New Year Question: Can the World Embrace China’s Aspiration for Military Rise?

Whenever the global community raises concerns with the rise of Chinese military power, the Chinese side refutes “There is nothing strange that we strengthen our military in accordance with our national power. Through this way, it is necessary to defend Chinese national interests that have expanded on a global scale.” However, the real threat for both Asia Pacific and Western nations is China’s intention. A typical case is China’s proposal to divide the Pacific Ocean into US and Chinese sphere of influence (“Division Rejected”；Washington Times; August 17, 2007). Considering such behavior, it is nothing strange that the global community suspect that China is imposing its own national interests, while dismissing other nations’ will and global public interests.

A strong military power is not necessarily regarded as a threat by foreign countries. The most typical case is the relationship between Canada and the United States. Canada has a long border with the superpower to the south, and its population concentrates on the border area. Normally, this is very vulnerable to the threat of its neighbor, but hardly any Canadians regard America as a national security threat for them. That is because it is quite unlikely that the United States has an intention to invade Canada.

For historical consideration of military strength and threat recognition, the most suitable case is great power rivalries among Britain, America, and Germany from late 19th century to early 20th century when imperialism was at the peak of its own. The United States and Germany increased military strength in accordance with their national power, but it was Kaiser’s Germany that defied the hegemony of the British Empire. Therefore, Britain allied with friendlier United States to confront Germany.

Moreover, we must remember the viewpoint of providing global public goods. In order to maintain Pax Britannica, Britain adopted the two power standard so that it could gain military predominance over possible coalition of two great powers from Germany, France, and Russia. Thanks to such a security umbrella, small powers like Benelux and Scandinavians enjoyed peace. Likewise, Asia Pacific nations enjoy peace under Pax Americana today. When Chinese leaders argue for “military strength in accordance with national power”, it appears that they lack such “understanding of history”.

One thing we have to question regarding Chinese national security policy is their territorial claims in the East and the South China Seas. Few states and non-state actors support China’s claim in both areas. Even Russia, that moves closer to China for rivalry against the West and has a territorial dispute with Japan over South Kuril Islands, stays neutral in these cases. China’s attitude to push through its territorial claim is more aggressive than that of Imperial Japan that trumpeted the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. I would like to question China’s “understanding of history” on this issue.

What makes the global community feel increasingly uneasy about China’s external policy is its oppression against domestic ethnic minorities such as Tibetans and Uyghurs. Minority right activists appeals that an appeasement with China will lead a nation to lose its independence. Such voices are taken seriously because of synergies of aggressive territorial claims in the East and the South China Seas, and inhumane oppression against ethnic minorities in China.

It seems that Chinese government officials and opinion leaders believe that just a ritual incantation of “military strength in accordance with national power” to the global media can persuade worldwide public opinion. However, I hope them to recognize the fact that their claims are hardly accepted both in Asia and the West.

New Year Greeting

Happy New Year from King Cobra for a year of snake.

American Strategy in Afghanistan after 2014

The War on Terror has begun from Afghanistan, and 2014 is a strategic turning point as security responsibility will be transferred completely from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces. Terrorist activities get intensified, in view of coalition withdrawal. Afghanistan is not just a battle ground against terrorism. It is surrounded by critical strategic areas: resource rich Central Asia to the north, Iran to the west, and Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry to the east. Though President Barack Obama was skeptic to the Iraq War, he asserted that Afghanistan was the frontline of the War on Terror. In the lecture on US army strategy at Chatham House on June 6, General Raymond Odierno included Afghanistan into the Asia Pacific region as it is closely related to security in the Indian subcontinent. Obama’s rebalance to Asia shall not lower strategic implication of Afghanistan in US national security. Given such a unique geopolitical position that Afghanistan holds, counterterrorism operations in this country is a critical test to assess the validity of Obama’s strategic shift from the Middle East to Asia. Therefore, I would like to explore American strategy in Afghanistan after 2014.

Despite critical importance as I mentioned above, Afghanistan was not a key agenda during the presidential election. Ahmad Majidyar, Senior Research Associate at the American Enterprise Institute, points out the following reasons. The election focused on the economy, and this is reflected in current congressional conflict on the fiscal cliff. In addition, American voters were fed up with costs and casualties associated with the long war. Both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney may not have talked on Afghan issue for such reasons, but that does not erode US security interests in the Af-Pak region. In face of massive withdrawal of coalition troops in 2014, Taliban and Al Qaeda are reinvigorated. In order to curb the threats of insurgents, Barack Obama and Hamid Karzai reached the security partnership agreement in May to keep some military presence along the Af-Pak border and train counterterrorism troops of Afghanistan (“Reasons behind Obama and Romney's silence over Afghanistan”; BBC Persian; 6November, 2012). NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said that 2014 Afghan presidential election will be a turning point for Afghan security (“OpeningRemarks”; NATO Speeches and Transcripts; 12 November, 2012).

The war in Afghanistan is winnable, and the United States needs to overcome domestic annoyance. However, strategic adjustment is necessary. Let me talk about current situation in Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid, author of a famous book “Taliban”, comments that pessimism prevails among Afghan watchers around the world, but troops on the ground do not necessarily agree with them. One example is a comment by US Marine Major General Mark Gurganus, the regional commander for southwestern Afghanistan, saying, "We are still a province at war, but look at the progress that has been made in Helmand Province over the past three years." The Times editorial argues furthermore, "The Taliban has not retaken territory lost to coalition forces" (“We're Winning in Afghanistan”;Foreign Policy; October 24, 2012). However, drastic reduction of the troops will ruin such achievements. Afghan warlords like Ismail Khan of Herat are arming up for self defense, for fear of security vacuum after Western troop pull out (“AfghanWarlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials”; New York Times; November 12, 2012).

Two questions need to be answered to manage Afghanistan after 2014. First, how many troops should stay there continually? Second, what kind of qualitative changes are required in American approaches to Afghanistan? But to answer the above questions, it is essential to understand why the US troops should remain there, despite domestic annoyance with the long war and Obama’s interest in Asia rather tan the Middle East. American strategists recommend a recent article by Kimberly and Frederick Kagan that articulates the reason for continual US military presence in Afghanistan.

The Kagans argue that sufficient troop level must be maintained in order to avoid terrorist attacks like what happened in Benghazi, Libya. Also, it is US presence in Afghanistan that facilitates counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. Terrorist bases in South Asia are concentrated along the Af-Pak border area such as the Federally Administered Tribal Area in Pakistan, and Konar and Nuristan provinces in Afghanistan. If the United States were to fight against terrorists in such remote areas without ground bases, the following three would be considered: armed drone planes, parachute airborne, and manned aircrafts. The former two have problems with outreach and safe return. The third option of jet planes flies too fast to identify the target. Advanced technologies are no substitute for frontline ground bases. Furthermore, ground bases must be protected from unexpected attacks. Therefore, the Kagans insist that the United States maintain 30,000 soldiers for there objectives. They argue that defeatism and “light footprint” strategy will embolden terrorists, which will lead to more serious catastrophes for US national security (“Why U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan”; Washington Post;November 24, 2012). Furthermore, Max Boot, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, points out that helicopter operations will require aerial refueling without sufficient ground bases. That poses considerable constraints on the mission (“Steep U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan brings substantialrisks”; Washington Post; December 24, 2012).

The Kagans' opinion wins trans-ideological support, and Washington Post editorial board questions why US troop level under Obama’s plan falls short of the Kagan recommendation (“A U.S. future inAfghanistan?”; Washington Post: December 2, 2012). We must consider political aspects, in addition to military strategy. The United States plans to expand diplomatic missions to Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif. Obama’s plan to cut troop level in Afghanistan drastically is contradictory to such policy objectives. Also, Obama’s troop cut makes it increasingly difficult to persuade European allies to keep sufficient presence. The problem is, Karzai wants less foreign armed forces to stay in Afghanistan, despite fragile security (“U.S. force in Afghanistan may be smaller thanexpected after 2014”; Los Angels Times; December 11, 2012).

Mutual distrust between Karzai and the West must be resolved. While the coalition forces attacked innocent civilians by mistake, the Karzai administration fails to improve governance in Afghanistan. Ransom imprisonment happens frequently, drug and natural resource trafficking prevails, and government officials monopolize development business through nepotism. As a result, people discredit the government. In view of these problems, Sarah Chayes and Frederic Grare of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that the quality of the Afghan National Security Forces counts much more than the quantity. In addition, they raise critical concerns with Pakistan’s dark connections with Afghan terrorists. For fear of encirclement by India, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) helps Afghan insurgents to prevent the Indo-Afghan partnership. Considering deleterious impacts of ISI activities, Chayes and Grare even insists on imposing sanctions on Pakistan for terrorist sponsorship (“AvoidingCatastrophic Failure in Afghanistan”; Global Ten Challenges and Opportunitiesfor the President 2013—Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; November 29,2012). Quite ironically, ISI’s ties with terrorists harm Pakistani security. The Taliban in Pakistan frequently kill Shiites, and 90 people were wounded and 5 were murdered by their bomb attack in Dera Ismail Khan on the Ashura holiday, which is a crucial ceremony for Shiites (“Pakistani Taliban claim responsibility for bomb attackon Shia procession”; Guardian; 25 November 2012).

As security responsibility will be handed over to Kabul completely in 2014, the global community needs to refocus on Afghanistan. In addition to political and military involvement as mentioned above, much broader regional framework expanding to Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent must be found. Mishandling of Afghan security after 2014 will ruin achievements that America and European allies have made. Furthermore, it will shatter American strategy both in Asia and the Middle East. 


Further link: NATO and Afghanistan

How should Japan Persuade Strategic Value of Senkakus to Americans?

The Senkaku clash between Japan and China draws worldwide attention. This is not just a disagreement on territorial sovereignty but an issue of sea lane security and offshore resource. American ambiguity on Senkakus is a problem. In view of Chinese maritime expansionism, the Senkaku Islands is a Rhineland against Adolf Hitler’s Germany. Remember British Prime Minister-then Margaret Thatcher warned of Saddam Hussein’s megalomaniac ambition to President-then George H. W. Bush, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Therefore, it is compellingly crucial to explore how Japan should persuade strategic value of the Senkaku Islands to the American public and policymakers successfully.

Actually some Americans are reluctant to get involved deeply in the Senkaku clash, though understanding the threat of Chinese expansionism. James Holmes, Associate Professor at US Naval War College, compares such psychology with Athenian position when the Peloponnesian War broke out (“Thucydides, Japan and America”; Diplomat; November 27, 2012). Referring to “The History of the Peloponnesian War” by Thucydides, Holmes points out perception gaps between a stronger partner and a weaker partner within the alliance. While a weaker ally wants to make use of power of the alliance hegemony as much as possible to maximize its national interests, a stronger ally does not want to run the risk of confronting the challenger. In the case of the Peloponnesian War, Corcyra asked Athens for help in their conflict with Corinth. As the hegemon of the Delian League, Athens sent warships to accompany the Corcyraean navy, but forbade them to fight against Corinthians unless they face imminent danger. Athenians were afraid of direct confrontation with Sparta, the archrival and the head of the Peloponnesian League. If American attitude is so ambiguous like that of Athens, Japan may be tempted to act independently, even though the United States is dragged into the Sino-Japanese clash unwillingly. The result of it simply undermines mutual trust between Japan and the United States. Ancient pundits show insightful lessons to present day strategists, but their policy implications depend on how we interpret them.

In view of fatal consequence of such halfway commitment, some American media urge the Obama administration to articulate the position to support Japan. Japan has not resort to violence in any territorial disputes with its neighbors like Russia and South Korea, in addition to China. The Christian Science Monitor argues furthermore that nuanced restraint of the Obama administration’s neutrality on Senkaku sovereignty while admitting Japanese administrative authority there, can trigger Chinese adventurism as in the case of Saddam Hussein’s invasion to Kuwait (“US must clearly back Japan in islands dispute with China”;Christian Science Monitor; October 25, 2012). Also, the Washington Free Beacon criticizes the Obama administration’s impartial approach to the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes, while General Xu Caiho, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, remarked that China be ready for possible war with Japan on September 14. This online newspaper blames that Obama fails to support key allies in East Asia in view of China’s aggressive maritime expansionism (“The Great Pacific Panic”; Washington FreeBeacon; December 6, 2012). There is no wonder that the Senate passed a resolution to back Japan about Senkakus on November 30.

However, some Americans are still reluctant to confront China for the sake of “tiny dots" on the map. How should the Japanese side persuade strategic implications of the Senkaku clash to Americans and the global community successfully? Japanese policymakers need to think of effective media campaign to appeal legitimacy of Japanese territorial claim, the thereat of Chinese expansionism, and strategic value of the Senkaku Islands. For this purpose, Japan must choose the right media and stress right focal points. Let me mention two cases. When Hitoshi Tanaka, Former Deputy Minister of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave a lecture entitled “Japan: Bridging East Asia with the Rest of the World” at Chatham House on September 12, he did not mention navy build up by China, sea lane security for East Asian nations, and natural resource disputes involved in the East and the South China Sea Though he raised critical concerns with Chinese nationalism, his emphasis on Sino-Japanese mutual economic interdependence may have obscured the danger of Chinese hegemonic instinct as remarked by Xu Caiho. It is a pity that Tanaka failed to harness such a good opportunity to send Japanese messages from a venerable and prestigious medium. See the text and the video below.

On the other hand, Yasuhisa Kawamura, Deputy Chief of Mission at New York Consulate of Japan, articulated Japanese position on Senkakus when he appeared a local TV program of New York “Inside City Hall” on October 11 this year. Kawamura explained Japan’s legitimacy from legal and historical points. Legally, Japan conducted the first research of these islands in 1885 ahead of any other nations. Those islands were uninhabited without administrative control of the Qing China. China did not object to Japanese sovereignty until oil reserve was found. In reply to a question to belittle importance of “tiny” islands, Kawamura asserted that territory is a key component of the state. I am in full respect of clear and persuasive arguments by Kawamura. However, it is questionable whether Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose the right medium. It seems that Errol Louis, Anchorman of this program, does not understand territorial issue, as he mentioned Senkakus, remote islands, and the size of a room or even a double bed. The tone he spoke in the program sounded so easy going as if he were talking about entertainment news. He even called Kawamura by the wrong title “Ambassador”. See the video below.

In addition to successful media strategy, I have to mention concerns with the rise of nationalism among the Japanese public that could worsen Japan’s impression in the global community. This will ruin any kind of efforts that Japan has ever made. In view of growing military pressure from China and defense cuts of the United States, Japan is exploring multilateral strategic partnership with Asia Pacific nations. The United States welcomes Japan’s active role in defense to prevent Chinese expansionism (“Japan Is Flexing Its MilitaryMuscle to Counter a Rising China”; New York Times; November 26, 2012). However, Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University shows concerns with growing clash of nationalism between Japan and China stemming from mutual hatred. Nye does not see any danger of Japanese return to past militarism as current Self Defense Force is under tight civilian control, despite provocative remarks by rightwing populists like Shintaro Ishihara and Toru Hashimoto. What makes him worried is the rise of overconfidence among the Chinese public which makes increasingly inward looking Japanese people more anxious of Japanese decline (“Japan’snationalism is a sign of weakness”; Financial Times; November 27, 2012). Such a spiral of self-interested mutual hatred with China can move the United States away from Japan, and lead it to an Athenian ambiguity at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

In order to persuade the United States and its allies in Asia and Europe, Japan should not talk from narrow sighted national interest, but from global public interest. Also, Japan should tell the United States that an Athenian ambiguity on Senkakus is a superpower suicide. Japan needs to learn lessons from Margaret Thatcher’s successful approach to persuade George H. W. Bush over Saddam Hussein’s invasion to Kuwait. Furthermore, Japanese policymakers must shed the Edwin Reischauer complex. He must have been a great ambassador to bridge Japan and America, but fluency in Japanese and deep understanding of Japanese culture are not necessarily vital. Rather, Japanese leaders should explore ties with American strategists who are critically concerned with Chinese expansionism, like the military, neoconservatives, and freedom advocates.

A Brief Review of US Defense and the Budget

In view of the forthcoming conflict over the fiscal cliff, the budget and defense issue is a critical problem for the United States to fulfill the role of world policeman. Numerous nations around the globe live in a liberal world order under American hegemony. I would like to discuss the problem of defense and the budget later on, but let me mention some useful references.

Does the United States overspend on the military? Defending Defense Project, jointly run by the American Enterprise Institute, the Foreign Policy Initiative, and the Heritage Foundation, released a basic guidebook entitled “Defense Spending 101”. America has not overstretched because defense spending in terms of GDP percentage has declined since the Cold War era. In addition, the United States faces multiple security challenges today, and the American economy can prosper in a stable liberal world order. Therefore, American defense capability should be maintained. Quite importantly, off shore balance is no substitute for forward presence, due to weaker deterrence in the region and lower trust from allies.

Regarding fiscal cliff, Mackenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute  comments “A common denominator in all these scenarios is that averting the fiscal cliff does not mean that things would automatically improve. The only silver bullet remains a comprehensive debt reduction deal” (“The fiscal cliff's threat to nationalsecurity”; US News and World Report; November 1, 2012).

The budget conflict is not the only reason for defense cut. Danielle Pletka, President of the AEI, concludes “There are others who hide behind fiscal responsibility in order to further their isolationist ideals. Plenty on the left. Plenty on the Ron Paul right (“Beefjerky and the nation’s defense”; American Enterprise Institute; November 15;2012).

Forgotten War in Iraq

In the presidential election this year, foreign policy was not a primary agenda, and both Obama and Romney hardly talked about Iraq and Afghanistan. However, stability in Iraq has direct influences on Iran and Syria. Also, it is necessary to keep an eye on resurgence of Al Qaeda, in view of the Benghazi attack in Libya. Not only those security challenges that matter. The regime change in Iraq has inspired youngsters in the Middle East, which led to the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Iraq was expected to turn into a show window of democracy as Japan and Germany are. America has not forgotten both allies. Why was Iraq such a small issue in the presidential election? Although the Obama administration has withdrawn troops from there, the War on Terror and security management in this country will have significant influence on the Middle East and even Sahel Africa. Fragile security in the Middle East will ruin Obama’s strategy of the pivot to Asia. Therefore, we must not dismiss what happens in Iraq after the pull out of the Western coalition.

To begin with, I would like to talk about current security environment around Iraq. Unlike President Barack Obama’s declaration as “sovereign, stable, and self reliant Iraq” when US forces withdrew from this country last December, things go the opposite. Frederick Kagan, Director at the American Enterprise Institute, and Kimberly Kagan, President at the Institute of the Study of War, point out that the Obama administration fails to make Iraq a reliable security partner (“Losing Iraq”; National Review; October 15, 2012). After the withdrawal, only 150 US military personnel stay in Iraq, but they are not engaged neither in training nor combat missions with Iraqi forces. As a result, US-Iraqi counterterrorism cooperation dwindled precipitously, and Al Qaeda revives. Violence increased since the withdrawal, particularly by the Islamic State of Iraq which is a frontline organization of Al Qaeda Iraq. Since they are Sunni, sectarian battles against Shiite militia led by Moqtada al-Sadr are being intensified.

In addition, Iranian influence is growing. Iran uses Iraqi air space to supply military equipments for the Assad regime in Syria. Iraqi air force is too weak to expel Iranian air intrusion without staunch security partnership with the United States. Iranian influence penetrates into the Iraqi authority. After the United States handed over Shiite extremists to the Maliki administration, Iraqi court decided to release them without disbanding their militias required by Iraqi law.

Strong US military presence in Iraq could have checked Al Qaeda and Iran as envisioned in the Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2008. However, the Obama administration refused the Maliki administration’s request for US deterrence in Iraq. It is a common security interest for both the United States and Iraq to stop Al Qaeda from building their bases in this country. Obama’s reluctance for defense involvement in Iraq is utterly strange, and it appears to me that he does not learn the lesson of 9-11, that is, America’s low attention to terrorist heaven in Afghanistan led to the attacks. Remember the Benghazi attack was done by Al Qaeda. The success in killing Osama bin Laden does not guarantee the end of the War on Terror.

If the Obama administration is so reluctant to deepen military commitment in Iraq, and wants to shift resource and manpower to Asia, then, the United States needs to use more diplomatic measures to keep Iraq close. Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, mentions communication gaps in US-Iraqi diplomatic channels. On the American side, few diplomats sent to Baghdad speak Arabic fluently.  It appears to me that things are somewhat similar to the case of the Iranian revolution. Just before the fall of the shah, there were not sufficient Farsi speaking US diplomats and CIA agents in Iran. Consequently, the Carter administration failed to act adequately. Will the Obama administration make the same mistake?

On the Iraqi side, they have not founded reliable diplomatic channels in Washington. America is a typical country of pluralistic democracy. Therefore, diplomacy with the United States needs informal gateways through the media, think tank, and the Congress, in addition to formal ones through the State Department, Pentagon, and the White House. Since Iraq has not founded such gateways, Washington policymakers pay little attention to Iraqi voices in dealing with Syria, Iran, and Al Qaeda (“Iraqidiplomacy has no voice in Washington”;Al Aalem; November 1, 2012). Rubin argues this just a problem on the Iraqi side, but I think that the American side needs to help Iraq found informal diplomacy network in the United States. That is because every communication is mutual.

As the only senator voted against the Iraq War, President Obama may want to this war swept way into oblivion. However, foreign policy needs national consistency, regardless of power rotation. Drastic contraction of US commitment to Iraq will undermine long awaited vision of Middle East democratization, while aspiration for freedom is rising in this region. Historically, Bagdad had been a center of the Arab world, from the era of the Abbassid caliphate to British rule after the Ottoman Empire. Considering regional impacts,         the Obama administration must reconsider the Iraq policy. No Middle East stability, no pivot to Asia.

Japanese Conservatives Must Affirm the Postwar Regime Change

As the Noda administration appears increasingly lame duck, LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) leader Shinzo Abe is likely to become the next prime minister in Japan. Along with Abe and other LDP politicians, conservative voices are rising in the “third pole” led by ultra-nationalist Shintaro Ishihara and populist Toru Hashimoto. Quite a large portion of the above conservative politicians advocate a “reconsideration of the postwar regime”, and many of them openly criticize “imposed” democratization by the United States. It is critically concerned that such a remark will send a wrong message to the global community that Japan is moving toward prewar nationalism.

Rather, I would propose that Japan affirm the postwar regime change for much more active role in the Western alliance. Remember that all LDP leaders since the Koizumi administration supported regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan led by the United States, both of which are modeled after postwar Japan and Germany. Logically, it does not make sense to support Middle East democratization, while denouncing “imposed” reforms in the postwar era by US led occupational forces. Ever since Junnichiro Koizumi, LDP prime ministers endorsed regime changes to win the War on Terror and stop nuclear proliferation, particularly to terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda. I have no doubt in their sincerity to stand with American forces to overthrow Saddam Hussein and Taliban. Koizumi’s successors were in his cabinet when both wars broke out. Taro Aso advocated the Arch of Freedom and Prosperity, which was in line with the Bush administration’s initiatives. Though the Obama administration decided to withdraw troops from both countries while terrorism is still strong, the global community explores to help their reconstruction and train their security forces, including Iraq war opponents like France and Germany. Japan has hosted the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Therefore, instead of quibbling over US occupational rule in the past, Japan should act as a role model of model of regime change from the Middle East to China, including Tibet, East Turkistan. That is, Japan can show the successful step toward democracy, and persuade citizens in those countries to follow the same path. This will bolster Japan’s position on the global stage. Remember that there is nothing wring with Japan’s support for regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Japanese leaders should be more confident of it.

I have no objection to changing obsolete and dysfunctional systems, regardless of ideology. DPJ (Democratic Party Japan) liberals like Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan, and Katsuya Okada also insisted on reviewing postwar Japanese politics with regard to the US-Japanese alliance and Kasumigaseki bureaucracy, which simply resulted in paralyzing Japanese domestic politics and worsening relations with the United States. Whoever the next prime minister is, such horrible mistake should not be repeated.It is quite worrisome that the global public will misinterpret the “Reconsideration of the Postwar Regime” as a complete denial of regime changes and democratization in both Japan and Germany. Furthermore, Japan would be isolated from both Asia and the West if such misinterpretation prevails.

Let me talk about US-Japanese relations. Japan handlers in Washington political corridor may be generous to Japanese conservative aspiration to “independence” as long as they are sincere to develop security partnership against threats in East Asia like China and North Korea, and those on the global stage like Al Qaeda, Iran, and so forth. However, not all Americans share such mindsets. Some media may cast doubt on inconsistency to advocate close US-Japanese alliance and collective security against autocracies while denouncing an "imposed" regime change by Douglas McArthur. In other words, a "Reconsideration of the Postwar Regime" can be interpreted immature anti-Americanism, if it does not mean clearly. This can lead Japan to be isolated from democratic partners both in Asia and the West. The core of postwar regime change is the pacifist constitution. It has already accomplished a historical role to impress Japanese regime change to the global community, and that role is over as global security environment has changed. Therefore, I am in full support of changing the constitution.

It is understandable that not everything of postwar occupational rule was good. Also, not everything of prewar Japan was bad. The Taisho democracy was a marvelous achievement. While Meiji reforms are heavily dependent on Western thoughts introduced by elites, Taisho movements are initiated entirely by Japanese grassroots. It was beyond universal suffrage. Women and burakumin (social outcastes) stood up to improve their social position. People’s demand for freedom and equality spread nation wide. Had the Taisho democracy been successful, Japan could have democratized Prussian styled Meiji constitution without any foreign intervention. Regretfully, the Taisho democracy was destroyed by itself, just as the Weimar democracy in Germany did, which gave way to militarism. That is why we have to review the prewar political culture critically.

Currently, Shinzo Abe is most likely to succeed Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. In view of the lost 20 years, obsolete and dysfunctional systems should be dismantled. But whoever the next prime minister is, or whatever the leader’s ideological standpoint is, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of a “Reconsideration of the Postwar Regime”, in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings both globally and domestically. Along with Germany, Japan is a role model to prevail democracy throughout the world, and this is the vital point to for Japan to deepen the alliance with the United States, develop strategic partnership with free nations of the West and Asia, and enhance its presence on the global stage. Remember Japan’s contribution to Iraq and Afghanistan! Historical revisionism simply ruins what Japan has achieved on the global stage.