Academics and policy watchers explore various information sources to find the key to understanding the unpredictability of the Trump administration. To understand specific policies, some publications and comments by cabinet members and other senior officials are helpful. However, it is President Donald Trump himself who makes the final decision about everything. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the driving force behind his offensive and sometimes self-destructing words and deeds.
The keyword to explain his populist thoughts and behavior is called “thin centered ideology” by a Dutch political scientist, Associate Professor Cas Mudde at the University of Georgia in the United States. I came across this word when I read one post about populism and Trump tariffs in "LSE British Politics and Policy Blog" (1). In that blog post, the notion of “thin centered ideology” is explained as an anti-elitist ideology without solid values and policies. Mudde’s theory draws much attention from Japanese academics, too. Professor Yoshihiko Takahashi at Hokkai Gakuen University comments that Populism is defined as a “thin-centered ideology” that sees society as ultimately divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, that is, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt élites", and this worldview asserts that politics should be an expression of the "general will" of the people. Interestingly, he mentions that populists ask the right questions about social contradictions, but respond with wrong answers (2). I would like to talk about Trump’s thin-centered ideology on three issues: trade, anti-Semitism, and Iran.
1. Trade
Since the first term, Trump tariffs have been the tool of bluff in his trade negotiations. But it is quite doubtful what he has achieved through such high-handed postures. Those tariff assaults seem to be reality shows to entertain frustrated MAGA voting base. In the first term, Trump tariffs broke NAFTA but similar regional free trade deal was made with Canada and Mexico. Similarly, Trump withdraw his tariff hike on China, once he reached an interim deal. In the second term, Trump’s trade policy turns more erratic, and instrumentalizes for broader political objectives such as imposing pressure on Canada and Latin American countries regarding deported immigrants and illegal drug flows. Historically, populist trade agendas are anti- élitist and politically perverted to charm angry mobs. Quite interestingly, when such high-handed negotiation turns unfavorable, Trump withdraws his demand immediately. Therefore, he is nicknamed TACO, Trump Always Chickens Out.
Among America’s trade partners, Trump hits China most bitterly to appeal his tough posture to his MAGA base in the Rust Belt. But sane economists snub such a reality show since Trump’s election campaign. It is not China but labor movement to the Sun Belt that has led to job losses in the Rust Belt. Trump’s tariff attack is completely off the point (3). More typically, "thin-centered ideology" is seen in the trade talks with Brazil. He threatens President Lula da Silva with a 50% tariff bluff, unless his country releases former President Jair Bolsonaro who is currently in custody for his failed coup attempt after the presidential election in 2022. Trump infringes on criminal jurisdiction of other country, which is intolerable from the rule of law perspective. Furthermore, the United States has been in surplus in trade with Brazil since 2007 (4). What is the objective of Trump’s tariff hike? Are those trade talks just reality shows of bullying foreign trade partners and free trade inclined establishment?
2. Anti-Semitism
Blaming college research and education as left-oriented, Trump infringes on academic freedom. Along with denouncing DEI movements in college campuses, Trump labels student rallies against Israeli attack on Gaza as woke and anti-Semitist. But it does not make sense as Trump and his associates have been endorsing far right movements in Europe. In the first term, Trump’s ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell anguished German the public through his interference to strengthen political contact with right-wing AfD (5). In the second term, Elon Musk launched notorious MEGA campaign. Also, Trump’s election campaign was boosted by social media activist Nick Funtes who is a notorious holocaust denier. In addition, some Trump administration officials are closely tied with anti-Semitists to promote their right-wing views. Paul Ingrassia, White House liaison to the Department of Homeland Security, is closely in contact with holocaust deniers including Funtes. At the Department of Justice, Trump’s pick of Ed Martin to the Attorney for the District of Columbia (currently, Pardon Attorney) raised concerns for his praise of a Nazi sympathizer Hale-Cusanelli. Also, FBI Director Kash Patel hosted a holocaust denier Stew Peters to his podcast before his inauguration (6). If anti-Semitism matters so much, why did Trump appoint them?
Nevertheless, “thin-centered ideology” does not care such logical contradictions. MAGA mobs align with Zionist extremist not because they are pro-Jewish but because they are driven by anti-establishment and xenophobia, particularly Muslims hate sentiments. Those anti-intellectualists label protests against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Gaza policy as woke and pro-terrorist. That is Trump’s definition of anti-Semitism. Therefore, there is nothing strange that holocaust deniers, Christian nationalists and other right-wingers resonate with Trump’s case. However, Israelis do not necessarily support Netanyahu on Gaza as it gives insufficient consideration to hostages taken by Hamas (7). Also, Jews in the USA are not necessarily blind supporters of Israel (8). Quite a few Jews are critical to Zionist extremism. Trump’s anti-Semitism is poorly grounded, but a thin-centered ideology interprets the term in its own preference.
3. Iran
The recent conflict with Iran is another case of Trump’s thin-centered ideology as he swung from isolationism to military adventurism. While Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in his first term, he initiated “peaceful” bilateral negotiations with Iran for nuclear nonproliferation in the second term. As seen in Syria and Afghanistan in his first term, Trump wanted to lower US military involvement in the Middle East. However, Netanyahu drew Trump’s America into Israeli attack on Iran. From Arab viewpoints, Israel and the United States share common enemies, notably, anti-Zionist extremists and Iran. Also, Arabs are impressed with Netanyahu’s political skill to control America regardless of partisanship (9). Israel has leverage to keep the United States on its side through pro-Israeli lobbying and Christian right-wingers. Among successive prime ministers of this country, Netanyahu is outstandingly good at communicating with those groups and American audiences (10). Also, he may have exploited Trump’s distrust of US intelligence as shown in his sidelining of DNI Director Tulsi Gabbard. Trump attacked Iran based on Mossad information (11).
Drawn into an unwanted skirmish against Iran, Trump remarked quite an unlikely word of “regime change” in Iran as opposed to his MAGA election pledge. Trump has been mocking internationalist foreign policy as “establishment” and “neocon”. More critically, his administration is slashing the number of personnel in the National Security Council and the Foreign Service. Remember, America invested so much brainpower in postwar Germany and Japan. A DOGE-driven small government is too under-staffed to make a plan for such a huge project. Obviously, this administration too ill-prepared for regime change, even if Trump changed his foreign policy direction suddenly. He did not show any ideals and policies about Iran after the current Shiite theocracy. In addition to values and policy implementation, oligarchic nature of his administration matters critically, regarding “thin-centered ideology” on Iran. Currently, the United States have three difficult diplomatic negotiations on Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran, and Trump sends his business friend Steve Witkoff for all of them. Such caudillismo comes from anti-establishment and anti-intellectualist disdain of nonpartisan and professional foreign service, which is closely associated with DOGE-lead personnel cut at the Department of State (12). Professor Nicholas Burns of Harvard University mentioned critical concerns about that in an interview with NPR (13), as the Bush administration’s ambassador to NATO and the Biden administration’s ambassador to China.
Despite Trump’s flamboyant appeal of the abrupt attack on Iran, it was not effective enough to wipe out all the nuclear facilities and their will to continue the project. Unlike Ba’athist Iraq and Syria, Iran has institutions to withstand a long war. even if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and IRGC generals were killed (14). Trump is quite “thin-centered” about Iranian denuclearization. Reviewing the case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution mentions that bombing is no guarantee to remove nuclear threats. Rather, he warns that Trump wants to seize the opportunity to tighten dictatorial control over law enforcement through those showy attacks, as seen in his National Guard deployment in the Los Angels protests this June. If Iran retaliated the United States by terrorism, Trump would declare the state of emergency. Therefore, Kagan is concerned that whatever success Trump makes in Iran would undermine liberal democracy globally (15).
Conclusion
Even though, Turmp’s “thin-centered ideology” shows no coherent policy directions, regardless of issues, his rule is driven by his own greed to exhibit his presence to the nation and the world. That is typically seen in strong quest for the Nobel Peace Prize. By winning the prize, he may want to demonstrate his superiority against his archrival, ex-President Barack Obama. Since the Norwegian committee, not MAGA Americans, selects the laureate, it is quite unlikely that he wins the prize. Nevertheless, Trump can make his MAGA base exuberated by challenging Obama. His repetitive anti-establishment and anti-intellectualist posture is intended to demonstrate his superiority to the élite and foreign nations, which draws applause from mobs who are obsessed with hate for others. Considering rightful criticism by Burns and Kagan, it is utterly wrong to assume Trump as something of the Zeitgeist (epoch spirit) of Americans today.
“Thin-centered ideology” may be inconsistent logically, but very consistent emotionally. This is a keyword to explore unpredictable nature of the Trump rule. The notion of the focal terminology of this article is quite old and new, as Bertrand Russell stated “The first step [in a fascist movement] is to fascinate fools and muzzle the intelligent, by emotional excitement on the one hand and terrorism on the other,” in 1940 (16). As we understand, populism and fascism are deeply intertwined each other.
Footnotes:
(1) “The populist logic behind Trump’s tariffs”; LSE British Policy and Politics blog; April 2. 2025
(2) “【Book Review】Mudde, Cas; Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017).[Populism: A Very Short Introduction]. Oxford: Oxford University Press"; Tokyo Foundation; May 17, 2021
(3) “Shifts, Not Shocks: Rethinking Rust Belt Decline”; CATO at Liberty; Maay 23, 2025
(4) “Trump threatens 50% tariffs on Brazil if it doesn’t stop the Bolsonaro ‘witch hunt’ trial”; CNN; July 11, 2025
(5) “Trump's Ambassador Finds Few Friends in Germany”; Spiegel; January 11, 2019
(6) “Multiple Trump White House officials have ties to antisemitic extremists”; NPR; May 14, 2025
(7) “Netanyahu hopes for boost from Iran conflict - but do Israelis still trust him?”; BBC; 28 June 2025
(8) “'I left one conflict zone to enter another': Harvard's Jewish foreign students on Trump row”; BBC; 30 May 2025
(9) “From Clinton to Trump, Netanyahu fights with presidents and wins”; Arab Weekly; 22 June, 2025
(10) “Exactly Why Is It that All American Presidents Dance to Bibi’s Tune?”; The New Republic; June 20, 2025
(11) “US strikes failed to destroy Iran's nuclear sites, intelligence report says”; Reuters; June 25, 2025,br>
(12) “Israel’s attack on Iran underscores Trump’s failures as a peacemaker”; Washington Post; June 13, 2025
(13) “Former U.S. ambassador to NATO discusses downsizing in the State Department”; NPR; July 12, 2025
(14) “Regime change in Iran seems unlikely amid war with Israel, Middle East scholar says”; PBS; Jun 21, 2025
(15) “American Democracy Might Not Survive a War With Iran”; Atlantic; June 21, 2025
(16) p253 in “Freedom and Government”, Bertrand Russell; “Freedom: Its Meaning”, Ruth Nanda Anshen (ed); 1940
