Should the LDP leader election sacrifice Japan’s UN diplomacy?

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said he would not run for the next LDP leader election the other day, and he was scheduled to attend the Quad summit and the US-Japanese bilateral summit on September 22, and supposed to deliver a speech at the UN General Assembly on 26th, as the wrap up of his diplomacy in his term. As Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki of Sojitz Research Institute commented, this diplomatic tour to the United States is a commemorative event for Kishida who made the Three National Security Documents to deepen the US-Japanese alliance as his legacy to his successor (“What will happen after the Kishida-Biden era?”; Tokyo Keizai; August 17, 2024). On the other hand, it is regretful that he will miss the UN General Assembly because of the LDP leader election on 27th (”Kishida to skip U.N. General Assembly speech during U.S. visit”; Japan Times; August 31, 2024).

　In the process of founding the world order, since Japan is constrained by the pacifist constitution, it cannot be involved in use of force as the law enforcement measure in the global community, whether directly or indirectly. As I mentioned in the previous post on August 4, that is a huge handicap for Japan to boost its global presence. It is widely known that Western allies provide huge military aid for Ukraine in the current Russia-Ukraine War. Moreover, even South Korea expresses consideration to provide weapons to Ukraine for their critical concerns with the Russo-North Korean alliance (”South Korea will consider supplying arms to Ukraine after Russia, North Korea sign strategic pact”; VOA News; June 27, 2024). Also, it is reported that Britain’s MI6 assisted recent Kursk Incursion by the Ukrainian troop (”As Ukraine brings war to Russia, Britain too must be bolder with sanctions”; City A.M.; 14 August, 2024). Meanwhile, Japan cannot make any kind of international contribution as mentioned above.

　Assuming it quite hard to show global presence in military aspects, Japan needs to make much efforts for international contribution in non-military aspects. Since the end of World War II, Japan has been advancing development aid and international cooperation with the Global South, particularly with South East Asia, Africa, and currently with Central Asia. Also, the Japanese government regards the United Nations as the centerpiece of its diplomacy. Nevertheless, the prime minister will miss the forthcoming UN General Assembly. When Prime Minister Kishida cannot attend an important international conference, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa is expected to go to the meeting on his behalf, but she is also unable to attend the UNGA as she runs for this LDP leader election. For Japan that is founding independent relations with the Global South while staying at the heart of G7, it would be a loss of opportunity to address its foreign policy direction to the global community if it misses the forthcoming general assembly. That will be a huge diplomatic damage.

　In view of this, can the LDP postpone the party leader election for a couple of days? Things that I mentioned above appear as if they put the party above the country. After all, is it so important to hold an event of the “neighborhood meeting of Nagatacho” as scheduled? Seen from a “panoramic view of history” beyond partisanship, the slogan of placing the United Nations at the heart of diplomacy by successive Japanese cabinets since the end of World War II, sounds doubtful due to the absence of the prime minister at the UNGA. I would see the next administration with such skepticism, accordingly. Furthermore, was the passion for Japanese bid for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, that rose so much a few years ago, actually counterfeit? I do not regard this case as just a matter of the Kishida administration. I regard it as a matter of all administrations of Japan from the past to the future.

　While on this subject, the Constitutional Democratic Party values non-military role of Japan in the world as it upholds the “protection of anti-war Article 9”, they are supposed to believe the importance of UN diplomacy much more than the LDP does from their pacifism position. Nevertheless, it does not seem that they objected strongly to Prime Minister Kishida’s absence from the UNGA. Probably, the CDP is also preoccupied with the election of their own party leader. But that is an abdication of the role of the opposition in parliamentary democracy. It appears that they are also entangled with the “neighborhood meeting of Nagatacho”.

　Here, I would like to appeal to all the political parties and some fractional groups that we have to reconfirm that Japan has a huge handicap in international politics, as it is unable to assume military role. In order to make up for that, Japan needs to take huge roles in non-military aspects. If it is not possible to postpone the LDP leader election for just a couple of days for the forthcoming UNGA, how would Japan compensate for the loss of this opportunity? Taking everything into consideration, it is critical to think how to steer this country beyond the “neighborhood meeting of Nagatacho” perspectives.

How well did Foreign Secretary Cameron act the role of Churchill to move America for defending Ukraine?

Earlier this April, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited the United States to talk further military aid to Ukraine with his counterpart Secretary of State Antony Blinken. But Trump loyalists in the Republican Party objected to the plan. Cameron needed to remove the bottleneck to pass the Ukrainian aid bill in the US House of Representatives, because Russia was pushing back Ukrainian counteroffensive and an increasing number of civilians were killed. Therefore, he proposed to meet the supposed Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and House Speaker Mike Johnson urgently. Cameron’s diplomatic tour was in parallel with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s state visit to meet President Joe Biden. The latter drew much more attention from the media and think tanks around the world, but I regard Cameron’s direct meeting with Trump as more important to move America that does not act as the superpower. Let me explain it below.

Both British and Japanese diplomatic efforts were commonly aimed at getting America more engaged with the world. Along with the peril of Trump 2.0, the rise of anti-Israeli “Hamas left” on the left raise serious concerns with populist isolationism in America. Can any foreign leader overturn such trends? In history, Winston Churchill urged the hesitant superpower to actively involved in stopping Nazi Germany. Also, when Americans were indulged in a daydream of postwar peace, he gave the Iron Curtain speech to awaken them to see the reality of international politics. Shortly after that, the United States declared the Truman Doctrine. When the Congress was bitterly divided between internationalists and nativists, America hosted leaders from key allies of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Compared the two, Ukraine aid that Cameron brought was emergent, and there were no scenarios arranged by the foreign service beforehand when he met his opponent Trump. Meanwhile, Kishida was warmly welcomed as the state guest by President Biden and leaders of both houses of the Congress, and the was nothing challenging in his diplomatic tour. More importantly, Britain is directly involved in military aid for Ukraine to defeat Russia.

On the other hand, Japan is still constrained by the pacifist constitution, which keeps this country from participating in a mission that former Secretary of Defense James Mattis called “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” when he talked about his combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (General: It's 'fun to shoot some people'; CNN; February 4, 2005). After all, that is a serious drawback for Japan to be a vital stakeholder in global security, as long as this country is unable to get involved in military aspects. Kishida spoke softly at the congressional speech, as if healing the superpower in fatigue of global tottering rather than reconfirming America’s role as the indispensable nation for the world order (“Japanese PM Fumio Kishida addresses U.S. 'self-doubt' about world role in remarks to Congress”; NBC News; April 11, 2024). That does not necessarily come from his unprovocative personality. Even more exuberant Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who expressed strong support the Iraq War by the Bush administration (“Press Conference by Prime Minister-then Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq”; Prime Minister’s Office, Japan; March 20, 2003), did not actually send combat troops. Japanese commitment was too small to worry about being caught up in America’s war. Whether “healing” Kishida or “exuberant” Koizumi, what Japanese leaders did fall short of fulfilling the Churchillian role.

Nevertheless, since no single politician today is so charismatic as Churchill was, it is quite likely that an indirect Anglo-Japanese diplomatic coordination had some effect to prompt the both parties to reach an agreement in the US congress. Kishida’s Japan was a good side kick for Britain. The aid bill was finally approved on this occasion, but quite uncertain for future. Russian President Vladimir Putin clings to reconquering Ukraine so much that the war is going to continue long. Unlike Cameron’s official meeting with Secretary Blinken, the detail of his closed-door meeting with Trump has not been publicized. He did not even mention that on Twitter, while tweeting extensively about the Israeli-Hamas war. Trump may have been reluctant to listen to Cameron, but he had to avoid negative reputation of delaying the Ukraine aid bill to pass the Congress, in view of his presidential campaign. In addition, Britain’s commitment to military aid made Cameron’s case more compelling, because Trump is obsessed with burden sharing of defense spending. That was also helpful in his meeting with Blinken to reconfirm further assistance to Ukraine by Britain and the United States. International politics is inherently leontomorphic, and therefore, strong defense and deep military commitment are essential in law enforcement for the world order.

Now, let me talk about the bottleneck for successful Cameron-Blinken foreign ministers meeting, which was Trump’s view of the world. Hal Brand of the American Enterprise Institute comments that it is simplistic to take his America First as complete disengagement from the world. Rather, it is extremely sensitive to the costs and benefits of intervention. Therefore, Trump is skeptical of helping Ukraine, and he believes that America not run the risk of getting involved in a big war for the sake of defending small countries overseas, whether in Europe or Asia. And there isn’t an Indo-Pacific exception in Trump’s mindsets despite China hawk remarks by his fellows. While showing isolationist aspects, Trump is willing to intervene abroad to impose US national interests of his understanding on other nations when he thinks it necessary. Meanwhile, he sidelines the idea that America as guarantor of the liberal world order disdainfully. That attitude led to the trade war with China, and brinkmanship diplomacy against Iran and North Korea in his last term. Therefore, Trump fellows pursue military build-up, but not interested in defending allies or invaded countries. Rather, they focus on homeland defense, and explore more investment in cyber security and missile defense. They assume international politics as rivalries of self-interested nation states, and thus, agendas like democracy promotion are useless for them (“An “America First” World: What Trump’s Return Might Mean for Global Order”; Foreign Affairs; May 27, 2024).

Of course, there is a fallacy in such viewpoints, which leads to Trump’s poor understanding of the alliance. Former US ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder criticizes that Trump sees the trans-Atlantic alliance as a liability that could drag America into a war against nuclear Russia when some eastern flank nation is invaded. Actually, the alliance deters enemy aggression. Furthermore, he is wrongly preoccupied with burden sharing of defense spending, instead of pursuing common security objectives with partners (“NATO is about security — not dollars and cents”; Politico; April 10, 2024). His six-month blocking of the Ukraine aid bill through his Republican loyalists in the House had benefitted Russia so much, which hurt mutual trust between Europe and America (The US aid package to Ukraine will help. But a better strategy is urgently needed”; Chatham House; 26 April, 2024). As long as American right wingers are entrapped in a “Hillbilly Elegy” victimhood mindset, i.e., allies freeride the security umbrella, another congressional bickering could delay necessary help for Ukraine.

Next, an overview of Britain’s trans-Atlantic diplomacy is the following. Regardless of the reelection possibility of Trump, strong Lindbergh isolationism among the American public poses constraints on UK foreign policy. Wyn Rees of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) presents an over view of Britain’s relations with NATO and the United States as follows. Britain has been America’s first choice for the partner in military and intelligence operations, which is so beneficial to its political presence NATO and worldwide. But Trump’s anti-NATO and anti-Ukrainian posture ruins this premise. Therefore, Cameron had to show European commitment to burden sharing to Trump, such as defense spending increase, intra-European defense cooperation, troop deployment in the Baltic, and so forth (“Trump, NATO and Anglo-American Relations”; RUSI; 9 May, 2024). As of February 29, this year, before the Ukraine Aid bill passed the US Congress, EU institutions donated more aid than the United States. In addition, sovereign European countries made contributions. That is to say, America, not Europe, was freeriding the alliance, unless the Ukraine Aid bill passed. See the chart.

Chart
How does U.S. aid to Ukraine compare to that from other donors?

For a Churchillian diplomacy to overturn isolationism in America, Britain needs to strengthen independent political and military resilience on the European side against Russia. Currently, Ukraine has signed a bilateral security agreement with France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Britain. For effective coordination of these deals, how much can the United Kingdom take initiatives in a European framework to support Ukraine without EU membership? Britain took leadership role of the drone coalition in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which was founded by NATO to facilitate arms procurement for Ukraine. Also, Samir Puri of Chatham House urges the United Kingdom to endorse EU proposed joint military procurement initiatives, such as the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum (European Commission; 6 May, 2024) and the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) (European Commission; 5 March, 2024), to improve European defense readiness and support Ukraine’s defense industry (“The UK should help coordinate support for Ukraine by backing EU defence initiatives”; Chatham House; 19 March, 2024). UK backed plan to fund Ukrainian war efforts from frozen Russian assets was approved at G7 Italy this year (“G7 agrees $50bn loan for Ukraine from Russian assets”; BBC News; 14 June, 2024). Currently, Britain needs to tackle the capability gap problem for “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys” around the world. This country needs to upgrade its arms and equipment to defend its homeland and national interests worldwide within its own limited resources. At present, foremost threats are Russia for the short term, and China for the long-term. Along with defense spending increase, Andrew Dorman, editor of "International Affairs", comments that Britain's rearmament plans should define the focus of investment. For example, regarding the deterrence against Russia, this country must choose whether to overturn current gradual nuclear disarmament policy to make its independent nuclear umbrella stronger, or to boost rapid response deployment in the Arctic, Scandinavia, and the Baltic regions through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) (“Britain must rearm to strengthen NATO and meet threats beyond Russia and terrorism”; Chatham House; 25 March, 2024).

After a laborious persuasion meeting with Trump, Cameron talked with Blinken at the formal foreign ministers meeting to boost further assistance to Ukraine. During the press conference, there was a question about the Mar-a-Lago meeting, and Cameron replied that it was just a normal diplomatic meeting with the opposition leader on the occasion of election (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Cameron at a Joint Press Availability”; US Department of State Press Release; April 9, 2024). But apparently, Trump is still a drag in the trans-Atlantic alliance as he rejects further aid to Ukraine. He does not care about bipartisan consistency in diplomacy. Appallingly, he says he would end the war as soon as he inaugurated. Even Russia does not take it seriously (“Russia says 'let's be realistic' about Trump plan to end Ukraine war”; Reuters; July 18, 2024). The Mar-a-Lago talk would have been far from normal.

As if implying a turbulent dialogue, Trump fellows backlashed vehemently to Cameron’s Churchillian effort. Since Trump encouraged Russia to invade NATO countries, Cameron has been critical of his views on trans-Atlantic alliance (“David Cameron Rebukes Donald Trump's Divisive Remarks About Nato And Russia”; HuffPost; 12 February, 2024). It is not easy to fill the gap in just a single secret meeting. As expected, Trump’s foreign policy advisor Elbridge Colby, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, denounced Cameron’s lobbying for the pass of the Ukrainian aid bill at the Congress as intervention into American politics. Also, he expressed resentment that Cameron moralized the case for Ukraine and lectured it to Trump (“Trump ally hits out at David Cameron for ‘lecturing’ US”; Politico; May 2, 2024). But historically, Wilsonian moralism has been centerpiece of American foreign policy regardless of partisanship. Also, moralism cemented the Reagan-Thatcher conservative alliance, which ultimately brought the end of the Cold War. Deplorably, Colby’s comment shows how badly conservatism in America degraded today.

While Colby belittles Russia as China’s junior partner (“China’s Russia Support Strategy”; Politico; February 22, 2024), that is not necessarily the case in view of the Kremlin’s aggression in Europe and infiltration in the Middle East and Africa. In his article of the Washington Post, he does not care such contradictions in his advocacy of strategic refocus on China (“To avert war with China, the U.S. must prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 18, 2023). Ironically, Taiwan does not endorse Colby’s strategic shift to Asia (“Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine”; Washington Post; May 10, 2023). Prominent Never Trump pundits such as Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution deny lopsided China-hawks like Colby to put American foreign policy on the right track (“A Republican ‘civil war’ on Ukraine erupts as Reagan’s example fades”; Washington Post; March 15, 2023). Nevertheless, Colby praised new UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy for his compassionate attitude to Trump. However, Republican Vice President candidate JD Vance has ruined such a lukewarm friendship between Trump and Labour Britain, as he blasted this country as an Islamist state with nuclear weapons (“Rayner dismisses Trump running mate 'Islamist UK' claim”; BBC News; 17 July, 2024). Despite Cameron’s successful lobbying for Ukraine, the negative influence of MAGA Republicans is still undismissable, regardless of the results of the presidential election. As is often the case with Trump supporters, both Vance and Colby are characterized with vituperative words and confrontational attitudes. If Trump 2.0 emerged, that would be a severe diplomatic drawback for American allies.

During World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack silenced Lindbergh isolationists, which enabled President Franklin Roosevelt to fight for freedom around the world upon Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s request. But today, MAGA Republicans drag American foreign policy even under current Biden administration. Therefore, NATO is seriously considering Trump proofing to prepare for the worst scenario in the presidential election in the United States. The most critical point is to boost defense capability on the European side. While NATO member states are raising their defense spending to meet the 2% of GDP target of the organization, even that would not be enough to keep America engaged with Europe. Actually, Colby rebuffed Britain’s 2.5% spending plan by the Sunak administration meaningless. Most of the NATO members do not reach the 2% target today, but they spent over 3% during the Cold War. The real problem is not the amount of money but the focus of defense investment. Such investment on deterrence and denial capabilities against Russia should be spent efficiently to make US rescue operations in Europe less costly. Joint procurement coordination in Europe, particularly among Britain, France, and Germany will be helpful for this objective (“Trump-Proofing NATO: 2% Won’t Cut It”; RUSI; 7 March, 2024).

Currently, the impending problem is Ukraine. At the 75th anniversary of NATO in Brussels, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a proposal to insulate NATO’s role in Ukraine from American politics. That is to give more leverage of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to NATO from the United States, to facilitate the implementation of the military aid package of $100 billion for five years. However, the Biden administration did not express so much interest in this plan (On NATO’s 75th birthday, fear of Trump overshadows celebrations; Washington Post; April 4, 2024). Ironically, the incumbent Never Trump government of the United States is not supportive of a Trump proofing initiative by Europe. Nevertheless, this year will be critical in the war in Ukraine, according to Michael Clarke, ex-Director General of the Royal United Service Institute. Russia lacks the equipment and trained manpower for a major offensive until spring 2025 or later, while Ukraine desperately needs Western military aid to rebuild combat capability to retake occupied territories (“Ukraine war: Three ways the conflict could go in 2024”; BBC; 29 December, 2023).

The global community is imperiled with Trump 2.0, but the real problem is beyond Trump himself. Some anti-mainstream foreign policy pundits of both right and left appeal for so-called “restrained” diplomacy to make the case against Wilsonian globalism. Among them, rightwing nationalists make use of Trump to advance their advocacy. Although Trump behaves in notoriously high-handed manners, former Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull tells world leaders not to flatter him to avoid his anger. Trump may feel a formidable counterpart unpleasant, but he respects him or her after he calms down (“How the World Can Deal With Trump?”; Foreign Affairs; May 31, 2024). Cameron told urgent necessity to help Ukraine candidly, as shown in Colby’s malicious response. Also, Japanese Prime Minister-then Shinzo Abe told reciprocity of the US-Japanese alliance when he visited the Trump Tower, shortly after unexpected victory of Trump in the election. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Taro Aso’s visit appears unnecessary kowtow to the opposition candidate. Abe’s memoir says that Trump talked extensively about private golf even at the official bilateral summit. What did Aso talk to enjoy the meeting with him?

Despite Trump’s conviction, Western democracies have no choice but align with the United States, as commented by Leslie Vinjamuri, the director of the US and Americas programme at Chatham House. Otherwise, should they choose Russia or China as their partner (“The Global Implications of Trump’s Conviction”; Council on Foreign Relations; June 4, 2024)? Though Democratic candidate Kamala Harris is surging to edge out Trump, the “restrained” diplomacy school would draw US leadership role in the world, even under her administration. Along with rightwing think tanks such as the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and the Marathon Initiative, there is bipartisan Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft which is co-sponsored by libertarian Chrales Koch and liberal George Soros (“George Soros and Charles Koch take on the ‘endless wars’”; Politico; December 2, 2019).

In order to move America that does not act, politicians today, whether UK Foreign Secretary Cameron, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, or anyone else, must elaborate on Churchillian diplomacy without the charisma of Churchill, the hero of World War II. American allies need to coordinate with bipartisan internationalists to persuade hard-wired isolationists as Cameron did. Also, they should demonstrate the willingness to do “the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys”, whether by directly involved in military actions or by providing military aid for a nation withstanding enemy invasion. In other words, it is a commitment to burden sharing of law enforcement for the world order. On the American side, it would be interesting if Harris hinted to make a staunch national security team with her pick of Vice President and other top positions in the cabinet to distinguish herself from gaffe-prone and DEI blaming Trump-Vance duo.


NB: Harris chose Governor Tim Waltz of Minnesota on August 6. National security heavy weight will be appointed to other key cabinet positions.

A Question about Former US Ambassador to Japan Hagerty’s Interview

Former US Ambassador to Japan William Hagerty had an interview with Jiji Press on February 29 to soothe anxiety among Japanese people that the US-Japanese alliance would be destabilized if Trump were to be elected. Currently, he is a Republican senator on the Capitol Hill. He emphasized that Donald Trump understood strategic importance of the alliance with Japan, and commented that the global public misunderstood Trump’s America First and isolationism. Typically, ex-Ambassador says that Trump’s bluff on NATO allies to suggest American withdrawal from the organization is his deal making technique to force some members to increase defense spending to the NATO guideline. Therefore, he says that Trump takes the threat of Russia seriously.

That was a piece of news report, and the detail of interview is not shown to the public. Therefore, it might be premature to respond to Hagerty’s comments, but that was far from being sufficient for Japanese people to embrace moshi-Tora (a possible Trump victory in the election) so favorably as he argues. Trump's bluff of NATO withdrawal, which was famously mentioned “racketeering” in the open letter against his America First by Professor Eliot Cohen of the SAIS, raised bipartisan alert so much that Democratic Senator Tim Kaine and Republican Senator Marco Rubio submitted a bill to stop any US president from withdrawing from NATO without Congressional approval, which has passed at the Senate. That bill could be helpful to maintain a psychological assurance of collective defense, which is essential for deterrence.

However, Trump would curtail US commitment to NATO drastically, despite the Kaine and Rubio bill. Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO and former US ambassador to the organization Alexander Vershbow warns that Trump would obstruct American diplomats to attend various meetings at NATO and cut American budget for Brussels headquarters. In other words, Trump could paralyze NATO legally (“Trump will abandon NATO”; Atlantic; December 4, 2023). Trump may disrespect the rule of law, but he is consummate in exploiting the loophole of the law like Brazilian leftwing populist President Lula da Silva who is inviting Russian President Vladimir Putin to the BRICS summit in his country this year despite the criminal charge by the ICC. Remember, Trump successfully let conservative dominated Supreme Court turn down the decision in Colorado and Maine to disqualify his candidacy. That is what populists are, whether right or left. After all, Hagerty did not answer the critical question regarding the sustainability of America’s global network of alliance that Vershbow mentions. In NATO organizational structure, Americans take command of military affairs while Europeans lead civilian bureaucracy. Vershbow raises his deep concerns as one who has experienced the highest position of the organization for American diplomats .

There is no doubt that burden sharing in defense is an old and new problem. Ever since the Cold War era, the United States has been urging its allies to boost defense spending. For mutual trust and confidence, a free rider is not desirable in the alliance, of course. However, that is not the fundamental problem of American national defense. Retired General Jack Keane of the US army commented in FOX News on February 16 that US national security was critically in danger as its military power was slashed during the Trump and Biden era while enemies were building up their offensive capability. Obviously, it is America’s own defense capability that vitally matters. Trump’s bashing on American allies may be cheered among his rock-solid supporters, but a serious military professional like Keane, who talks about US national defense beyond partisanship, has completely different viewpoints, even though he is a commentator of MAGA Republicans’ favorite TV channel. Therefore, any Japanese would question bitterly whether Trump really understands American and global security if he still were to cling to his idiosyncratic idea.



In addition, it is hardly imaginable that some European allies that fail to meet the NATO pledge of defense spending can invest in something of new technology to change the balance of power in our favor. They can just buy a little more US-made weapons by increasing military expenditure. That might be of some help for American defense contractors, and Trump may want to make money for himself through such deals. But his excessive obsession with blaming “small” allies is off the point. Deplorably, Trump does not talk about critical issue like defense manpower and procurement that Retired General Keane mentions, but agitates the angry working class to quibble against the tax to be used for foreign allies and ethnic minorities at home. His isolationism in foreign policy and hate ideology in domestic politics are deeply intertwined. Trump cunningly exploits the small government ideal to provoke fanaticism among his rock-solid supporters. Jiji Press should have asked Senator Hagerty about these points.

From the Jiji interview article, I have an impression that Trump associates are disrespectful to Japan’s multilateral security policy to manage global challenges and to curb Chinese threats in the region. Hagerty’s comment in the interview sounds as if Trump’s bullying on NATO allies were irrelevant to the alliance with Japan. But since Shinzo Abe launched the FOIP initiative, which includes Asian and European stakeholders, his multilateralist legacy has been inherited to the Suga and the Kishida administrations. Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa is enhancing this furthermore as indicated in her foreign policy speech on January 30, stating “The security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are inseparable.” Some Republican isolationists like Senator Josh Hawley are so NIMBY that they are willing to bash China to relieve pent-up frustration among angry working class, while dismissing the Russian threats Ukraine and the trans-Atlantic region as something distant to American national security. That is not in linw with Japan’s global strategy direction. It is vital for Japan to defend current liberal and rule-based world order.

We have to take it seriously that key former cabinet members of the previous administration speak against Trump’s candidacy, as Robert Kagan recommended in his column to the Washington Post at the end of the last year (“The Trump dictatorship: How to stop it”’ Washington Post; December 7, 2023). Following ex-Vice President Mike Pence, who refused to endorse Trump to run for the second in public, top national security officials of his last term administration expressed serious concerns with his poor understanding of America’s global network with allies and constitutional democracy. Those cabinet members include his Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, White House Chief of Staff John Kelly, Joint Chief of Staff Mark Milley, and National Security Advisor John Bolton (“Full List of Former Donald Trump Officials Refusing to Endorse Him”; Newsweek; March 23, 2024). Quite noticeably, substantial portion of them are core military professionals of the US armed forces.

Quite interestingly, Trump affiliates justify his gaffs by idiosyncratic phrases. As is often the case, his last term Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff of the NSC Alexander Gray told to understand Trump by his deeds, not by his words in an interview with a Japanese TV news media. Also, he stressed that America’s alliance with Japan deepened furthermore during the Trump era (“The impact on Japan, if Trump were reelected”; TBS News 23; March 14, 2024). But it was adults in the room and technocrats who modified Trump’s America First, and now, they stand against him. Japanese people and politicians are well-aware of it. Actually, Ex-Sec Defense Esper commented, “The first year of a second Trump term will look like the last year of the first Trump term, in other words, with all the craziness” in ‘Real Time with Bill Maher’ on HBO TV (“Trump’s Former Defense Secretary Tells Bill Maher He Is ‘Definitely Not’ Voting for Ex Boss”; Daily Beast; March 31, 2024).

Ultimately, Trump’s disdain of multilateral alliance is at odds with the views of ex-Army General David Petraeus who made America win the war through multilateral strategic coordination with numerous allies and local leaders. As Trump goes the opposite, it is quite likely that he would make America lose in any war and great power rivalries in this century. Furthermore, his rightwing populism is eroding the legitimacy of American democracy, which invigorates revisionist powers like China and Russia. Some MAGA Republicans like Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene spreads Russian propaganda within the Congress as if she were Putin’s spy.

GOP Rep. Mike Turner says it's “absolutely true" that Russian propaganda has "infected" a portion of the Republican party:

“We see directly coming from Russia ... communications that are anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia messages, some of which we even hear being uttered on the House… pic.twitter.com/cNzF1qiOIV

— Republicans against Trump (@RpsAgainstTrump) April 7, 2024

Once again Moscow Marge is busy deploying her Kremlin talking points. Is she a useful idiot or is she intentionally spreading Putin’s lies? Either way it’s pathetic and unAmerican.

pic.twitter.com/wf1w5SJbgO

— Liz Cheney (@Liz_Cheney) April 12, 2024

That is inflicting critical damages on the US-Japanese alliance, too. There is no doubt that the Japanese government needs to prepare for moshi-Tora. Meanwhile someone in Japan should resonate with Never Trumpers in the United States, in view of corrosive impacts by Trump. Therefore, the Japanese media should ask much harder questions to Trump associates, rather than treating them so politely like a tea ceremony guest.

The Corrosive Effect of Rightwing Populism on National Security

Notorious rightwing populists: Trump, Netanyahu, and Bolsonaro
Right-wingers frequently boasts their passion for patriotism and devotion to national defense over their political opponents at home. However, their self-righteous way of governing is prone to put the nation at risk. When Hamas invaded Israel to brutally kill and abuse kibbutz residents and music festival participants near the border of the Gaza Strip last October, Professor Yuval Noah Harari of Hebrew University who has written “Sapiens” and “Homo Deus” commented that it was the mismanagement of the government by the Netanyahu administration that created an information vacuum against terrorist intrusion. To begin with, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed his cabinet members based on loyalty, as he prioritizes his personal interests over the national interest. In his sixth term of his cabinet from December 2022, the team had become so extremist and religiously dogmatic that they were obsessed with blaming the “deep state” through agitating political divide and spreading conspiracy theories. Consequently, Netanyahu failed to gather necessary information about impending national security threats from security forces, intelligence agencies, and numerous experts. Through such corroded policy making interactions, Israel failed to take effective measures of deterrence against Hamas (“The Hamas horror is also a lesson on the price of populism”; Washington Post”; October 11, 2023). Former South Korean Unification Minister, Professor Kim Yeonchul at Inje University makes a similar point that the divide and rule technique simply agitates demonization of others among the public and obstructs intersectional communications within the government. In other words, Netanyahu’s failure of intelligence in the Hamas attack is an inevitable consequence of his failure in democracy (“Why is the far right so incompetent at national security?”; Hankyoreh Newspaper; October 30, 2023).

Furthermore, the Gaza war has revealed that Netanyahu self-deceived that Russia would hold tight grips on Iran, which enabled Israel to air raid Iranian proxies in Syria in 2015. Actually, Russian Predident Vladimir Putin just wanted to demonstrate Russian presence in the Middle East by striking a balance between Israel and its strategic enemies like Iran and Syria. In return, Israel refused to join Western sanction against Russian invasion of Crimea. But his friendship with Russia turned out empty when the war in Ukraine broke out, and the Kremlin was forced to depend on the Axis of Evil, notably, Iran, Syria and Hamas (“Israel and Russia: The End of a Friendship?”; Carnegie Politika; November 11, 2023). Former center left Zionist Union member of the Knesset Ksenia Svetlova comments that isolated Russia today needs Iran more than the other way around, and Israel has no reason to help Putin’s ambition lead the anti-Western bloc geopolitically (“Russia’s priorities are clear after Netanyahu-Putin call, and Israel isn’t one of them”; Times of Israel; 11 December, 2023). Netanyahu pursued pseudo-realism to deepen strategic relations with Russia while maintaining close ties with the United States, which made Israel a useful pawn for Putin’s manipulation to divide the Western alliance (“Putin’s Gaza front”; ICDS Estonia Commentary; October 30, 2023).

In the United States, rightwing populists misidentify the enemy likewise. Just as Netanyahu, Donald Trump is charmed by Putin so much that he even utters withdrawal from NATO. Also, they fondly resort to autocratic measures against democratic rule of law. Trump agitated the January 6 riot, and Netanyahu launched the “judicial reform” to enable the government to override the supreme court decision to implement his policy beyond checks and balances (“Israel judicial reform explained: What is the crisis about?”; BBC News; 11 September, 2023). Netanyahu wanted to advance Jewish settlement in the West Bank along with his coalition partner Religious Zionist Party, without judicial checks. Just as Trump’s credentials for primary candidacy is denied in Colorado and Maine, Netanyahu’s judicial reform has been turned down at the supreme court to defend the foundation of democratic governance of Israel (“Israel Supreme Court strikes down judicial reforms”; BBC News; 1 January, 2024). Remember that rightwing populists denounce responsible stakeholders of democracy the “enemy of the people” as communist revolutionaries do. That leads to critical failure of strategic communication among governmental and national security organizations once they take office, as mentioned by Harari and Kim.

With such mindsets, rightwing populists do not hesitate to prioritize their partisan agendas at the expense of national security. That is typically witnessed in the obstruction of military appointment by MAGA Republicans. The Republican Party had assumed their strength in defense before the Trump era. However, rightwing populists detest political correctness and human rights liberalism so much that they even dare to put critical national interest at risk in exchange for pushing their agendas to overjoy their rock-solid supporters. Notably, Senator Tommy Tuberville delayed military personnel nomination to defend “freedom” of white nationalist thoughts and to stop promotion of anti-abortion officers. As Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations comments, he is not interested in accelerating military personnel arrangement to defeat external threats, but defeating domestic opponents of the culture war within armed forces (“The GOP claims to be strong on defense. Tommy Tuberville shows otherwise.”; Washington Post; June 19, 2023). In addition, Retired Admiral James Stavridis of the US Navy deplores about Tuberville’s pork barreling as he manipulates to attract Space Force headquarters to his district Alabama, in obstruction of the military plan to build the facility in Colorado (“Tuberville slams lack of decision on Space Command headquarters, blames politics”; Stars and Stripes; July 26, 2023).

Much more problematically, far right House Republicans are blocking the budget deal for military aid to Ukraine and Israel in exchange for tightening border control at home. However, as Retired General Jack Keane of the US Army comments, both are different issues of their own, and the risk of Russian victory in Ukraine is critically great to national security (“What would a win in Ukraine look like? Retired Gen. Jack Keane explains.”; Washington Post; March 6, 2023). More deplorably, Representative Troy Nehls objects to Ukraine aid simply because he wants to stop reelection of President Joe Biden (“A border deal to nowhere? House GOP ready to reject Senate compromise on immigration”; CNN; January 3, 2024). Those moves are extremely partisan, and they are the conflict of interest with the state. It is such narrow-sighted partisanship that led to diplomatic vacuum when Hamas attacked Israel, because those right-wingers precluded the appointment of the ambassador to Jerusalem (“Jack Lew, Ambassador to Israel”; Wikipedia).

Furthermore, let me talk about the fallacy of perception on Ukraine, among the American rightwing. Former Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, currently at the Atlantic Council, commented that a Putin victory in Ukraine would embolden Russia to reinfiltrate into the former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact nations, many of which are NATO members. He also stressed that it is NATO that has ensured security in Europe after two World Wars, which has ultimately ensured security of the United States. Therefore, Ukrainian victory is a vital national interest of America. Most importantly, he argues that an appeasement so as not to provoke Russia and China is the most provocative diplomacy because they count on weak leadership of America.



In the past, Republicans understood the principle that Herbst mentioned. But MAGA Republicans today have no hesitation to impress such weakness to the enemy as Nehls does in the House. More disastrously, Trump’s long-time desire of withdrawal from NATO raises critical concerns between America and Europe. Democrat Tim Kaine and Republican Marco Rubio introduced a bipartisan bill to stop any US President from withdrawing from NATO, which has already passed at the Senate. But the problem is psychological, and allies would see America unreliable if Trump were elected, which would weaken deterrence of the Western alliance. In view of this, Anne Applebaum of the Atlantic quotes her interview with former US Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow that Trump could paralyze NATO by obstructing meeting attendance of American diplomats and cutting the budget for its headquarters before stopped by the Congress (“Trump will abandon NATO”; Atlantic; December 4, 2023).

Quite importantly, some political scientists and historians in America say that the Republican Party was gradually returning isolationist after the Cold War. In such a circumstance, Dan Caldwell at pro-Trump Center for Renewing America comments that Republicans are increasingly supportive of the changing role of America in the world based on “realism and restraint”, instead of leading the free world. Accordingly, the Heritage Foundation once advocated Ronald Reagan’s “Strong America”, but today, its president Kevin Roberts not just opposes the Ukraine aid, and even argues for defense spending cuts. Such America First momentums has been resurging among conservatives, as typically seen in Pat Buchanan’s repeated bid for presidency in the 1990s, according to Associate Professor Nicole Hemmer of Vanderbilt University. Quite confusingly, some isolationist conservatives like Senator Josh Hawley insist “The problem is not there but here” to urge American foreign policy makers to disengage from Europe and to focus on Chinese infringement on the well-being of the middle class and the working class at home. That is a problem beyond the rivalry between trans-Atlanticist and Asia-Pacificist. China hawk views among those rightwing populists come from Trump-like cost and profit thinking, and thus, they regard allies as the burden to America. Their strategic shift to China just reflects the anger of the working class who feel themselves victimized by globalization. Foreign policy internationalists including Robert Kagan rightly refute their stupid idea (“A Republican ‘civil war’ on Ukraine erupts as Reagan’s example fades”; Washington Post; March 15, 2023). Also, ex-General David Petraeus spoke against their pseudo realism and fake small government thinking, both of which are based on property dealer’s cost and profit mindsets, when he visited the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The man who made America win in the War on Terror urges defense planner to upgrade the procurement system to manage multifaced threats around the world.




Rightwing arguments on China sound so NIMBY as those of Japan bashers from the 1960s to the 1980s. Asian allies should not trust those NIMBY China hawks who are willing to appease Putin and to abandon Ukraine and the whole of European allies. The Kishida administration of Japan is right not to bandwagon with them, as Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa correctly stated “the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are inseparable”, which is naturally interpreted “the security of Ukraine and East Asia are inseparable”, in the foreign policy speech at the Ordinary Session of the House on January 30. Deplorably, late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a pseudo-realist mistake as Netanyahu of Israel did to befriend with that bloodthirsty Moscovite autocrat to counter the Chinese threat. The war in Ukraine has revealed that his assumption was wrong from the beginning.

FM Kamikawa adresses foreign policy of the Kishida administration at the Japanese diet.

Also, American right-wingers mishandled the Israel-Hamas war. When terrorists invaded Israel, Trump relinquished Netanyahu bluntly for his poor deterrence and preparation to fight against them. It has turned out that Netanyahu’s loyalty to Trump for shared rightwing values was one-sided, while Biden helps Israel’s fight against Hamas (“Trump’s turn against Israel offers stark reminder of what his diplomacy looks like”; CNN; October 13, 2023). But the problem was actually created by the Abrahams Accord which Trump boasts of his success. While urging Israel and Arab emirates to normalize diplomatic relations to encircle Iran, Trump aggravated Israeli-Palestinian tensions by endorsing Israeli right-wingers’ expansionism, notably, approving Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem, Jewish settlement in the West Bank, and the annexation of Golan Heights. Meanwhile, he cut American aid to Palestinians. Therefore, Max Boot commented in his Washington Post column that those Arab-Israeli normalizations do not resolve other grave conflicts in the Middle East, including those in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, and more importantly, the Israeli-Palestinian clash itself (“So much for the Abraham Accords. Trump made things worse in the Middle East.”; Washington Post; May 12, 2021). Despite that, Trump irresponsibly blamed Netanyahu when the war broke out. Trump and Netanyahu appeared like-minded, when the accord was reached, but their clash is a natural consequence of right-wing nature, which is to pursue maximum self-gain at the expense of others. That is not in fit for bilateral or multilateral partnership.

Some anti-globalists naïvely argue that rightwing populists are better than those of leftwing to deter China. That is too superficial. See what happens in Brazil. It was rightwing president Jair Bolsonaro who endorsed the Chinese plan to build the railway and the highway passing through Amazonian forests to Peru for the Belt and Road Initiative, which could be too destructive for the ecosystem for local flora and fauna and the livelihood of indigenous uncontacted peoples (“Proposed Brazil-Peru road through untouched Amazon gains momentum”; Diálogo Chino; March 10, 2022). Again, I have to stress that right-wingers are obsessed with pseudo-realism to edge out others for their tribal maximum gain, even though at the expense of indigenous people and ecosystem. Consequently, there is no reason for them care about security of other nations and the global community. It was leftwing President Lula da Silva who demanded China to reconsider those plans when he was reinaugurated in January last year (Opinion: Brazil can make green gains from China’s ‘ecological civilisation’ aims; Diálogo Chino; October 3, 2023). I do not necessarily favor leftist Lula over rightist Bolsonaro, as he revealed his indulgence in outdated anti-colonialism ideology to invite Putin to G20 and BRICS summits in Brazil this year. Remember even South Africa’s ANC-bound President Cyrill Ramaphosa gave up inviting that Russian criminal to the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, in face of fierce litigation by the Democratic Alliance to demand the government to abide by the rule of the International Criminal Court (“Lula invites Putin to Brazil, sidesteps on war crimes arrest”; Politico; December 4, 2023). It seems that both Bolsonaro and Lula are disrespectful to the rule of law, in view of their handling of Amazonian development and the BRICS summit in each. Actually, both populists are headaches for the Brazilian foreign service as they do not want unnecessary frictions with the West and indiscreet tilt to revisionist powers (“Can Brazil become a major power in international politics? Lula’s questionable tilt to authoritarian powers”; Brasil Nippou; September 26, 2023). After all, we have to bear in mind that the fear of China is no reason for taking side with rightwing populists.

Among rightwing populist threats worldwide, the US presidential election is the most critical case. How can America stop Trump from being reelected? Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution warns of pro-Trump fervors among Republican voters. No Republican rivals are capable of destroying Trump’s rock-solid base in the primary as he mentions. More problematically, MAGA Republicans justify everything of Trump, including the January 6 riot and other criminal cases on legal charges. Much more absurdly, they blame Biden for their supposed failure in Ukraine, Israel, and Afghanistan, although it is actually Trump who is really responsible for those fiascos. Sane Republicans are completely sidelined, and the “adults in the room” of the last Trump administration are reluctant to denounce him in public (“A Trump dictatorship is increasingly inevitable. We should stop pretending.”; Washington Post; November 30, 2023). In order to stop Trump, Kagan comments that Republicans, notably Nikki Haley, should question his electability for his disdain to the constitutional democracy. But all the Republican rivals think nothing of denying Trump’s credential, as they stress partisan loyalty if he were nominated. Quite noticeably, the more Trump portrays himself a victim of persecution, the more infuriated his supporters are with American judicial system and elite as a whole. Therefore, it is risky for Republicans to provoke those MAGA voters. In view of this, Kagan urges veteran Republican politicians such as Mitt Romney, Liz Cheyney, Condoleezza Rice, and James Baker, and also, former cabinet members like Mike Pence and John Kelly to lead a nationwide campaign to defend democracy in America (“The Trump dictatorship: How to stop it”’ Washington Post; December 7, 2023). After all, the key to stopping Trump is the will of orthodox Republicans. They have already launched such movements like the Lincoln Project, the Republican Accountability project, Republicans for the Rule of Law. How will veteran politicians join them?

The key to curb rightwing populism is the resilience of democracy. Last October, Keio Center for Strategy hosted an online dialogue between Professor Yuichi Hosoya of Keio University and Professor Maiko Ichihara of Hitotsubashi University to explore security implication of democratic recession in the world. In the dialogue, both scholars focused extensively on the vulnerability of Western democracy to disinformation by revisionist powers. Currently advanced democracies in Europe and North America are plagued with the rise of populism, which typically appears in the form of anti-establishment outrage and anti-immigrant nativism. Most notably, MAGA Republicans misapply small government ideals to boost hate ideology and to attack such socio-economically and culturally deprived people. Those who feel themselves victimized by globalization applaud rightwing demagogues for tough and resolute postures. But such “I alone can fix it” approaches simply make the government dysfunctional and the nation unsecured as Harari argues.




In the dialogue, Ichihara explained how Russia and China seize those opportunities of disinformation to manipulate domestic politics in the West through effective use of digital technology. Both scholars agreed that democracies need countermeasures to defend themselves from enemy manipulation. Meanwhile, we have to notice that some democracies such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, are relatively successful in curbing rightwing populism. Particularly in Japan, people still trust the government, media, and established intellectuals, which deters dubious conspiracy theories from being propagated, as Hosoya mentioned.Also, I would call an attention to both Commonwealth dominions, as they are in the sphere of Anglo-American political culture, but not facing serious upsurge of demagogy. Can the three Pacific democracies show some hints of how to manage populism to the global community?