Geopolitics and values behind King Charles III`s state visit to Trump’s America for the 250th anniversary

I have been watching Britain’s tightrope diplomacy between Trump’s America and Europe since last May. UK-US relations in Trump 2.0 started relatively friendly, but as the trans-Atlantic chasm grows due to the Donroe doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the special relationship is critically questioned now. The British Royal Family is visiting Trump’s America in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, when intergovernmental relations are in discord. And ironically, Donald Trump is the most unconstitutional president in history, as shown in National Guard and ICE deployment in Blue States, and tariff diplomacy, which are completely incompatible with the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Despite such controversies, King Charles III and Queen Camilla are scheduled to visit from April 27 to 30, and subsequently, the Prince and Princess of Wales are expected to visit in June or July.

1. [Britain’s royal diplomacy in America]
Prior to talking about current bilateral relations, let me mention the history of the royal family and the American people. The Boston Tea Party, which led to the American Revolutionary War, was not a protest against the British monarchy originally, but an appeal for the rights as Englishmen as declared “no taxation, without representation”. In the early days, newly independent America was anti-British, but as its democracy matured, its border dispute with Canada was settled, and its internationalism rose towards the new century, the Anglo-American relationship gradually developed into the special relationship of the latter days. Ever since the future Edward VII visited the United States as a prince in 1860, royal visits were very helpful in nurturing a favorable image of Britain among the American public. In 1939, when World War II was almost breaking out, George VI and the future Queen Mother Elizabeth met President Franklin Roosevelt to mitigate the epidemic of America First isolationism among American citizens.

Most importantly, Elizabeth II and Prince Phillip visited the United States in 1957 on the occasion of the 350th anniversary of the English settlement in Jamestown, to heal ruptured Anglo-American relations by the Suez Crisis. However, will King Charles and Prince William foster a friendship between the two countries? Remember, President Donald Trump mocked Prime Minister Keir Starmer during the Iran war. Trump called independently deployed Royal Navy aircraft carriers in the East Mediterranean toys, and denounced Starmer as a coward because he did not give complete permission for the USAF to use RAF air bases. (1) Ultimately, would the king give credit to Trump’s right-wing populism? To answer those questions, let me talk about British diplomacy with Trump’s America in his second term.

2. [The special relationship with America in Trump 2.0]
It was Britain’s imperative to stabilize the special relationship with the United States, no matter how disruptive the incoming president was, and repair the damage of Brexit in Europe, while the Russian invasion of Ukraine poses critical threats to the Euro-Atlantic sphere. In such a trans-Atlantic security environment, the Starmer administration was inaugurated shortly before Donald Trump was reelected. When Trump’s second term started, Britain reached relatively favorable agreements, compared with the EU and Japan. Notorious Trump tariffs were lower, and a huge US investment in the UK tech industry was agreed through the TPD (Technology Prosperity Deal). Furthermore, the invitation to the royal dinner at Buckingham Palace satisfied Trump’s childish vanity. It appeared that Starmer managed to stabilize the relationship with Trump’s America.

However, towards the end of the last year, Trump resorted to assaults on NATO allies increasingly, such as claiming annexation of Canada and Greenland, raising tariffs furthermore, and withdrawing support for Ukraine. The regime ousting of Venezuela was done almost effortlessly, and Starmer embraced the consequence. But he suspended intelligence sharing with the United States, because global concerns were raised about the legality of US attacks on a Venezuelan drug smuggling boat in the Caribbean Sea, where Britain and other European nations have overseas territories. (2) And then, the war in Iran inflicted a fatal blow on UK-US relations. Globally, Trump’s attack on Iran is criticized for a lack of international legal grounds, poorly defined strategic goals of the war, Israeli influence on American decision-making, and so forth.

Along with problems such as asymmetric warfare, energy price, and the Hormuz Strait, Peter Ricketts, who served as the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Blair administration and the National Security Advisor of the Cameron administration, comments that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to eliminate the threats of Iran and its proxies for the legislative elections by late this October. (3) Meanwhile, Trump’s first-term National Security Advisor John Bolton says that Trump wanted a quick and efficient war against Iran as he did in Venezuela for the midterm elections this November. (4) Though both leaders do not share the same intention, we have to remember that they are quite election-oriented.

From British perspectives, Trump’s war against Iran is disrespectful to postwar Anglo-American relations. Jean-Marc Vigilant at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) contrasts British and French trans-Atlantic strategy after the Suez Crisis. In order to avoid an unexpected clash. Britain stepped toward close strategic contacts with the United States to have some influence on its decision-making and keep its military presence in Europe. On the other hand, France sought strategic autonomy from the United States by developing its sovereign and independent nuclear weapons and withdrawing from NATO's integrated military command. (5) In the Gulf War by George H. W. Bush and the Iraq War by George W. Bush, Britain was in strategic contact with America. But in the Iran War, Trump talked with Netanyahu only, and Britain was sidelined. Why should Starmer help him?

Quite importantly, the Iran War is so unpopular in Europe that any support for Trump and Netanyahu could ruin the pledge to increase defense spending against Russia among NATO allies. (6) Therefore, Britain is taking increasingly French-styled strategic autonomy and hosted a conference on freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Strait. (7) Pro-Trump MPs such as Reform UK Leader Nigel Farage and Conservative Leader Kemi Badenoch demanded that Starmer join the war for the special relationship when it broke out, but now, they have withdrawn their support for Trump. This is also the case with ex-Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is a senior executive of Trump’s controversial Board of Peace. (8) They should have remembered that even a Thatcherite Lord Chris Patten argues that Britain should not assume the special relationship with Trump’s America. (9)

3. [America and the world order in chaos]
Furthermore, I would like to mention American foreign policy. Last June, when the war in Iran was not imminent, Robert Kagan at the Brookings Institution commented that Trump turned the US military into his private army when he deployed National Guard and ICE in Blue States unconstitutionally. Also, he aligns with Netanyahu as both share ethnoreligious nationalism, which is completely at odds with universal liberal values of the Founding Fathers. As Kagan argues, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is advancing anti-DEI initiatives in the US military, and he even likens the war in Iran to a crusade, both of which are deeply rooted in white Christian nationalism. Therefore, Kagan concludes that any success Trump claims in Iran will be a victory for autocracies around the world. (10) Continual frictions between Trump and US allies make China and Russia pleased. America has lost trust from allies, furthermore, in the Iran War. This would accelerate not only the isolation of America in geopolitics but also the fall of the Enlightenment, which would turn the world, including America itself, less secure. (11)

To my eyes, ex-President Barack Obama was also too post-American, but his foreign policy could have been compatible with the world order of the middle power alignment, which was proposed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. On the other hand, Trump is excessively post-Enlightenment, which has made America completely isolated. That is savage enough to return the world really to the Stone Age. In his latest article of the Atlantic Journal, Kagan calls Trump’s America a rogue superpower. He mentions the ongoing war, “The Iran war is global intervention “America First”–style: no public debate, no vote in Congress, no cooperation or, in many cases, even consultation with allies other than Israel, and, apparently, no concern for potential consequences to the region and the world.” That makes America lonely and dangerous, but never great. (12) Thereby, Trump destroys the world order that has brought innumerable benefits to the United States and its allies.

4. [The post-Enlightenment trend and the rise of the civilizational state]
The final point of the discussion is the political transition in the global context. Aaron McKeil at the London School of Economics mentions that in the post-Enlightenment era, as seen in viral right-wing populism in the West and geopolitical challenges by authoritarian powers, civilizational state values would replace liberal cosmopolitan ideals. Then what is a civilizational state? It is a kind of ethnocultural sphere of influence claimed by a great power or a regional power as a body of governance beyond its own territory. This is typically seen in Russia’s Russkiy Mir and China’s “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation". Domestically, a civilizational state focuses on national unity through ethnocentric traditionalism. Trump has trashed America’s hegemonic advantage in universal cosmopolitan ideals with White Christian nationalism and turned it into an authoritarian civilizational state like Russia and China. Those civilizational state advocates are not necessarily retrospective, according to McKeil. They are often aligned with new techno futurists who are keen on winning the great power rivalry in the tech industry. (13) This is typically seen in the TPD in current Anglo-American relations.

[Conclusion]
Deplorably, America elected the least qualified president to commemorate the 250th anniversary, though King Charles is visiting this historic landmark of democracy in America. The shift of Starmer’s diplomatic stances shows us that it is no use flattering Trump just to avoid a clash with him. Even pro-Trump Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni rejects Trump’s demand to admit the USAF to use air bases in Italy. In domestic politics, Trump fired so many loyalists. Returns are hardly expected through sycophancy. Among G7 leaders, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is so eager to conform to Trump. Her crazy dance was ridiculed both at bilateral meetings in Tokyo and Washington, DC. But I would rather call attention to her impolite laugh at the autopen portrait of former President Joe Biden. That implicitly indicates that she lost the sense of political balance. I would suggest that Takaichi rename herself MAGAichi, as she is dishonorably fascinated with Trump so much.

Among the British public, this visit is unpopular, and they want the King to cancel the tour, according to the You.gov poll last March. (14) Considering the nature of the Trump administration and his character, even this state visit is unlikely to improve the state-to-state relations of both countries. Therefore, there is no need for King Charles to make an impression as if giving credit to Trump. Meanwhile, Britain’s royal diplomacy has nurtured a friendship with the United States for more than a century. Focusing on people, instead of Trump, the King’s visit for the 250th anniversary would be an opportunity for them to recall the ideals of the Founding Fathers. The British royal family is popular among Americans, historically.

Since Trump’s America is a civilizational state incorporating new techno futurism, a huge business deal such as the TPD will be a “hostage” to stop Trump from fatally breaking up the bilateral relationship, even though he escalates blaming Starmer as relations with Britain grow worse. He never suggested withdrawing this tech deal, despite his penchant for madman diplomacy. This is a lesson for world leaders who want to stabilize the relationship with Trump’s America through flattery.

In this historic event, despite the chaos that Trump brings at home and worldwide, will King Charles III have a favorable impact on democracy in America and trans-Atlantic relations? The king spoke of the late Queen Elizabeth II’s legacy of optimism that "goodness will always prevail and that a brighter dawn is never far from the horizon", before the state visit to the United States of America. (15)




Footnotes:

(1) “As a state visit looms … can King Charles tame Trump?”; Guardian; 4 April. 2026

(2) “U.K. withholds intelligence on alleged drug boats over U.S. strikes, sources say”; NBC News; November 13, 2025

(3) PeterRicketts, BBC Breakfast; 4 March, 2026

(4) “John Bolton Warns How Trump’s Big Mouth Has Weakened U.S.” Daily Beast; April 20, 2026

(5) “Europeanising” NATO: A Utopia or an Obvious Necessity for Europeans?”; IRIS; 16 May 2025

(6) “Trump wants to strongarm NATO into a new Gulf war. Here’s why Europe must resist”; Centre for European Reform; 18 March 2026

(7) “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, and others on the Strait of Hormuz”: UK Government Press Release; 19 March 2026

(8) “The UK’s right wing is suddenly silent about supporting war in Iran”; News Agents; 11 March, 2026

(9) "Britain Must Downgrade the Special Relationship"; Project Syndicate; February 28, 2025

(10) “American Democracy Might Not Survive a War With Iran”; Atlantic Journal; June 21, 2025

(11) “America vs. the World”; Atlantic Journal; January 18, 2026

(12) “America Is Now a Rogue Superpower”; Atlantic Journal; March 30, 2026

(13) “How to navigate global disorder”; Engelsberg IDEAS; March 23, 2026

(14) “By 49% to 33%, Britons say King Charles should cancel official visit to USA”;You.gov; 26 March 2026

(15) “William and Catherine praise late Queen's 'lifetime of duty'”; BBC News; 22 April, 2026

Real national defense capability matters rather than the GDP ratio of spending

Ever since the Cold War, the United States has been urging its allies to increase defense spending for burden sharing, whether it acts as the world policeman or America First. However, I have always wondered why people talk about the amount of money to be spent so much, while hardly paying attention to how it is spent and implemented. A discrepancy in defense strategy and procurement could weaken collective defense. Quite recently, retired British Army General Richard Barrons raised a serious concern about this point that I have thought of for years.

Prior to mentioning his article in detail, we have to review the security environment of the world today. The latest NSS of the Trump administration emphasizes America First more than ever, and urges allies to assume more defense burdens. The paper even bluffs that the United States will withdraw from the alliance unless its members increase defense spending more drastically. As a result, liberal democracies in Europe and Asia are forced to pursue independent and multilateral security policy coordination, with the surge in defense budgets. In addition, wise spending must be considered to arrange such new security framework more effective. Both in Europe and Asia, President Donald Trump takes an Obama-style “offshore balancer” stance in Ukraine and Taiwan, while acting predatory in the Western Hemisphere, as seen typically in Venezuela and Greenland. He gives priority to making a deal of the mining business in Donbas rather than settling the territory and sovereignty issues with Russia. Also, in the recent Sino-Japanese conflict over Taiwan, he prioritized trade talks with China rather than geopolitical checks against its expansionism. Trump would be happy with a spending increase among allies and a decrease in the burden of American security commitments from his business acumen. It seems that he does not care about the use of increased spending, nor the division of roles with allies.

In view of such a global security environment, let me talk about ex-General Barrons’s commentary about the UK-German strategic discrepancy in defense spending objectives. As one of the leaders of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, he considered two points, which are the strategic requirements in deterrence and fighting, and financial capacity over the next decade (1). In addition, Britain, like other European nations, is forced to increase its military budget within such constraints in the face of Trump’s pressure. Therefore, wise spending for the properly focused objective is critical. While Britain is investing in technological innovation to resolve financial and personnel restrictions, Germany is building the strongest conventional army in Europe by overturning fiscal authority, and even by reintroducing conscription (2). Meanwhile, Britain’s military manpower is shrinking year by year despite its global commitment.

Contrary to Germany, Britain is pursuing tech-based military reform through combat lessons from Ukraine. Newly established digital targeting web will connect any UK troop sensors through AI-managed cloud to connect any of its weapons whether locally or globally (3). Such approaches require an innovative industrial base. The SDR 2025 even states “Defence also has <> at the heart of the UK’s economic strategy (4).” The Starmer administration’s TPD (Technology Prosperity Deal) with Trump’s America draws $350 billion in investments from U.S. firms into the UK's technology ecosystem, particularly in AI, quantum computing, and civil nuclear energy (5). Defence Secretary John Healey commented proudly that the deal would boost Britain’s leadership in defense, data and AI technology and as an ideal location for investment (6).

On the other hand, Britain`s ambitious scheme is not necessarily praise worthy. Barrons urges the British authority to fund and implement the project quickly, as Germany is building a conventional army rapidly. He recommends that Britain’s conceptual innovation and Germany’s efficient bureaucracy be combined to strengthen European defense capability. He criticizes the bureaucratic sectionalism of Whitehall for the delay. There is no denying that conventional plans are quicker to start than future-oriented ones. However, strategic rationality and efficiency are not the only reasons that determine the use of defense spending. The political culture of each country also matters. The primary focus of Germany’s national defense is urgent territorial defense in view of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For this objective, the Merz administration prioritized immediate military buildup, rather than future-oriented military reform. Furthermore, ethical hurdles make Germany cautious to use AI for military objectives, from the historical experience of authoritarian surveillance by Nazi and the Stasi. The German military prioritizes human control of technology and bans fully operational LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems) but admits human-overseen AI systems (7).

Such a discrepancy is found in the GCAP as well. While Britain was inclined to the command center version which is networked with ACPs (Autonomous Collaborative Platforms) or loyal wingman drones for multirole combat missions to increase combat mass and reduce damage risks, Japan prefers the manned version to replace aging F-2 immediately, which is equipped with more advanced sensors and networking technology than the F-35. Meanwhile, Italy is dissatisfied with the extremely high cost and tight restrictions for the technological transfer of the F-35. GCAP partners reached an agreement to fill these R&D objective gaps by making common manned aircraft and then, adapt them to the requirements of each air force (8).

However, the war in Ukraine has changed military tactics so drastically that the above discrepancies between Britain and Japan could shrink faster than expected. Following the New Year visit to Ise Shrine on January 5, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that her cabinet would revise the National Security Documents by the Kishida administration to focus much more on drone and AI networking systems (9). Also, she said a stronger defense industry would be a new locomotive to boost the Japanese economy in this century. Those points somewhat similar to what is stated in Britain’s SDR 2025. That could make Japan’s position in the GCAP more in line with the UK. Unlike Germany, Japan has little ethical hurdles for AI weapons.

In an era of more self-interested America with the Donroe Doctrine, the target of increased defense spending has become more important than ever. Ex-General Barrons raises a critical question as he compares defense plan of Britain and Germany. We have to consider strategic rationality and political culture of partners in mini or multilateral policy coordination. Different priorities between Britan and Germany, and Britain and Japan, are just a tip of the iceberg among numerous cases. We tend to talk about the size of firepower and weapon of choice when we boost national defense, but don’t dismiss AI networking system and problems associated with that as it is emerging increasingly important. How should we spend increased defense budget? Each nation should think again.



Footnotes:
(1) "The UK and Germany should combine their strengths to address weaknesses in European defence"; Chatham House; 19 November, 2025

(2) "Germany votes to bring in voluntary military service programme for 18-year-olds"; BBC News; 6 December 2025

(3) "I wrote the UK defence review: Britain must accelerate reform if it is to help guarantee Ukraine’s security"; Chatham House; 25 September, 2025

(4) "The Strategic Defence Review 2025"; UK Government;8 July 2025

(5) "Trump, Starmer sign $350B tech deal to spur AI, nuclear energy and quantum computing"; New York Post; September 18, 2025

(6) "New strategic partnership to unlock billions and boost military AI and innovation"; UK Government Press Release;18 September 2025

(7) "Ethical and Operational"; German Council on Foreign Relations; November 09, 2022

"AI – its risks and possible side effects"; German Ethics Council; 4 April, 2023

"Chapter 8: Privacy and Security: German Perspectives, European Trends and Ethical Implications"; Ethical Issues in Covert, Security and Surveillance Research; 2021

(8) "The New Partnership among Italy,Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)"; Istituto Affari Internazionali; 3 March, 2023

"Forget F-35, F-47 and FCAS: The GCAP Fighter Is Coming"; 1945; December 26, 2025

(9) Takaichi Security Revise; NHK World; January 5, 2026