro-American Thatcher, as opposed to pro-EU Heseltine, he insists that Britain be more sovereign and autonomous from MAGA-jacked America. He understands both Europe and Asia through his career in politics. Given this, how would a Euro-Japanese alliance lead value-oriented diplomacy of the world when America is withdrawing the freedom ideal and humanitarianism?

As I mention in the question, UK Lord Chris Patten was a devoted Atlanticist and a darling of the Reagan-Thatcher world order, and a consummate British diplomat both in Asia and Europe as the last governor of Hong Kong and former European Commissioner for External Relations. From this career background, Patten argues Britain downgrade the decades-long special relationship with the United States because Trump’s America is no longer the bearer of freedom values as seen in the January 6 riot. As the ex-Chancellor of Oxford University, he reflects on the history of the Anglo-American alliance since Winston Churchill academically, to argue that Trump destroyed the fundamental premise of shared values. Therefore, Patten urges Prime Minister Keir Starmer that Britain not to give in to every demand that Trump makes (8). Quite appallingly, Starmer is repealing hate speech laws in return for a favorable trade deal with Trump’s America (9). What a horrible kowtow that the Labour adopts a MAGA policy! In addition, Trump’s sheer lack of knowledge in history and geopolitics is revealed in his big power-focused diplomacy, because World Wars began from small countries such as Sebia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as Patten mentions.

Considering chaotic governance in current America and poor understanding of international affairs by its incumbent president, a Euro-Japanese alliance could complement the lack of US leadership in value-oriented diplomacy. Let me review the Grok reply. Besides shared values of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, both sides are committed to humanitarian issues such as disaster relief and the environment. Their respect for a rule-based world order leads them to object to Trump’s way of racketeering of small nations in the name of deal diplomacy. That makes the global security environment favorable for authoritarian powers, but Trump does not care. From the experience of negotiating with China regarding democratic governance of Hong Kong, Patten learned the danger of making an impetuous compromise with authoritarian power. If Trump is really abdicating Ukraine and Taiwan, a Euro-Japanese alliance could fill the vacuum to help Patten’s vison of reorganizing the League of Democracies. But we have to remember that neither Europe nor Japan can replace the current US-centered alliance with the alliance of democratic middle power simply though moral high grounds, because the United States is too big and strong despite Trump, and separated geography may split strategic priority of Europe and Japan.

Finally, the most critical issue of the world order today is Trump tariffs. How should a Euro-Japanese alliance manage the trade war with Trump’s America? I asked the following question recently(10).

【Question 4】: The trade negotiations are not only about the global economic regime, but also about geopolitics. Although more multilateral approaches are desirable, some countries seem to prioritize their deal-making with Trump rather than standing against his America First trade policy through multilateral solidarity. Among them, I would like to ask about two major economies.
(1) Japan is willing to reach an early agreement with Trump, but if it is hasty, will it set a bad precedent for other countries’ trade talks? Is the Ishiba administration too Japan First?
(2) Britain suggested repealing hate speech laws in return for tariff cuts. If the Labour cabinet accepts MAGA agendas so easily, the Conservative Party could move farther to the right, which could prompt an ideological surenchère in Britain’s domestic politics. Will it help Elon Musk’s MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) initiative to provoke right-wing populism in Europe, which would ultimately disunify NATO and the EU?

Regarding Japan, Grok admits the risk of becoming a bad precedent, but comments that Ishiba is not so much Japan First with his close policy coordination with FOIP participants and NATO. This counterargument has some points as Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba stressed Japan’s role to mediate the United States and ASEAN nations in the trade war on his recent visit to Vietnam and the Philippines (11). Still, there is a concern that Japan’s rush for a hasty agreement could break up the world trade order. In the trade talk with Trump’s America, Ishiba officials mention almost entirely about Japan’s national interest. That sounds quite Japan First for a staunch proponent of the liberal world order and Never Trumper like me.

As to Britain, Grok admits my concern that Starmer’s concession to MAGA would embolden Conservative rightwing or even Reform UK. Furthermore, infiltration of MAGA political culture would boost anti-EU or anti-NATO sentiments throughout Europe, which would Elon Musk’s MEGA agitation. Grok refers to my previous question about Patten’s warning in its reply that a U.S. democratic backslide empowers Europe’s illiberal fringes, and Labour’s concessions could grease that slide. While acting cautiously, pro-EU Starmer explores new trade and security partnership with the EU to counter Trump (12).

Prior to this, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for an international coordination in macroeconomic and financial policy to overcome worldwide recession and inflation by Trump tariffs as the global community did in the 2008 financial crisis (13). Also, he advocates collective initiatives for the new world order of reconstructed rule of law that incorporates emerging economies. A Euro-Japanese alliance that I mention can listen to them to rearrange rule-based multilateralism against sharp power transactionalism by Trump's America, Putin's Russia, and Xi Jinping's China. For this objective, Brown urges the UK to restore strategic partnership with the EU in security and the economy to override the post-Brexit shock (14).

Generative AI is quite helpful in streamlining thoughts and occasionally, realizing overlooked points, particularly in exploring complicated issue like a Euro-Japanese alliance in the world of increasing uncertainty. Also, it would be helpful for teachers to get used to AI thinking, in order to check AI cheating by students when they submit reports and essays. Finally, we have to notice that Elon Musk uses AI for his controversial work at the DOGE, and a familiarity with this application would be useful to understand his strange ways of thinking. After all, AI is no panacea to resolve the problem. The answer by the AI depends on the quality of question by each person. Also, various AIs are emerging and evolving one after another, and each of them has its own strength and weakness. We have to bear it in mind to discuss the issue of a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world. More questions and deeper questions to AI are necessary to explore this matter furthermore.



Footnotes:
(1) Grok Chat

(2) "Sixth-Generation Fighter Showdown: F-47, GCAP, FCAS, and J-36 (Baidi)"; European Defence Review; 24 March, 2025

(3) "Will Boeing’s F-47 ‘KILL’ European GCAP & FCAS Programs As U.S. Could Export 6th-Gen Jets To Allies?"; Eurasian Times; March 23, 2025

(4) "Global Combat Air Programme Joint Statement"; UK Government; 20 November 2024

(5) "How Iran manages to keep its F-14 Tomcats flying"; Key Aero; August 2, 2022

(6) "Can Europe Build Its Own Nuclear Umbrella?"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; April 3. 2025

(7) "The UK’s nuclear deterrent relies on US support – but there are no other easy alternatives"; Chatham House; 24 March, 2025

(8) "Britain Must Downgrade the Special Relationship"; Project Syndicate; February 28, 2025

(9) "Starmer told UK must repeal hate speech laws to protect LGBT+ people or lose Trump trade deal"; Independent; 16 April, 2025

(10) Grok Chat

(11) "Japan's role for ASEAN increasingly crucial amid US tariff standoff"; Mainichi Shimbun; April 30, 2025

(12) "UK and EU defy Trump with new strategic partnership to boost trade and security"; Guardian; 29 April, 2025

(13) "Trump is pushing the world towards recession. By learning the lessons of 2008, we can still prevent it"; Giardian; 10 April, 2025

(14) "The ‘new world order’ of the past 35 years is being demolished before our eyes. This is how we must proceed"; Guardian; 12 April, 2025

How well did Foreign Secretary Cameron act the role of Churchill to move America for defending Ukraine?

Earlier this April, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited the United States to talk further military aid to Ukraine with his counterpart Secretary of State Antony Blinken. But Trump loyalists in the Republican Party objected to the plan. Cameron needed to remove the bottleneck to pass the Ukrainian aid bill in the US House of Representatives, because Russia was pushing back Ukrainian counteroffensive and an increasing number of civilians were killed. Therefore, he proposed to meet the supposed Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and House Speaker Mike Johnson urgently. Cameron’s diplomatic tour was in parallel with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s state visit to meet President Joe Biden. The latter drew much more attention from the media and think tanks around the world, but I regard Cameron’s direct meeting with Trump as more important to move America that does not act as the superpower. Let me explain it below.

Both British and Japanese diplomatic efforts were commonly aimed at getting America more engaged with the world. Along with the peril of Trump 2.0, the rise of anti-Israeli “Hamas left” on the left raise serious concerns with populist isolationism in America. Can any foreign leader overturn such trends? In history, Winston Churchill urged the hesitant superpower to actively involved in stopping Nazi Germany. Also, when Americans were indulged in a daydream of postwar peace, he gave the Iron Curtain speech to awaken them to see the reality of international politics. Shortly after that, the United States declared the Truman Doctrine. When the Congress was bitterly divided between internationalists and nativists, America hosted leaders from key allies of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Compared the two, Ukraine aid that Cameron brought was emergent, and there were no scenarios arranged by the foreign service beforehand when he met his opponent Trump. Meanwhile, Kishida was warmly welcomed as the state guest by President Biden and leaders of both houses of the Congress, and the was nothing challenging in his diplomatic tour. More importantly, Britain is directly involved in military aid for Ukraine to defeat Russia.

On the other hand, Japan is still constrained by the pacifist constitution, which keeps this country from participating in a mission that former Secretary of Defense James Mattis called “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” when he talked about his combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (General: It's 'fun to shoot some people'; CNN; February 4, 2005). After all, that is a serious drawback for Japan to be a vital stakeholder in global security, as long as this country is unable to get involved in military aspects. Kishida spoke softly at the congressional speech, as if healing the superpower in fatigue of global tottering rather than reconfirming America’s role as the indispensable nation for the world order (“Japanese PM Fumio Kishida addresses U.S. 'self-doubt' about world role in remarks to Congress”; NBC News; April 11, 2024). That does not necessarily come from his unprovocative personality. Even more exuberant Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who expressed strong support the Iraq War by the Bush administration (“Press Conference by Prime Minister-then Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq”; Prime Minister’s Office, Japan; March 20, 2003), did not actually send combat troops. Japanese commitment was too small to worry about being caught up in America’s war. Whether “healing” Kishida or “exuberant” Koizumi, what Japanese leaders did fall short of fulfilling the Churchillian role.

Nevertheless, since no single politician today is so charismatic as Churchill was, it is quite likely that an indirect Anglo-Japanese diplomatic coordination had some effect to prompt the both parties to reach an agreement in the US congress. Kishida’s Japan was a good side kick for Britain. The aid bill was finally approved on this occasion, but quite uncertain for future. Russian President Vladimir Putin clings to reconquering Ukraine so much that the war is going to continue long. Unlike Cameron’s official meeting with Secretary Blinken, the detail of his closed-door meeting with Trump has not been publicized. He did not even mention that on Twitter, while tweeting extensively about the Israeli-Hamas war. Trump may have been reluctant to listen to Cameron, but he had to avoid negative reputation of delaying the Ukraine aid bill to pass the Congress, in view of his presidential campaign. In addition, Britain’s commitment to military aid made Cameron’s case more compelling, because Trump is obsessed with burden sharing of defense spending. That was also helpful in his meeting with Blinken to reconfirm further assistance to Ukraine by Britain and the United States. International politics is inherently leontomorphic, and therefore, strong defense and deep military commitment are essential in law enforcement for the world order.

Now, let me talk about the bottleneck for successful Cameron-Blinken foreign ministers meeting, which was Trump’s view of the world. Hal Brand of the American Enterprise Institute comments that it is simplistic to take his America First as complete disengagement from the world. Rather, it is extremely sensitive to the costs and benefits of intervention. Therefore, Trump is skeptical of helping Ukraine, and he believes that America not run the risk of getting involved in a big war for the sake of defending small countries overseas, whether in Europe or Asia. And there isn’t an Indo-Pacific exception in Trump’s mindsets despite China hawk remarks by his fellows. While showing isolationist aspects, Trump is willing to intervene abroad to impose US national interests of his understanding on other nations when he thinks it necessary. Meanwhile, he sidelines the idea that America as guarantor of the liberal world order disdainfully. That attitude led to the trade war with China, and brinkmanship diplomacy against Iran and North Korea in his last term. Therefore, Trump fellows pursue military build-up, but not interested in defending allies or invaded countries. Rather, they focus on homeland defense, and explore more investment in cyber security and missile defense. They assume international politics as rivalries of self-interested nation states, and thus, agendas like democracy promotion are useless for them (“An “America First” World: What Trump’s Return Might Mean for Global Order”; Foreign Affairs; May 27, 2024).

Of course, there is a fallacy in such viewpoints, which leads to Trump’s poor understanding of the alliance. Former US ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder criticizes that Trump sees the trans-Atlantic alliance as a liability that could drag America into a war against nuclear Russia when some eastern flank nation is invaded. Actually, the alliance deters enemy aggression. Furthermore, he is wrongly preoccupied with burden sharing of defense spending, instead of pursuing common security objectives with partners (“NATO is about security — not dollars and cents”; Politico; April 10, 2024). His six-month blocking of the Ukraine aid bill through his Republican loyalists in the House had benefitted Russia so much, which hurt mutual trust between Europe and America (The US aid package to Ukraine will help. But a better strategy is urgently needed”; Chatham House; 26 April, 2024). As long as American right wingers are entrapped in a “Hillbilly Elegy” victimhood mindset, i.e., allies freeride the security umbrella, another congressional bickering could delay necessary help for Ukraine.

Next, an overview of Britain’s trans-Atlantic diplomacy is the following. Regardless of the reelection possibility of Trump, strong Lindbergh isolationism among the American public poses constraints on UK foreign policy. Wyn Rees of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) presents an over view of Britain’s relations with NATO and the United States as follows. Britain has been America’s first choice for the partner in military and intelligence operations, which is so beneficial to its political presence NATO and worldwide. But Trump’s anti-NATO and anti-Ukrainian posture ruins this premise. Therefore, Cameron had to show European commitment to burden sharing to Trump, such as defense spending increase, intra-European defense cooperation, troop deployment in the Baltic, and so forth (“Trump, NATO and Anglo-American Relations”; RUSI; 9 May, 2024). As of February 29, this year, before the Ukraine Aid bill passed the US Congress, EU institutions donated more aid than the United States. In addition, sovereign European countries made contributions. That is to say, America, not Europe, was freeriding the alliance, unless the Ukraine Aid bill passed. See the chart.

Chart
How does U.S. aid to Ukraine compare to that from other donors?

For a Churchillian diplomacy to overturn isolationism in America, Britain needs to strengthen independent political and military resilience on the European side against Russia. Currently, Ukraine has signed a bilateral security agreement with France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Britain. For effective coordination of these deals, how much can the United Kingdom take initiatives in a European framework to support Ukraine without EU membership? Britain took leadership role of the drone coalition in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which was founded by NATO to facilitate arms procurement for Ukraine. Also, Samir Puri of Chatham House urges the United Kingdom to endorse EU proposed joint military procurement initiatives, such as the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum (European Commission; 6 May, 2024) and the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) (European Commission; 5 March, 2024), to improve European defense readiness and support Ukraine’s defense industry (“The UK should help coordinate support for Ukraine by backing EU defence initiatives”; Chatham House; 19 March, 2024). UK backed plan to fund Ukrainian war efforts from frozen Russian assets was approved at G7 Italy this year (“G7 agrees $50bn loan for Ukraine from Russian assets”; BBC News; 14 June, 2024). Currently, Britain needs to tackle the capability gap problem for “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” around the world. This country needs to upgrade its arms and equipment to defend its homeland and national interests worldwide within its own limited resources. At present, foremost threats are Russia for the short term, and China for the long-term. Along with defense spending increase, Andrew Dorman, editor of "International Affairs", comments that Britain's rearmament plans should define the focus of investment. For example, regarding the deterrence against Russia, this country must choose whether to overturn current gradual nuclear disarmament policy to make its independent nuclear umbrella stronger, or to boost rapid response deployment in the Arctic, Scandinavia, and the Baltic regions through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) (“Britain must rearm to strengthen NATO and meet threats beyond Russia and terrorism”; Chatham House; 25 March, 2024).

After a laborious persuasion meeting with Trump, Cameron talked with Blinken at the formal foreign ministers meeting to boost further assistance to Ukraine. During the press conference, there was a question about the Mar-a-Lago meeting, and Cameron replied that it was just a normal diplomatic meeting with the opposition leader on the occasion of election (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Cameron at a Joint Press Availability”; US Department of State Press Release; April 9, 2024). But apparently, Trump is still a drag in the trans-Atlantic alliance as he rejects further aid to Ukraine. He does not care about bipartisan consistency in diplomacy. Appallingly, he says he would end the war as soon as he inaugurated. Even Russia does not take it seriously (“Russia says 'let's be realistic' about Trump plan to end Ukraine war”; Reuters; July 18, 2024). The Mar-a-Lago talk would have been far from normal.

As if implying a turbulent dialogue, Trump fellows backlashed vehemently to Cameron’s Churchillian effort. Since Trump encouraged Russia to invade NATO countries, Cameron has been critical of his views on trans-Atlantic alliance (“David Cameron Rebukes Donald Trump's Divisive Remarks About Nato And Russia”; HuffPost; 12 February, 2024). It is not easy to fill the gap in just a single secret meeting. As expected, Trump’s foreign policy advisor Elbridge Colby, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, denounced Cameron’s lobbying for the pass of the Ukrainian aid bill at the Congress as intervention into American politics. Also, he expressed resentment that Cameron moralized the case for Ukraine and lectured it to Trump (“Trump ally hits out at David Cameron for ‘lecturing’ US”; Politico; May 2, 2024). But historically, Wilsonian moralism has been centerpiece of American foreign policy regardless of partisanship. Also, moralism cemented the Reagan-Thatcher conservative alliance, which ultimately brought the end of the Cold War. Deplorably, Colby’s comment shows how badly conservatism in America degraded today.

While Colby belittles Russia as China’s junior partner (“China’s Russia Support Strategy”; Politico; February 22, 2024), that is not necessarily the case in view of the Kremlin’s aggression in Europe and infiltration in the Middle East and Africa. In his article of the Washington Post, he does not care such contradictions in his advocacy of strategic refocus on China (“To avert war with China, the U.S. must prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 18, 2023). Ironically, Taiwan does not endorse Colby’s strategic shift to Asia (“Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 10, 2023). Prominent Never Trump pundits such as Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution deny lopsided China-hawks like Colby to put American foreign policy on the right track (“A Republican ‘civil war’ on Ukraine erupts as Reagan’s example fades”; Washington Post; March 15, 2023). Nevertheless, Colby praised new UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy for his compassionate attitude to Trump. However, Republican Vice President candidate JD Vance has ruined such a lukewarm friendship between Trump and Labour Britain, as he blasted this country as an Islamist state with nuclear weapons (“Rayner dismisses Trump running mate 'Islamist UK' claim”; BBC News; 17 July, 2024). Despite Cameron’s successful lobbying for Ukraine, the negative influence of MAGA Republicans is still undismissable, regardless of the results of the presidential election. As is often the case with Trump supporters, both Vance and Colby are characterized with vituperative words and confrontational attitudes. If Trump 2.0 emerged, that would be a severe diplomatic drawback for American allies.

During World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack silenced Lindbergh isolationists, which enabled President Franklin Roosevelt to fight for freedom around the world upon Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s request. But today, MAGA Republicans drag American foreign policy even under current Biden administration. Therefore, NATO is seriously considering Trump proofing to prepare for the worst scenario in the presidential election in the United States. The most critical point is to boost defense capability on the European side. While NATO member states are raising their defense spending to meet the 2% of GDP target of the organization, even that would not be enough to keep America engaged with Europe. Actually, Colby rebuffed Britain’s 2.5% spending plan by the Sunak administration meaningless. Most of the NATO members do not reach the 2% target today, but they spent over 3% during the Cold War. The real problem is not the amount of money but the focus of defense investment. Such investment on deterrence and denial capabilities against Russia should be spent efficiently to make US rescue operations in Europe less costly. Joint procurement coordination in Europe, particularly among Britain, France, and Germany will be helpful for this objective (“Trump-Proofing NATO: 2% Won’t Cut It”; RUSI; 7 March, 2024).

Currently, the impending problem is Ukraine. At the 75th anniversary of NATO in Brussels, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a proposal to insulate NATO’s role in Ukraine from American politics. That is to give more leverage of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to NATO from the United States, to facilitate the implementation of the military aid package of $100 billion for five years. However, the Biden administration did not express so much interest in this plan (On NATO’s 75th birthday, fear of Trump overshadows celebrations; Washington Post; April 4, 2024). Ironically, the incumbent Never Trump government of the United States is not supportive of a Trump proofing initiative by Europe. Nevertheless, this year will be critical in the war in Ukraine, according to Michael Clarke, ex-Director General of the Royal United Service Institute. Russia lacks the equipment and trained manpower for a major offensive until spring 2025 or later, while Ukraine desperately needs Western military aid to rebuild combat capability to retake occupied territories (“Ukraine war: Three ways the conflict could go in 2024”; BBC; 29 December, 2023).

The global community is imperiled with Trump 2.0, but the real problem is beyond Trump himself. Some anti-mainstream foreign policy pundits of both right and left appeal for so-called “restrained” diplomacy to make the case against Wilsonian globalism. Among them, rightwing nationalists make use of Trump to advance their advocacy. Although Trump behaves in notoriously high-handed manners, former Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull tells world leaders not to flatter him to avoid his anger. Trump may feel a formidable counterpart unpleasant, but he respects him or her after he calms down (“How the World Can Deal With Trump?”; Foreign Affairs; May 31, 2024). Cameron told urgent necessity to help Ukraine candidly, as shown in Colby’s malicious response. Also, Japanese Prime Minister-then Shinzo Abe told reciprocity of the US-Japanese alliance when he visited the Trump Tower, shortly after unexpected victory of Trump in the election. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Taro Aso’s visit appears unnecessary kowtow to the opposition candidate. Abe’s memoir says that Trump talked extensively about private golf even at the official bilateral summit. What did Aso talk to enjoy the meeting with him?

Despite Trump’s conviction, Western democracies have no choice but align with the United States, as commented by Leslie Vinjamuri, the director of the US and Americas programme at Chatham House. Otherwise, should they choose Russia or China as their partner (“The Global Implications of Trump’s Conviction”; Council on Foreign Relations; June 4, 2024)? Though Democratic candidate Kamala Harris is surging to edge out Trump, the “restrained” diplomacy school would draw US leadership role in the world, even under her administration. Along with rightwing think tanks such as the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and the Marathon Initiative, there is bipartisan Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft which is co-sponsored by libertarian Chrales Koch and liberal George Soros (“George Soros and Charles Koch take on the ‘endless wars’”; Politico; December 2, 2019).

In order to move America that does not act, politicians today, whether UK Foreign Secretary Cameron, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, or anyone else, must elaborate on Churchillian diplomacy without the charisma of Churchill, the hero of World War II. American allies need to coordinate with bipartisan internationalists to persuade hard-wired isolationists as Cameron did. Also, they should demonstrate the willingness to do “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys”, whether by directly involved in military actions or by providing military aid for a nation withstanding enemy invasion. In other words, it is a commitment to burden sharing of law enforcement for the world order. On the American side, it would be interesting if Harris hinted to make a staunch national security team with her pick of Vice President and other top positions in the cabinet to distinguish herself from gaffe-prone and DEI blaming Trump-Vance duo.


NB: Harris chose Governor Tim Waltz of Minnesota on August 6. National security heavy weight will be appointed to other key cabinet positions.

The question of Britain’s tilt to the Indo Pacific and its relationship with China

Britain is one of the key partners of the multilateral coalition to enforce FOIP operations to defend the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in view of maritime challenges by China. Ever since the Johnson administration released the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy entitled “Global Britain in a competitive age” in March 2021, the United Kingdom has been proceeding strategic tilt to the Indo Pacific. In accordance with this strategy, Britain is deepening strategic partnership with Japan and India. Particularly with Japan, Britain signed the RAA (Reciprocal Access Agreement) this year to faciilitate access to mutual troop facilities and bilateral operational and training cooperation between their armed forces. Also, both countries conduct joint research and development of the GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) with Italy. With India, Britain provides technological assistance for its indigenous next fighter project to supplant Russian sponsored FGFA (Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft). Furthermore, the United Kingdom singed the AUKUS deal with the United States and Australia. In view of those agreements, Britain is supposed to be deeply committed to the FOIP against China along with regional powers like Japan, India, and Australia, and most importantly, through the “special relationship” with America. However, some restraints of domestic politics, notably the Labour Party and the financial lobby, could erode Britain’s solid commitment to the deterrence against China. Also, the Sunak administration is not necessarily harmonious in their stances against China, unlike their approaches against Russia.

Let me mention the Labour Party first. Shadow Defence Secretary John Healey questioned Tory national security strategy of the tilt to the Indo Pacific initiated by the Johnson administration, in view of growing threat of Russia since the outbreak of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Secretary Healey said that Britain should focus its limited budgetary resource on the defense of its home turf and the Euro Atlantic, as commented "The first priority for Britain's armed forces must be where the threats are greatest, not where the business opportunities lie” (“Labour defence chief questions using UK's 'scarce resources' in Indo-Pacific”; Forces Net; 8 February, 2023). The point of Labour argument is that Britain should rearm to meet the requirement to defend Europe, the Atlantic and the Arctic, while its military stockpile at home is depleting to support Ukraine (“Labour calls for UK rearmament and end to military cuts”; UK Defence Journal; February 7, 2023). But does the Labour Party belittle the threat of China, although it encroaches Britain’s homeland via secret agents, cyber manipulations, etc? Current party leader Keir Starmer assumes himself a Blairite, but his party’s defense initiative seems more like Harold Wilson’s who decided to withdraw British troops from east of Aden in 1968, rather than Tony Blair’s whose global trotting foreign policy explored to let Britain punch above its weight.

If the Labour Party is not obsessed with anti-colonialist woke ideology, how would they strike a balance between Britain’s strategic necessity around the globe? Rather than denying the tilt to the Indo Pacific, Veerle Nouwens of the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) suggests that the Labour Party tailor the tilt to their priorities. Geographical distance is no reason to disengage from the Indo Pacific. After all, the Tory defense plan does not argue that Britain keep solid permanent military presence in Japan or Australia. The Labour should bear in mind that the Indo Pacific strategies of France and Japan stretch from East Africa to the South Pacific. Furthermore, she comments that Britain does not necessarily keep military presence to the furthest in the Indo Pacific, but it has to make full use of existing UK facilities in Indian Ocean, ie, the Middle East, East Africa, and Singapore. That would be helpful for the British troop to react to an emergency in the Far East, when China or North Korea defy global rules and norms such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and nuclear nonproliferation in this region. While Shadow Defence Secretary Healey stresses limited budgetary resource, Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy does not deny the tilt, but proposes the “three Cs”. That is, Britain should challenge and compete against China geopolitically, but cooperate with them on some issues such as climate change when necessary (“How Labour Can Reform, Rather Than Do Away With, the UK’s Indo-Pacific Tilt”; RUSI Commentary; 14 February 2023). After all, I would argue that Healey’s vison is a sheer denial of Britain’s historical status as a maritime trade nation.

For diplomatic consistency, Britain’s Indo Pacific partners, notably Japan and Australia, need to talk with the Labour shadow cabinet to reconfirm the imperative of the FOIP for global security and common interests in this region. Quite importantly, the general election in Britain is scheduled no later than January 28, 2025, which is quite closely dated to the US presidential election on November 5, 2024. According to the latest opinion poll by Ipsos from August 11 to 14, 56% of UK voters think that Starmer will defeat Sunak in the forthcoming election. While Starmer leads 9 out of 12 points, particularly on being in touch with ordinary people, understanding the problems facing Britain, and being an experienced leader, Sunak leads on being good in a crisis (“Majority of Britons think it is likely Keir Starmer will become Prime Minister”; Ipsos Political Pulse; 24 August, 2023).

The FOIP is multilateral by nature, and Quad members and other regional and global stakeholders need to send a message so that a Labour Britain would not fall into radical anti-colonialist. Above all, Starmer needs to outline a Labour national security strategy, around the world. He told that his cabinet would seek a bilateral security and defense treaty with Germany quickly if he were elected (“UK Labour would seek security and defense treaty with Germany”; Politico; May 16, 2023). But it is not clear how he would adjust Healey’s Euro-Atlantic focused defense and Lammy’s three Cs against China in the Indo Pacific.

The left is not the only problem. Former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne who was an architect of the Anglo-Chinese Golden Era under the Cameron administration, has become a fintech lobbyist to embrace money from China and Russia to the London financial market, after his retirement from politics. Even though David Cameron quit his political career after the Brexit referendum, Osborne remained in the House of Commons as a backbencher. However, he was forced to resign as he was appointed to the editor of the Evening Standard though he was an MP. Ever since he was the chancellor, Osborne wanted to make London a global hub of fintech (“Osborne wants London to be 'global centre for fintech”; Financial Times; November 11, 2015), but his policy was critically concerned, because it seemed that he prioritized the relationship with China at the expense of human rights and US-UK relations. Also, Cameron refused security commitment Britain’s traditional allies in South East Asia when he visited Singapore in 2015 so as not to provoke China (“In for a Yuan, in for a Pound: Is the United Kingdom Making a Bad Bet on China?”; Council on Foreign Relations Blog; October 20, 2015). Osborne also had some dubious ties with Russia, as he accepted donations from a Russian oligarch in 2008 (“George Osborne admits 'mistake' over Russian oligarch”; Guardian; 27 October, 2008). Brexit is a disaster for Britain and the global community, but had Cameron stayed in the office, Osborne would have advanced his pro-Sino-Russian fintech policy at the expense of national security.

As if representing the financial lobby led by Osborne, Sherard Cowper-Coles, head of public affairs at HSBC Holdings PLC, criticized the British government so “weak” as to follow America to curtail business ties with China (“HSBC Executive Slams ‘Weak’ UK for Backing US Against China”; Bloomberg News; August 7, 2023). His remark is “too market-oriented”. Certainly, London has been an offshore financial market where traders can deal with currencies out of American regulation, notably the Eurodollar from the Soviet Union and the petrodollar from OPEC nations. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Cold War notions of rational deterrence, and the financial market is required to reject politically risky foreign money more strictly today. Nevertheless, it is quite hard to keep Britain’s open economy, while stopping money laundering by China, Russia, and other revisionist powers (“Why Britain’s Tories are addicted to Russian money”; Politico; March 7, 2022). Regarding the supply chain with China and energy dependence on Russia, Germany and France are frequently criticized, but we have to watch Britain’s handling of these issues as well.

The Sunak administration may not explore the Golden era with China, but the prime minister’s background is business oriented. Having graduated from Oxford University with a BA in PPE, Rishi Sunak acquired an MBA from Stanford University, where he met his wife Akshata Murty whose father is an Indian IT business tycoon Narayana Murty. Sunak himself made his career in hedge fund business before entering politics. In view of his business instinct, he could be tempted to prioritize economic interests with China and take lukewarm attitudes to its threats in the Indo Pacific and the UK homeland, although he declared the end of the Golden Era (“Rishi Sunak: Golden era of UK-China relations is over”; BBC News; 29 November, 2022). Therefore, House Foreign Affairs Committee MPs raised critical concerns with Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, when he visited China at the end of this August. This backlash was led by Conservative MP Alicia Kearns who chairs the committee, arguing that he should have been tough on Chinese espionage in the UK homeland, human rights abuse in Xinjian Uyghur and Tibet, and UK security role in the FOIP operation (“James Cleverly urged to be ‘crystal clear’ with China on ‘the rule of law and human rights’”; Politico; August 30, 2023). Criticism comes not only from Sunak’s party, also from his own cabinet. Minister of State for Security Tom Tugendhat has been a renowned China hawk, and he was banned from entering the country in 2021 (“Cleverly asks Bryant to withdraw ‘Chinese stooge’ claim amid row over Beijing”; Independent; 13 June, 2023). As an HM army veteran, he was so alert to China’s overseas police station in the United Kingdom that he eliminated them, because they were not permitted by the British government (“Chinese 'police stations' in UK are 'unacceptable', says security minister”; Sky News; 6 June 2023).

China appeasers are witnessed beyond partisanship. On the left, there are anti-colonialist wokes. On the right, there are financial lobbyists and their sympathizers. Old fashioned right-left dichotomy is meaningless to analyze correlation of foreign and domestic policy. Britain’s Indo Pacific partners need to be deeply in contact with both ruling and opposition parties to reconfirm security environment in this region and international agreements such as the G7 declaration and the UK-Japanese accord in Hiroshima. Also, it is necessary to reexamine Britain’s own security guidelines like the Integrated Review of Security in 2021, the Strategic Review in 2023, and House Foreign Affairs report led by Kearns this August. Most importantly, Britain’s military presence in Asia would be helpful in the special relationship with the United States, which would ensure a successful Global Britain. At the House of Lords, ex-Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen argued that Americans were more concerned with military adventurism of China than ongoing war in Ukraine, and it would be advantageous for Britain to show its shared security objectives with them in the Pacific (“British carrier in Pacific bolsters US-UK alliance”; UK Defence Journal; September 30, 2023). Though Lord Owen was a secretary of state in the Callaghan administration of the Labour party, his views on the Indo Pacific tilt is completely different from that of current Shadow Defence Secretary Healey. Shadow Foreign Secretary Lammy upholds the “three Cs”, but it is still unclear. After all, it is not ideological label or partisanship, but views and understandings on the Indo Pacific tilt and the Chinese threat that critically matter. Beware of domestic politics in Britain.

International Affairs Surrounding the JEF of Britain and Northern Europe

I would like to explain the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force) that I mentioned in the 2nd paragraph from the bottom in the post of this blog on November 7, and to tell how it is related to various international problems, notably ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. As cited in the post, this is a multilateral coalition of Scandinavian and Baltic nations led by Britain. Currently, the following counties join the coalition.


Britain, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden

First, let me talk about the genesis of the JEF. Originally, Britain had the JRRF (Joint Rapid Reaction Force) , which was composed the three services of its armed forces, and the troop was sent in response to emergencies such as the Sierra Leone Civil War in 2000 and the conflict in North Macedonia in 2001. However, since the 9-11 terrorist attacks onward, Britain had been forced to spare military personnel to Afghanistan and Iraq disproportionately, and therefore, it had become quite difficult for this country to meet the requirement for a rapid response troop by itself. In view of this, former Commander of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), based on advices by HM Army General David Richards ("Speech by General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff"; RUSI; 17 December, 2012), multilateral coalition force was founded in parallel with NATO Wales Summit in 2014. That is the JEF ("The UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)"; IFS Insights; May 2018).

It can be said that the foundation of the JEF is an actual implementation of Britain’s strategy to “boost the tilt to the Indo Pacific, while augmenting presence in the Euro Atlantic region” ("Global Britain in a Competitive Age"; March 2021). Then, what sort of organization the JEF is? It is a multilateral coalition force to respond to the emergency in Northern Europe and the High North, ie, from Greenland to the Barents Sea national border region between Norway and Russia. Along with its own missions, the JEF can collaborate with international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, and each sovereign state like the United States, France, Germany, etc, to defend its operational areas ("Ready to Respond: What is JEF?"; Strategic Command; 11 May 2021). The distinctive feature of this coalition is that its troop is organized on ad hoc basis by countries that can manage the situation on specific occasion to meet the requirements for rapid response, rather than unanimous approval and participation of all the members. This March, Prime Minister-then Boris Johnson boasted that the JEF was the most rapid to respond to the expansion of threat to Scandinavia and the Baltic area from Russian invaded Ukraine ("The Joint Expeditionary Force: Global Britain in Northern Europe?"; CSIS Commentary; March 25, 2022).

Incidentally, since the operational areas of the JEF are Scandinavia, the Baltic, and High North, it is necessary to watch whether independence campaigns of Scotland would pose negative impacts on military cooperation among Britain, Northern Europe, and Baltic nations, as it is located at the center of the above regions. The British Supreme Court rejected the bid by the Scottish government for judicial procedure to hold a referendum for independence without approval of the British parliament, on November 23 ("Blow for Scottish nationalists as UK court rejects independence vote bid"; Reuters News; November 24, 2022). Above all, could Scotland govern a sovereign the state on its own, even if it won independence and joined the EU successfully? The incumbent Sturgeon administration implements quite a high level of welfare policy such as providing period products for all the women for free. That requires strong foundation of the economy, but there is not so much value-added industry in Scotland today. It is too wishful to pursue such a highly developed welfare state, while dependent on the primary industry.

In England, the are some world class IT industry bases such as Cambridge, but not in Scotland. Also, most of the Britain’s aerospace businesses are based in England. Under such circumstances, it is British defense industry that brings value-added business there, and particularly, the Royal Navy creates demand for high-tech warships in the ship building industry, in which Scotland is strong traditionally. If First Minister Nicola Sturgeon really were to materialize her ideal of welfare state, she should be well aware of economic relations with the United Kingdom.

Britain and Scotland are in win-win relations on defense, too. Since the Cold War era, Russian threat comes from the Murmansk area via air and sea. Against such threats from the north, Britain has been checking them with its navy and air force, in cooperation with NATO allies. Particularly, Scotland is strategically important in those missions. Among numerous military bases, Clyde naval base in Faslane is favorable to keep confidentiality of nuclear submarines thanks to complex terrain, and the US navy and air force also have their bases in Scotland. Does Sturgeon believe that their autonomous state can manage Russian threats without being defended by Britain and America? It does not make any sense for Scotland to bring uncertainty to the JEF.

However, more critical international problem that needs attention in relation to ongoing Ukrainian crisis is that Sweden and Finland apply for NATO membership while Turkey insists on reserving the approval of the bid because both countries protect asylum seekers who are designated terrorists in the Turkish homeland. Britain and Scandinavian nations have been in deep-rooted friendship since the old EFTA era, which is also a background component of recent foundation of the JEF. On the other hand, Anglo-Turkish relations have been close, because both countries have been EU outsiders each other. Britain’s bids for EEC membership were rejected twice by De Gaulle’s France, and though this country finally managed to join the Community in 1973, it dragged the progress of further integration of Europe frequently. Meanwhile, successive administrations of Turkey have made efforts to join the EU, but that has not been accomplished yet. Prior to an agreement with the EU, Turkey concluded the bilateral trade deal with Britain in December, 2020. Also in military cooperation, Turkey receives technological assistance from Britain in its next generation fighter jet project.

Currently, Turkey provides Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 as a NATO member country, and launched corvettes for the Ukrainian navy in October last year, which were ordered in 2020 ("Turkey Launches 326-Foot Warship For Ukraine, Won’t Arrive Until 2024"; The War Zone; October 3, 2022). At the United Nations, Turkey votes consistently for denouncement and sanctions on Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, this country impresses its political presence to the world by intermediating Russia and Ukraine to settle a grain export deal. Turkey can assume such a role due to deep economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine in construction and tourism, wheat import, and fruit export. Furthermore, Turkey is a leading exporter of pasta and flour with wheat import from both countries ("Turkey not to suffer shortage in grains: Ministry"; Hurriyet Daily News; February 26, 2022). In view of this, would Britain fulfill some role along with the United States, the NATO leader, considering its vital strategic relations with both Turkey and the two Scandinavian nations? As mentioned in the explanation about the JEF in this post, Sweden and Finland are no longer neutral, but deeply associated with the Western alliance. NATO expansion is intended to bolster the alliance furthermore, and it is also a vital issue to envision the world order after the war between Ukraine and Russia.

Both international and Japanese media may not report about British military organization frequently. However, its international relations are beyond Britain and its neighbors. Since the Anglo-Japanese defense cooperation is deepening these days, we have to pay more attention to British national security.

Japan’s Embedded Alliance with Anglo-Saxons and Its Sovereign Strategy

JAUKUS? A Pacific alliance of Japan, Australia, the UK, and the USA.


In the previous post, “Can Britain Draw India into the West?”, I talked about Britain's joint project of developing next generation stealth fighter with Turkey, India, and Japan. Geopolitically, the above three were strategic hubs of the British Empire, and they are located in the west, the central south, and the east of Eurasia respectively. Of course, Britain is not the hegemonic power today, but the tilt to the Indo-Pacific area while maintaining ties with Europe is more in congruent with a global strategic scope of the maritime hegemony in the past, and that of the United States, the global hegemony today, than that of a Euro-Atlantic regional power.

It is not necessarily quixotic to explore a geostrategy based on past imperial experience. There is no denying that Russia's neo-Eurasianist dream to reconquer Ukraine has turned out catastrophic. On the other hand, Turkey's neo-Ottoman vision is much more successful to boost its global presence, though this requires a tight rope diplomacy between the West and the rest. Meanwhile, Japan is in a mixed position. While aspiring to explore sovereign and independent initiatives to boost political presence in the world after the Cold War, Japan positions itself deeply embedded in the Anglo-Saxon security network in the Indo-Pacific, which is the Quad plus AUKUS, rather than pursuing an imperial dream in wartime history. Thereby, this country assumes its position as a key proponent of the liberal world order in this century, which is Pax Anglo-Saxonica 2.0 against China and other revisionist powers. It would be quite narrow-sighted to regard Japan just as a tiny insular nation caught between America and China. From a panoramic view of the world, we understand that Japan and the Anglo-Saxon hegemony have given geostrategic priorities in the Eurasian Rimland since the prewar era.

Meanwhile, we have to understand sovereign and independent aspects in Japanese foreign policy. This July, the Japan Forum on International Relations has released a new book, entitled "Japan’s Diplomacy in Eurasian Dynamism", which is a self-portrait of the Japanese strategy in the Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. When the Hashimoto administration launched the New Silk Road initiative to strengthen ties with the Eurasian heartland in the 1990s, it was more like a romantic exploration of ancient cultural and historical friendship with Asia, rather than geopolitical consideration. Also, ideological aspects were not so much important in that initiative. It was the 9-11 terrorist attacks that prompted the evolution of Japanese grand strategy. Prime Minister-then Taro Aso publicized the Arch of Freedom and Prosperity against terrorism and autocracy, in resonance with the Greater Middle East Initiative by the Bush administration.

Aso's successor Shinzo Abe advanced the grand strategy furthermore. He lead regional security and free trade initiatives, notably the FOIP and the TPP, when the United States was plagued with America First isolationism under the Trump administration. Quite importantly, he called global attention to the threat of China, particularly from Western leaders. Prior to that, Western media treated conflicts between Japan and China like Third World regional power rivalries between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, etc. Actually, I also distanced myself from those who were obsessed with China in those days, because I was disgusted with Japan First attitudes of online right wingers and other revisionists whose vision of the world were hardly panoramic, and sounded something like Putinistic grudge against postwar Pax Americana and Trumpian grudge against globalization these days. Without attendance of events at the Japan Forum on International Relations, I may have missed opportunities to keep up with the reality of growing challenges by China.

On the other hand, Abe was so wishful as to believe that Russia would return the Northern Territories in exchange for economic cooperation, as he was poorly aware of the nature of the Putin regime、which is the rule of power. We should not forget that Abe invited Vladmir Putin to a hot spring resort in his Yamaguchi constituency for a rest just before the bilateral summit in 2016, his attitude to charm that cruel dictator was something like behavior of a master of a classical-styled Japanese inn at the resort ("Abe and Putin meet at a hot spring resort in Japan"; Yahoo News; December 16, 2016).

For further discussion, I would like to mention the three geostrategic hubs from historical contexts. Turkey had been a bulwark against Russia’s southward expansion, and a vital member of NATO and the CENTO to stop Soviet threats in Europe and the Middle East. India has been a connecting link between East Asia and the Middle East, and also between the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia since the era of the British Raj. With such geopolitical background, India has become an indispensable strategic partner for the United States in the War on Terror and the Quad today. Meanwhile, Japan has been an offshore outpost to block East Asian land powers from gaining access to the sea. Currently, Turkey and India aspire to play independent role in geopolitics of a multipolar world, while preserving membership of NATO and the Quad respectively. Meanwhile, Japan upholds the G7 principle of a rule-based world order, which makes this country reliable for Anglo-Saxon sea-powers.

In addition to geopolitics, it is necessary to mention defense industries of the three hubs. They have some defense technology, but not advanced enough to make the whole of the next generation fighter. Turkey exports less expensive and easily available weapons to developing countries primarily. Notably, the Bayraktar TB2 drone has won a global reputation, as it helps Ukraine’s counter-offensive against Russia. However, in advanced technology, this country needs assistance from major Western powers. Meanwhile, India manufactures numerous lines of indigenous weapons, such as the Tejas fighter jet, the Arjun tank, Astra BVR air to air missile, etc, under the “Make in India” campaign by Prime Minister Narendra Modi ("Top 10 Indian Indigenous Defence Weapons"; SSBCrackExams; October 24, 2020). But since they are not competitive in the global arms market, India is still dependent on Russia in defense procurement. Through technological cooperation with the West, India is pursuing self-sufficiency in national defense.

Unlike the above two, Japan is fundamentally strong in advanced technology, and provides critical components for Western weapon system. Notably, Japanese seeker will be integrated with Britain’s Meteor air-to-air missile to make the JNAAM ("Japan confirms plan to jointly develop missile with Britain"; UK Defence Journal; March 4, 2022). But Japanese defense contractors do not have political network for marketing, which was quite disadvantageous to compete with France to win the submarine contract with Australia. Fortunately for Japan, French submarines were edged out when the AUKUS agreement was declared. Australia switched to American and British nuclear submarines.

Anglo-Saxon sea powers make their strategies from global perspectives, and the priority among their regional hubs can change in accordance with the global security environment. Therefore, it is not recommendable for Japan to bandwagon with narrow-sighted China hawks in America, in view of current Russian defiance to the world order through invading Ukraine. They are obsessed with the Chinese threat in Asia so much that they do not see the world from panoramic viewpoints. They align with America First right-wingers and antiwar left-wingers to preclude America from helping Ukraine ("A Moment of Strategic Clarity"; The RAND Blog; October 3, 2022). Also, those anti-interventionists coordinate with anti-tax movements on this issue ("Inside the growing Republican fissure on Ukraine aid"; Washington Post; October 31, 2022). As mentioned in the National Security Strategy of the Biden administration, China has become the primary contestant against the liberal world order. Also, Russia and other revisionist powers obstruct and defy this world order that Japan rests on its peace and prosperity. Therefore, Japan should not appear self-interested, through resonating with the wrong partners..

Under the current geopolitical context, how do Anglo-Saxon sea-powers strike the strategic balance in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific? Let me talk about it from Britain’s relationship with the three joint fighter jet project partners. For Turkey, The United Kingdom has been the friendliest European nation for decades. Prior to Brexit, Britain had been endorsing Turkey's bid to join the EU. In the post-Brexit era, Britain and Turkey need each other more than ever. In trade, Turkey found that a deal with Britain is more preferable to preserve its economic sovereignty, rather than a deal with the EU that requires cumbersome procedures of common customs. Quite importantly, Turkey faced some tensions with the EU, as Erdoğan sent brutal Syrian mercenaries to the civil war in Libya in 2020, and attacked Kurdish militants in Syria to stop his claimed terrorism in his country in 2018. However, Britain restrained to denounce Turkey ("TURKEY AND THE UK: NEW BEST FRIENDS?; CER Insights; 24 July, 2020). India is also a prospective market in the post Brexit era. Strategically, this country has edged out ex-CENTO but pro-Chinese and Taliban-tied Pakistan as Britain’s primary partner in South Asia ("The Integrated Review In Context: A Strategy Fit for the 2020s?" Kings College London; July 2021). As stated in the UK-India joint statement in April this year, their bilateral strategic partnership goes beyond the Quad plus AUKUS, and even expands to Africa.

Meanwhile, Japan is a key partner in Britain’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific, along with Australia. As G7 members, both countries staunchly support the rule-based world order. While Britain needs Japan to over-ride post Brexit political and economic uncertainties, Japan needs Britain to cope with growing security tensions with China and North Korea. In trade, Japan endorses Britain’s bid for the CPTPP. In order to strengthen bilateral security cooperation, Japan launched a joint military exercise with Britain during the May era, and even partially modeled on the British system to found its own NSC to enhance the strategic decision-making capacity ("The UK-Japan Relationship: Five Things You Should Know"; Chatham House Explainer; 31 May, 2019).

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Biden administration outlined American national security strategy this October, which states that we are in an era of geopolitical and ideological competition, particularly with Russia and China. According to the publicized strategy, “Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown.” Meanwhile, as to China, it states “[It] is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.” On the other hand, it advocates for international cooperation to resolve globally shared issues climate change, energy security, pandemics, financial crisis, food crisis, etc. Whether in competition or cooperation with those challengers, President Joseph Biden is rebooting America’s global alliance network, while his predecessor Donald Trump was contemptuous of it. That is favorable for Japan to deepen the alliance via the Quad.

The strategic emphasis of Anglo-Saxon sea-powers may change, according to their situational necessity, but Japan is much more advantageous than other fighter project hubs. Turkey is chronically plagued with the Kurdish problem. Erdoğan attacked Syrian Kurds, which lead to “NATO’s brain death”. Also, this country still quibbles about Kurdish asylums in Sweden and Finland, upon their bid to join NATO. That will place friendly Britain in an awkward position, because it leads the Joint Expeditionary Force of the Netherlands, Scandinavian and Baltic nations. India is taken over by Hindu nationalists, and their domestic clash with Muslims and Christians is an unneligible concern. Quite problematically, both countries have strong ties with the Kremlin. Turkey bought S-400 surface to air missiles from Russia. Also, India still abstains from voting against condemning and sanctioning Russia at the UN General Assembly.

Nonetheless, Japan is free from domestic ethno-sectarian tensions that terribly inflict on Turkey and India. Regarding the relationship with Russia, current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida overturns Abe’s appeasement to Putin in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. Kishida’s appointment of ex-Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, who is also a JGSDF veteran, to his Special Advisor for International Human Rights Issues, sends a strong message that Japan takes human rights as a critical issue of national security. We can also interpret it that Kishida shall never forgive brutal crimes that Vladimir Putin committed at home and in Ukraine, and he shall never make the same mistake that Abe made. In globally shared issues, Japan has been willing to get involved as a civilian power in the postwar era through the G7 and various international and regional channels. The situation and the environment of global security always change. But whatever happens, Japan should not fall into Japan First, in order to maintain the reputation and trust from the world.

The Catastrophe of US Troop Withdrawal from Germany

President Donald Trump declared abruptly that he would pull out 9,500 soldiers from Germany this June, which dismayed national security officials of both countries. The focal point is that Trump’s appalling election pledge to pull out US forces from overseas is not a bluff, but real. This is not the first time. Last autumn, he abdicated Syrian Kurds who was a key ally for the United States in the War on Terror. Now, Trump is implementing the core policy of his America First pledge in Europe, when his presidential term is ending.

As Richard Haass mentions, Trump’s foreign policy is based on the “Withdrawal Doctrine”. He pulls America out of multilateral agreements like the TPP, the Paris Accord, the Iran nuclear deal, and other arms control agreements. Also, he abdicates security commitments in Syria and Afghanistan (“Trump’s foreign policy doctrine? The Withdrawal Doctrine”; Washington Post; May 28, 2020). Now, he is slashing American military presence in Germany. In my view, Trump’s America First is an inferior version of Obama’s Nation Building at Home, as it just provokes fears, anxieties, and discomfort among the global public.

In accordance with such views of the world, the Trump administration handles Germany vitriolically. From cabinet members like Vice President Mike Pence to nationalist scholars like Jakub Grygiel of the Heritage Foundation and Michael Anton of Hillsdale College, Trump conservatives denounce that Germany freerides the alliance selfishly, and makes use of the EU to fend off their sovereign nation bilateralism (“Trump treats Germany like “America’s worst ally”; Brookings Institution—Order from Chaos; May9, 2019). Furthermore, recently stepped down ambassador Richard Grenell wrongly said "A troop reduction would take place as a tit for tat for Germany’s continued trade surplus" (“Trump ‘to withdraw thousands of US soldiers from Germany by end 2020”; Local; 6 June, 2020). Some sources even say that Trump’s abrupt US troop withdrawal is a personal revenge to Chancellor Angela Merkel, as she declined to attend the G7 that he hosts this July. As a former national security advisor to ex-Vice President Joseph Biden, Julianne Smith of the German Marshall Fund comments that it will just hurt US interests (Twitter; @Julie_C_Smith; June 6). Yes, this is a conflict of interest.

Quite problematically, Trump made this decision without consulting without consulting with the Department of Defense and the EUCOM. However, Grenell denies this, and says that Trump has been in preparation since last year (“National security officials unaware of Trump's decision to cut troops in Germany: report”; Hill; June 9, 2020). The process shows the inherent danger of this administration, that is, vital national security decision is made only by the president and his personal loyalists. Grenell has no military expertise, and he cannot specify which troops to leave. Security experts on both sides of the Atlantic are concerned that Trump is just committed to “Make Russia Great Again” in European geopolitics (“Real or Not, Trump’s Germany Withdrawal Helps Putin”; Chatham House Expert Comment; 8 June, 2020). The real problem is that he prioritizes his reelection campaign to diplomacy. His isolationist base regards his coercive negotiation style to allies as a splendid art of the deal, and they do not care its terrible consequences on US diplomacy (“Opinion: Trump is playing election games with US troops in Germany”; Deutsche Welle; 7 June, 2020).

For American defense planners, Germany is a strategic hub of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Therefore, the US forces maintain a huge military presence in this country. Among those bases, Stutsgart accommodates the headquarters of the EUCOM and the AFRICOM; and Ramstein accommodates the headquarters of the US air force in Europe and Africa, the Allied Air Command of the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe of NATO, and the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center where wounded soldiers from Iraq and Afghanistan are cured. Just as in Afghanistan (“The Aftermath Plan for Afghanistan”; National Interest; June 6, 2020), Trump thinks that US troops can be redeployed in Germany immediately when necessary. However, from a military point of view, dynamic force employment like this is relatively easy for the air force, but not so for the army and the navy (“The German Drawdown Debacle”; American Interest; June 10, 2020).

Finally, geopolitical consequences need to be considered. Robert Kagan points out that the German problem would reemerge in Europe, after the power vacuum of US pullout. That is, with the largest economy and population in the region, Germany could overwhelm her neighbors, which might destabilize the regional balance of power in Europe, as it happened in the early 20th century (“Interview with Robert Kagan: Permanence of Liberal Democracy 'Is an Illusion'”; Spiegel International; 8 November, 2019). British Prime Minister-then Margaret Thatcher raised the same concern so acutely, when Germany was reunified after the Cold War.

The German problem poses more extensive implications to global security. Like Germany, Trump has been pushing Japan and South Korea to pay more for US troops in their territories (“From Germany to Japan, Trump seeks huge premium from allies hosting US troops”; Straits Times; March 8, 2019). According to James Schoff at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Trump treats Japan more favorably than Germany, as she does not brandish multilateral security framework. Therefore, he says that the problem of nasty pressure over the payment, which is stated in the memoir of former National Security Advisor John Bolton, is not so serious (“U.S. demanded Japan pay $8 bil. annually for troops: Bolton”; Kyodo News; June 22, 2020 and “Bolton memoir raises concern over Japan alliance if Trump re-elected”; Mainichi Shinbun; June 24, 2020). Nevertheless, Trump clings to his idiosyncratic election pledge over the payment and withdrawal, whether it is feasible or not. A second term of this administration would inflict fatal damages on America’s global alliance network.

The trans-Atlantic Chasm Undermines the US-Japanese Alliance

It is commonly assumed that the US-Japanese alliance is a security partnership in the Pacific region, but I would like to see this strategic linchpin from the Atlantic side. For this purpose, I would like to mention Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s address at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, when he attended NATO foreign Ministers Meeting last December. His Trumpian speech dismayed Europeans. He flatly denied world peace by multilateralism and regional cooperation, which saved Europe from antagonistic great power rivalries before World War II. Moreover, he stated that the EU was a polity of multinational bureaucracy, at the expense of sovereign nations and citizens (“Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo at the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium”; US Missions to International Organizations in Vienna; December 4, 2018). Pompeo’s remark is widening the trans-Atlantic chasm so critically that the foundation of the liberal world order is increasingly at risk today.

The Brussels speech is graded negatively among American foreign policy experts as well. Robert Kagan at the Brookings Institution, comments that Pompeo’s speech resonates with Israeli far right scholar Yoram Hazony, as he said democracy was based on nationalism, not liberalism (“The strongmen strike back”; Brookings Institution; March 2019). Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations criticizes his “principled realism” more harshly. While Pompeo attacked multilateral organizations that the United States has endorsed or created, like the EU, the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF, he did not mention how much the Trump administration had eroded America’s reputation among allies. Contrary to Pompeo’s understanding that multilateralism has augmented excessive burden of bureaucratic procedures, and restricted sovereign actions of US diplomacy, Patrick argues that multilateral cooperation has been mutually beneficial, and helped American supremacy on the global stage. Regarding the EU, he refutes Pompeo’s poorly founded view about national sovereignty, because member states have the most powerful leverage in the decision making of the Union. Likewise, Pompeo is wrong about other international organizations. More importantly, unlike Pompeo defends, Trump shows no interest in defending the world order and US leadership, but he alienates America’s long standing allies (“Tilting at Straw Men: Secretary Pompeo’s Ridiculous Brussels Speech”; CFR Blog; December 4, 2018). This is typically shown in his scornful remark, “Our allies take advantage of us far greater than our enemies”, prior to the G7 Biarritz (“Trump heading to G-7 summit after insulting allied world leaders”; CBS News; August 23, 2019).

The EU won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, because of "the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation, and for democracy and human rights". Not only has it deepened multilateral cooperation in Western Europe, but also promoted freedom values in Eastern Europe in the post-communist era. Europe defends the common values of the trans-Atlantic community, while Trump’s America is shedding them. Seen from the Atlantic side, the US-Japanese alliance is growing increasingly fragile. In of view this, it is time to review a US-Japanese joint policy brief, “Stronger than Ever but More Challenged than ever: The US-Japan Alliance in the Trump-Abe era” by the JFIR (Japan Forum on International Relations), along with the National Defense University and the Atlantic Council. Since it was published in April last year, Trumpification of American foreign policy staff has advanced. Adults in the room, notably James Mattis and H. R. McMaster, were replaced by more nationalist and loyalist Mike Pompeo and John Bolton. Even Bolton was fired now, and American diplomacy has become more susceptible to Trump’s whimsical temperament.

Despite Trump’s abrupt withdrawal from the TPP, not so profound ideological discrepancies are shown between Japan and the United States, compared with Europe and America. As mentioned in the JFIR policy brief, both nations were forming a built-in-stabilizer to manage growing threats in the Indo-Pacific area, notably China and North Korea, and defend democratic values in this region. This was supposed to save the alliance from unpredictable populism in American domestic politics. But actually, as stated in the brief, it was the adults in the room like Secretary of State-then Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense-then James Mattis, who confirmed America's continual commitment to the liberal world order and multilateral cooperation in Asia. However, it is questionable whether Pompeo is committed to regional stability as much as they were. Though he addresses for freedom and democracy in Hong Kong, Uyghur, and so forth, the meaning of these words and his intention seems to be more “principled realist” or even Hazonian nationalist, rather than Wilsonian idealist. His contemptuous views about multilateral diplomacy are starkly in contrast with those of Mattis, who emphasizes close policy coordinations with allies from the battlefield to UN corridors (“Jim Mattis: Duty, Democracy and the Threat of Tribalism”; Wall Street Journal; August 28, 2019). Unlike Mattis, Pompeo’s power bases are the Tea Party and evangelicals, not military élites, though he was a captain of the US army. Therefore, the US-Japanese alliance is turning weaker again, after the departure of the adults in the room.

It was revealed that Japan is in a difficult position between Europe and Trump’s America at the G7 Charlevoix and Biarritz. Since Europe and America bicker too much over the Paris Accord and Russian readmission to G7 membership, critical security problems in Asia, such as China and North Korea are sidelined (“Japan’s Disappointing G7 Summit”; Diplomat; August 28, 2019). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had an ambition to act as a connecting bridge between Europe and America through his relatively good personal ties with Trump, to boost Japan’s global standings. But the trans-Atlantic chasm is too wide and deep. Currently, Iran is a critical issue between the United States and democratic allies. While Pompeo calls for allies to join the coalition of the willing to defend the Hormuz Strait, Europeans do not see imminent threats there, and Trump’s intention over Iran is unclear (”Trump’s coalition of one”; Politico; August 2, 2019). Regarding the Saudi Arabian oil field attack, François Heisbourg, Senior Advisor for the IISS, is cautious to accept Trump’s claim that Iran did it, and some American experts agree with him. Japan is also reluctant to join Trump’s coalition against Iran. The trans-Atlantic chasm in the Trump era is undermining Japan’s diplomacy that takes “a panoramic perspective of the world map”.