It is ironical. In the early 20th century, the West was overconfident to assume “white man’s burden”, which led to the zenith of imperial capitalism, and ultimately, the most devastating World Wars in history. But today, a reluctant and self denying West is responsible for global disorder. It is not just Obama’s superpower suicide. In Britain, the House of Commons rejected R2P action to Syria, which gave a blow to Cameron’s ideal of inheriting Blairite liberal interventionism. Also in Germany, people turn less willing to endorse European integration in view of the burden of helping financial crisis of Greece and Cyprus.
During the Cold War, a solid Transatlantic alliance was the anchor of the Free World. This helped American alliance spread across the Asia Pacific and the rest of the world. After the Cold War, NATO expanded their mission to Afghanistan, in order to manage globalized threats out of the Euro Atlantic sphere, typically Al Qaeda terrorism. But currently, both America and Europe are hesitant to use their hard power and soft power for global and regional public interest, and pursue their own recluse happiness. What happened with the West?
Both in the United States and Britain, people are tired of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Partisan politics and weak economy hurt their global policemanship. Autocracies like Russia and China, and terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda make use of such annoyance for their favor (“The weakened West”; Economist; September 21, 2013). The heir of Greco-Roman civilization and the creator of universal liberal norms is disposing the burden for global public interest.
Let me see country by country to explore why the West has become so reluctant to take leadership roles. First, I have to talk about the United States. In view of public hesitation to attack Syria, President Barack Obama remarked that the United States would not act as the world policeman on September 10 (“Team America no longer wants to be the World’s Police”; Washington Post; September 13, 2013). In an interview with France 24 TV on September 27, Xenia Dormandy, Senior Fellow at the Chatham House, commented that American military and economic power still overwhelm others, but the problem is how to use them and whether it sustains the will to use them for global interests. See the video below.
Despite the war wary atmosphere among the public, some American leaders are keenly aware of benefits of Pax Americana for the world and America itself. Senator Marco Rubio comments “History teaches us that a strong and engaged America is a source of good in the world. History also teaches us that the best way to preserve the peace is to have the military power to win any war. Our foreign policy should sustain and deepen our relationships with our allies, including those who are threatened because of their willingness to stand with America” (“Putin Is Wrong”; National Review Online; September 12, 2013). What Rubio mentioned here is the vital lesson of 9-11 terrorist attacks.
Then, I have to talk about Europe. At the World Economic Forum in 2008, Europeans questioned if Japan was a forgotten power on the global stage. However, I would like to remind them that their post imperial mindsets lower global public attention to Europe as well. For example, the media in Japan pay far more attention to South Korea than the EU and major European powers. Considering their political, economic, military, and cultural power, this is absurdly unbelievable. That is primarily because Europeans are too self-critical of assuming global responsibility, and become too inward-looking.
Even in Britain, that boasts a global power status through the special relationship with the United States, the House of Commons rejected intervention to Syria. Quite importantly, some Tory MPs such as Davis Davis, Crispin Blunt, and Julian Lewis voted against the Cameron administration for fear of an escalation of the war and confrontation with Russia (“Dozens of Conservative MPs defied David Cameron over Syria” Daily Telegraph; 30 August, 2013). Polly Toynbee, Columnist of the Guardian, comments that the decision at the Commons illustrates a farewell to Britain’s imperial legacy and Blair styled liberal interventionism (“No 10 curses, but Britain's illusion of empire is over”; Guardian; 29 August, 2013). But what is Britain that hesitates to police the world with America, detaches from the EU, and rejecting the imperial legacy?
Reclusive isolationism is on the rise in Germany as well. Despite the victory of Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union in the last election, its neo liberal coalition partner Free Democratic Party lost seats (“Early results give FDP 4.7 percent, short of representation in Bundestag”; Deutsche Welle; 22 September, 2013) for fear of the borderless economy across the globe and within Europe. Germans chose Merkel because they are content with relative stability and prosperity in a continent of debt crisis and youth unemployment coupled with resurgent nationalism (“Why Germans May Stick With Merkel’s Steady Hand”; Bloomberg News; September 21, 2013). German voters are not so much interested in greatness, strength, and regional obligations of their nation, judging from their self-defensive response to the Greek and Cypriot financial crisis. This is a problem, considering Germany’s historic contribution to European integration.
I shall never endorse “white man’s burden” idea in the old days, but in presentday context, Europeans should play more proactive roles to manage global problems, and they should not be forgotten. The fatal consequence of such a reclusive and self-indulged West is a growing assumption among challengers like Russia, China, and Islamic terrorists, that neither America nor Europe is capable of boasting their primacy. An understanding of “Western decline” provokes them to behave more assertively and defiantly to current global system. As a result, the clash between the West and the rest of the world will be intensified. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent contribution to the New York Times (“A Plea for Caution From Russia”; New York Times; September 11, 2013) is an apparent declaration against American, and more broadly, Western preeminence.
The chasm between the West and the rest will place intermediary nations like Japan, India, and Turkey in awkward positions. These non-Western democracies are regional powers closely associated with the West. Japan and Turkey are too well known for successful modernization through the Meiji Restoration and the Kemal Revolution. After the World War II, both nations are natural member of the Western alliance. On the other hand, India has been assuming itself a leader of the Third World. However, since the inauguration of the Singh administration, India has been deepening economic ties with the West. The War on Terror has made India's relations with the West ever closer.
In view of a reluctant West and aggressive challengers, should intermediary nations act independently? Remember the failure of detachment from the West by the Hatoyama administration of Japan and the Erdoğan administration of Turkey. Quite interestingly, both Hatoyama and Erdoğan thought emerging economies in their neighborhood were more prospective partners than the West. But Yukio Hatoyama’s initiatives for the East Asia Community stalled due to China’s autocratic and expansionist policy. So did Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutogul’s blueprint of “Turkey at the heart of the Afro-Eurasian sphere”, as Turkey failed to improve relations with Iran, Syria, and Iraq, and Islamic populist Morsi administration of Egypt was overthrown. Turkey realizes that NATO is the only reliable partner to manage the civil war in neighboring Syria, just as Hatoyama’s Japan learned the real meaning of US deterrence against Chinese threats. From this point, Japan’s former ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa was wrong to manage the Sino-Japanese diplomacy through the instinct based on his businessman background.
The West is predominant in capability of setting universal norms and founding a global regime, which is deep rooted since the Greco-Roman, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment era. Seemingly powerful, challengers simply defy the West, but not thinking of supplanting its global supremacy. Russians claim their preeminence in the Eurasian heartland, Chinese do in the Pacific area, and others do accordingly. What intermediary democracies like Japan and India, need to do is to explore how to share burdens with the West, rather than to detach from it. The failure of Istanbul’s bid for the Olympics symbolizes fatal consequence of Erdoğan’s “independent” foreign policy. Rather, proactive engagement by intermediary powers will bolster the confidence of the West to assume global responsibility, and this is more constructive than the Hatoyama- Erdoğan initiatives.
Monday, September 30, 2013
Sunday, September 15, 2013
Iraq is the Key to Resolving Unrests in Syria
When we talk of widespread unrest in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, we must not dismiss Iraq after US troop withdrawal in December 2011. The Obama administration failed to found a sound partnership with Iraq, which led to resurgence of Al Qaeda and growing sectarian violence there. Furthermore, worsening security in Iraq inflicts tremendous negative impacts on Syria. Sunni extremists from Iraq join the civil war, and Iran uses Iraqi air space to support the Assad administration. Moreover, Iraq experiences pose psychological constraints to R2P intervention in Syria. Therefore, it is necessary to assess security in Iraq after US withdrawal and its spill over effect in the neighborhood, including Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
To begin with, we must understand the overview of security in current Iraq. The public in the United States and the most of the world regards that the war in Iraq is over, but Senator John McCain endorses deep engagement with Iraq after December 2011. Retired General Jack Keane of the US Army and Director of the Critical Threat Project Frederick Kagan at the American Enterprise Institute, both of who are the architects of successful surge to defeat insurgents in Iraq, explored strategic implications of the unrest in Iraq along with Senator McCain. Let me mention their panel discussion at the AEI on March 19. See the video below.
In this panel, Senator John McCain, Retired General Jack Keane, and Director of the Critical Threat Project at AEI Frederick Kagan, assessed security in Iraq. The three panelists are top architects of the Iraq War and the surge to defeat insurgents, and they stress that Iraq policy must be beyond the partisan storm in a tea cup. While the public regards the war in Iraq is over after the withdrawal in December 2011, sectarian conflicts still continue there. In view of this, the three panelists argue that policymakers must learn lessons from Iraq and define the role of the united States.
For the lesson, we must understand that current turmoil in Iraq is a consequence of poor security coordination under the Obama administration. When the Bush administration signed the security pact with Iraq in 2008, the Maliki administration was ready to accommodate US 20,000 troops. However, quoting a comment by General Martin Dempsey, McCain said that the Obama administration “cascaded down” the troop level to 3,000, and such tiny scale was no worth for Iraq to maintain security. The problem is not just total pullout of US forces. The Los Angels Times reports poor contacts between Iraqi tribal leaders and US troops in the Gulf area allows the rise of sectarian violence and penetration of Iranian influence (“Ten years after Iraq war began, Iran reaps the gains”; Los Angels Times; March 28, 2013). The United States failed to show enduring will to defeat insurgents, and that has invigorated the enemy. Successful intelligence against the enemy is another lesson to be learnt from Iraq. Misinformation about Saddam’s nuclear weapons gives rise to psychological hesitation for active intervention, and helps widespread annoyance of war grow among the public.
As to the role of the United States, Keane pointed out that the Obama administration failed to respond to the Arab Spring, unlike in past historical cases like the collapse of the Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein’s invasion to Kuwait, undermines American leadership in the Middle East. Quite devastatingly, Iraq has become Al Qaeda’s new safe haven and Iran’s pathway to provide chemical weapons for Syria. Those weapons can be handed to extremists like Hezbollah from Assad. The spillover effect of Iraq so great that it is necessary to assess how much reliable Baghdad is as an ally of the United States.
The most critical issue to Iraq’s neighborhood is Iranian military aid to Syria through Iraqi air space. When Secretary of State John Kerry met Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to stop arms supply from Iran on March 24, he was simply frustrated because the Iraqi side was not so cooperative (“10 years after Saddam, is Iraq a U.S. ally?”; Foreign Policy—Passport; April 9, 2013). This is primarily due to insufficient armament and training of the Iraqi security forces. Former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker comments that the Obama administration’s precipitous pullout has ruined achievements made by the surge from 2007 to 2008, and Al Qaeda has come back to refound their bases in Iraq. Crocker says the clash in Hawija near Kirkuk on April 23 this year very illustrative, because Sunni protesters harbored insurgents against the security forces. Some Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq like Jabhat al-Nusra, send combatants to Syria to prevail extremist influence among the rebel (“Iraq on the brink, again”; Washington Post; May 1, 2013).
The number of casualties rose dramatically since then. Emma Sky, Political Advisor to General Ray Odierno of the US Army, says similarly “Driven by an imperative to end the war, the U.S. strategy for Iraq became lost in the transition as America disengaged rather than changing the basis of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship to a nonmilitary one,” in a commentary piece for the Center for a New American Security (“Iraq’s Sectarian Violence: Bombings Plunge Country Into Deadly Spiral”; Time; May 21, 2013). In July, the death toll number exceeded 1,000, which I the highest record since 2008 (“Over 1,000 Iraqis killed in July, highest monthly toll since 2008: U.N.”; Reuters; August 1, 2013). See the table below.
As Hezbollah does in Lebanon, a Shiite power broker Abu Mehdi Mohandis acts to help Iranian influence grow in Iraq. A proxy like him raises critical concerns among Iraqi politicians and Western diplomats (“Ten years after Iraq war began, Iran reaps the gains; Los Angels Times; March 28, 2013). For Iran, Syria has been the only consistent ally since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Most of the Iran’s Arab neighbors supported Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the Iran Iraq War, for fear of Shiite revolution expansionism. Iran gives military and financial aid to Syria, including chemical weapons program, because Iran needs an ally along with Hezbollah to resist the United States and Israel, according to Karim Sadjapour, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (“Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria”; Combatting Terrorism Center; august 27, 2013). Considering such indispensable strategic interest, there is every reason for Iran to conspire unrest in Iraq to maintain the passage for Syria.
A destabilized Iraq poses spillover effect to another big neighbor Saudi Arabia. Domestic sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites are brought to Saudi Arabia. Economic inequalities intensify Sunni-Shiite clashes in Saudi Arabia. Shiites reside in oil rich Gulf areas, rather than in urban areas like Riyadh and Jeddah. However, they are marginalized to live in mud brick houses, while oil companies earn petro-dollars. Quite alarmingly, Shiites are more loyal to their religious leaders than to the state of their citizenship (“Iraq conflict reignites sectarian rivalry in Saudi Arabia”; Baltimore Sun; April 27, 2013). This implies that insecurity in Iraq can prevail throughout the region, and the rise of extremist populism as seen in Egypt can augment the crisis furthermore. The Geostrategic importance of Iraq must be understood from historical perspectives. Abbasid caliph al Mansur moved the capital to Bagdad in 762 to expand the sphere to Iran and the Mediterranean area, while maintaining contacts with the Arabian Peninsula.
In order to improve security in Iraq, Former Ambassador Crocker suggests that the United States strengthen the leverage on Iraq through providing training and armaments to the Iraqi security forces, and facilitate secretarial level communications based on the Strategic Framework Agreement between both countries. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari visited Washington mid August in view of the worst death toll record since 2008 in July, and said “There is greater realization in the Iraq government that we should not shy away from coming and asking for some help and assistance”. He is critically concerned that Sunni terrorists from Iraq join the rebel to fight against Allawite Assad regime (“Iraq seeks help from U.S. amid growing violence”; Military Times; August 16, 2013).
The experience in Iraq has made the global public reluctant to intervene Syria. In an interview with BBC, Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair comments that the Commons vote against the attack to Syria gave a blow to the alliance with the United States and R2P mission in the face of mass murder with chemical weapons by the Assad regime. Unlike Iraq, the use of chemical weapon is apparent in the case of Syria. Therefore, Blair focuses on the problem of extremist participation as he talks about psychological hurdles for intervention (“Tony Blair: Iraq War made UK 'hesitant' over Syria intervention”; BBC News; 6 September 2013). Actually, war opponents in the US Republican Party are extremely concerned that Obama’s attack against Assad will help extremists rather than pro-Western freedom fighters. The rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt startled conservative citizens in the West as Morsi enacted the Sharia law.
Regarding the Iraq effect on Syria, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfovitz also says the use of chemical weapons is apparent in Anderson Cooper 360 of CNN on September 4. He advocated that America act in accordance with the Reagan Doctrine to assist those who are fighting for the American side, and help their endeavor by arming them. Wolfovitz says that “boots on the ground” is not necessary in Syria, in reply to war annoying public opinion. Quite importantly, he said that the United States should have responded to Saddam’s repression against the Kurds shortly after his loss in the Gulf War. This is a critical point to think of the moral case for American interventionism. See the above video.
When we talk of the risk of intervention in global crises, we must also consider the risk of non -intervention. Obama’s disengagement policy in Iraq worsens the civil war in Syria and political transition in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. Considering the geostrategic position, stability in Iraq is the key to the war in Syria, democracy promotion after the Arab Spring, and American preeminence in the Middle East. Furthermore, comprehensive Middle East strategy is necessary, rather than acting on stopgap and country specific basis.
To begin with, we must understand the overview of security in current Iraq. The public in the United States and the most of the world regards that the war in Iraq is over, but Senator John McCain endorses deep engagement with Iraq after December 2011. Retired General Jack Keane of the US Army and Director of the Critical Threat Project Frederick Kagan at the American Enterprise Institute, both of who are the architects of successful surge to defeat insurgents in Iraq, explored strategic implications of the unrest in Iraq along with Senator McCain. Let me mention their panel discussion at the AEI on March 19. See the video below.
In this panel, Senator John McCain, Retired General Jack Keane, and Director of the Critical Threat Project at AEI Frederick Kagan, assessed security in Iraq. The three panelists are top architects of the Iraq War and the surge to defeat insurgents, and they stress that Iraq policy must be beyond the partisan storm in a tea cup. While the public regards the war in Iraq is over after the withdrawal in December 2011, sectarian conflicts still continue there. In view of this, the three panelists argue that policymakers must learn lessons from Iraq and define the role of the united States.
For the lesson, we must understand that current turmoil in Iraq is a consequence of poor security coordination under the Obama administration. When the Bush administration signed the security pact with Iraq in 2008, the Maliki administration was ready to accommodate US 20,000 troops. However, quoting a comment by General Martin Dempsey, McCain said that the Obama administration “cascaded down” the troop level to 3,000, and such tiny scale was no worth for Iraq to maintain security. The problem is not just total pullout of US forces. The Los Angels Times reports poor contacts between Iraqi tribal leaders and US troops in the Gulf area allows the rise of sectarian violence and penetration of Iranian influence (“Ten years after Iraq war began, Iran reaps the gains”; Los Angels Times; March 28, 2013). The United States failed to show enduring will to defeat insurgents, and that has invigorated the enemy. Successful intelligence against the enemy is another lesson to be learnt from Iraq. Misinformation about Saddam’s nuclear weapons gives rise to psychological hesitation for active intervention, and helps widespread annoyance of war grow among the public.
As to the role of the United States, Keane pointed out that the Obama administration failed to respond to the Arab Spring, unlike in past historical cases like the collapse of the Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein’s invasion to Kuwait, undermines American leadership in the Middle East. Quite devastatingly, Iraq has become Al Qaeda’s new safe haven and Iran’s pathway to provide chemical weapons for Syria. Those weapons can be handed to extremists like Hezbollah from Assad. The spillover effect of Iraq so great that it is necessary to assess how much reliable Baghdad is as an ally of the United States.
The most critical issue to Iraq’s neighborhood is Iranian military aid to Syria through Iraqi air space. When Secretary of State John Kerry met Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to stop arms supply from Iran on March 24, he was simply frustrated because the Iraqi side was not so cooperative (“10 years after Saddam, is Iraq a U.S. ally?”; Foreign Policy—Passport; April 9, 2013). This is primarily due to insufficient armament and training of the Iraqi security forces. Former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker comments that the Obama administration’s precipitous pullout has ruined achievements made by the surge from 2007 to 2008, and Al Qaeda has come back to refound their bases in Iraq. Crocker says the clash in Hawija near Kirkuk on April 23 this year very illustrative, because Sunni protesters harbored insurgents against the security forces. Some Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq like Jabhat al-Nusra, send combatants to Syria to prevail extremist influence among the rebel (“Iraq on the brink, again”; Washington Post; May 1, 2013).
The number of casualties rose dramatically since then. Emma Sky, Political Advisor to General Ray Odierno of the US Army, says similarly “Driven by an imperative to end the war, the U.S. strategy for Iraq became lost in the transition as America disengaged rather than changing the basis of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship to a nonmilitary one,” in a commentary piece for the Center for a New American Security (“Iraq’s Sectarian Violence: Bombings Plunge Country Into Deadly Spiral”; Time; May 21, 2013). In July, the death toll number exceeded 1,000, which I the highest record since 2008 (“Over 1,000 Iraqis killed in July, highest monthly toll since 2008: U.N.”; Reuters; August 1, 2013). See the table below.
As Hezbollah does in Lebanon, a Shiite power broker Abu Mehdi Mohandis acts to help Iranian influence grow in Iraq. A proxy like him raises critical concerns among Iraqi politicians and Western diplomats (“Ten years after Iraq war began, Iran reaps the gains; Los Angels Times; March 28, 2013). For Iran, Syria has been the only consistent ally since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Most of the Iran’s Arab neighbors supported Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the Iran Iraq War, for fear of Shiite revolution expansionism. Iran gives military and financial aid to Syria, including chemical weapons program, because Iran needs an ally along with Hezbollah to resist the United States and Israel, according to Karim Sadjapour, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (“Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria”; Combatting Terrorism Center; august 27, 2013). Considering such indispensable strategic interest, there is every reason for Iran to conspire unrest in Iraq to maintain the passage for Syria.
A destabilized Iraq poses spillover effect to another big neighbor Saudi Arabia. Domestic sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites are brought to Saudi Arabia. Economic inequalities intensify Sunni-Shiite clashes in Saudi Arabia. Shiites reside in oil rich Gulf areas, rather than in urban areas like Riyadh and Jeddah. However, they are marginalized to live in mud brick houses, while oil companies earn petro-dollars. Quite alarmingly, Shiites are more loyal to their religious leaders than to the state of their citizenship (“Iraq conflict reignites sectarian rivalry in Saudi Arabia”; Baltimore Sun; April 27, 2013). This implies that insecurity in Iraq can prevail throughout the region, and the rise of extremist populism as seen in Egypt can augment the crisis furthermore. The Geostrategic importance of Iraq must be understood from historical perspectives. Abbasid caliph al Mansur moved the capital to Bagdad in 762 to expand the sphere to Iran and the Mediterranean area, while maintaining contacts with the Arabian Peninsula.
In order to improve security in Iraq, Former Ambassador Crocker suggests that the United States strengthen the leverage on Iraq through providing training and armaments to the Iraqi security forces, and facilitate secretarial level communications based on the Strategic Framework Agreement between both countries. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari visited Washington mid August in view of the worst death toll record since 2008 in July, and said “There is greater realization in the Iraq government that we should not shy away from coming and asking for some help and assistance”. He is critically concerned that Sunni terrorists from Iraq join the rebel to fight against Allawite Assad regime (“Iraq seeks help from U.S. amid growing violence”; Military Times; August 16, 2013).
The experience in Iraq has made the global public reluctant to intervene Syria. In an interview with BBC, Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair comments that the Commons vote against the attack to Syria gave a blow to the alliance with the United States and R2P mission in the face of mass murder with chemical weapons by the Assad regime. Unlike Iraq, the use of chemical weapon is apparent in the case of Syria. Therefore, Blair focuses on the problem of extremist participation as he talks about psychological hurdles for intervention (“Tony Blair: Iraq War made UK 'hesitant' over Syria intervention”; BBC News; 6 September 2013). Actually, war opponents in the US Republican Party are extremely concerned that Obama’s attack against Assad will help extremists rather than pro-Western freedom fighters. The rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt startled conservative citizens in the West as Morsi enacted the Sharia law.
Regarding the Iraq effect on Syria, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfovitz also says the use of chemical weapons is apparent in Anderson Cooper 360 of CNN on September 4. He advocated that America act in accordance with the Reagan Doctrine to assist those who are fighting for the American side, and help their endeavor by arming them. Wolfovitz says that “boots on the ground” is not necessary in Syria, in reply to war annoying public opinion. Quite importantly, he said that the United States should have responded to Saddam’s repression against the Kurds shortly after his loss in the Gulf War. This is a critical point to think of the moral case for American interventionism. See the above video.
When we talk of the risk of intervention in global crises, we must also consider the risk of non -intervention. Obama’s disengagement policy in Iraq worsens the civil war in Syria and political transition in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. Considering the geostrategic position, stability in Iraq is the key to the war in Syria, democracy promotion after the Arab Spring, and American preeminence in the Middle East. Furthermore, comprehensive Middle East strategy is necessary, rather than acting on stopgap and country specific basis.
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