The results of the last House of Councillors election on July 20th were quite like a vulgar reality show. Right-wing populist party Sanseito made great gains, but like the Trump administration and its like-minded far-right groups in Europe and the United States, they are shouting xenophobia and inciting hatred toward those who oppose them based on a "thin centered ideology ". To prevent such extremists from taking over our nation, I call for trans-partisan solidarity among internationalists.
As seen in most of the issues that I usually take up, I am not a Nagatacho watcher. Japanese domestic politics is not my primary focus. Therefore, this post will neither analyze the recent election nor discuss the prospect political interactions. Nor will I question whether Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba should remain in office or not. Here, I would like to explore what Japan's internationalism should be, how it should be reflected in domestic and foreign policy, and how we should counter xenophobic and hate-based populism. Shortly after the House of Councillors election, Nagatacho is currently in a "storm in a teacup", rife with partisan politics. However, I cannot remain silent and ignore right-wing populism, which has now become a disruptor of the world order. While the rise of Sanseito drew attention in the last election, numerous other right-wing nationalist parties, such as the Conservative Party of Japan, the Japan Seishinkai, and the NHK Party, have also sprung up like mushrooms after a rain.
Japan's prosperity and stability require a free and open society, both externally and internally. The free movement of people, goods, and capital that such a society brings has enriched the quality and quantity of people's lives. Furthermore, both Japan's domestic and foreign policies have benefited greatly from the postwar liberal world order. Ever since Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire brought about the glory of Hellenistic civilization, globalization has driven the evolution of human history. Conversely, an era of anti-globalization has seen a regression of history. Examples include Europe after the fall of Rome and China, which was left behind by the Ming Dynasty's maritime ban. Even in modern-day Japan, we cannot sit idly by and watch the rise of xenophobia, which is bringing about a devolution of history.
What's so bad about radical nationalism is that it's based on a sense of exclusion toward others. In other words, a zero-sum worldview—"we sacrifice, they gain"—is at the heart of their thinking. This sense of exclusion extends not only to foreigners but also to their fellow citizens. During the recent House of Councillors election, Sohei Kamiya, leader of Sanseito, sparked controversy with his statement, "Only young women can give birth. Men, and I'm sorry to say, older women, can't have children." I immediately recognized that this was not just a women's issue; it suggested something extraordinary. That is, those who are not involved in reproduction and production are a burden to the state and should not receive the country's welfare benefits. Kamiya's thinking echoes the actions of the Nazis, who labeled the physically and intellectually handicapped as the social misfit and sent them to concentration camps. His advocacy of "Japanese First" is as blatantly exclusionary as U.S. President Donald Trump's "America First," even toward his own people.
In the last House of Councillors election, it's said that conservative votes flowed to right-wing populist parties because the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is no longer a conservative party that is supposed to be. However, from a global perspective, the definition of conservatism is swinging. In exploring the notion of Japan's internationalism in this post, I would like to begin my discussion with this point in mind. A major difference can be seen between the conservatism of the Reagan-Thatcher era and that of the Trump era. The former conservatism is not based on xenophobia and a victimhood mindset, while the latter is openly xenophobic and victimhood mentality. This is why, in a contribution to Project Syndicate, Lord Chris Patten, who held key positions under the Thatcher administration (and was the last Governor of Hong Kong under the successor Major administration), valued the transatlantic alliance with "Reagan's America" but was skeptical of relations with "Trump's America." Given the above-mentioned flip-flops in the definition of conservatism around the world, I would like to question the argument that the LDP's defeat in the last House of Councillors election was due to an outflow of conservative votes to right-wing parties such as Sanseito. Also, the mainstream conservatism of the LDP in Japan is the loyal heir of the Yoshida Doctrine, and its direction of international cooperation, which advocates Japan as a major trading nation. Rather, while historical LDP prime ministers and party leaders have assumed themselves mainstream conservatives, haven't their actual policies been consistently quite liberal?
To answer these questions, I applied the four archetypes of American foreign policy proposed by Walter Russell Mead of the Hudson Institute to past LDP prime ministers and party leaders. They all fall into the "Hamiltonian" category. Prime Ministers Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda are typical examples. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, known as the "Ghost of the Showa Era," may have been an imperial nationalist at heart, but his actual policies were based on developing trade-oriented nation. The same can be said of Kishi's grandson, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In other words, the LDP's mainstream conservative base was strongly liberal by nature. The conservative votes that supposedly flowed out in the last House of Councillors election were not the LDP's core supporters, but rather its outliers. Among the right-wing LDP candidates who lost their seats as a result, Mio Sugita was too controversial due to her extreme nationalism and discriminatory profanity, and she was a candidate whom the LDP's core supporters disliked. Politicians like Sugita, whose ideology is considered closer to that of Sanseito, are "Jacksonians" who aggressively proclaim their own country's interests and are not afraid to incur friction with the international community. Indeed, President Andrew Jackson was infamous for his support of slavery and the genocide of Native Americans, and is considered one of the most racist figures in U.S. history. The Japanese equivalent of the liberal "Jeffersonians," who advocate international non-interventionism, is the left-wing constitutionalists who advocate unilateral pacifism.
Regarding "Wilsonian" who advocates the realization of universal human ideals through active international intervention by the United States, there are no corresponding politicians in Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated a "free and open Indo-Pacific," and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has proclaimed that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow." However, neither of these approaches is strong enough to enable Japan to lead the international public interest. While Abe's vision appears to aim to strengthen the liberal world order, it is also blended with the nationalist and realist perspectives of his grandfather, Prime Minister Kishi. During Kishida's state visit to the United States at the end of his term, he called for the continuation of American internationalism in Congress. However, his success did not garner the same level of internationalist support as did World War II hero UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill. As with the case of postwar LDP prime ministers and party leaders, both remain within the "Hamiltonian" category. Based on the above discussion, the view that the loss of fringe nationalist votes was a blow to the LDP needs to be reconsidered.
Based on this classification, what should Japan's version of internationalism be? Prior to answering this question, let me review it in other countries briefly. To begin with, American internationalism emerged during the eras of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, which came from a growing call for the United States to move beyond its traditional isolationism and assume a role in international politics befitting a major power. As a result, they explored to prevail American values, such as freedom and democracy. However, as the Trump administration dismisses human rights issues, the uniquely American approach to value-based diplomacy is fading. In contrast, Europe, having experienced two world wars, sought regional integration based on multilateralism and a break with the colonial empires of the past. In the UK, a latecomer to the EC, rising nationalist sentiment led to Brexit. However, subsequent Conservative administrations led by pro-Brexit prime ministers also adopted internationalist foreign policies in the name of Global Britain, including a strategic tilt toward the Indo-Pacific region and leading support for Ukraine. Since Starmer's Labour administration came to power, relations with Germany, France, and other European countries have improved, partly due to their response to the Ukraine crisis, although they have not yet rejoined the EU. Brexit does not necessarily bring a decline of internationalism.
So, what kind of ideals should Japan's version of internationalism, one that transcends party lines, look like? In recent years, growing threats from neighboring countries have led the Japanese people to reevaluate postwar pacifism. Even so, Japan's forte remains soft power, centered on non-military matters, rather than hard power diplomacy. As seen in Japan's diplomacy surrounding the FOIP and the war in Ukraine, it will likely also emphasize universal principles such as the rule of law and the denial of the use of force to change the status quo. Despite the recent signing of the first-ever large-scale arms export contract to Australia for the Mogami-class frigates, Japan's foreign policy will likely remain fundamentally Hamiltonian. However, it should move beyond its traditional position as a trading nation friendly to the world and lean more toward a Wilsonian approach that advocates adherence to the principles of the international order. However, Japan will likely not become a "world policeman," as American neoconservatives and others advocate for foreign policy of their country.
While Japan is expected to demonstrate leadership in non-military areas such as development aid and empowerment, the validity of the argument for a stronger international presence on gender issues is questionable. Japan's ranking in the women's power index is lower than that of major developed countries, even developing countries. Meanwhile, there is a survey results showing that “women, the elder, and the poorly educated” are happier than “men, younger, and highly educated” in Japan, a finding that contradicts global trends. While these contradictory results raise doubts about the notion of international leadership on gender issues, they also raise the possibility that this could be an important issue for Japan's soft power diplomacy.
It is important to note here that the women’s power index statistical data focuses only on a select few who have achieved success through social advancement. For the vast majority, these figures are completely unrelated. In the 2016 US presidential election, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton attracted worldwide attention as a potential first female president. However, it should not be forgotten that many rural female voters in the US viewed this as an issue for elites like Clinton, and that it had nothing to do with them. On the other hand, when it comes to happiness statistics, the background to the results is not clearly explained. In any case, Japan's leadership on gender issues has many unexplored issues.
Internationalism is not limited to foreign policy. In domestic politics, the influx of foreign capital and foreign labor was a major issue in the recent House of Councillors election. Both are essential for the country's economic development, and hate is ethically unacceptable. However, concerns about national security and domestic public security should be wiped out. Aside from these practical issues, I would like to propose that, in order to counter the nationalist sentiment fueled by the recent election results, we adopt the argument for making English an official language, as advocated by then Asahi Shimbun editorial board member Yoichi Funabashi during the Obuchi era. The direct goal of this would be to maintain an open society while also satisfying security and public order demands. Making Chinese an official language would be just problematic in the latter two points. Therefore, Japanese society should present a desirable image of foreigners. This should be a clear, hate-free standard: "Regardless of blood and color, they should be legitimate members of global society in taste, opinions, morals, and intellect." Making English an official language is the first step toward this goal.
There are competent people in Japanese politics who can support internationalism. It wouldn't be surprising if political heavyweights like LDP Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, former Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, and Democratic Party for the People leader Yuichiro Tamaki formed a Harvard University faction that transcends party lines. As for other prestigious overseas universities, former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiji Kihara, who served as a policy advisor for the Kishida administration, is an alumnus of the London School of Economics. While there are such cabal of people to support Japanese-style internationalism across party lines, right-wing populist leader Sohei Kamiya of the Sanseito graduated from Kansai University's law school. While Kamiya majored in law, his proposed constitutional amendments lacked the fundamentals of modern constitutions, such as the guarantee of fundamental human rights, freedom of thought and conscience, and freedom of religion. This is not even a question of Kamiya's vision of the nation. Incidentally, I did not major in law both as an undergraduate and a graduate student, but even so, I understand just how terrible his mistakes were. What exactly did Kamiya study at law school?
It hasn't been long since the last election, and lawmakers in Nagatacho seem busy debating who will be prime minister and how to form party alliances. In any case, it is strange that politics of this country is being swayed by someone like the party leader Kamiya. It's said that Sanseito will eventually lose momentum, but we mustn't forget that the recent election saw a proliferation of right-wing populist parties spring up like mushrooms after a rain. To defeat them, we must explore a trans-partisan internationalism of Japanese version in both domestic and foreign affairs. Every policy will be valid only when it is made with a solid foundation of principles.
No comments:
Post a Comment