Despite critical importance as I mentioned
above, Afghanistan
was not a key agenda during the presidential election. Ahmad Majidyar, Senior
Research Associate at the American Enterprise Institute, points out the following
reasons. The election focused on the economy, and this is reflected in current
congressional conflict on the fiscal cliff. In addition, American voters were
fed up with costs and casualties associated with the long war. Both Barack
Obama and Mitt Romney may not have talked on Afghan issue for such reasons, but that does not
erode US security interests in the Af-Pak region. In face of massive withdrawal
of coalition troops in 2014, Taliban and Al Qaeda are reinvigorated. In order
to curb the threats of insurgents, Barack Obama and Hamid Karzai reached the
security partnership agreement in May to keep some military presence along the
Af-Pak border and train counterterrorism troops of Afghanistan
(“Reasons behind Obama and Romney's silence over Afghanistan”; BBC Persian; 6November, 2012). NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said that
2014 Afghan presidential election will be a turning point for Afghan security (“OpeningRemarks”; NATO Speeches and Transcripts; 12 November, 2012).
The war in Afghanistan
is winnable, and the United
States needs to overcome domestic annoyance.
However, strategic adjustment is necessary. Let me talk about current situation
in Afghanistan .
Ahmed Rashid, author of a famous book “Taliban”, comments that pessimism
prevails among Afghan watchers around the world, but troops on the ground do
not necessarily agree with them. One example is a comment by US Marine Major
General Mark Gurganus, the regional commander for southwestern Afghanistan , saying, "We are still a
province at war, but look at the progress that has been made in Helmand Province over the past three
years." The Times editorial argues furthermore, "The Taliban has not
retaken territory lost to coalition forces" (“We're Winning in Afghanistan”;Foreign Policy; October 24, 2012). However, drastic reduction of the troops will
ruin such achievements. Afghan warlords like Ismail Khan of Herat are arming up
for self defense, for fear of security vacuum after Western troop pull out (“AfghanWarlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials”; New York Times; November 12, 2012).
Two questions need to be answered to manage
Afghanistan
after 2014. First, how many troops should stay there continually? Second, what
kind of qualitative changes are required in American approaches to Afghanistan ?
But to answer the above questions, it is essential to understand why the US troops should remain there, despite domestic
annoyance with the long war and Obama’s interest in Asia rather tan the Middle East . American strategists recommend a recent
article by Kimberly and Frederick Kagan that articulates the reason for
continual US military presence
in Afghanistan .
The Kagans argue that sufficient troop
level must be maintained in order to avoid terrorist attacks like what happened
in Benghazi , Libya . Also, it is US presence in Afghanistan
that facilitates counterterrorism operations in Pakistan . Terrorist bases in South
Asia are concentrated along the Af-Pak border area such as the Federally
Administered Tribal Area in Pakistan ,
and Konar and Nuristan provinces in Afghanistan . If the United States
were to fight against terrorists in such remote areas without ground bases, the following three would be considered: armed drone planes,
parachute airborne, and manned aircrafts. The former two have problems with
outreach and safe return. The third option of jet planes flies too fast to
identify the target. Advanced technologies are no substitute for frontline
ground bases. Furthermore, ground bases must be protected from unexpected
attacks. Therefore, the Kagans insist that the United States maintain 30,000 soldiers
for there objectives. They argue that defeatism and “light footprint” strategy
will embolden terrorists, which will lead to more serious catastrophes for US
national security (“Why U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan”; Washington Post;November 24, 2012). Furthermore, Max Boot, Senior Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, points out that helicopter operations will require aerial refueling
without sufficient ground bases. That poses considerable constraints on the
mission (“Steep U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan brings substantialrisks”; Washington Post; December 24, 2012).
The Kagans' opinion wins trans-ideological
support, and Washington Post editorial board questions why US troop level under
Obama’s plan falls short of the Kagan recommendation (“A U.S. future inAfghanistan?”; Washington Post: December 2, 2012). We must consider political
aspects, in addition to military strategy. The United
States plans to expand diplomatic missions to Kandahar , Jalalabad and
Mazar-i-Sharif. Obama’s plan to cut troop level in Afghanistan drastically is
contradictory to such policy objectives. Also, Obama’s troop cut makes it
increasingly difficult to persuade European allies to keep sufficient presence.
The problem is, Karzai wants less foreign armed forces to stay in Afghanistan , despite fragile security (“U.S. force in Afghanistan may be smaller thanexpected after 2014”; Los Angels Times; December 11, 2012).
Mutual distrust between Karzai and the West
must be resolved. While the coalition forces attacked innocent civilians by
mistake, the Karzai administration fails to improve governance in Afghanistan . Ransom
imprisonment happens frequently, drug and natural resource trafficking prevails,
and government officials monopolize development business through nepotism. As a
result, people discredit the government. In view of these problems, Sarah Chayes
and Frederic Grare of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues
that the quality of the Afghan National Security Forces counts much more than
the quantity. In addition, they raise critical concerns with Pakistan ’s dark
connections with Afghan terrorists. For fear of encirclement by India , Pakistan ’s Inter-Service
Intelligence (ISI) helps Afghan insurgents to prevent the Indo-Afghan partnership.
Considering deleterious impacts of ISI activities, Chayes and Grare even
insists on imposing sanctions on Pakistan for terrorist sponsorship (“AvoidingCatastrophic Failure in Afghanistan”; Global Ten Challenges and Opportunitiesfor the President 2013—Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; November 29,2012). Quite ironically, ISI’s ties with terrorists harm Pakistani security. The Taliban
in Pakistan
frequently kill Shiites, and 90 people were wounded and 5 were murdered by
their bomb attack in Dera Ismail Khan on the Ashura holiday, which is a crucial
ceremony for Shiites (“Pakistani Taliban claim responsibility for bomb attackon Shia procession”; Guardian; 25 November 2012).
As security responsibility will be handed
over to Kabul completely in 2014, the global community
needs to refocus on Afghanistan .
In addition to political and military involvement as mentioned above, much
broader regional framework expanding to Central Asia
and the Indian subcontinent must be found. Mishandling of Afghan security after
2014 will ruin achievements that America and European allies have
made. Furthermore, it will shatter American strategy both in Asia and the Middle East .
Further link: NATO and Afghanistan
Further link: NATO and Afghanistan