How does a generative AI tell us about a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world?

US President Donald Trump articulates more radicalized MAGA and America First position in his second term, without being moderated by adults in the room. As seen in his transactional pursuit of a peace deal in Ukraine, the world is turning toward a disorder. In such a world, Liberal Democracies need a risk hedge to override the chaos by MAGA-jacked America. A Euro-Japanese alliance could serve this objective, but it would not be an alternative but a supplement of the trans-Atlantic and the US-Japanese alliances. It is still unrealistic for American allies worldwide to throw away the security umbrella completely. In an increasingly complicated world like this, can generative AI show some policy directions for the future? As an example, I would like to talk about Grok answers to my questions on a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world.

Grok is a recently added generative AI application on Twitter (Currently, X). Based on the profile summary from my tweets, it explained briefly about a Euro-Japanese alliance as follows. There are strategic rationales from three points, Russian threats in both Europe and Asia, Chinese BRI worldwide and anti-FOIP challenges, and predatory America First by Trump. In practice, Europe and Japan would be able to pursue military cooperation such as intelligence sharing and joint R&D of weapons, and economic policy coordination. Politically, a united Euro-Japanese voice at the UN and G7 would boost the rule-based world order, which would help small nations such as Ukraine, Baltic states, and Taiwan stand up against predatory great powers in their neighborhood like Russia and China. The problem is geographical remoteness of both sides and American discomfort with being sidelined from the alliance.

This is just a typical textbook introduction of the main agenda, and further conversations are necessary to judge the real thinking capability of generative AI. Among those questions, I would like to focus on whether Grok understands lengthy and complicated questions properly, not just words but nuances, and how it streamlines the direction of the argument lucidly. Let’s see some unorthodox ones of my own interest, rather than something orthodox and expectable about Euro-Japanese relations and Trump's America (1).

【Question 1】: Trump told the media that only the monkey model of the F-47, the next generation fighter jets, is available for allies. That is what the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. His brain is Russified so much. Should American allies invest more in independent high-tech weapons such as GCAP and FCAS fighters? Also, Trump's remark does not make sense, as Iran's F-14s have been in poor condition since the Islamic Revolution. It seems that he is interested in sales profit from the next-generation fighter rather than global security.

In reply, Grok admitted my concerns with monkey model provisionally, that Trump may not have “Russified” his mindsets but he prioritizes export profit of the F-47 for the United States to the security of allies. Regarding whether allies should invest in the GCAP by Britain, Japan, and Italy, or the FCAS by France, Germany, and Spain, instead of “dubious” F-47 (2)(3), Grok outlines both R&D projects, and concluded that the GCAP meets Japan’s timetable for deployment(4) against China, but future acquisition of the F-47 should not be ruled out even though it is downgraded. I understand this reply that it takes years for R&D of the next generation fighter, and the future US administration could permit regular model exports of it. Also, it did not mention a shock of supply chain cut if a Trump-like nationalist stop component exports of this fighter jet as it happened in the case of Iranian F-14s(5). AI does not answer everything.

Nevertheless, this AI application mentioned the vital point of my question that Soviet-styled monkey model export by Trump illustrates his deep-rooted America First mindsets. As to this question, though lengthy and not so simple, generative AI understands my intention so profoundly. Quite interestingly, I mistyped GCAP for GPAC in the question, but Grok interpreted it correctly.

【Question 2】: Now, a question about nuclear deterrence. Should Japan help R&D to boost British and French nuclear capability while not possessing its own nuclear weapons? Japan, as an independent nuclear power, would accelerate the collapse of the global non-proliferation regime, which in turn would pose critical threats to its national security. Also, how about Japan's nuclear sharing with both countries, in case Trump's America abdicates its allies?

This question is quite controversial as Japan maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons into its territory. However, since America’s nuclear umbrella is turning unreliable in Trump’s second term, a risk hedge is a critical issue for Japan. Grok replied to my question from two points, R&D and nuclear sharing. While it mentions positively about the former, somewhat cautiously about the latter. Japan has money and technology to help Britain and France bost their nuclear capability. Also, it is not the interest of the global community if Japan runs the risk of provoking proliferation to other non-nuclear powers to destroy the global arms control regime by possessing its own nuclear arsenals. This is also the case with Japan’s nuclear sharing with Britain and France. However, nuclear sharing could trigger anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan more seriously for fear of escalating tensions with China. Also, an increasingly nationalist United States might doubt Japan’s loyalty to the alliance if such a risk hedge were explored.

But I do not necessarily agree to Grok’s concerns with “nukes on home soil is taboo” among the Japanese because British and French nuclear weapons would not be deployed permanently as most of them are not land-based. They just come to naval or air force facilities in Japan when necessary. After all, a sovereign and independent nuclear deterrence is the last of the last of the last resort for Japan. Therefore, I would argue that it necessary to think about a nuclear security partnership with Britain and France both in terms of quality and quantity, to fill a vacuum of superpower suicide by a populist-jacked America regardless of partisanship. Currently, their nuclear deterrence is too small, even if combined (6).

Quite interestingly, Britain is reconsidering its dependence on the US-made Trident SLBM as the governance of Trump’s America is a critical risk to its national security. Currently, the following three options are considered for its sovereign independent nuclear weapons. That is to build up deterrence by itself or with France. But in both cases, the economy of scale for nuclear R&D is restricted. Therefore, the third option that is to boost Britain’s nuclear deterrence within the Euro-Atlantic multilateral framework such as NATO is considered (7). In that case, some Pacific nations like Japan, Australia, etc. could join the project.

【Question 3】: The problem is not just geopolitics. The fall of democracy in Trump's America is a fatal problem, as mentioned in a recent article by Chris Patten in Project Syndicate. Though he was very close to pro-American Thatcher, as opposed to pro-EU Heseltine, he insists that Britain be more sovereign and autonomous from MAGA-jacked America. He understands both Europe and Asia through his career in politics. Given this, how would a Euro-Japanese alliance lead value-oriented diplomacy of the world when America is withdrawing the freedom ideal and humanitarianism?

As I mention in the question, UK Lord Chris Patten was a devoted Atlanticist and a darling of the Reagan-Thatcher world order, and a consummate British diplomat both in Asia and Europe as the last governor of Hong Kong and former European Commissioner for External Relations. From this career background, Patten argues Britain downgrade the decades-long special relationship with the United States because Trump’s America is no longer the bearer of freedom values as seen in the January 6 riot. As the ex-Chancellor of Oxford University, he reflects on the history of the Anglo-American alliance since Winston Churchill academically, to argue that Trump destroyed the fundamental premise of shared values. Therefore, Patten urges Prime Minister Keir Starmer that Britain not to give in to every demand that Trump makes (8). Quite appallingly, Starmer is repealing hate speech laws in return for a favorable trade deal with Trump’s America (9). What a horrible kowtow that the Labour adopts a MAGA policy! In addition, Trump’s sheer lack of knowledge in history and geopolitics is revealed in his big power-focused diplomacy, because World Wars began from small countries such as Sebia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as Patten mentions.

Considering chaotic governance in current America and poor understanding of international affairs by its incumbent president, a Euro-Japanese alliance could complement the lack of US leadership in value-oriented diplomacy. Let me review the Grok reply. Besides shared values of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, both sides are committed to humanitarian issues such as disaster relief and the environment. Their respect for a rule-based world order leads them to object to Trump’s way of racketeering of small nations in the name of deal diplomacy. That makes the global security environment favorable for authoritarian powers, but Trump does not care. From the experience of negotiating with China regarding democratic governance of Hong Kong, Patten learned the danger of making an impetuous compromise with authoritarian power. If Trump is really abdicating Ukraine and Taiwan, a Euro-Japanese alliance could fill the vacuum to help Patten’s vison of reorganizing the League of Democracies. But we have to remember that neither Europe nor Japan can replace the current US-centered alliance with the alliance of democratic middle power simply though moral high grounds, because the United States is too big and strong despite Trump, and separated geography may split strategic priority of Europe and Japan.

Finally, the most critical issue of the world order today is Trump tariffs. How should a Euro-Japanese alliance manage the trade war with Trump’s America? I asked the following question recently(10).

【Question 4】: The trade negotiations are not only about the global economic regime, but also about geopolitics. Although more multilateral approaches are desirable, some countries seem to prioritize their deal-making with Trump rather than standing against his America First trade policy through multilateral solidarity. Among them, I would like to ask about two major economies.
(1) Japan is willing to reach an early agreement with Trump, but if it is hasty, will it set a bad precedent for other countries’ trade talks? Is the Ishiba administration too Japan First?
(2) Britain suggested repealing hate speech laws in return for tariff cuts. If the Labour cabinet accepts MAGA agendas so easily, the Conservative Party could move farther to the right, which could prompt an ideological surenchère in Britain’s domestic politics. Will it help Elon Musk’s MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) initiative to provoke right-wing populism in Europe, which would ultimately disunify NATO and the EU?

Regarding Japan, Grok admits the risk of becoming a bad precedent, but comments that Ishiba is not so much Japan First with his close policy coordination with FOIP participants and NATO. This counterargument has some points as Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba stressed Japan’s role to mediate the United States and ASEAN nations in the trade war on his recent visit to Vietnam and the Philippines (11). Still, there is a concern that Japan’s rush for a hasty agreement could break up the world trade order. In the trade talk with Trump’s America, Ishiba officials mention almost entirely about Japan’s national interest. That sounds quite Japan First for a staunch proponent of the liberal world order and Never Trumper like me.

As to Britain, Grok admits my concern that Starmer’s concession to MAGA would embolden Conservative rightwing or even Reform UK. Furthermore, infiltration of MAGA political culture would boost anti-EU or anti-NATO sentiments throughout Europe, which would Elon Musk’s MEGA agitation. Grok refers to my previous question about Patten’s warning in its reply that a U.S. democratic backslide empowers Europe’s illiberal fringes, and Labour’s concessions could grease that slide. While acting cautiously, pro-EU Starmer explores new trade and security partnership with the EU to counter Trump (12).

Prior to this, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for an international coordination in macroeconomic and financial policy to overcome worldwide recession and inflation by Trump tariffs as the global community did in the 2008 financial crisis (13). Also, he advocates collective initiatives for the new world order of reconstructed rule of law that incorporates emerging economies. A Euro-Japanese alliance that I mention can listen to them to rearrange rule-based multilateralism against sharp power transactionalism by Trump's America, Putin's Russia, and Xi Jinping's China. For this objective, Brown urges the UK to restore strategic partnership with the EU in security and the economy to override the post-Brexit shock (14).

Generative AI is quite helpful in streamlining thoughts and occasionally, realizing overlooked points, particularly in exploring complicated issue like a Euro-Japanese alliance in the world of increasing uncertainty. Also, it would be helpful for teachers to get used to AI thinking, in order to check AI cheating by students when they submit reports and essays. Finally, we have to notice that Elon Musk uses AI for his controversial work at the DOGE, and a familiarity with this application would be useful to understand his strange ways of thinking. After all, AI is no panacea to resolve the problem. The answer by the AI depends on the quality of question by each person. Also, various AIs are emerging and evolving one after another, and each of them has its own strength and weakness. We have to bear it in mind to discuss the issue of a Euro-Japanese alliance in the Trump world. More questions and deeper questions to AI are necessary to explore this matter furthermore.



Footnotes:
(1) Grok Chat

(2) "Sixth-Generation Fighter Showdown: F-47, GCAP, FCAS, and J-36 (Baidi)"; European Defence Review; 24 March, 2025

(3) "Will Boeing’s F-47 ‘KILL’ European GCAP & FCAS Programs As U.S. Could Export 6th-Gen Jets To Allies?"; Eurasian Times; March 23, 2025

(4) "Global Combat Air Programme Joint Statement"; UK Government; 20 November 2024

(5) "How Iran manages to keep its F-14 Tomcats flying"; Key Aero; August 2, 2022

(6) "Can Europe Build Its Own Nuclear Umbrella?"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; April 3. 2025

(7) "The UK’s nuclear deterrent relies on US support – but there are no other easy alternatives"; Chatham House; 24 March, 2025

(8) "Britain Must Downgrade the Special Relationship"; Project Syndicate; February 28, 2025

(9) "Starmer told UK must repeal hate speech laws to protect LGBT+ people or lose Trump trade deal"; Independent; 16 April, 2025

(10) Grok Chat

(11) "Japan's role for ASEAN increasingly crucial amid US tariff standoff"; Mainichi Shimbun; April 30, 2025

(12) "UK and EU defy Trump with new strategic partnership to boost trade and security"; Guardian; 29 April, 2025

(13) "Trump is pushing the world towards recession. By learning the lessons of 2008, we can still prevent it"; Giardian; 10 April, 2025

(14) "The ‘new world order’ of the past 35 years is being demolished before our eyes. This is how we must proceed"; Guardian; 12 April, 2025

Do not trust Rubio the Turncoat, the new Secretary of State!

Republican Senator Marco Rubio was unanimously approved for the Secretary of State on President Donald Trump’s inauguration day for his second term. He is one of the less controversial nominees among the Trump administration, and therefore, he is the first cabinet member to be appointed in the Second Trump administration (1). There is no doubt that Rubio is far better than some of Trump’s picks. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was harshly questioned his credential for his alcoholism and sexual violence. But with the tie-breaking vote by Vice President JD Vance, he was barely approved at the Senate (2). Director of National Intelligence nominee Tulsi Gabbard is also severely questioned for her affinity with Russia and ex-President Bashar Assad of Syria. British national security circles are critically concerned with this as her appointment would devastate the intelligence cooperation of the Five Eyes (3). Rubio is not regarded so problematic as those picks, but we have to remember his flip flop in foreign policy ever since he surrendered Trump in the Republican primary of the presidential election in 2016. Also, his flattering apology for his campaign ridicule to Trump appeared a miserable kowtow to the alpha male gorilla, as Trump attacked him with abusive words more cruelly.

Rubio has been engaged in foreign affairs in the House and the Senate for a long time, before running for the presidential election when the Obama term was ending. In the Republican primary, he upheld the New American Century ideal, which was more in resonance with former Republican candidate John McCain’s vision of American leadership in the world, rather than Trump’s America First. He was well aware of the impact of turmoil overseas on US national security in an increasingly interconnected world. Therefore, he criticized President-then Barack Obama’s “nation-building at home” policy for massive cuts in defense spending, skepticism for moral diplomacy, and appeasement to the enemies worldwide including Russia, China, Iran, Islamic extremists, etc. Quite importantly, he endorsed enduring American commitment to Asia, Europe, and the Middle East for global security and prosperity (4). After the surrender, Rubio conformed his foreign policy views with Trump’s America First, although he had schooled the notion of nuclear triad in the primary debate to the alpha male gorilla who has far less knowledge and experience in foreign policy than him (5).

Such inconsistency was criticized by Rubio’s ex-foreign policy advisor Max Boot. In an interview with PBS News in 2021, Boot commented that he was disappointed with Rubio because he changed the attitude to Trump after suspended his campaign. When Rubio stayed in the race, he questioned Trump’s credentials for the commander in chief because the alpha male gorilla knew fatally little about nuclear arms control. But after dropping out, Rubio began to speak about Trump’s causes and even to emulate his words and phrases (6). Clearly, the cabinet position is a reward for such loyalty to the alpha male. Quite noticeably, Robert Kagan, who was a foreign policy advisor for Republican presidential candidates John McCain and Mitt Romney as Boot was, joined the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s team. Kagan may have recognized something to indicate the degradation of the Republican Party even though Trump was regarded as the joke candidate in the earlier stage. Also, he may have recognized some character deficiencies with Rubio as shown in his servile “Don’t go against the tide” attitude to Trump.

At the Senate confirmation hearing before the inauguration, Rubio outlined his foreign policy views, which were starkly at odds with those of the New American Century that he upheld in his 2016 campaign. He argued for a foreign policy of “realistic” approaches on Ukraine, humanitarian aid, and other global issues. Implicitly, that word implies a foreign policy of restraint such as the offshore balancing strategy of Obama. Therefore, he has reversed his initial ideas in his presidential bid, and defends Trump’s America First unabashedly. From that point of view, he regards competition in technology and the global markets, and in politico-military influence with China far more critical to national security than rivalry in global and Eurasian geostrategy, and in ideological superiority with Russia. His China hawk vision is intertwined with protectionist trade policy to “rebuild domestic industrial capacity”, which is a deviation from his free trade view in the 2016 presidential bid (7). As he stated in the hearing, the confirmed Secretary of State declared to freeze humanitarian foreign aid to meet America First demand, i.e., not to fund projects which Trump thought useless to help US interests in the economy and national security directly, such as democracy promotion, empowerment, etc (8). But in face of criticism, Rubio waived the freeze of “humanitarian” projects for lifesaving such as medical service, public health, food supply, etc, except those for abortion and LGBTQ issues. The decision leaves American foreign aid workers in a complete mess as the definition of “lifesaving” is unclear, and they cannot decide whether to continue or stop their activities (9). That is the consequence of Rubio’s Trump First management of the State Department.

With such servile loyalty to Trump, Rubio visited Latin America including Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica for his first foreign trip as the Secretary of State, in order to dismantle growing influence of China (10). Rubio’s Hispanic background was taken into account upon his nomination, which indicates the Trump administration places heavy emphasis on America’s southern backyard, in order to implement the Monroe Doctrine of this century as shown in Trump’s vexing remarks on Canada, Greenland, and Panama Canal. Alexander Gray, senior fellow of the American Foreign Policy Council and former chief of staff at the National Security Council in Trump’s first term presidency, justifies this new Monroe Doctrine in his recent article in Foreign Policy. Quite disappointingly, he is preoccupied with edging out influence of America’s strategic opponents from Latin America, but hardly mentions visionary ideas to deepen mutual partnership in regional security, economic development, governance and empowerment, as cited proudly in the Alliance for Progress by President John F Kennedy in the 1960s. Trump-styled Monroe Doctrine that Gray advocates is narrow-sightedly driven by the fear of China, and he speaks geopolitical rivalry from victimhood mindsets, i.e., America’s strategic interests are infringed. He does not show the slightest idea about America’s role as the guardian of the liberal world order (11).

The prospect of Trump diplomacy in Latin America is dismal, according to Rodrigo Moura an international infrastructure projects lawyer and a PhD. candidate at the University of Essex. Whether right or left, Latin American and Caribbean nations are exploring more diversified foreign relations, rather than predominant dependence on the United States in the past. More critically, Trump scapegoats Latin American counties to appeal to his MAGA rock solid base, as shown in his coercive tariff on Colombia over the undocumented immigrant deportation dispute. That would nurture anti-American sentiments furthermore, which would ultimately help China. As long as Rubio represents Trump’s MAGA agenda in domestic politics such as trade and immigrants, it is unlikely that he would improve American reputation in the region (12). And globally, Trump`s Monroe Doctrine places disproportionate emphasis on China over Russia, as MAGA voters regard geopolitics in Europe as remote and irrelevant to them, while they are imperiled with Chinese threat to their jobs. Trump wants to split China and Russia as Henry Kissinger did in history. However, the Sino-Soviet rift had already existed before Kissinger’s secret diplomacy. Today, China and Russia are not in rift but aligned as shown in BRICS meeting and the war in Ukraine. Lopsided China hawk views among MAGA republicans are wrong (13). After all, Rubio has Trumpified himself as typically seen in his defense of Trump’s unhumanitarian “Riviera” comment about Gaza (14), while calling Latin American autocracies including Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba enemies of humanity (15).

With more uncompromisingly MAGA Trump and increasingly subservient cabinet members are in, America today has changed from a bright power (bearer of rules and norms for the world order) to a dark power (unabashed pursuer of beggar thy neighbor policy at the expense of others). Even unanimously approved secretary of state is strongly influenced by rightwing populism at home. American allies are rearranging relations with America of Trump 2.0. Europe is exploring strategic autonomy acceleratingly, which requires Britain’s reengagement with the Continent as Prime Minister Keir Starmer insisted in the general election last July. However, Trump appears to split Britain from the rest of Europe in the tariff war (16). He even considers the United Kingdom as the first country to visit in this term (17). Despite that, as Trump considers 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum import unanimously, it is not clear how much would it hit non-EU Britain (18). Above all, Trump’s trade war is at odds with his demand for a self-reliant Europe in defense against Russia, because that will break the unity and weaken resilience of them.

As to Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba ended his diplomatic meeting with Trump successfully for the time being. However, Tobia Harris, a Japanese politics analyst, mentioned that the second term Trump does not need advices from a foreign leader, and therefore, the Abe legacy does not necessarily work for him (19). Therefore, Japan should still keep alert to Trump’s sporadic words and deeds. Remember, ex-Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes comments in recent article in the New York Times that Trump suddenly expresses territorial greed for Canada, Greenland, and Panama Canal, which was not stated in his election pledge (20). Japan is a fragile blossom without the umbrella of multilateral security structure, but it has long experience of diplomatic relations with “bad guys”, thanks to “pragmatic peaceful realism” by Tanzan Ishibashi as mentioned in the interview with Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya by Professor Yuichi Hosoya of Keio University (21). The notable case is the JICA’s training for Ukrainian demining in Cambodia under the Hun Sen administration (22). Such experience would be helpful to treat Trump.

Finally, I would like to mention that Secretary Rubio still understands the importance of bipartisan foreign policy, despite his submissive attitude to Trump the alpha male gorilla. He proposed a bill with Democratic Senator Tim Kaine to stop unilateral withdrawal from NATO by the president in 2023 (23). Hopefully, he would give priority to his conscience over personal loyalty to his boss when national and global security is critically tested.



Footnotes:
(1) "Senate confirms Marco Rubio as secretary of state, giving Trump the first member of his Cabinet"; AP News; January 21, 2025

(2) "Vance Breaks Tie To Confirm Pete Hegseth For Pentagon"; Daily Wire; January 25, 2025

(3) Twitter; @carolecadwalla; November 14, 2024

(4) "Marco Rubio's Foreign Policy Vision"; Council on Foreign Relations; May 13, 2015

(5) "Marco Rubio schools Donald Trump on the nuclear triad"; Politico; December 15, 2015

(6) "Max Boot: “Extremists” in Control of the Republican Party"; PBS News; October 22, 2021

(7) "Rubio details what Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy will entail"; Washington Post; January 15, 2025

(8) "State Department freezes new funding for nearly all US aid programs worldwide"; AP News; January 25, 2025

(9) "Rubio backtracks on near-total foreign aid freeze, issues humanitarian waiver"; Washington Post; January 28, 2025

(10) "Rubio Sends Strong Message With Destination Of His First Foreign Trip"; Daily Wire; January 23, 2025

(11) "Trump Will End U.S. Passivity in the Western Hemisphere"; Foreign Policy; January 13, 2025

(12) "Can Marco Rubio Help Rebuild US Influence in Latin America – and Erode China’s?"; Dilomat; January 29, 2025

(13) "Transition 2025: Events Will Test Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Promises"; Council on Foreign Relations; December 13, 2024

(14) "Trump aides defend Gaza takeover proposal but walk back some elements"; Reuters News; February 6, 2025

(15) Twitter; @StateDept; February 6, 2025

(16) "Trump's Tariff Threats Drive New Wedge Between UK and Europe"; Financial Post; February 4, 2025

(17) "Trump says Starmer is doing ‘a very good job’ ahead of phone call between two leaders"; Leading Britain's Conversation; 26 January, 2025

(18) "Donald Trump’s tariffs: what’s happening and what could it mean for the UK?"; Full Fact; 4 February, 2025

(19) "LDP election, 'Who is America alarmed with?'"; Sankei Shimbun; September 17, 2024

(20) "This Isn't the Donald Trump America Elected"; New York Times; February 9, 2025

(21) "Interview with Foreign Minister Iwaya: Japanese foreign policy in 2025"; Gaiko; January/February 2025

(22) "Japan partners with Cambodia to share demining knowledge with Ukraine, other countries"; AP News; July 7, 2024

(23) "Congress approves bill barring presidents from unilaterally exiting NATO"; Washington Post; December 18, 2023